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i 
Abstract  
I n this thesis I  exam ine how the scient ific advisory system in England and 
Wales has responded to concerns about  the r isks of pest icide residues in 
food and demands for wider engagement  in the formulat ion of advice.  
Specifically,  I  explore how the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP)  
frames scient ific uncertaint ies in r isk assessment , and why some bodies 
outside and within government  are cr it ical of the ACP’s approach that  is 
cent red in the convent ional single-chem ical, high-dose- response 
paradigm of toxicology. Although some of these challenges date back to 
the early history of pest icide regulat ion in England and Wales, the 
emergence of scient ific research employing different  methods to assess 
the effects of chem ical m ixtures and chronic low- level exposure has 
st imulated new concerns about  the r isks posed by pest icide residues for 
human health.  
 
Using sem i-st ructured interviews and documentary analysis, a key finding 
is that  concerns about  low- level exposure to chem ical m ixtures have been 
persistent ly bracketed in official advice as insufficient  for changing current  
advice and regulat ion. Drawing from literature in science and technology 
studies, I  account  for this finding in three ways. First , it  is perceived that  
change is unnecessary since established methods of pest icide r isk 
assessment  represent  an exemplar for other domains. Secondly, evidence 
select ion by the ACP and related commit tees is shaped by regulatory 
guidelines which aim  to provide standardisat ion and quality assurance, 
but  also const rain judgements about  which risk assessment  studies are 
considered adm issible. Thirdly, fundamentally different  not ions are at  play 
ii 
in terms of what  const itutes legit imate expert ise and who should embody 
it ,  leading to tensions within government  as well as between the ACP and 
NGOs. These lim it  the impact  of post -BSE at tempts to make the role of 
scient ific advice in policy-making more part icipatory and ‘evidence-based’,  
and the capacity to int roduce new paradigms of chem ical r isk assessment  
in the pest icide advisory process.   
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1 
Chapter 1 : I nt roduct ion 
1 .1  I nt roduct ion 
This thesis considers how uncertainty is addressed in the r isk assessment  
and advisory process in England and Wales for pest icides, specifically 
potent ial r isks associated with the consumpt ion of pest icide residues in 
food. Recent ly, previous assumpt ions made by both scient ists and 
regulators that  exposure to low- levels of chem ical m ixtures are 
unproblemat ic to human health are being challenged, with scient ific 
research beginning to suggest  that  interact ions at  low- levels may cause 
toxicological effects (Colborn et  al. ,  1993;  Henschler  et  al. ,  1996;  
Rajapakse et  al. , 2002;  Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 
2003;  Sheehan, 2006;  Christ iansen et  al. ,  2009) . Consumer advice from 
the Food Standards Agency regarding pest icide residues is clear in stat ing 
that  the current  assessment  system is adequate in protect ing the public’s 
health and that :  “ the r isk to people’s health from  m ixtures of residues is 
likely to be sm all”  (Food Standards Agency, 2004b) . However, such 
advice has been challenged as the concern surrounding chronic exposure 
to low- levels and exposure to m ixtures or ‘cocktails’ of chem icals, and 
pest icides in part icular, has grown among Brit ish NGOs (Friends of the 
Earth, 2004b;  Pest icide Act ion Network, 2004;  Women's Environmental 
Network, 2004;  WWF-UK, 2004) , as well as policy-makers at  the 
European level (European Commission, 2004a) . This thesis will explore 
how the r isk assessment  system, cent red around the Advisory Commit tee 
for Pest icides (ACP) , has dealt  with these challenges. 
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As in other UK scient ific advisory areas, the pest icide advisory system can 
be characterised as being in a state of flux, a system that  is st ill 
responding to changes inst igated in the m id-90s by the most  prom inent  
of all UK food safety cr ises involving the r isk of t ransm ission of bovine 
spongiform  encephalopathy (BSE)  to humans. The cont roversy 
surrounding BSE became a catalyst  for change in the formal organisat ion 
of UK scient ific advice, as the t radit ional closed style of advisory decision-
making that  had previously been praised for it s capacity to negot iate 
mandates for environmental protect ion in some areas (Jasanoff, 1986;  
Vogel, 1986;  Jasanoff, 1990) , was seriously quest ioned by both the public 
and the then newly appointed Labour Government . I n a widely cited 
report , the House of Lords Select  Commit tee on Science and Technology 
(2000)  spoke of a cr isis in the relat ionship between science and society, 
while the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion (1998)  called for 
greater awareness of the role of value judgements in the set t ing of 
environmental standards. The former Chief Scient ific Adviser, Sir Robert  
May int roduced guidelines for greater t ransparency in the scient ific 
advisory process (Office of Science and Technology, 1997)  and the UK 
Government  began to advocate a widening of part icipat ion to include not  
only alternat ive sources of scient if ic and technical expert ise but  also lay 
representat ives (The St rategy Unit , 2002) . Government  departments 
were also given guidelines to follow the tenets of ‘evidence-based policy’.  
 
Thus, in addit ion to the long standing demands of both the agrochem ical 
indust ry and farm ing unions to relax pest icide related regulat ions, and the 
requirement  to comply with internat ional standards, such as those 
imposed by the World Trade Organisat ion and European harmonisat ion, 
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there are now two addit ional and dist inct  pressures on pest icide r isk 
assessment :  first  from  other scient ific, public and governmental concerns 
surrounding the need to consider realist ic scenarios of low- level chem ical 
exposure to mult iple pest icide residues and second, from the new 
demands for wider part icipat ion in the r isk assessment  process. This 
thesis therefore seeks to explore how the scient ific advisory system in 
England and Wales has responded to concerns about  the r isks of pest icide 
residues in food and demands for wider engagement  in the formulat ion of 
advice through addressing the following research aim :  
 
How are the twin challenges posed by changes in the organisat ion of the 
Brit ish advisory system  and by em erging scient ific uncertaint ies in 
chem ical r isk assessment  m anaged in the case of r isk assessm ent  of 
pest icide residues in food, and to what  effect? 
 
I n order to elaborate the context  for these challenges, in the next  part  of 
this chapter (1.21)  I  provide an overview of the chem ical r isk assessment  
process, moving on in Sect ion 1.22 to discuss the challenges posed in the 
assessment  and management  of chem ical m ixtures. I n Sect ion 1.23 I  
consider why pest icide residues are a good case study to explore how 
these challenges have been managed in pract ice. 
 
I n Sect ion 1.3 I  discuss the wider changes to the UK scient ific advisory 
system and how this may affect  pest icide assessment  pract ices. Last ly, in 
Sect ions 1.4 and 1.5 I  present  my research quest ions and provide an 
overview of the layout  and chapter st ructure of the thesis.  
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1 .2  Research rat ionale  
Humans and the environment  are cont inuously exposed to a wide range 
of indust r ial chem icals. While there are over one hundred thousand 
chem icals registered on the European market , fewer than five percent  of 
these have been subject  to “posit ive approval”  for use in specific products 
(Defra, 2005) . The remaining ninety- five percent  are allowed to be freely 
used unless they are specifically regulated on the basis of toxicological 
evidence that  ident ifies them as toxic, carcinogenic or mutagenic. As a 
result ,  many of these chem icals have either never been tested or been 
subject  to only lim ited scient ific invest igat ion;  their long- term  effects on 
human health and the environment  is therefore unclear and at  present  
difficult  to determ ine.  
 
Current ly, European regulatory guideline values for many non-
carcinogenic1
                                                 
1
 Chem icals are typically assessed different ly depending on their capacity 
to induce cancer, with non-carcinogenic chem icals typically working within 
a scient ific model that  is grounded in the concept  of threshold doses, 
where exposure to levels of chem icals below the threshold is seen as 
acceptable. For those chem icals that  are recognised as carcinogenic, and 
more specifically as genotoxic carcinogens, all exposure is seen as 
potent ially r isky, i.e., there is no safe dose. This is discussed further in 
Chapter Three. 
 chem icals – including pest icides -  are derived from data 
obtained through toxicological assessment  that  is grounded in the concept  
of dose response modelling. The Food Standards Agency (FSA)  states that  
these studies are “based on internat ionally accepted guidelines”  and that  
they “establish what  scient ists agree is an acceptable dose to humans, 
usually based on a ‘no observed adverse effect  level’ (NOAEL)  in animals”  
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(Food Standards Agency, 2004b) . Typically, chem icals are assessed in 
isolat ion with tests focusing on a “single media, single source and single 
toxic endpoint ”  ( I PCS, 2001) . Although this t ight ly bounded approach to 
assessment  may from an outsider’s perspect ive be viewed as somewhat  
reduct ive in its scope, the process of assessing r isk from single chem ical 
substances is historically well established and believed among the 
regulatory and toxicology community to be generally reliable and robust ;  
other chemical related r isks such as those created from exposure to 
chem ical m ixtures are in cont rast  recognised by these communit ies as 
less well researched, often being characterised by a high degree of 
uncertainty (Colborn et  al. ,  1993;  van Zorge, 1996;  De Rosa et  al.,  1998;  
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 2003;  Weinhold, 2003;  
Wharfe et  al. ,  2004) . This has led many groups including scient ists, 
campaigners, policy-m akers and advisory bodies to call for greater use of 
integrated approaches that  consider realist ic mult i- chem ical, mult i- route 
exposure scenarios ( I PCS, 2001;  Pest icide Act ion Network, 2002;  Friends 
of the Earth, 2004b) .  
 
1 .2 1  Chem ical r isk  assessm ent  fram ew ork 
As the terms r isk and r isk assessment  are used in different  ways, I  will 
f irst  clar ify the official meaning of “ r isk assessment ”  as it  is used in the 
scient ific literature. The convent ional r isk assessment  paradigm consists 
of four parts -  hazard ident ificat ion, hazard characterisat ion, exposure 
assessment  and r isk characterisat ion – where Defra describe a hazard as:  
“any situat ion that  in part icular circumstances could lead to harm” , and 
r isks as “a combinat ion of the probabilit y of occurrence of a defined 
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hazard and magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence”  (Defra, 
2000) . A schemat ic illust rat ion taken from Defra’s Guidelines for 
Environmental Risk Assessment  and Management  is shown in Figure One. 
 
Figure 1 : A Fram ew ork for  Risk Assessm ent  and Managem ent  
( Defra , 2 0 0 0 )  
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Figure one highlights the iterat ive nature of the r isk assessment  process 
and suggests that  r isk assessment  and r isk management  are seen by 
Defra as separate act ivit ies. Throughout  the chem ical r isk assessment  
process a variety of experimental act ivit ies will occur. During stage one -  
hazard ident ificat ion -  the inherent  capacity of a chem ical to cause one or 
more adverse effects will be ident if ied. This ident ificat ion is followed by a 
process of hazard characterisat ion. During this stage there will be a sem i-
quant itat ive evaluat ion of the chemical in quest ion that  will include factors 
such as dose response and toxic potency. The toxicity of a chem ical is 
usually determ ined using a combinat ion of the following three methods;  
epidem iology, in vivo and in vit ro methods.  
 
The third stage -  exposure assessment  -  may be descr ibed as the sem i-
quant itat ive evaluat ion of the likely exposure of man and/ or the 
environment  to a chem ical (Anon, 2002 b) . I t  is used to qualify the level 
of chem icals to which humans and the environment  are exposed with 
regards to the magnitude, durat ion and frequency (Risk Assessment  and 
Toxicology Steering Commit tee, 1999) . Assessment  of exposure is an 
important  part  of the r isk assessment  process as it  is only through 
exposure that  a chem ical changes from being defined as hazardous into a 
r isk.  
 
The final stage of the r isk assessment  process is that  of r isk 
characterisat ion. As r isk characterisat ion is based on the informat ion that  
has been obtained during the process of r isk assessment , it  is crucial that  
all relevant  informat ion regarding the possibilit ies of toxic effect  and route 
of exposure be considered and the r ight  quest ions asked.  
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While many scient ists and regulators would argue that  the r isk 
assessment  process as shown in Figure One is robust  enough to cope with 
new findings and new methodological developments, it  is also increasingly 
acknowledged within these communit ies that  variabilit y and uncertainty 
enter the assessment  process at  every stage (van Veen et  al. ,  2001) . 
Therefore, while r isk assessment  is frequent ly port rayed in the science 
and regulatory literature as being founded in scient ific pr inciples it  is in 
reality a combinat ion of science and expert  judgement , a situat ion that  is 
recognised by many within the r isk analysis community (Kraus et  al. ,  
1992) . 
 
The growing awareness on the part  of regulators and government  of the 
underlying assumpt ions that  are present  in the assessment  process and 
an acknowledgement  of the lim itat ions of current  methods have led to a 
call from  some in these communit ies for an assessment  process that  is 
based on more realist ic exposure scenarios ( I PCS, 2001;  European 
Commission, 2004a) . 
 
1 .2 2  Concern surrounding exposure to low - levels 
and chem ical m ixtures 
A growing area of concern that  has been highlighted by scient ists and 
act ivists is the study and regulat ion of chem ical m ixtures. Although it  is 
widely acknowledged that  humans are cont inuously exposed to chem icals 
occurr ing in combinat ion, at  a variety of concent rat ions and through 
different  routes of exposure (van Zorge, 1996) , many scient ists and 
regulators have largely believed that  due to the typically low 
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concent rat ions of chem icals individually present  their impact  on human 
health would be negligible. However, these assumpt ions that  suggest  
exposure to low- levels of chemicals and exposure to m ixtures is 
unproblemat ic are being challenged within the scient ific literature 
(Henschler  et  al. ,  1996;  De Rosa et  al. ,  1998) , with research beginning to 
indicate that  synergist ic interact ions i.e. interact ions that  have an effect  
greater than simple addit ion, may be more prevalent  than first  assumed 
(Rajapakse et  al. , 2002;  Christ iansen et  al. ,  2009) . 
 
While there is increasing concern, especially among environmental health 
act ivists,  that  exposure to low- levels and m ixtures of chem icals may lead 
to illness such as Mult iple Chemical Sensit iv ity Syndrome (MCSS) and 
Chronic Fat igue Syndrome (Bell et  al. ,  1999) , such diseases have been 
difficult  to characterise and have been contested within the medical 
sphere, often being described as ‘invisible’ (Barret t ,  1997;  Dum it , 2006) . 
I ndeed, the ambiguity in their aet iology has led many physicians to 
believe them to be symptomat ic of psychiat r ic illness or even a physical 
react ion to childhood sexual abuse (Schot tenfeld, 1987) . Addit ionally, it  is 
noted by Ashford and Miller (1998)  that  chemical related illnesses appear 
to disproport ionately affect  women, leading some advocacy groups to 
suggest  that  the lack of will to adequately invest igate these illnesses is 
symptomat ic of a system influenced by pat r iarchy, where women’s health 
problems are marginalised or ignored 2
 
.    
Campaign groups have taken the reluctance of regulators to address 
these concerns as a challenge and have direct ly quest ioned medical and 
                                                 
2
 See the Women’s Environmental Network (www.wen.org.uk) . 
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scient ific opinion through the campaigning for and undertaking of new 
environmental health research. Such efforts have included Community-
Based Part icipat ion Research (O' Fallon and Dearry, 2002) , the inst igat ion 
of quant itat ive health r isk assessments at  community level (Elliot t  et  al. , 
1999)  and the inclusion of environmental groups in the set t ing of nat ional 
environmental health research (O' Fallon et  al. ,  2003) . However, many 
campaign groups alongside scient ists such as van Zorge (1996)  and Feron 
et  al. (2002)  argue that  the only way forward in the debate over the 
effects of exposure to chem icals is an overhaul of t radit ional chem ical r isk 
assessment  methods. 
 
This thinking appears to have begun to filter through at  a European level,  
as can be seen in the recent  “European Environment  and Health St rategy”  
(European Commission, 2004a) , and increasingly to the UK r isk 
assessment  community, where there has been a visible increase in 
discussions surrounding the issue of chem ical m ixtures at  a government  
advisory level. For example, in a recent  report  that  specifically considered 
the r isk assessment  of pest icide m ixtures, the Commit tee on Toxicity 
(COT) , a government  funded advisory group, that  works independent ly of 
the Food Standards Agency, acknowledged the complexity involved in the 
study of m ixtures stat ing that  it  is often difficult  to determ ine the 
potent ial toxic effects that  may occur as a result  of exposure. However, 
the COT concludes that  in its opinion there is not  a singular suitable 
approach for the r isk assessment  of chem ical m ixtures;  rather specific 
problems will require individual solut ions.  
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1 .2 3  Pest icide exposure 
A group of chem icals that  embodies all the challenges faced in r isk 
assessment  is pest icides. A pest icide may be considered as any substance 
or m ixture of substances intended for prevent ing, dest roying, or 
cont rolling any pest  that  could harm  food, human health or the 
environment  (FAO, 1986) . Although pest icides are released into the 
environment  with the specific aim  of harm ing or killing their target  
organism, it  has been recognised that  in many cases the effects are not  
lim ited to the target  species but  can result  in adverse health effects in 
humans (Weisenburger, 1993;  Colborn, 2006) .  
 
I n this sense, the case of pest icides and the r isk associated with their use 
is somewhat  paradoxical. Scient ific progress and the r ise in intensive and 
mono-agricultural have seen a growth in both the development  and use of 
pest icides, so that  their applicat ion has become normalised and rout ine 
within Western European agriculture. The widespread use of pest icides is 
seen to have benefited society through increasing product ion levels and 
providing a level of food security within Europe that  was not  present  pr ior 
to World War I I .  However, despite their commercial applicat ion over the 
past  sixty years there remain uncertaint ies and r isk surrounding their use 
and their effects on human health and the environment . I t  was for this 
reason that  I  chose pest icides, and more specifically pest icide residues3
                                                 
3
 I n the regulatory context  food does not  include water, which is regulated 
on a separate basis. Residues are the t races of pest icides that  are found 
within the food chain as a result  of pest icidal substances remaining on or 
within crops following their harvest  and storage. 
, 
as a means to understand how changes in the Br it ish scient ific advisory 
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system and challenges posed by emerging scient ific uncertaint ies are 
managed in the r isk assessment  process.  
 
Pest icides are a large chem ical group with a diverse range of applicat ions, 
as such their assessment  and regulat ion falls across a variety of 
regulatory domains. The manner in which they are polit ically organised 
has therefore dictated which aspects of pest icide assessment  and 
regulat ion are considered within this thesis. As this thesis is pr imarily 
concerned with the assessment  and management  of pest icides found on 
or within food I  will only be discussing pest icides that  are classed as 
chem ical substances as found in Part  A of Annex I I  of the Direct ive 
91/ 414/ EEC. I  will therefore not  be discussing act ive substances 
consist ing of m icro-organisms, which includes viruses, as found in Part  B 
of Annex I I  of the Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC4
 
.  I  will also only be discussing 
those pest icides that  are assessed using dose response data to determ ine 
threshold effects and are therefore not  deemed carcinogenic.  
Within England and Wales the r isk assessment  of pest icides is conducted 
within the Pest icide Safety Directorate (PSD)  through the Advisory 
Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) . However, due to the wide ranging 
applicat ion of pest icides, there are now several agencies within England 
and the UK that  work within the area of pest icide regulat ion and r isk 
communicat ion, each of whom have a different  rem it  and agenda. For 
example, the Pest icide Residues Commit tee (PRC)  is responsible for 
nat ional surveillance program mes and crop sampling procedures 
                                                 
4
 Please refer to the Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC for further details (Office for 
Official Publicat ions of the European Communit ies, 1991) . 
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(Pest icide Residues Commit tee, 2009) , whereas, the Food Standards 
Agency (FSA)  is responsible for providing public advice surrounding 
exposure to pest icides within food. 
 
As with chem icals more generally, a key area of concern with regards to 
uncertainty in the assessment  of pest icides is the possible human health 
effects that  may result  due to exposure to m ult iple pest icides. There are 
current ly over 350 approved act ive pest icide substances for use on food 
animals and crops in the UK alone (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b) . I t  is 
therefore possible that  consumers can be exposed to mult iple pest icide 
substances or residues in any one meal or even through the consumpt ion 
of a single piece of produce;  a recent  survey conducted by the US 
Department  of Agriculture found that  73%  of convent ionally grown fruit  
and vegetables5
 
 were found to have at  least  one pest icide residue 
present , with apples more likely to contain four or more residues than 
three or less (Baker  et  al. ,  2002) . Therefore, in any one meal an 
individual is likely to be exposed to a m ixture of pest icide residues, as 
opposed to one single substance.  
While the major ity of exposures are expected by regulators to be at  or 
below the legally acceptable reference dose, concerns have been 
expressed in the scient ific literature that  sim ilar ly to other chemicals 
pest icides when present  in a m ixture may act  in an addit ive or synergist ic 
manner (Lydy  et  al. , 2004;  Moser  et  al.,  2005) . While the possibilit y of 
synergism  is a recognised toxicological concern when humans are 
                                                 
5
 Over 90 000 retailing units of twenty types of fruit  and vegetables were 
analysed for pest icide residues over the course of a decade.  
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exposed to mult iple chem icals, it  is most  commonly expected to occur 
where exposure levels are relat ively high. However, the recent  report  on 
the r isk assessment  of m ixtures of pest icides by the Commit tee on 
Toxicity for the Food Standards Agency suggests that  exist ing research 
that  has focussed on the interact ion effects at  high doses may be 
unsuitable for use in the r isk assessment  of exposure to the lower levels 
that  the public are likely to be exposed to on a regular basis e.g. through 
the consumpt ion of mult iple pest icide residues:  
 
The type of combined act ion or interact ion found at  clearly 
toxic levels may not  predict  what  will happen at  non- toxic 
levels, including levels only slight ly lower than the lowest  
observed adverse effect  level (LOAELs) . (Commit tee on 
Toxicity, 2002b, p.7)  
 
However, despite a growing body of scient ific and advisory literature 
suggest ing that  exposure to m ixtures of low- levels may be problem at ic 
the consumpt ion of mult iple residues and the potent ial for interact ion is 
not  rout inely addressed by the standard single substance assessment  
approach favoured by the UK’s pest icide assessment  commit tee, the 
Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) . This gap was recent ly 
highlighted in the report  by the Working Group on the Risk Assessment  of 
Mixtures of Pest icides (WiGRAMP) which acknowledged that  “ there is a 
concern that  the regulatory system for pest icides found in foods does not  
rout inely address the toxic effects of different  substances in combinat ion”  
(Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b, p. 5) .   
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Addit ionally, in those instances where policies for assessing r isk from 
m ixtures are in place it  has been suggested by some scient ists that  there 
is likely to be a high degree of uncertainty (van Zorge, 1996;  Wharfe et  
al.,  2004) . This may in part  be due to the amount  of t ime and research 
that  has historically been spent  invest igat ing such r isks;  compared to the 
research invest igat ing the adverse effects of single substances, exposure 
to chem ical m ixtures has received only marginal at tent ion 
 
I n the UK, despite an historical reluctance to invest igate the potent ial 
effects of exposure to m ixtures of pest icides, there has been a move 
towards considering this type of exposure in regulatory circles, both at  a 
nat ional and European level. For example, in 2000 the FSA set  up the 
Working Group on the Risk Assessment  of Mixtures of Pest icides 
(WiGRAMP) which published a report  of it s assessment  in 2002 
(Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b) . Since publicat ion this report  has become 
a key document  that  is used by the FSA to issue consumer advice 
regarding exposure to m ixtures through the consumpt ion of pest icide 
residues in food. The cent ral finding of the report  was that  the r isk posed 
by exposure to m ixtures is likely to be small.  However, this finding has 
subsequent ly been crit icised for failing to give due weight  to the 
uncertainty involved in assessing these r isks.  
 
A key concern raised by many public interest  groups (Friends of the 
Earth, 2004a;  Pest icide Act ion Network, 2004)  regarding pest icide 
residues is the exposure faced by children;  they eat  more food per body 
weight  than adults, including a higher proport ion of fruit  and vegetables 
(Lawrie, 1998) . As such, dietary intake represents a major source of 
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pest icides in this age group (Nat ional Research Council,  1993) . However, 
the FSA (2004b)  draws upon the WiGRAMP report  to st ress that  children, 
pregnant  and breast feeding women are unlikely to be more affected by 
exposures to m ixtures than others, a finding that  has since been 
contested (Pest icide Act ion Network, 2004) . I n relat ion to disputes over 
the effects of exposure to m ixtures of pest icides all groups involved 
purport  to have a scient ific basis for their claims. However, it  is apparent  
that  different  judgements have been made not  only regarding the efficacy 
and ut ilit y of current  assessment  techniques but  also in how evidence has 
been understood and applied to formulate r isk management  decisions and 
advice. I t  is therefore important  to understand the basis of such 
judgements. 
 
Within this sect ion I  have highlighted that  although there are formal r isk 
assessment  procedures in place to assess chem ical and in part icular 
pest icide r isk, there remain concerns surrounding the effects of chronic 
exposure to low- levels and m ixtures, areas that  are not  rout inely 
addressed within the current  pest icide r isk assessment  pract ices, which 
focus on the assessment  of single chem icals. However, despite these 
concerns, the Food Standards Agency has advised that  the r isks posed by 
exposure are likely to be small,  a conclusion that  has been widely 
challenged. I n the following sect ion I  provide an overview of the Brit ish 
scient ific advisory system and how it  has changed since the m id-1990s. 
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1 .3  The UK scient ific advisory system  in flux 
Since the m id-1990s it  is possible to characterise the Brit ish advisory 
system as one that  is in flux, a system that  is st ill,  ten years on, 
responding to the cr isis in food safety management  and the science-
society relat ionship sparked by bovine spongiform  encephalopathy (BSE) . 
 
On the 20 th of March 1996 the Brit ish Government  acknowledged that  the 
ten new cases of variant  Creutzfeldt -Jakob disease (vCJD)  were likely to 
be at t r ibutable to the consumpt ion of cat t le infected by bovine spongiform  
encephalopathy (BSE)  (Jasanoff, 1997a) . Although there had been 
previous occurrences of CJD in Britain, the link between the new variant  
(vCJD)  and the consumpt ion of infected beef had been persistent ly down 
played by the UK Government . Since the late 1980s, the UK Government  
and its science advisors had repeatedly advised the public that  beef was 
safe to eat , port raying the UK policy on BSE as being based on ‘sound’ 
science (Rothstein, 2003) . However, subsequent  STS analysis has 
revealed that  the select ion and interpretat ion of evidence used by the 
advisory experts was heavily shaped by the policy context  in which it  was 
created (Jasanoff, 1997a;  Millstone, 2007) , leading to the proposit ion that  
the failure of BSE policy was not  accidental. I nstead, it  could be 
considered a result  of longstanding inadequacies in the UK’s approach to 
r isk policy-making that  resulted in both a cr isis of legit imat ion and 
substance (van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2005) . For example, the 
Phillips Report  that  was charged with invest igat ing the BSE crisis 
suggested that  the failures in BSE policy were primarily a consequence of 
inst itut ional failures of communicat ion, whereby regulatory rest r ict ions on 
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human and cat t le consumpt ion were int roduced and enforced both too 
late and too ineffect ively (Phillips, 2000) . However, others, part icularly 
those in the STS community, have argued that  the science itself was and 
remains uncertain and incomplete, with the effect  that  policy which 
purported to be able to cont rol r isk was seen as unconvincing by the 
public (van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2005) .  
 
On a wider scale, Rothstein (2003)  has suggested that  there were three 
ident ifiable inst itut ional problems within the UK’s food policy regim e prior 
to the BSE crisis of 1996:  first , the regime was underm ined by the conflict  
of interest  within the Minist ry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food’s (MAFF) , 
which was simultaneously responsible for both food safety and 
agricultural business;  secondly, that  MAFF had poor working relat ions 
with other branches of the UK Government , most  notably the Department  
for Health, with the effect  that  they were not  sufficient ly joined up in their  
r isk assessment  pract ices and r isk advice;  thirdly, that  there was 
insufficient  t ransparency in decision-making processes, which when 
combined with regulatory failures encouraged public dist rust  in MAFF and 
UK food safety policy more widely.   
 
I n this sense, BSE starkly highlighted these shortcom ings and acted as 
the catalyst  for wider recognit ion of the need for change in the 
management  of scient ific uncertainty and r isk in the UK. I n 1997 in the 
wake of BSE, Robert  May, the then Government ’s Chief Scient ific Adviser, 
produced guidelines on the “Use of Scient ific Advice in Policy Making”  
(Office of Science and Technology, 1997) . Within these guidelines May 
st ressed that  there should be a move away from the confident ial culture 
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within Whitehall and it s agencies to a culture that  promotes t ransparency 
within policy-making. This was stated as cr it ical in situat ions where advice 
is uncertain or divided, so that  the public are kept  fully informed from the 
start  of disagreements, and are bet ter equipped to cope with shifts to the 
scient ific consensus and changes to the surrounding policies (Science and 
Technology Select  Commit tee, 2000) . I n the same year the James Report  
(James, 1997)  was published, which was direct ly responsible for the 
establishment  of the Food Standards Agency (FSA)  and its three golden 
principles:  independence;  put t ing the consumer first ;  and being open and 
accessible to the wider public.  
 
I n 1999, following the elect ion of Labour, the White Paper “Modernising 
Government ”  (The Cabinet  Office, 1999)  was published. The paper 
suggested that  the policy process must  be one of cont inuous learning and 
improvement , where policy-makers should be willing to “quest ion 
inherited ways of doing things”  and to make bet ter use of evidence and 
research, focussing on policies that  deliver long- term  goals ( ibid, Chap. 
2) . Such sent iments help illust rate the degree to which the cont roversy 
surrounding BSE became the impetus for change within the UK scient ific 
advisory system. The most  notable areas of change were in the call for 
greater t ransparency and the use of evidence-based policy, a term  that  
suggests r isk policy and advice is both object ive and grounded in clear 
empir ical research (The Cabinet  Office, 2001;  The St rategy Unit , 2002, 
pp.79-80) . Addit ionally, reports such as “Risk and Uncertainty”  (The 
St rategy Unit , 2002)  indicate that  there is a move within government  to 
extend the boundaries of who can part icipate in policy debates through 
wider public or stakeholder engagement . Pet ts and Leach (2000)  
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document  that  in 1998 the UK Cabinet  Office emphasised to cent ral 
government  and departments that  consultat ion between stakeholder 
groups can lead to an increasingly realist ic policy that  is “bet ter at  
reflect ing peoples needs and wishes” . Sim ilar ly, the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollut ion (1998) , in part  drawing on STS literature 
surrounding the study of regulatory science and part icipat ion in 
environmental and r isk decision-making, st ressed in its document  
“Set t ing Environmental Standards”  that  government  departments should 
adopt  methods in environmental decision-making that  account  for values 
and lay knowledge, as well as technical or scient ific expert ise;  a posit ion 
that  although increasingly democrat ic, creates new challenges and 
tensions surrounding the epistem ic value of alternat ive form s of 
engagement  and knowledge. The view expressed by the Royal 
Commission was formally art iculated by The House of Lords Select  
Commit tee on Science and Technology who recommended in its 2000 
“Science and Society Report ”  that :  
 
Direct  dialogue with the public should move from being an 
opt ional add-on to science-based policy making … and should 
become a normal and integral part  of the process (House of 
Lords Select  Commit tee on Science and Technology, 2000) .      
 
I ndeed, recent  sociological and STS literature suggests that  increasingly, 
science-based policy-making that  does not  involve part icipat ion by both 
experts and stakeholders, which may include the public, is being seen as 
not  only ineffect ive but  illegit im ate (Buckeley and Mol, 2003;  I rwin, 
2006) . However, relat ively lit t le work has been undertaken on how these 
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wider percept ions have actually affected the conduct  of scient ific r isk 
assessment  in specific areas of environmental regulat ion. Taken together 
with the challenges already described that  have been posed from within 
the chem ical r isk assessment  community itself,  these changes form  the 
backdrop to my invest igat ion. 
 
1 .4  Research quest ions 
The aim  of this thesis is to cr it ically evaluate how the twin challenges 
posed by changes in the organisat ion of the Brit ish scient ific advisory 
system and by emerging scient ific uncertaint ies in chem ical r isk 
assessment  are managed in the case of r isk assessment  of pest icide 
residues in food, and to what  effect . To undertake this, four research 
quest ions are considered:  
 
1)  How have the potent ial r isks of pest icides been historically assessed 
and regulated in England and Wales since their f irst  commercial use in 
the m id- twent ieth century? 
2)  How are the potent ial r isks of pest icide residues in food assessed in 
the current  advisory system for regulat ion? Why has this system been 
challenged? 
3)  How do different  advisory bodies use scient ific studies of r isk 
assessment  to produce advice on the r isks of pest icides and pest icide 
residues? 
4)  How are compet ing claims for scient ific expert ise and for lay 
involvement  in r isk assessment  being handled in the case of pest icide 
residues?  
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1 .5  Thesis layout  
The thesis is divided into eight  chapters. This first  chapter provides an 
int roduct ion to the thesis, set t ing out  why pest icide residues have been 
chosen as a case study. 
 
I n Chapter Two I  review exist ing work in the fields of environmental 
sociology and STS to explore the relat ionships between science, expert ise 
and advisory decision-making and how the concept  of regulatory science 
can be used to understand scient ific decision-making. I n the first  part  of 
the chapter I  focus on UK food safety policy. I n suggest ing that  policy 
problems are socially negot iated, I  draw on exist ing literature to consider 
who it  is that  is allowed to part icipate in r isk discussions, and the 
importance of expert ise in obtaining authority in decision-making 
exercises. I t  is within this sect ion that  the role and expert ise of NGOs is 
explored and it  is highlighted that  NGO staff are frequent ly scient ifically 
t rained, with the effect  that  their presence within advisory commit tees is 
somewhat  ambiguous. I n the third sect ion, I  cr it ically exam ine the 
relat ionship between scient ific facts and value judgements and explore 
how scient ific uncertainty can be understood. Last ly, I  discuss the subject  
of regulatory science and highlight  the complex nature of science policy 
and the difficult ies faced by advisors and policy-makers under condit ions 
of scient ific uncertainty. 
 
I n Chapter Three I  provide a detailed overview of the methods used 
within this research -  documentary analysis and interviews. Specifically, I  
discuss issues surrounding sampling and access, ethics and the difficult ies 
in interviewing elites and obtaining grey literature. Last ly, I  discuss how 
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the collected data have been analysed using a themat ic approach that  has 
drawn on the concept  of fram ing and boundary work.  
 
I n Chapter Four, using documentary evidence, I  explore the first  research 
quest ion:  How have the potent ial r isks of pest icides been historically 
assessed and regulated in England and Wales since their first  commercial 
use in the m id- twent ieth century? I  aim  to understand how historical 
decisions, such as the decision to classify pest icides as separate to other 
food and environmental contam inants and the decisions to maintain 
voluntary agreements unt il the m id 1980s, have shaped pest icide 
assessment  and regulat ion as we understand it  today. I  suggest  that  
despite significant  technical and scient ific advances, the fundamental 
quest ions that  are being asked about  the r isks of exposure to pest icides 
through food have not  significant ly altered since the first  review by Lord 
Zuckerman in 1953.  
 
I n Chapter Five I  step behind the regulat ions to explore the toxicological 
science on which pest icide reference doses, and hence r isk advice, is 
derived, and explore the challenges and uncertainty present  in the r isk 
assessment  of pest icides as conceptualised by those working in this field. 
Using a combinat ion of documentary evidence and interview data I  
answer the second research quest ion:  How are the potent ial r isks of 
pest icide residues in food are assessed in the current  advisory system for 
regulat ion and how has this system been challenged by those outside of 
the official process, such as NGOs? 
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I n Chapter Six I  move on to the stage following r isk assessment  to 
highlight  how inst itut ional pract ices can act  not  only as frames and 
boundary objects that  help establish which areas of r isk are seen as 
important , but  can also determ ine which evidence is acceptable for use in 
providing advice. Using three case studies – advice surrounding exposure 
to pest icide m ixtures, advice surrounding the peeling of fruit  and 
vegetables, and advice surrounding crop spraying and bystander 
exposure – I  exam ine the emerging tensions found between the official 
advisory system for pest icide regulat ion, as typified by the Advisory 
Commit tee on Pest icides, and other government  bodies involved in 
assessing r isk and providing advice, with specific reference to how these 
conflicts have been managed. I n doing so I  look to answer the third 
research quest ion:  How do advisory bodies use scient ific studies of r isk 
assessment  to produce advice on the r isks of pest icides and pest icide 
residues? 
 
I n Chapter Seven, I  seek to answer the final research quest ion:  How are 
compet ing claims for scient ific expert ise and for lay involvement  in r isk 
assessment  being handled in the case of pest icide residues? Having 
previously illust rated that  the product ion of r isk advice can lead to 
tensions not  only between government  bodies and NGOs but  also 
between different  bodies within government , I  explore the factors that  
underlie these differences;  percept ions of expert ise, t rust  and epistem ic 
authority. The chapter is div ided into four sect ions:  first , I  consider what  
it  means to be the ‘r ight ’ k ind of expert ;  secondly, I  discuss barr iers to 
groupthink;  thirdly, I  explore what  happens when experts disagree;  
25 
fourthly, I  consider the effects of widening part icipat ion in advisory 
commit tees to include lay members. 
 
Finally, Chapter Eight  draws the discussions from each preceding chapter 
together to consider how the evidence presented within the thesis 
answers the overall research quest ion. Following this I  consider the wider 
policy implicat ions of this research and how it  could be extended in the 
future.  
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Chapter 2 : Regulatory Science and 
Expert ise in Science- Based Policy- Making 
2 .1  I nt roduct ion 
I n the previous chapter, I  highlighted that  the scient ific advisory system 
involved in pest icide r isk assessment  has come under pressure:  first  from  
other scient ific, public and governmental concerns surrounding the need 
to consider realist ic scenarios of low- level chem ical exposure to mult iple 
pest icide residues, and second, from the new demands for wider 
part icipat ion in the risk assessment  process. These pressures have 
created a set  of uncertaint ies, the management  of which serves as the 
subject  of this thesis.  
 
I n this chapter, I  survey literature from Science and Technology Studies 
(STS)  and allied fields that  provide a way of conceptualising and further 
exploring the nature and management  of uncertainty in areas where 
scient ific knowledge plays a dom inant  role. The literature discussed is not  
definit ive but  has been selected for it s relevance to the research 
quest ions posed in this thesis. The decision to ground my thesis in the 
field of STS was deliberate. Although the research quest ions specifically 
relate to pest icide residues as found in food, the underlying issues are 
essent ially socio-scient ific, concerning regulatory science, the t reatment  
of scient ific uncertainty and indeterm inacy, and the interface between 
science and policy in r isk assessment  and r isk management . All of these 
themes have been crit ically discussed in detail within the field of STS, 
although not  always in relat ion to pest icides and very rarely in relat ion to 
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the r isk assessment  of chem ical m ixtures and more specifically m ixtures 
of pest icides. I n this sense I  aim  to use the literature (discussed in this 
chapter)  as a working framework with which to understand and situate 
my own research. I n doing so I  should be able to highlight  sim ilar it ies and 
divergences between my empir ical research and that  which has gone 
before. Ult imately, in complet ing this thesis I  will be able to extend the 
understanding found in the exist ing STS literature to the r isk assessment  
of pest icide m ixtures and hence add to the exist ing body of knowledge. 
 
Although this thesis is pr imarily concerned with decision-making 
processes at  the intermediate level of scient ific r isk assessment  for 
regulat ion, rather than at  the ‘higher’ level of decision-making at  
bureaucrat ic or polit ical levels, it  is important  to understand why these 
formally separate funct ions may become blurred in pract ice and why 
science becomes polit icised. For this reason, the chapter begins with a 
brief overview of the literature on areas of science-based policy-making 
(Jasanoff, 1986;  van Zwanenberg, 1996;  Jasanoff, 1997a;  Sarewitz, 
2004;  van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2005)  where uncertainty and 
cont roversy around scient ific evidence have been common features. 
I ndeed, the debate around r isks of pest icide residues in food m irrors 
these features with several actors quest ioning the scient ific basis of 
policies that  legit im ise the use of pest icides, thereby drawing the 
ostensibly neut ral r isk assessment  process into public scrut iny. The STS 
literature helps us understand such developments by highlight ing the 
ways in which the scient ific knowledge used to just ify policy decisions is 
shaped by a number of tacit  assumpt ions, pract ical const raints and value 
judgements. 
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The general overview of STS concepts in 2.2 is followed by a review of 
recent  developments in Brit ish policy around environmental and health 
r isk, and the role of scient ific evidence. This helps to place the current  
cont roversy around r isks of pest icide residues in the context  of previous 
studies of cont roversies involving pest icide r isk assessment  and the wider 
cr it ique that  has been emerging over the t radit ionally closed and 
commercially focussed system of decision-making for food safety. The 
role of scient ific r isk assessment  has come to be seen as part  of this 
closed, indust ry- favoured system rather than as a correct ive to it .   
 
These crit icisms have cont r ibuted to calls for wider engagement  -  sect ion 
2.3 reviews literature suggest ing further complexit ies and ambiguit ies in 
how this engagement  agenda is conceived. The nature of expert ise itself 
has been opened up in recent  work, so that  the original not ion of “ lay 
expert ise”  seems to be insufficient  in capturing the diversity of knowledge 
and skills that  those labelled as ‘lay’ often appear to possess. The 
ambiguous role of NGOs at  the interface between scient ific experts and 
the ‘lay’ public is also out lined here. NGOs often rely on their use of 
science to gain authority in areas of scient ific decision-making, however, 
in doing so the value judgements embedded in the science often remain 
concealed. This suggests that  more at tent ion must  be paid to how 
scient ific r isk assessment  is it self conducted.  
 
The final sect ion 2.4 reviews literature on the product ion of scient ific 
knowledge in the context  of regulat ion. The assessment  of r isk from 
exposure to pest icide residues can be described as an area of “ regulatory 
science”  (Weinberg, 1972;  Ashford et  al. ,  1983;  Jasanoff, 1990;  Harr is et  
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al. ,  2001) ;  where “ regulatory science”  is used to describe the blurred area 
between science and policy, where quest ions may be asked of science but  
cannot  be fully answered through its applicat ion. Key quest ions of interest  
that  are covered within this sect ion are therefore:  1)  how boundaries are 
drawn between what  is scient ific and what  is outside of science, and 2)  
how is uncertainty in r isk assessment  understood and represented. 
 
2 .2  Risk advice in the UK  
I n Chapter One, the area of pest icide r isk assessment  was shown to be 
content ious, an area where the scient ific data are frequent ly challenged 
by those outside of the advisory process. Pest icide r isk assessment  is 
therefore an example of a science-based cont roversy, sim ilar to others 
that  have been extensively invest igated within the field of STS – see for 
example, debates surrounding power plants (Nelkin, 1975) , fluoridat ion 
(Mart in and Richards, 1995) , BSE (Jasanoff, 1997a) , and clim ate change 
(Sarewitz, 2004) . 
 
At  first  glance, it  is somewhat  surprising that  the area of pest icide r isk 
assessment  should be viewed as cont roversial as it  is one where decisions 
are purportedly science-based, and hence could be considered as being 
grounded in object ive evidence obtained through a neut ral process. 
However, previous research in the area of science-based policy-making 
(Jasanoff, 1986;  Wynne, 1992;  I rwin et  al. ,  1997;  Jasanoff, 1997a;  
Sarewitz, 2004;  van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2005)  has quest ioned 
this image of value-neut ral science, highlight ing how social, polit ical and 
pragmat ic factors can influence the creat ion and assessment  of scient ific 
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knowledge for regulatory purposes. These influences mean that  scient ific 
data, such as those used in pest icide r isk assessment , and science-based 
advice that  is developed on the basis of these data can no longer be 
considered as simple representat ions of nature. I nstead, they are seen as 
socially negot iated and containing a number of value judgements that  
may or may not  be explicit ly recognised and understood. Addit ionally, 
some authors such as Sarewitz (2004)  and Jam ieson (1992)  suggest  that  
cont roversy exists only when it  is accompanied by a conflict  in values and 
interests. This is key in the area of pest icide r isk assessment  where there 
are opposing views, regarding not  only what  level of pest icide exposure 
can be deemed acceptable, but  whether the use of pest icides can ever by 
just ifiable. I n this sense, it  is unsurprising that  pest icide r isk assessment  
is characterised by uncertainty and cont roversy.  
 
A common method of managing the challenges posed by uncertaint ies in 
the evidence is to actually reinforce the role of scient ific expert ise and 
argue that  only experts are capable of understanding and resolving them. 
However, this too provides challenges and can often lead to greater 
cont roversy as it  is often unclear who it  is that  possesses the necessary 
expert ise. I ndeed, even looking within science for expert ise presents 
challenges;  science itself is not  an homogenous ent ity but  is divided into a 
mult itude of disciplines each having its own ethos and value systems 
(Collingr idge and Reeve, 1986) . Each discipline is therefore only likely to 
best  understand those parts and processes that  fall into their rem it . As 
such, experts are likely to understand the area different ly and use 
different  cr iter ia to assess the validity of evidence.  
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These themes will be explored further in this chapter and throughout  this 
thesis. I n the following sect ion, I  will begin by considering developments 
in the Brit ish scient ific advisory system which, at  first  sight , suggest  that  
the not ion of scient ific advice as socially shaped is gaining wider credence 
and producing significant  changes in how advice is organised and 
represented.  
 
2 .2 1  Scient ific advisory pract ices 
Recent  developments in Brit ish science advice are part ly grounded in a 
wider movement  promoted by the Labour Government  for rethinking the 
philosophy of making public policy. A major White Paper ent it led 
“Modernising Government ”  (The Cabinet  Office, 1999)  defined policy-
making as the process by which governments t ranslate their polit ical 
vision into programmes and act ions to deliver 'outcomes' or desired 
changes in the real world. To achieve this goal the paper suggested that  
the policy-making process must  be one of cont inuous learning and 
improvement , an open process where policy-makers should be willing to 
“quest ion inherited ways of doing things”  and to make bet ter use of 
evidence and research, focussing on policies that  deliver long- term  goals 
( ibid, Chap. 2) . Sim ilar ly, in a report  on “Risk and Uncertainty”  (The 
St rategy Unit , 2002) , the then Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote that  a 
prior ity for policy-makers must  be to bet ter manage r isks and so m inim ise 
the likelihood of expensive cr ises such as that  presented by bovine 
spongiform  encephalopathy (BSE) .  
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The BSE crisis is widely acknowledged in science policy literature as a 
catalyst  for at tempts to change ent renched procedures in the 
management  of scient ific uncertainty and food r isk in the UK, and hence 
UK food safety policy. I n 1997 in the wake of BSE, Robert  May, the then 
Government ’s Chief Scient ific Adviser, produced guidelines on the “Use of 
Scient ific Advice in Policy Making” . Within these guidelines May st ressed 
that  there should be a move away from the confident ial culture within 
Whitehall and its agencies to a culture that  promotes t ransparency within 
policy-making. This was stated as cr it ical in situat ions where advice is 
uncertain or divided, so that  the public are kept  fully informed from  the 
start  of disagreements, and are bet ter equipped to cope with shifts to the 
scient ific consensus and changes to the surrounding policies  (Science and 
Technology Select  Commit tee, 2000) . I n the same year the James Report  
(James, 1997)  was published, which was direct ly responsible for the 
establishment  of the Food Standards Agency (FSA)  and its three golden 
principles:  independence;  put t ing the consumer first ;  and being open and 
accessible to the wider public.  
 
Following BSE, government  r isk advice has become associated with 
evidence-based decision-making (The Cabinet  Office, 2001;  The St rategy 
Unit , 2002, pp.79-80) . However, there are key tensions in how the 
concept  is understood. The use of phrases such as “evidence-based 
decision-making”  suggests that  previous policy decisions were made in 
the absence of evidence or an evidence-based framework. However, I  will 
show in the following chapters that  this is a m isleading proposit ion for 
pest icides, where decisions have historically been grounded in scient ific 
evidence-based r isk assessment , albeit  to varying degrees and under 
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different  polit ical frameworks. I n the context  of pest icide residues, 
evidence-based policy-making is therefore not  a new concept ;  rather it  
appears to represent  a commitment  on behalf of the UK Government  to 
ensure that  the process of decision-making is t ransparent , accountable 
and engaging.  
 
The appeal for openness marks a clear rhetorical shift  away from the 
model of decision-making that  dom inated UK agrochem ical policy and 
food safety policy more generally between the 1960s to m id-1990s, a 
model which Jasanoff (1997a, p.228)  has previously described as 
operat ing within an environment  that  was “closed, cooperat ive, informal 
and consensual” . Here, policy decisions surrounding r isks associated with 
agrochem icals have been shown to have been made on the advice of a 
small number of scient ific experts, often affiliated to the indust r ies being 
regulated (Gillespie et  al. ,  1979;  Jasanoff, 1986;  van Zwanenberg, 1996;  
Jasanoff, 1997a;  Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002) . This situat ion led 
many to suggest  that  the advisory system used to create policy did not  
always favour the consumer (Jasanoff, 1997a;  Millstone et  al. , 2000) . 
 
However, while this advisory environment  has been crit icised, it  has also 
been praised. For example, pr ior to the public out rage over BSE, Jasanoff 
(1986)  had argued that  in comparison to the adversarial advisory system 
of the US, the closed Brit ish style system offered a number of 
advantages:  namely that  use of a closed system dom inated by experts 
can reduce technical cont roversy and make government  decision-making 
and r isk management  more efficient . However, she ( ibid)  also recognised 
the negat ive aspects of this approach – a lack of public engagement  and 
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cont rol over polit ical and value choices and undue influence of indust ry – 
all of which were highlighted as problemat ic in the wake of BSE. I n 
part icular, it  has been argued by several social and STS researchers 
(Millstone et  al.,  2000;  Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002;  Rothstein, 
2003)  that  this closed environment  enabled policy-makers to both conceal 
uncertainty surrounding decisions from the public and place responsibilit y 
for decisions surrounding issues of food r isk on the scient ific advisors 
through present ing food safety decisions as being based on “ sound 
science” ;  a phrase that  is rarely defined (Michaels and Monforton, 2005) . 
 
The appeal to sound science can be seen as a method of lim it ing polit ical 
disputes through present ing decisions as being based on facts that  cannot  
rat ionally be opposed (Collingr idge and Reeve, 1986;  Nelkin, 1992) . 
However, as more scient ific evidence is generated, the number of polit ical 
disputes can actually increase, as the science can be variously interpreted 
and used to support  a variety of polit ical arguments and r isk management  
approaches, all of which can be presented as being based on “sound 
science”  (Collingr idge and Reeve, 1986;  Sarewitz, 2004;  Krimsky, 2005) . 
The reliance on sound science within government , as a means of 
legit im ising policy decisions, can also be used as a means for inact ion;  if 
there is seen to be an absence of sound science then there is just ificat ion 
not  to regulate areas where evidence of environmental harm  or r isk to 
health remains uncertain. This type of use of science to avoid regulat ion 
has been widely cr it icised by those promot ing approaches enshrined in 
the Precaut ionary Principle, which is described by the European 
Commission as a principle that :  
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[ The precaut ionary principle]  may be invoked where urgent  
measures are needed in the face of a possible danger to 
human, animal or plant  health, or to protect  the environment  
where scient ific data do not  perm it  a complete evaluat ion of 
the r isk. I t  may not  be used as a pretext  for protect ionist  
measures. (Europa, 2005)  
 
These tensions surrounding the proper interpretat ion of uncertainty in 
scient ific evidence have been shown to be prevalent  in the history of UK 
pest icide regulat ion, where advisory bodies such as the Advisory 
Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP)  have been shown to be reluctant  to act  
upon scient ific evidence that  does not  explicit ly show a causal link 
between exposure and effect  (Gillespie et  al. ,  1979;  Jasanoff, 1986;  
I rwin, 1995;  van Zwanenberg, 1996) ;  hence a lack of evidence can be 
presented as a lack of sound science. 
 
Addit ionally, previous studies on the scient ific advisory system 
surrounding the r isk assessment  of pest icides in the UK that  have 
considered the role and rem it  of the ACP, such as that  conducted by 
Gillespie et  al.  (1979) , I rwin (1995)  and van Zwanenberg (1996)  have 
shown that  there is a reluctance within these commit tees to consider 
evidence alternat ive to that  provided by indust ry and regulatory sources, 
and that  there is an over reliance on certain types of formal expert ise, 
namely toxicological. Both these factors may compound the situat ion 
described above as they may further lim it  what  scient ific evidence is 
considered as acceptable or ‘sound’. 
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I t  is frequent ly argued within STS that  the monopolisat ion of policy-
making by those considered as expert  may lead to a narrow definit ion of 
the problem, which in turn will affect  any likely solut ion (Jasanoff, 2000;  
Millstone, 2007) . Consequent ly, the exclusion of non-experts in decision-
making exercises may result  in the proposal of solut ions that  are 
unsat isfactory to those on the outside of the process. To address this 
problem, theories such as Beck’s reflexive scient isat ion (Beck, 1992)  
advocate a de-monopolising and democrat isat ion of science to allow wider 
part icipat ion in r isk decisions. Through such involvement  stakeholders 
such as campaign and public interest  groups could become co-producers 
in the const ruct ion of knowledge (Hajer, 1995;  Bäckst rand, 2004;  
Jasanoff, 2004) . 
 
I f one accepts that  to a greater or lesser extent  policy problems m ay be 
socially const ructed and that  the nature of problems may differ depending 
on who is involved in their const ruct ion then it  is cr it ical to establish 
which actors have been involved in the policy process. I n the following 
sect ion I  exam ine who has t radit ionally been allowed to part icipate in 
science-based policy-making and on what  basis. I  begin by considering 
why wider engagement  m ight  be desirable and then explore how experts 
and non-experts have t radit ionally been different iated. Last ly, I  consider 
NGOs and where they are posit ioned in terms of expert ise.  
 
2 .3  A case for  w ider engagem ent?  
The issue of wider, and in part icular greater public and lay part icipat ion in 
science-based policy-making has been extensively considered and 
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discussed within the STS literature (as will be illust rated in this sect ion) , 
and it  has been argued within STS (Cohen and Galusky, 2010)  that  the 
increased public visibilit y of this literature has been influent ial in 
encouraging a more discursive and crit ical appraisal of government  and 
regulatory decision-making processes by both those within and outside of 
government . For example, the use of STS literature in documents such as 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion’s “Set t ing 
Environmental Standards”  report  (RCEP, 1998) , which draws heavily on 
STS literature to highlight  the underlying assumpt ions found in r isk 
assessment  and perceived benefits of adopt ing a more t ransparent  and 
part icipatory assessment  framework, suggests that  the STS literature in 
this area is now being used by some advisory bodies and government  
departments to just ify a call for the developm ent  of a more t ransparent  
and part icipatory culture in UK science-based policy-making.  
 
The recognit ion that  STS research can influence and ult imately alter the 
area it  studies has led many STS researchers to st ruggle to “define the 
relat ionship of their research to the thing being researched”  (Cohen and 
Galusky, 2010, p.2) . I ndeed, some, such as Mohr and Raman (2009) , 
have argued that  members of the STS community need to remain 
reflexive when making “cr it ical sense of public engagement  exercises”  as 
they are increasingly playing a mediat ing role – see for example, the role 
of STS scholars at  Lancaster University in the NanoDialogues project  
(Wilsdon et  al.,  2005) . This new dynam ic suggests that  STS researchers 
are often in a privileged posit ion where they can not  only observe, 
theorise and comment  on their field of research but  also part icipate and 
inst igate change, a posit ion however, that  requires reflexivity and 
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responsibilit y, and a greater awareness of the policy implicat ions of their  
research. 
 
I n this sect ion I  consider the recent  move by the UK Government  towards 
wider engagement  within scient ific advisory commit tees and science 
policy m ore widely, to include not  only different  types of expert ise but  
also ‘lay’ experts. I  discuss that  in the advisory areas surrounding 
pest icides the original not ion of “ lay expert ise”  seems to be insufficient  for 
capturing the diversity of knowledge and skills that  those labelled as ‘lay’ 
often possess. I n the later part  of the sect ion, I  explore the ambiguous 
role of NGOs who sit  at  the interface between scient ific experts and the 
‘lay’ public.  
 
Reports such as “Risk and Uncertainty”  (The St rategy Unit , 2002)  indicate 
that  there is a move among those in government  to extend the 
boundaries of who can part icipate in policy debates through wider public 
or stakeholder engagement . I ndeed, increasingly science-based policy-
making that  does not  involve part icipat ion by both experts and 
stakeholders, which may include the public, is viewed by some as not  
only ineffect ive but  illegit imate (Shrader-Frechet te, 1991;  Beck, 1992;  
Buckeley and Mol, 2003;  I rwin, 2006) . 
 
Pet ts and Leach (2000)  document  that  in 1998 the UK Cabinet  Office 
emphasised that  consultat ion between stakeholder groups can lead to an 
increasingly realist ic policy that  is “bet ter at  reflect ing peoples needs and 
wishes” . Sim ilar ly, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion 
(1998)  st resses in its document  “Set t ing Environmental Standards” , that  
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government  departments should adopt  methods in environmental 
decision-making that  account  for values and lay knowledge, as well as 
technical or scient ific expert ise. This view was also expressed in 2000 by 
the House of Lords Select  Com mit tee on Science and Technology who 
recommended that :  
 
direct  dialogue with the public should move from being an 
opt ional add-on to science-based policy making … and should 
become a normal and integral part  of the process (House of Lords 
Select  Commit tee on Science and Technology, 2000) .      
 
As I  have noted, a key driver for the considerat ion of wider engagement  
was the BSE crisis of the m id-1990s and the realisat ion ( that  in part  was 
influenced by the growing STS literature in this area)  that  decisions that  
are underpinned by scient ific uncertainty carry wider social and ethical 
implicat ions. Within the field of STS it  is accepted that  science alone is not  
the solut ion to complex r isk problems. This situat ion has been widely 
discussed, being labelled by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993)  as “post -
normal science” 6
                                                 
6
 The term  ‘post -normal’ is used to describe a situat ion where any 
decision made may carry consequences both known and unknown to the 
natural and social world.  
.  They argue that  the inherent  uncertainty in the 
knowledge used to produce decisions increases the difficulty of separat ing 
facts from value judgements. Post -normal science therefore occurs at  the 
science policy boundary and can be applied to areas such as food safety, 
where policy decisions carry large public safety implicat ions. Ravetz 
(2002)  argues that  the uncertainty in the r isk assessment  process and 
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the dependence on stat ist ical analysis may not  adequately represent  the 
reality of the r isks that  we are exposed to. A solut ion to this, as 
advocated within the post -normal framework, is to extend the boundaries 
of who may part icipate in the decision-making process (Stern and 
Fineburg, 1996) .  
 
Collins and Evans (2002)  argue that  an overr iding theme since the early 
1970s in discussions around science-based decision-making has been the 
“Problem of Legit imacy” . They are here referr ing to the need to look 
beyond the use of technically qualified in decision-making to increase 
polit ical legit imacy. Benefits other than that  of legit im isat ion have also 
been linked with widening the sphere of part icipat ion. For example, 
Sarkission et  al.  (1997)  note that  stakeholder part icipat ion can promote a 
bet ter understanding of a project  and its implicat ions. This may help 
resolve or avoid potent ial problems through the considerat ion of 
previously unconsidered drawbacks and lim it  public disapproval so 
reducing the likelihood of cost ly delays. They go on to state that  
part icipat ion may increase cooperat ion between stakeholders result ing in 
a higher degree of t rust  between stakeholders and increased 
t ransparency of the decision-making process.  
 
Despite the reported benefits of wider inclusion, as discussed above, 
many have been crit ical of this part icipatory turn. For example, some 
such as Collins (1988)  and Poppy (2000)  have set  out  a case for returning 
experts to their ‘proper’ role in technical decision-making, arguing that  
public part icipat ion can at  t imes be m isguided as the public may not  have 
the necessary expert ise with which to crit ically evaluate scient ific 
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informat ion. Poppy (2000)  claims that  “ (while)  complexit y of assessing 
r isk is well understood by specialists ( it  can be)  somewhat  m isunderstood 
by non-specialists” . By cont rast , those such as Wynne  (1996;  1998)  and 
I rwin (2006)  have argued that  despite the rhetoric the role of alternat ive 
and lay expert ise remains marginal in scient ific discussions and decision-
making. 
 
More recent ly, in a discussion paper explor ing the move towards wider 
part icipat ion in r isk regulat ion and policy, Rothstein (2003, p.1)  concludes 
that  although widening part icipat ion may increase public confidence in a 
regulatory regime, “broadening part icipat ion per se does not  necessarily 
produce more democrat ic or robust  policy outcomes than closed 
processes” . I rwin (2006)  has also suggested that  there is a lack of clar ity 
surrounding widening part icipat ion, which has resulted in a discursive 
st ruggle emerging around what  counts as “ legit imate talk”  and how talk 
should be const ructed within public engagement . I n part icular, he 
highlights how the twin goals of consensus building and the call for the 
greater involvement  of ‘innocent ’ cit izens, as opposed to act ivists, have 
created tensions and an often simplist ic, homogenised view of the public. 
 
Given that  there remain significant  challenges to extending part icipat ion it  
is important  to consider what  the desired goal is in any discussion forum 
and who may have a useful input  in const ruct ing policy choices. 
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2 .3 1  Lay- experts and the ‘public’ 
Typically, experts are those who hold some formal qualificat ion that  has 
required assessed t raining. Therefore, when experts are called as a 
witness or to provide evidence in decision-making there is an assumpt ion 
that  their advice represents only their professional knowledge. 
Conversely, lay knowledge may be simplist ically defined as embodying a 
concern from the subject ive standpoint  of lay-people or non-experts 
(Williams and Popay, 2001) . However, it  may be bet ter thought  of as 
referr ing to knowledge that  is shaped not  by t raining or educat ion but  by 
the events and experiences of everyday life (Corburn, 2003) . 
Tradit ionally, expert  and lay knowledge may also be dist inguished 
through methods of knowledge ver ificat ion;  while expert  knowledge tends 
to be tested through methods such as peer review or a Popperian style of 
falsificat ion, the nature of lay knowledge makes it  difficult  to formally 
validate.  
 
While it  m ight  be tempt ing for policy-makers to homogenise the public 
into one undifferent iated mass this has been crit icised as insufficient  in 
describing the diverse nature and experience of the populat ion as a whole 
(Pet ts and Leach, 2000) . Sociologists, such as Wynne (1998) , in his much 
cited study of Cumbrian hill sheep farmers and the assessment  of 
radioact ive fallout  from  Chernobyl, have shown that  in many cases those 
considered as lay may have their  own form  of knowledge that  could be 
equally as important  as that  of experts who possess more t radit ional 
technical t raining (Wynne, 1996) . I n such cases it  may be more 
appropriate to abandon the term ‘lay expert ise’ and consider them as 
experts in their own r ight ;  although they may have no formally 
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recognised qualificat ions, they are different  to the populat ion as a whole 
having specialised knowledge or being found in small specialist  groups.  
 
Collins and Evans (2002, p.254)  have considered this conundrum in 
relat ion to their own experience as science studies scholars and 
suggested that  expert ise can be dist inguished into three categories:  
 
1)  No Expert ise:  That  is the degree of expert ise with which 
the fieldworker sets out ;  it  is insufficient  to conduct  a 
sociological analysis or do quasi-part icipatory fieldwork. 
2)  I nteract ional Expert ise:  This means enough expert ise to 
interact  interest ingly with part icipants and carry out  a 
sociological analysis. 
3)  Cont r ibutory Expert ise:  This means enough expert ise to 
cont r ibute to the science of the field being analysed 
 
Such categorisat ion suggests that  there are no clear boundaries that  
determ ine who can be considered expert . However, Collins and Evans 
( ibid)  argue that  we should not  become ‘paralysed’ by this but  should use 
these categorisat ions as a tool to help consider the inter- relat ionships 
between actors. I mportant ly, it  should be noted that  although this 
descript ion provides a useful working framework in explor ing the not ion of 
expert ise, Collins and Evans appear to overlook one dist inct  type of 
expert ise that  is often present  in policy making – procedural expert ise. 
This type of expert  does not  necessarily require interact ional or 
cont r ibutory expert ise as their role is to challenge exist ing working 
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pract ices, as opposed to cont r ibut ing to technical discussions. Within this 
thesis I  will consider how these categorisat ions may reflect  those working 
within the sphere of pest icide assessment  and management . 
 
While highly contested, there is therefore in pract ice a dist inct ion made 
between those considered expert , lay-expert  and non-expert . However, 
the campaigning NGOs7
                                                 
7
 The definit ion of an NGO has been taken from Lane and Morrison (2006)  
who define NGOs as non-state or non-profit  organisat ions that  have been 
t radit ionally composed of volunteers and concerned with dist inct  policy 
object ives.  See:  (Lane and Morrison, 2006)  
 are one group who are often involved in the 
policy process that  arguably do not  sit  comfortably in any of these 
categories. With the notable except ion of Yearley’s research (1992 -a;  
1992 -b;  1996)  there has been lit t le work that  considers NGOs as 
scient ific actors or exam ined their  role in governance. However, this is 
beginning to change with researchers such as Eden, and Lane and 
Morrison invest igat ing the expert ise of NGOs and their role in policy (Eden 
et  al. , 2006;  Lane and Morrison, 2006) . I t  has been argued that  in the 
current  polit ical culture, faith in hierarchical policies has decreased, 
leading towards an increase in governance that  can be characterised by 
networks of decision-making relat ionships that  link government  and civil 
society (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992;  Buckeley and Mol, 2003;  Eden and 
Parr, 2006) . The theory of ecological modernisat ion suggests that  as 
governance becomes horizontal, policy is likely to be increasingly 
mediated through non-state actors, so that  the importance of NGOs in 
shaping policy decisions increases (Hajer, 1995;  Buckeley and Mol, 2003) . 
Lane and Morrison (2006)  suggest  that  the result  of this shift  is that  
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NGOs can now be viewed as playing one of three roles:  service providers 
to cit izens through supplement ing the government ;  partners to the 
government  in the provision of public goods;  and challengers to the 
government  in dem anding accountabilit y and changes to public policy. Yet  
while NGOs can be ident ified as organisat ionally different  from  
‘unorganised’ or ‘innocent ’ cit izens (Breckenridge, 1999;  I rwin, 2006) , it  
can be argued that  they are often included in policy-making exercises not  
because they possess expert ise, but  because they represent  a part icular 
value system that  is shared by their members, in some cases both 
reasons may be used to just ify their inclusion. I n this sense, their role is 
often somewhat  ambiguous as they may be viewed as either an expert  or 
public representat ive or a hybrid of the two.  
 
I ndeed, affiliat ion by researchers to such a group can often have negat ive 
connotat ions and has t radit ionally been used as a tool to underm ine a 
researcher’s credibilit y, through labelling work conducted for or in 
conjunct ion with an NGO as ‘unscient ific’ (Eden, 2005) . An example of 
this is seen in the response provided by Milne (1993) , an indust r ial 
chem ist , to Wynne and Mayer’s (1993)  art icle on how science fails the 
environment . I n reference to Mayer, then an employee of Greenpeace, 
Milne ( ibid, p.27)  writes that  “ the Greenpeace approach is not  ant i-
science…but  neither is it  science. So what  is it? I t  is moral philosophy at  
least , and religion probably. All that  scient ists can say to Greenpeace is:  
sorry, your applicat ion for membership of the scient ific community has 
been carefully considered – and rejected” .  Here, Milne is clear ly signalling 
a boundary being drawn between real science undertaken by experts and 
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science undertaken by Greenpeace, an NGO, that  is at  best  value laden 
and at  worst  not  science at  all.  
 
However, studies into the scient ific legit imacy of NGOs (Yearley, 1992 -a;  
Eden, 2005;  Eden et  al. ,  2006)  have shown that  far from  being just  
consumers of science many NGOs produce, consume and publish scient ific 
research, with many of their staff having formal scient ific t raining 
(Eyerman and Jam ison, 1989;  Yearley, 1992 -b) . Therefore, they can no 
longer be derogat ively described as ‘pseudo-scient ists’,  as was the case 
when Mellanby (1974)  warned of the harm  that  may be done to the 
credibilit y of ‘real’ scient ists by the act ions of others, who adopt  the use 
of scient ific jargon to promote their own object ives, while having no 
formal science t raining. Although many NGO scient ists m ight  not  describe 
themselves as an ‘expert ’ in the t radit ional sense, they may recognise 
themselves as ‘intelligencers’8
 
,  producers of intelligence, rather than 
science for the people. I f NGOs are indeed act ive in the product ion and 
dissem inat ion of scient ific informat ion then their posit ion as non-experts 
or even lay-experts is open for quest ioning.  
An earlier  art icle by Yearley (1991)  highlighted that  environmental 
researchers working for NGOs will often argue that  evidence used in 
debates is based on “object ive reasoning”  and that  “ scient ific expert ise 
remains the principal form  of legit imat ion in the leading environmental 
organisat ions” .  The use and product ion of scient ific evidence and in-house 
expert ise by NGOs to challenge current  pract ices or make policy 
                                                 
8
 Taken from Eyerman and Jam ison (1989, p.114) , meaning a hybrid 
between a professional scient ist  and a movement  act ivist . 
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recommendat ions can therefore be seen as a form  of reflexive 
scient isat ion allowing NGOs to become alongside other stakeholders, co-
producers of science and scient ific knowledge. However, such 
observat ions also suggest  that  some NGOs are becom ing dependent  on 
science and scient ific pract ice as a means of legit im isat ion. Such a 
proposit ion leads one to propose that  far from  being ant i-science, as 
suggested by Milne’s comments, NGOs are in danger of reifying science 
so that  the social negot iat ions involved in arr iv ing at  scient ific ‘facts’ are 
lost  in their discussions.  
 
Eden et  al.  (2006)  argue that  environmental NGOs reflect  a mode 2 9
                                                 
9Gibbons et  al. argue that  there have been fundamental changes in the 
way that  scient ific, social and cultural knowledge is produced, which can 
be characterised by an increase in features such as reflexiv ity, t rans-
disciplinar ity, and heterogeneity. Thus, mode 2 knowledge product ion is 
undertaken in the context  of applicat ion and places science policy and 
scient ific knowledge in its broader societal context . However, it  should be 
noted that  the universality of this concept  has been quest ioned.  
 style 
knowledge product ion, as described by Gibbons et  al. (1994) , as they 
desire knowledge to be socially accountable and pract ically useful in 
environmental governance. I n response to this the authors ( ibid)  suggest  
that  NGOs do not  focus on the complexit ies and inner workings of science 
but  it s interpretat ions and consequences, with NGOs seeing their role in 
the product ion of knowledge as producers of policy relevant  research. 
However, knowledge obtained through a mode 2 style product ion can 
have drawbacks with producers facing difficult ies in validat ing their 
research, as legit imacy techniques used under mode 1 such as peer 
review are often not  available.  
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Yearley’s (1996)  study of conservat ion NGOs also suggests that  NGOs 
operate using an “epistemological flexibilit y”  that  allows them to be 
pragmat ic in whether they choose to accept  or deny the validity and 
authority of science. The tact ic of using science as a discursive medium  
allows NGO actors to obtain authority in a debate where they m ight  
otherwise be viewed as non-experts and so be prevented from  
part icipat ing in any discussions. 
 
The appearance of expert ise is important  in obtaining and maintaining 
authority in any debate as it  allows access to any formal negot iat ions, 
such as those involved in creat ing policy recommendat ions. Worcester’s 
(2001)  research 10 appears to confirm  Jasanoff’s (2003)  suggest ion that  
the credibilit y of expert ise is built  upon civic epistemology 11
                                                 
10
 This research by MORI  collated general public survey data collected 
both within and outside the UK and was used in the Jenkin Report . See 
(House of Lords Select  Commit tee on Science and Technology, 2000)  
 in 
highlight ing that  the public place more t rust  in scient ists working for 
NGOs than they do in those working for government  or indust ry. This 
suggests that  the public do not  base their opinion simply on the scient ific 
evidence presented to them but  are influenced by the context  in which 
such knowledge is produced and communicated. I f NGOs can be 
considered not  just  as public representat ives but  as possessing their  own 
expert ise, we need to ask ourselves what  role do they or should they play 
in the policy process? When they are included is it  because of their 
scient ific and expert  knowledge, or is it  because of the social values that  
11
 Civic epistemology is defined here as the cr iter ia by which members of 
society evaluate the validity of public knowledge. 
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they represent  and bring to the discussion? I f NGOs are there because of 
the values that  they represent , is this made explicit  and how does this 
affect  their abilit y to influence or steer policy discussions? 
 
I n this sect ion I  have highlighted that  although there has been a move 
among policy-makers ( in part  as a result  of STS discussions)  to consider 
widening the sphere of part icipat ion, wider part icipat ion remains ill 
defined as it  is unclear who should be included and what  their role should 
be. Through claim ing expert ise, it  appears that  actors are able to obtain 
power and authority in a debate that  is largely denied to those considered 
as possessing no or only lay expert ise. I n discussing NGOs I  suggest  that  
science and scient ific expert ise is a powerful tool by which actors can 
obtain or borrow authority and so present  themselves as competent  
actors who should be included in any policy discussions. However, an over 
reliance on science and scient ific pract ice by NGOs may result  in a 
situat ion where the social element  of scient ific research and the 
const ruct ion of scient ific facts becomes lost  and where any value 
judgements embedded within such ‘facts’ become overlooked. 
 
2 .4  Scient ific uncertainty: conceptualisat ion 
and m anagem ent   
I n the previous sect ions I  have discussed changes in UK food safety 
policy, suggest ing that  policy problems are in part  socially negot iated. I n 
the following, I  cr it ically exam ine the relat ionship between scient ific facts 
and value judgements and invest igate the role of scient ific uncertainty, 
r isk and error in advisory decision-making. I n doing so, I  seek to illust rate 
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that  scient ific uncertainty is often not  due to an inadequate amount  of 
research but  a result  of the init ial problem fram ing;  inappropriate  or un-
reflexive quest ions being asked or inappropriate m ethodology being 
adopted to answer these quest ions. I n the lat ter part  of this sect ion, the 
discussion moves on to consider the area of regulatory science and how 
the principles employed in this area may help overcome the effects of 
scient ific uncertainty.  
 
2 .4 1  The blurr ing of boundaries 
I t  is widely acknowledged within STS that  knowledge produced by science 
can never be independent  from society and the polit ical and regulatory 
context  in which it  is obtained. As such, it  has been argued that  there is a 
need for a cont inuous renegot iat ion in polit ics of the boundaries between 
science and policy (Jasanoff, 1987;  Dickson, 1988;  Jasanoff, 1996) . One 
difference between science and polit ics, as discussed by Sarewitz (2004) , 
is that  whilst  polit ical debates allow part icipants to draw on a range of 
arguments including scient ific fact , personal values and experience, those 
involved in scient ific debates are required to suppress the open discussion 
of value preferences to avoid science and polit ics becom ing synonymous 
with each other. However, while there is often an at tempt  to keep these 
boundaries separate, research such as Jasanoff’s (1990) , on the 
adversarial relat ionship between scient ists and regulators in the U.S., 
indicates that  the blurr ing of boundaries can somet imes result  in 
increasingly product ive policy-making. 
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I t  can be argued that  the separat ion of science from non-science is not  a 
set  of essent ial methodologies or code of pract ice but  an array of 
circumstances and st rategic behaviour known as “boundary work” , where 
success is measured by the prevent ion of science being cont rolled by 
outside powers (Gieryn, 1995) . I n other words, the challenge for science 
is to move closer to polit ics whilst  retaining its autonomy. Mukerj i (1989)  
illust rates this symbiot ic relat ionship of science and polit ics through 
highlight ing how just  as a scient ist ’s authority is legit im ated through the 
use of science in policy-making so too are government  officials able to 
legit im ise their decision-making through present ing them as being based 
on expert ise and scient ific facts. I ndeed, Gieryn (1995, p.436)  apt ly 
surm ises, “only good fences keep polit ics and science good neighbours” .  
 
Boundary work is therefore ut ilised by compet ing groups, such as 
scient ists or NGOs, to challenge scient ific credibilit y and so discredit  
unwelcome policy init iat ives. However, in doing so they must , to retain 
the legit im acy of their own claims, preserve the cultural authority of 
science. Gieryn (1995)  shows that  this is achieved through the creat ion of 
two abst ract  spaces;  one for scient ific pract ice and findings that  are 
labelled as ‘bad’ and a second space for real or ‘good’ science. Through 
the const ruct ion of art if icial boundaries that  separate ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
pract ice, the authority of science and the expert  status of scient ists is 
retained allowing the ‘good’ science to be used in policy-making and 
advisory decision-making. Boundary work can therefore be seen as 
providing a methodological approach that  enables us to explore how 
different  evidence is perceived and used and how different  forms of 
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expert ise are understood;  this approach is discussed further in Chapter 
Three. 
 
2 .4 2  Classifying uncertainty 
As I  suggested in Chapter One, in the discussion surrounding r isks from  
pest icides, advisory and r isk decisions are frequent ly taken when scient ific 
evidence is uncertain or contested. I n the following I  consider the 
different  ways in which uncertainty is understood and represented, 
showing that  even within the field of STS there are disagreements over 
how best  to conceptualise and manage uncertainty. 
 
I  shall first  consider Renn’s definit ion of uncertainty. I n discussing 
hormesis and r isk com municat ion, Renn (2003 p.18)  suggests that  there 
are “ three phenomenological components of any r isk debate” :  complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity – see Table One.  
 
Although Renn acknowledges a role for stakeholders in the resolut ion of 
uncertainty, his characterisat ion of uncertainty suggests that  it  can only 
be reduced through increased use of expert ise and the product ion of 
more, higher quality, scient ific data, i.e., it  suggests that  uncertainty can 
be reduced through more research. When consider ing the challenges that  
face pest icide r isk assessors – inabilit y to prove causat ion for real life 
exposures – Renn’s model suggests that  it  is not  uncertainty that  is the 
underlying problem in this area, but  ‘complexity’. Sim ilar to that  of 
uncertainty, Renn’s proposed solut ion is to apply increasingly 
sophist icated scient ific methods and greater use of expert  skills. Sim ilar 
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solut ions were frequent ly proposed by many of the expert  advisors that  
were interviewed during this research, as will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapters. 
 
Renn’s conceptualisat ion has been crit icised by some such as De Marchi 
(2003 p.26) , who suggests that  the presence of ‘complexity’ implies both 
a move towards post -normal science and “ the coexistence of pluralit y of 
legit imate perspect ives”  in any r isk debate. While Renn views such 
plurality as result ing in ambiguity, De Marchi (2003)  goes further, 
highlight ing the importance of how problems are framed in any discussion 
of r isk. She st resses that  different  fram ings, all of which may be 
legit imate, require the r isk assessor to be aware not  only of uncertainty 
but  also of ignorance. De Marchi ( ibid)  therefore argues that  the way that  
r isk problems are init ially fram ed can affect  the whole process of 
assessment , from  experimental design through to the reject ion or 
acceptat ion of a hypothesis. I n this sense, she states (p. 26)  that  
“ scient ific r isk assessment  neither exam ines nor explains reality in it s 
whole, but  approaches it  by (scient ific)  methods of approximat ion and 
select ion” .  
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Table 1 : Renn’s phenom enological com ponents ( Renn, 2 0 0 3 )  
Com ponent : Descript ion: Renn’s proposed Solut ion: 
COMPLEXI TY 
Difficulty in ident ify ing 
and quant ifying causal 
links between different  
chem icals and specific 
effects. Occurs where 
direct  observat ion of 
cause and effect  is 
unlikely. 
This may be due to 
chem ical interact ions in 
the environment , delayed 
react ion, differences in 
individual responses etc. 
EPI STEMOLOGI CAL 
DI SCOURSE 
I ncreased use of 
sophist icated scient ific 
invest igat ion. Need for the 
use of mathemat ical tools 
such as ext rapolat ion and 
fuzzy set  theory. 
Requires deliberat ion 
among experts with 
technical skills.  
UNCERTAI NTY 
Probabilit ies are not  
accurately able to predict  
uncertain events, with 
predict ions characterised 
by the inclusion of other 
unknowns i.e. m issing 
data. 
Uncertainty acts to reduce 
confidence in the cause 
and effects chain. I t  
therefore increases when 
complexity increases. 
I s linked to 
indeterm inacy. 
REFLECTI VE DI SCOURSE 
Requires involvement  of 
experts and the product ion 
of new and bet ter scient ific 
knowledge. 
Also requires the inclusion 
of stakeholders and the 
public to gain a wider view 
on acceptable levels of 
protect ion. There can be no 
scient ific answer to what  is 
considered acceptable as it  
involves societal values. 
AMBI GUI TY 
Where different  
interpretat ions arise from 
the study/ observat ion of 
ident ical data. 
Often does not  refer to 
differences in scient ific 
pract ice, rather what  the 
data means in relat ion to 
human health and the 
environment . 
PARTI CIPATORY 
DI SCOURSE 
Focus is on resolving value 
differences 
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The need to different iate forms of uncertainty has been succinct ly 
discussed by Wynne (1992  p.114) , who proposes four types – see Table 
Two. 
 
Table 2 : Four types of uncerta inty as defined by W ynne ( 1 9 9 2   
p.1 1 4 )  
Types of Uncerta inty: Descript ion: 
RI SK Where the odds are known 
UNCERTAI NTY 
 
Don’t  know the odds;  may know the main 
parameters. May reduce uncertainty but  
increase ignorance. 
I GNORANCE 
 
Don’t  know what  we don’t  know. I gnorance 
increases with increased commitments 
based on given knowledge. 
I NDETERMINACY Causal chains or networks open 
 
Whilst  Renn’s (2003)  definit ion of ‘complexity’ appears to be sim ilar to 
Wynne’s ‘r isk’, Renn appears to conflate the other three types into one. 
However, Wynne (1992)  is very clear that  indeterm inacy should not  
simply be viewed as large scale uncertainty, but  as part  of the 
foundat ions of all scient ific knowledge, as such it  can be present  when the 
level of t radit ional ‘uncertainty’ is thought  to be small.  I n making such a 
claim  Wynne ( ibid p.116)  explicit ly cr it icises Ravetz and Funtowicz’s 
concept  of post -normal science, which suggests uncertainty exists on a 
scale of sm all ( r isk)  to large ( ignorance) . I nstead, Wynne ( ibid)  views all 
four types of uncertainty as overlapping and perpetual, with each 
emerging in importance depending on the context  of the decision-making. 
I ndeterm inacy is therefore seen by Wynne as pervasive and ever present  
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in scient ific knowledge, however well it  is concealed. I n the context  of 
pest icide r isk assessment , Wynne’s (1992, p. 116)  concept  of 
indeterm inacy suggests that  it  “pervades even apparent ly purely technical 
quest ions” , as such it  is not  enough to simply conduct  a greater amount  
of scient ific study in a bid to reduce uncertainty, as this fails to address 
the underlying problems.  
  
I n discussions surrounding r isk and uncertainty it  is important  to consider 
the different  types of errors that  can be made and their implicat ions. I t  is 
recognised that  both Type 1 and 2 errors can occur during chem ical r isk 
assessment  (Cranor, 1993;  De Marchi, 2003) , with Type 1 errors 
indicat ing a false posit ive where an effect  is wrongly exhibited, and Type 
2 errors indicat ing a false negat ive where an effect  which should exhibit  
does not . Both types have repercussions in terms of how r isks are 
assessed and advice produced. I n addit ion to these two types of error a 
third type is now regarded as being present :  Type 3 12
 
,  which relates to 
the fram ing of r isk problems, the presence of ‘ignorance’, and the inabilit y 
of r isk assessors to account  for unknown variables and processes in their  
decision-making.   
Errors are important  considerat ions in regulatory science as the 
occurrence of Type 1 errors may to lead to over- regulat ion, which is likely 
                                                 
12
 This concept  has its or igins in Kimball’s (1957, p. 134)  stat ist ical 
concept  that  describes Type 3 errors as “ the error comm it ted by giving 
the r ight  answer to the wrong problem”  – see:  Kimball,  A.W. (1957)  
Errors of the Third Kind in Stat ist ical Consult ing. Journal of the Am erican 
Stat ist ical Associat ion, 5 2  (278) :  133-142. 
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to be expensive and over precaut ionary, while an excess of Type 2 errors 
is likely to lead to under- regulat ion, increasing the possibilit y of r isk 
through exposure. Within the field of r isk assessment  there is an 
emphasis on avoiding Type 1 errors ( false-posit ives) , and it  has been 
suggested that  this is linked to a cultural philosophy regarding scient ific 
progress and a demand for certainty:  
 
When the chances of false posit ives are kept  low, a posit ive 
result  can be added to scient ific knowledge with considerable 
knowledge that  it  is not  a random chance. Were one to 
tolerate higher r isks of false posit ives, take greater chances of 
new informat ion being false by chance alone, the edifice would 
be much less secure. (Cranor, 1993, p.33)  
 
Hoffmann-Reim  and Wynne (2002)  discuss Type 3 errors in their art icle 
“ I n r isk assessment , one has to adm it  ignorance” . Here, using the case of 
the pest icide DDT they detail how the effects of DDT on avian 
reproduct ion were not  detected, as this variable was never considered to 
be relevant  in the or iginal r isk assessment . They suggest  that  the 
problem of tackling the unknown in chem ical r isk assessment  is more 
pert inent  and important  in terms of maintaining credibilit y than the act  of 
decreasing and quant ifying known uncertaint ies. A situat ion which they 
state has been the t radit ional policy response, as it  creates an illusion 
that  r isks are containable. I ndeed, they make the following bold 
statement :  
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Risk assessment  and policy need to emphasize uncovering the 
lim its to knowledge rather than proving exist ing knowledge to 
be correct . (Hoffmann-Reim  and Wynne, 2002, p.416)  
 
To achieve this they suggest  widening part icipat ion and opening up the 
r isk assessment  process to increase its t ransparency and t rust  in the 
process.  
 
As the above indicates policy decision-making can be difficult  in domains 
characterised by uncertainty and indeterm inacy (Jasanoff, 1990;  Wynne, 
1992) , with some, like Rothstein et  al. (1999) , comment ing that  the 
scient ific demands made by nat ional policy-makers for definit ive answers 
can itself increase scient ific disagreement . I ndeed, studies have shown 
that  scient ific uncertainty is comm only cited as a reason for inact ion in 
policy-making (Oreskes, 2004;  Michaels and Monforton, 2005)  and can 
challenge both science and the authority of scient ists (Shackley and 
Wynne, 1996) ;  scient ists can st ruggle to retain a technical rat ionality if 
they are simultaneously obliged to acknowledge the existence of 
uncertainty while m inim ising the assumpt ion that  this uncertainty poses a 
challenge to the legit imacy of policy-making. One device used by 
scient ists to cope with this dual posit ioning is to perpetuate the belief that  
solut ions are possible if only more scient ific research is undertaken 
(Shackley and Wynne, 1996;  Poppy, 2000;  Oreskes, 2004) , a solut ion 
that  has already been highlighted as problem at ic (Wynne, 1992) . 
 
This belief that  more research would solve scient ific uncertainty can be 
seen as reaffirm ing and st rengthening the authority of science by 
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deflect ing at tent ion away from a cr it ique of scient ific pract ice;  here, the 
origin of uncertainty is not  the scient ist ’s methods but  the complex 
natural systems that  are under invest igat ion. Therefore, it  is not  science 
or the social and polit ical environment  in which science is undertaken that  
is responsible for uncertainty but  nature itself.  This argument  allows 
scient ists to retain their posit ion as experts as, they m ight  argue, it  is 
only through undertaking more r igorous science that  that  we can r id 
ourselves of such doubt . Such reaffirmat ion can also act  to reinforce the 
importance of a part icular policy order as in legit im ising the act  of 
scient ific pract ice we also legit im ise the policy that  is built  on scient ific 
foundat ions. 
 
Levidow (2003) , has argued that  in recent  years scient ific uncertainty has 
been more readily acknowledged, with its cause generally at t r ibutable to 
a lack of adequate scient ific informat ion. However, he rejects this 
hypothesis, arguing, like Wynne and Mayer (1993) , that  r isk assessment  
is it self characterised by uncertainty. Sim ilar to De Marchi (2003) , 
Levidow (2003, p. 116)  therefore proposes that  uncertainty does not  ar ise 
just  from  inadequate knowledge but  is also a reflect ion of the underlying 
quest ions asked by the scient ists and their select ion of relevant  facts, 
which he describes as ‘value laden’ choices. This view is shared by others 
researching food safety policy and pest icide r isk assessment  (van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2000;  Jensen and Sandøe, 2002;  Ravetz, 
2002) .  
 
Sim ilar ly, Jam ieson (1995)  has suggested that  uncertainty can be viewed 
as polit ically and culturally contextual and can be the result  of a 
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cont roversy rather than the cause of it .  I t  has also been argued that  
scient ists are more likely to express uncertainty if the science in quest ion 
is not  t ied to policy uses (Shackley and Wynne, 1996;  Sarewitz, 2004) . 
On this basis Sarewitz (2004, pp.385)  concludes that  scient ific 
uncertainty can be best  understood “not  as a lack of scient ific evidence 
but  as the lack of coherence among compet ing scient ific understanding, 
which is amplif ied by the polit ical, cultural and inst itut ional contexts in 
which science is undertaken” . 
 
2 .4 3  Regulatory science 
I n the previous sect ions I  have discussed how science is used in the 
advisory process and policy-making. I n doing so I  have illust rated that  
there are often cases where the science required is either unavailable or 
uncertain. For many science-based decisions, such as those pertaining to 
r isk management  st rategies and policies, science and evidence are often 
created specifically to answer part icular quest ions. This type of regulatory 
science is discussed below. 
 
Risk problems may be considered as ‘t rans-scient ific’,  a phrase developed 
by Weinberg (1972)  to highlight  the existence of a blurred area between 
science and policy, where quest ions may be asked of science, yet  cannot  
be fully answered through its applicat ion. Ashford (1983) , has since 
provided a more detailed definit ion, as shown by Jasanoff (1987) :   
 
Science policy denotes issues that  are grounded in scient ific 
analysis but  for which technical data are insufficient  to support  
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an unequivocal scient if ic conclusion. The ult imate resolut ion of 
these issues depends on determ inat ion of social policy.  
(Ashford et  al.,  1983)    
 
Quest ions may be unanswerable due to reasons such as a lack of 
scient ific understanding or the inabilit y to provide answers without  
disproport ionate t ime and expense being spent  on the solut ion. 
Weinberg’s concept  of t rans-science appears to fit  the process of chem ical 
r isk assessment  well,  as there is current ly lim ited understanding of 
human exposure to low- levels and m ixtures of chem icals, yet  policy 
decisions must  be made to prevent  or m inim ise r isks to human health.  
 
Weinberg proposes that  the answer to such problems is the creat ion of a 
dist inct  branch of science, that  has been variously labelled as ‘t rans-
science’ (Weinberg, 1972) , “ regulatory science”  (Jasanoff, 1990)  or 
“mandated science”  (Salter, 1988) , where the demands for proof are 
lower than that  of ordinary science. I t  is argued that  this relaxat ion in the 
demand for and qualit y of evidence can potent ially enable policy-m akers 
to reach a decision without  being burdened by the requirement  of 
unat tainable scient ific proof. I rwin et  al. (1997, p.19)  have expanded this 
idea, stat ing that  “ regulatory science is concerned with how science can 
make predict ions on the basis of uncertaint ies” .  
 
Although it  is argued that  the use of such a st rategy can prevent  
indecision and inact ion, it s use raises difficult  quest ions over the nature of 
science-based decision-making. For example, if the standards for 
assessing regulatory science are lower than that  of ordinary science, how 
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can one be certain that  the evidence used to reach a decision is reliable or 
wholly relevant? The use of this cr iter ion also suggests that  there is 
greater opportunity in the policy-making process for decisions to be based 
upon or influenced by the value judgements of those involved in 
assessing evidence. This raises sim ilar quest ions about  t ransparency and 
accountabilit y as discussed earlier in the chapter.  
 
Jasanoff’s (1990)  research on US science advisors involved in regulatory 
decision-making 13
                                                 
13
 Jasanoff’s earlier work on chem ical cont rol in Europe and the US, 
suggests that  t radit ionally the Brit ish style of regulatory science has been 
sim ilar to academ ic science allowing decision-making to proceed even 
under condit ions of uncertainty. This can be cont rasted with the 
adversarial style system of the US, where it  is easier to delay taking 
act ion. However, due to science based cont roversies such as BSE, and the 
r ise in problemat ic science-based quest ions stemming from policy issues 
such as the environmental release of GMOs, these dist inct ions are 
beginning to be challenged with the UK and European systems becom ing 
more openly adversarial like their  US counterparts. See:  (Brickman et  al. , 
1985) . 
 suggests that  regulatory science is rarely innovat ive or 
subject  to standard checking procedures such as journal publicat ion or 
peer review as found in a mode 1 style knowledge product ion. The 
absence of such correct ional m ethods that  are ingrained into the culture 
of pure or academ ic science may therefore result  in the product ion of 
science that  is either methodologically flawed or polit ically mot ivated to 
endorse a part icular regime or course of act ion. This would appear to 
suggest  that  science specifically produced for regulatory purposes would 
not  hold up to independent  scrut iny by peers within that  field. Conversely, 
while the use of regulatory science allows decisions to be made even 
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under condit ions of uncertainty it  is possible that  this very uncertainty will 
be used as a tool to delay act ion on the grounds that  more evidence is 
needed. 
 
Jasanoff (1990)  goes further;  in acknowledging the conceptual difficulty 
of drawing boundaries between branches of science she defines 
“ regulatory science”  as pract ical with its purpose being to produce 
techniques, processes and artefacts that  further the task of policy-
making. I n doing so she highlights ( ibid, p.77)  three types of act ivity that  
are indicat ive of regulatory science;  knowledge product ion to fill gaps that  
may be necessary for regulatory purposes, knowledge synthesis whereby 
exist ing primary scient ific research is evaluated and assessed, and 
predict ion which requires the decision-maker to determ ine the 
significance of any r isk created by the regulat ion. Rothstein et  al. (1999, 
p.243)  use this definit ion to state that  regulatory science can be viewed 
as “a problemat ic meet ing ground between the inst itut ional pract ices and 
professional expectat ions of science and of policy making” .  This point  is 
sim ilar to Shackley and Wynne’s (1995) , who suggest  that  it  is more 
pract ical to consider what  regulatory science represents rather than t rying 
to define it  by its purpose. Therefore, regulatory science is not  just  a 
hybrid between science and policy but  is part  of a larger process of 
“mutual const ruct ion”  that  varies across policy set t ings and decision-
making processes (Rothstein et  al.,  1999) . 
 
While the content  of regulatory science differs from that  of ordinary 
science, it  is the context  in which research and decisions are made that  is 
most  important . Regulatory science is dom inated by the heavy 
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involvement  of indust ry and government , and unlike academ ic research is 
often carr ied out  in short  t ime periods to meet  a part icular purpose as is 
highlighted by Jasanoff above. I t  is also often conducted at  the boundary 
of exist ing knowledge and as a result  can be more difficult  than ordinary 
science to validate.  
 
Rothstein et  al.  (1999)  in their study on regulatory science, 
Europeanizat ion and the cont rol of agrochem icals agree that  
characterisat ions of regulatory science based on content  or social funct ion 
are too generalized. Through invest igat ing regulatory science in act ion, 
they show that  the domain encompasses a variety of act ivit ies wider in 
scope than science alone. I n the example of the development  and 
innovat ion of agrochem icals, they state regulatory science can involve a 
range of scient ific, technical, legal and adm inist rat ive act ivit ies that  are 
increasingly internat ional14
                                                 
14
 Rothstein et  al. ’s study is specifically concerned with regulatory science 
in the context  of the Europeanizat ion of the agrochem ical indust ry.  
.  However, it  remains t ied together by relat ions 
of t rust , expert  knowledge and mutual understanding between those 
actors involved. Sim ilar ly, I rwin et  al.  (1997 p. 24)  too, in discussing the 
regulatory science used in agrochem ical r isk assessment , state that  
chem ical test ing “ interlinks social, bureaucrat ic and scient ific demands” , 
with the result  that  social assumpt ions “pervade the development  of a 
technical regulatory regime” . Here they are referr ing to the fact  that  both 
the means of product ion and presentat ion of scient ific evidence for 
regulat ion is implicit ly  and explicit ly shaped by social factors, such as 
inst itut ional affiliat ion. Wynne (1992) , goes further in stat ing that  the use 
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of r isk assessments for what  he describes as “badly st ructured extensive 
problems, such as toxic waste or pest icides”  have largely become 
art ificial,  with assessments and the result ing knowledge being const rained 
by pragmat ic considerat ions, such as what  is actually observable or 
measurable. I n this sense, r isk assessments are viewed as producing 
knowledge where variat ion and uncertainty have been art ificially reduced. 
Wynne ( ibid)  therefore makes the suggest ion that  this can lead to a 
fam iliar isat ion of protocol am ong r isk assessment  pract it ioners that  
renders the t rue scale of uncertainty invisible and therefore removed from 
risk decisions.  
 
Regulatory science can therefore be seen as having its own inst itut ional 
pract ices that  create new networks of knowledge users and producers. 
However, while there may be a variety of actors involved within the 
process, not  all are equal part icipants. I rwin et  al. ’s (1997)  study 
illust rates that  actors such as NGOs are often pushed out  of UK 
discussions due to a perceived lack of specialised expert ise, an idea which 
as discussed earlier has been challenged (Yearley, 1992 -b, 1992 -a;  
Eden et  al., 2006) . Conversely, indust ry groups who have a longstanding 
relat ionship with regulatory bodies and hence are heavily involved in 
regulatory discussions can be seen to subt ly influence the decision 
process (Rothstein et  al. ,  1999) .  
 
These ideas of regulatory science will be used in this thesis to explore and 
understand the creat ion and applicat ion of science used in pest icide r isk 
assessment . 
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2 .5  Sum m ary 
I n this chapter I  have shown that  regulatory science can be complex, 
involving a variety of actors who often have to exhibit  specific expert ise 
and prove their credibilit y before they are allowed to part icipate in 
science-based decision-making. To undertake science-based decision-
making, STS literature suggests that  science and scient ific research has 
to be cr it ically exam ined to understand how it  has been produced and 
what  the implicat ions for policy are if it  is used. Such a st r ingent  
exam inat ion of knowledge product ion may result  in science being shown 
as weak and uncertain. Previous research suggests that  this uncertainty is 
frequent ly used by compet ing actors, such as scient ists, policy-makers, 
campaign groups and the public, to gain authority in a debate and to 
challenge other actors’ r ight  to part icipate (Jasanoff, 1987) . However, 
studying these relat ionships and procedures can, as Jasanoff (1986)  and 
I rwin et  al. (1997)  suggest , provide an insight  into the changing nature of 
scient ific pract ice and help us understand how scient ific uncertainty is 
managed in the advisory and policy-making process. 
 
This review indicated that  there is a move among UK policy-makers to 
change the advisory and policy process so that  there is not  only wider 
engagement , but  also more t ransparent  decision-making that  ut ilises a 
wider range of evidence. However, it  has been observed that  in order to 
have authority and be a credible actor in any science policy debate, a 
degree of expert ise is often a prerequisite for involvement . Science 
expert ise however, is frequent ly challenged, often using boundary work 
st rategies to de- legit im ise other experts’ claim s.  
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I n this chapter I  use the literature to suggest  that  science and values are 
inherent ly linked, with values and judgements shaping all aspects of 
science;  from the init ial fram ing of a problem through to choice of 
methodology to finally finding and agreeing upon a solut ion. The presence 
of scient ific uncertainty has been shown to be a cause of inact ion and a 
tool that  can be manipulated within the advisory process. I  have argued 
that  uncertainty itself is complex, and needs to be understood in its social 
context . I  further argued that  the use of the principles found within the 
domain of regulatory science can be used to mediate scient ific uncertainty 
and so prevent  inact ion, but  illust rated that  these principles themselves 
raise quest ions that  range from issues of validat ion to the involvem ent  of 
value judgements in public policy.  
 
The themes discussed within this chapter will be applied to the area of UK 
pest icide residue regulat ion through the empir ical study detailed in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 : Methods 
3 .1  The scope of the inquiry 
The subject  of this thesis has grown out  of an interest  in two related 
areas:  one, the problem of environmental just ice and an increasing 
interest  in public part icipat ion in environmental policy, and two, the 
t ranslat ion of these normat ive concerns in regulatory debates around 
exposure to chem icals. I n part icular, I  was interested in those exposures 
which are likely to be considered as mundane, i.e., those that  occur 
everyday, often with lit t le act ive recognit ion or awareness of potent ial 
r isk. For example, chronic low- level exposure and exposure to m ixtures of 
different  chem icals through use of cosmet ics and cleaning products 
(Friends of the Earth, 2002a;  Women's Environmental Network, 2004;  
WWF-UK, 2004)  or through the consumpt ion of pest icide t reated food 
(Pest icide Act ion Network, 1997;  Friends of the Earth, 2004b, 2004c) . 
 
Prelim inary research revealed that  although there is a large array of 
scient ific literature on this type of exposure, when the subject  was 
t ranslated into policy documents it  was always t ied to part icular research 
themes. Given the t ime and resource lim itat ions of the PhD I  decided to 
adopt  a case study approach. Several possible case studies were 
exam ined that  included biocides, pest icides and phthalates. The case of 
pest icides was chosen as although synthet ic pest icides have been used 
and regulated in some form  since the late 1940s and their presence in 
food is current ly deemed acceptable by bodies such as the Food 
Standards Agency (Food Standards Agency, 2004b) , their use and effects 
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remain act ively debated within the scient ific, policy and consumer 
literature. 
 
Exposure to m ixtures of pest icides can occur through a variety of 
pathways;  to consider all or even several of these routes would be too 
large a task for one PhD thesis. Food residues were chosen as a primary 
case study as they represent  the greatest  source of non-occupat ional 
exposure to pest icides. I t  is an area that  has become increasingly 
regulated both at  a UK and European level. However, although officially 
set  exposure levels for individual pest icides are seen as acceptable by the 
regulat ing bodies, there cont inues to be concern and debate about  
potent ial effects of exposure to mult iple pest icides as explained in the 
previous chapter.  
 
3 .2  Research m ethods 
This study uses a combinat ion of interviews and documentary analysis to 
explore the research quest ions set  out  in Chapter One. A qualitat ive 
approach to this study was chosen as it  perm it ted a focus on values and 
allowed the case study to be exam ined within a broader context  of 
complex power relat ions. Silverman (2001)  st resses the need when using 
mult iple methods to keep things simple, stat ing one way to achieve this is 
to lim it  the amount  of data used within the research. I  was therefore very 
careful to have clear object ives from the outset  of my fieldwork so as to 
use my t ime and resources efficient ly and to set  clear param eters 
concerning what  would and would not  be included. 
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Documentary analysis of scient ific journals, policy and government  
advisory literature, and NGO campaign literature ( including that  produced 
by indust ry and t rade associat ions)  was undertaken to achieve a 
contextual understanding of the issues and debates surrounding exposure 
to pest icide residues. Appleton and Cowley (1997)  discuss the benefits of 
documentary analysis stat ing that  official records, documents and media 
literature “can provide the researcher with a wealth of easily accessible 
and readily available research data”  ( I bid, p.3) . However, despite the 
often easy access, such data are not  without  lim itat ions. For example, 
Stewart  (1984)  expresses doubt  regarding the benefit  of using secondary 
data because they are not  or iginally compiled for the purpose of the 
current  research. Like interview data, documentary data is not  free from 
bias. Documents, especially those writ ten for polit ical purposes, are likely 
to present  a part icular impression of the author or the organisat ion that  
produces them. As such they may be described using Prior ’s (2008)  
term inology as  “act ive agents” . 
 
I nterviews with 25 key actors in the pest icide assessment  community 
were conducted during the second and third year of this PhD in 2007 and 
2008. A sem i-st ructured approach that  cent red on a pre-compiled 
interview guide was chosen in preference to a more formal approach. 
I nterviews typically lasted between 40 and 120 m inutes. Where possible, 
interviews were recorded and then t ranscribed. The majority (18)  of such 
meet ings were formal occasions being conducted at  the interviewees’ 
place of work. However, on two occasions this was not  possible and 
telephone interviews were conducted instead. A number of interviews (5)  
necessarily had to adopt  a less st ructured approach;  for example, being 
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conducted over lunch or during the course of a longer visit  where I  had 
been allowed to hang out  at  my interviewee’s work place. I n such cases I  
felt  that  it  would have been both impract ical and inappropriate to have 
recorded the exchanges made during the meet ing. I nstead, observat ional 
notes were writ ten during and after the meet ings.   
 
Gudmundsdot ter (1996)  and Marton (1981)  write that  a sem i-st ructured 
interview style allows an interact ive flow of informat ion between 
interviewer and interviewee. I  deliberately chose this style, as this 
approach allowed me flexibilit y in the quest ions that  I  asked. This 
flexibilit y allowed my part icipants to explore themes and issues that  they 
felt  to be important  and raised m any points and further quest ions that  I ,  
as an outsider, may not  have been aware of at  the beginning of my 
fieldwork. I n this way each interview helped inform  and st ructure the 
discussion of subsequent  interviews.  
 
A more flexible approach also allowed part icipants to talk about  their own 
discipline, which would have been more difficult  to discuss using a very 
st ructured approach. I n giving my interviewees this freedom I  was able to 
gather data that  allowed me to exam ine how they discuss their own 
research in relat ion to others and exam ine how their descript ion may vary 
from more formal accounts of their work. I n doing so I  was able to map 
the boundaries, as drawn by them, in a manner that  I  would not  have 
been able to achieve had I  entered with a prior i assumpt ions.  
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3 .3  Sam pling and access 
I t  is acknowledged by Becker (1998 p.67)  that  sampling is a major issue 
for all researchers and that  it  is impossible to study every relevant  case. 
I n recognit ion of this a purposive sampling technique was applied to 
answer the research quest ions. While there is a cont inuing debate among 
qualitat ive researchers about  the need for generalisabilit y in research, 
this method was deemed most  suitable in this study as it  allowed the 
researcher to target  specific actors who were most  relevant  to the 
research quest ions posed. Hammersley (1992)  emphasises that  the 
decision against  the use of probabilit y methods does not  always preclude 
the researcher from making “ reasonable judgements about  the 
representat iveness of findings drawn from a part icular set t ing to some 
wider populat ions”  ( I bid, p.88) . However, he is equally clear that  when 
using such methods, empir ical generalisat ions can only be achieved if the 
studied populat ion to which findings may be generalised is adequately 
defined. I n this study, the main aim  is to understand how the wider 
changes ident ified in scient ific advice and chem ical r isk assessment  
affects the specific case in quest ion. I n this respect , generalising to a 
wider populat ion is not  really the main concern. Having said this, findings 
from this case study m ight  be expected to cont r ibute to a wider 
assessment  of how chem ical m ixtures are managed across different  
domains or on the impact  of formal changes in the organizat ion of 
scient ific advice on pract ice in different  commit tees.  
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3 .3 1  Docum entary data sources  
During the first  year of my PhD I  began reviewing the Science and 
Technology Studies (STS)  and sociological literature, the output  of which 
is shown in Chapter Two of this thesis. By conduct ing this review I  was 
able to place my research within a wider body of academ ic literature that  
has previously explored and theorised about  the issues I  planned to 
exam ine in this PhD, namely the relat ionship between science and policy, 
not ions of expert ise and engagement  and the scient ific, social and 
polit ical t reatment  of r isk and uncertainty in the creat ion of public r isk 
advice.  
 
I n parallel to the review of the sociological and STS literature I  exam ined 
the scient ific literature surrounding toxicological and pest icide r isk 
assessment  studies, specifically that  relat ing to the study of the effects of 
exposure to low- levels and m ixtures. This literature was largely obtained 
through using journal search engines such as Web of Science, using key 
words and phrases such as:  ‘pest icide* ’ and ‘r isk* ’,  “ regulatory r isk 
assessment” , “pest icide toxicology” , “pest icide m ixture* ” , ‘pest icide* ’ and 
‘synerg* ’. Key relevant  scient ific journals were also regularly reviewed, 
such journals include:  Toxicology, Toxicological Sciences, Journal of 
Toxicology and Environmental Health, Food and Chemical Toxicology, and 
Environmental Health Perspect ives. 
 
Through grounding myself in this body of literature I  was able to develop 
what  Collins and Evans (2002)  describe as interact ional expert ise, i.e., I  
became knowledgeable and competent  enough to part icipate in technical 
discussions and interact  with those working in the area of r isk 
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assessment . This knowledge and awareness of the literature helped to 
ensure that  I  was perceived as a credible researcher during my 
interact ion with those I  was studying. 
 
 I n part icular, reviewing this very technical literature allowed me to gain a 
greater understanding of the science underlying my research quest ions 
and explore how those working within the area understood and 
conceptualised the challenges and uncertaint ies present , or ascertain 
whether they were even recognised or discussed and by whom. 
Undertaking a review of both the social and scient ific literature therefore 
not  only helped to situate my own research within the wider field, but  
helped st ructure the design of my research including shaping my 
methodology and inform ing the interim  research hypotheses and 
quest ions I  compiled prior to my interviews.  
 
I n addit ion, to further accompany and inform  my interviews a number of 
official documents and public advice literature produced by UK and 
European advisory bodies and NGOs (both campaign groups and indust ry)  
were also analysed to understand how r isk and uncertainty in pest icide 
r isk assessment  was understood more widely. Specifically, I  was 
interested in the advisory literature produced by the Pest icide Safety 
Directorate (PSD) , the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollut ion (RCEP)  and the two working 
groups of the Food Standard Agency’s Commit tee on Toxicity;  WiGRAMP 
and the VUT. I n general, the public nature of this informat ion has meant  
that  these data have been relat ively easy to access.  
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Despite many of the advisory documents being held in the public domain 
I  experienced several problems in obtaining documents from both the FSA 
and the RCEP. I  was part icular ly interested in reviewing the material that  
related to the discussions held by WiGRAMP;  this advisory group no 
longer operates and published its final report  in September 2002. 
Hilgartner (2000) , in his writ ing on the performat ive funct ion of  scient ific 
advice, states that  a report  cannot  reveal the internal dynam ics of a 
commit tee, nor can it  provide any informat ion on what  aspects of the 
report  were altered or discarded before publicat ion, or show which claim s 
were cont roversial and which were uncontested. I n considering the above 
I  was therefore interested to see how much the final report  resembled the 
draft  that  was produced earlier in 2002.  
 
I n relat ion to this I  made several requests to see the comments that  were 
subm it ted to the Working Group following the publicat ion of it s draft  
report . Although under the Freedom of I nformat ion Act  I  am  ent it led to 
see this informat ion, each of my applicat ions was denied. I  was first  
advised that  this would not  be possible as they were confident ial;  when I  
quest ioned this I  was advised that  the documents had been m isplaced 
and that  no one in the department  could locate them. I  t r ied a further 
t ime but  again was refused perm ission, being told that  they are probably 
cent rally stored and would be too difficult  to access. As a last  resort  I  
broached the subject  during an interview with a senior manager at  the 
FSA;  I  was assured that  they would t ry and locate them, however, when 
the draft  report  was forwarded to me it  t ranspired that  it  was actually a 
draft  copy of the final report  before it  was published. To m it igate this 
problem I  contacted several of those who were listed as subm it t ing 
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evidence or correspondence to WiGRAMP and asked them direct ly for 
their subm ission. I n the major ity of cases those contacted provided me 
with the requested informat ion. 
 
To answer my first  research quest ion -  How have the potent ial r isks of 
pest icides been historically assessed and regulated in England and Wales 
since their first  com mercial use in the m id- twent ieth century? -  it  was 
necessary to undertake archival work at  the Nat ional Archives to explore 
how the assessment  of pest icides has been conceptualised and managed 
within the UK Government  and its scient ific advisory commit tees over the 
last  half century. While such informat ion can at  t imes be r ich in historical 
detail it  can also be patchy, leaving the researcher to interpret  and sketch 
around the data which have survived and been recorded. I n this sense, 
sim ilar to other more current  documents, archival evidence does not  tell a 
full story. However, the archival evidence was often found to contain 
internal correspondence that  was personal in nature, frequent ly out lining 
internal government  disputes at  a level of detail not  present  in the readily 
available informat ion provided today by government  bodies in a bid to be 
more t ransparent . 
 
3 .3 2  I nterview ees  
The interviewees in this study were chosen following documentary 
research in the first  year of the PhD on the area of pest icide r isk 
assessment  and regulat ion. This research enabled me to create a m ap of 
the key actors within this field. The creat ion of a physical diagram allowed 
me to draw links between agencies and actors, which in turn helped me 
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to highlight  the key figures in this field. This method was part icular ly 
helpful as the actors in this field form  a t ight  knit  community with many 
actors playing mult iple roles. For example, over half of my interviewees 
have served on several advisory commit tees in addit ion to maintaining 
their academ ic career;  several are also linked with the chem ical indust ry 
or environmental NGOs. I n this sense they are difficult  to adequately 
categorise into discrete study populat ions and any at tempt  to do so would 
be largely art ificial.  However, the pract ical necessity of discussing this 
research required m e to apply some form  of categorisat ion to my 
interviewees. I nterviewees are therefore ident ified only by the group that  
they were interviewed in relat ion to e.g. member of the Advisory 
Commit tee of Pest icides;  to list  their mult iple roles would act  to further 
reduce their anonym ity. I nterviewees are also labelled according to 
whether they are current  or former members of such groups – a full list  of 
interviewees can be found in the Appendix. I t  is recognised that  advisory 
commit tee membership frequent ly changes, so that  those members 
described as current  in the period of interviewing (2006-2007)  may not  
be members in 2009 when this thesis was subm it ted. These findings 
m irror those of Desmond (2004) , who describes her interviewees as a 
“hybrid elite” . The term  refers to the fact  that  her interviewees, who all 
worked within I reland’s Biotechnology sector, often st raddled mult iple 
domains that  included science, indust ry, policy and act ivism  ( I bid, p.263) .  
 
The research is interested in how scient ific uncertainty is understood and 
managed in the creat ion of advice regarding exposure to pest icide 
residues in food. I  was therefore interested in interviewing actors who are 
act ively involved in reviewing scient ific literature to produce public and 
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policy advice, thus I  concent rated on interviewing members of three UK 
advisory commit tees that  have recent ly debated such issues. The first  
was the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , a government  scient ific 
advisory commit tee, where members are drawn from outside of the civil 
service. The ACP is charged with providing advice to Ministers and 
regulatory departments on mat ters relat ing to the cont rol of agricultural 
pests and falls under the auspices of the Pest icide Safety Directorate 
(PSD) . The other two were working groups of the Food Standard Agency’s 
Commit tee on Toxicity (COT) :  The Working Group on the Risk Assessment  
of Mixtures of Pest icides and Veterinary Medicines (WiGRAMP)  and the 
Working Group on Variabilit y and Uncertainty in Toxicology (VUT)  – as 
these groups are relat ively small,  these interviewees are referred to as 
COT members throughout  this thesis to lim it  the possibilit y of 
ident ificat ion. Eleven of my interviewees had sat  on one or more of these 
groups and two more had acted as scient ific advisors to these groups. I  
specifically focussed on toxicologists but  also interviewed scient ists from  
other disciplines relevant  to human r isk assessment  such as epidem iology 
and endocrinology. I  became aware during my fieldwork that  members of 
these groups often had conflict ing opinions and often approached the 
discussion from differ ing philosophical standpoints. I  was therefore keen 
to reflect  this in my interview data.  
 
I  init ially approached my intended interviewees through a formal let ter or 
email that  br iefly detailed my research and asked for their part icipat ion. 
I n general I  had a very high success rate, with the majority of those 
contacted agreeing to part icipate. However, there were a number of 
instances where I  experienced problems. While it  was relat ively easy to 
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gain access to those who work in academ ia and/ or those who have sat  on 
advisory panels, I  experienced several problems accessing 
representat ives from the agrichem ical indust ry and NGOs working in this 
field. These difficult ies arose for a number of reasons. After contact ing 
several large chem ical companies I  was informed that  they were unable 
to speak with me on the grounds of t rade confident ialit y. I  also 
experienced difficult ies in arranging conversat ions with several NGO 
groups;  a common factor being a lack of staff and resources and the fact  
that  many were no longer working on this issue and so were reluctant  to 
discuss it .  To m it igate this I  have ut ilised publicly available documents to 
elicit  their posit ion on the mat ter.  
 
To put  the above into context , six out  of ten WiGRAMP members were 
contacted;  three part icipated and three declined, the two lay members 
were not  contactable, of the remaining two, one works abroad and one 
was not  deemed relevant  due to their research interests. Six of the twelve 
VUT members were contacted and five part icipated. Of the remaining six;  
the two consumer representat ives could not  be contacted, one member 
works abroad and four held research interests beyond that  of my study. 
I n 2006 there were 19 members of the ACP;  however, this number 
includes experts on both the human and environmental effects of 
pest icide exposure and two lay members. For the purpose of this research 
I  needed to focus on those working in human risk assessment . I  therefore 
conducted five interviews with current  members, which included one lay 
member, and a further two with past  members who had held senior 
posit ions within the commit tee. The majority of those who had 
part icipated held permanent  academ ic posit ions within a UK Higher 
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Educat ion inst itut ion, the remainder were either employed as professional 
scient ists or had recent ly ret ired.  
 
To complement  those ment ioned above, I  interviewed several other 
toxicologists and r isk assessors who are not  direct ly involved in the 
advisory process. These interviewees tended to work in the more 
developing and experimental areas of toxicology and included;  one of the 
UK’s leading m ixtures toxicologists, a computat ional toxicologist  and a 
probabilist ic modeller.  Although useful in providing context  to this 
research, much of the data collected from these interviews were not  
relevant  to the main focus of this thesis regarding how those within the 
advisory process were t reat ing this type of research.  
 
I  discovered during the course of my fieldwork that  there was a tension 
between the ACP and Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion 
(RCEP)  regarding the select ion and interpretat ion of scient ific evidence 
when creat ing advice regarding exposure to pest icides. While the RCEP’s 
focus was on the effects of pest icides on bystanders from crop spraying, 
and not  through the consumpt ion of food residues, there is an overlap in 
the literature that  is discussed. I  therefore interviewed a former senior 
member of the RCEP who part icipated in the 2005 report  on “Crop 
Spraying and the Health of Residents and Bystanders”  (Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollut ion, 2005) . I  had init ially contacted the chairman 
of the UK Pest icide Residues Commit tee (PRC) , which also falls under the 
PSD. However, my invitat ion was declined. I  decided against  interviewing 
other members as the PRC is primarily concerned with the monitor ing of 
pest icide residue levels on crops as opposed to the review of r isk 
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assessment  data and the set t ing of lim its, which is undertaken by the 
ACP. I n this sense the PRC are act ing at  a level beyond the interest  of this 
thesis.  
 
Six addit ional interviews were conducted with representat ives from both 
campaign groups and indust ry t rade associat ions. Last ly, three senior 
members from the FSA and PSD were interviewed to discuss the policy 
implicat ions of unresolved scient ific uncertainty and how evidence and 
expert ise is used in the product ion of r isk advice. 
 
3 .3 3  I nterview ing elites 
Many of those I  interviewed can be thought  of as occupying ‘elite’ 
posit ions. Here, I  use Lilleker’s (2003 p.207)  definit ion of elites as those 
“with close proxim ity to power or policymaking” . He suggests that  
through interviewing such a group the researcher has the opportunity to 
learn about  events that  occur “behind closed doors”  and gain insider 
knowledge regarding the influence of and relat ionship between actors 
working within policy decision networks. While Lilleker focuses on elites 
found within the polit ical sphere, the term  can equally be applied to those 
working within the scient ific advisory community. I n his study of  the 
connect ions between the academ ic scient ific research community and 
wider society Mulkay (1976)  argues that  the scient ific elite act  as 
mediators of scient ific knowledge. He highlights that  after World War I I  
the role of the scient ific elite as policy advisors has become 
inst itut ionalised in both the UK and the US, with the result  that  the elite 
now act  as the link between academ ia, government  and wider society. I t  
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is therefore important  to first  ident ify the elite working within the area of 
pest icide regulat ion and ask what  influence they have on the product ion 
and use of scient ific knowledge. 
 
Odendahl and Shaw (2002 p.304)  highlight  that  the key themes when 
interviewing elites are accessibilit y, cont rol and power. While the majority 
of my interviewees proved easy to contact , difficult ies arose in contact ing 
those who had ret ired from public life;  I  was often met  with suspicion by 
past  work colleagues and I  was frequent ly vet ted for my suitabilit y by 
past  secretaries and adm in staff.  Many of my interviewees conduct  
research involving in vivo methodology and were at  f irst  reluctant  to 
speak with me unt il I  told them exact ly what  I  wanted to discuss, as they 
were wary of animal r ights campaigners.  
 
I nvariably, I  t ravelled to my interviewees’ workplace and like others 
“ researching up”  was often made aware of my interviewees’ elite posit ion. 
During the course of my interviewing I  experienced all the subt le power 
dynam ics that  are discussed by Odendahl and Shaw (2002) . For example, 
being kept  wait ing, often with no explanat ion given;  having the 
interviewee take telephone calls during my visit ;  having the interviewee 
switch topic or ask quest ions regarding other interviewees. Addit ionally, 
many of my interviewees, although not  social scient ists, often took it  
upon themselves to tell me how I  should be conduct ing my research.  
 
Several of my part icipants confided that  they had children the same age 
as me, many of whom were also in university educat ion and undertaking 
a PhD. They would therefore engage me in conversat ion about  post -
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graduate educat ion and my student  lifestyle. I n that  sense I  often felt  the 
relat ionship to be almost  paternal and I  was looked upon like they would 
a fr iend of their child. This often manifested itself in what  I  would describe 
as parental concern with them t rying to be helpful towards me, not  only 
during the interview but  also in checking that  I  would be fine on my 
return journey, did I  need help get t ing to the stat ion, whether I  had 
managed to get  lunch, how was I  coping with my studies and so on. 
Desmond (2004)  states that  when asked sim ilar quest ions she felt  
belit t led. However, I  took these concerns in the spir it  in which I  believe 
them to be intended and used it  as an opportunity to build a rapport  with 
the interviewee, in case future contact  would be required. I ndeed, I  found 
it  was helpful for this type of relat ionship to be created as I  then became 
unthreatening, which often resulted in candid interviews.  
 
Another important  tool that  I  was able to use to build rapport  and gain 
confidence was to let  slip early in the interview that  I  had a scient ific 
background. Many of my interviewees were quite scathing of social 
scient ists, suggest ing that  they do not  understand “ real science”  or the 
pressures faced by scient ists;  this at t itude was especially prevalent  when 
the use of animals in tests were discussed. By telling them that  I  had 
previously undertaken a scient ific degree I  was no longer an outsider with 
whom they had to be careful, but  a paid up member of their club. The 
fact  that  my science degree only marginally overlapped with the area I  
am  studying was also beneficial. This overlap allowed me to sound 
knowledgeable about  some aspects of what  we were discussing but  also 
allowed me to play dum b on others. Although a slight ly decept ive tact ic,  
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this was useful as it  allowed me to ask quest ions at  a quite basic level 
without  underm ining my posit ion as a competent  researcher.  
 
3 .4  Ethics 
I t  is imperat ive when conduct ing any social research to consider the 
subject  of ethics. While this research did not  have to be formally assessed 
by an appointed ethics board, the issue was considered at  some length. 
Pract ical advice on how to best  achieve this was sought  and I  applied 
principles as suggested by Mason (1996) . These included inform ing 
potent ial part icipants of the nature of the study when they were init ially 
contacted and asked to part icipate. Addit ionally, all part icipants were 
formally thanked through writ ten correspondence short ly after the 
meet ing. At  the beginning of each interview I  requested perm ission from 
the part icipant  to record the interact ion and explained that  it  would be 
t ranscribed and may be used not  only in my PhD research but  also as a 
resource for future papers or other work produced by myself. The 
part icipants were advised that  the data would be t reated as confident ial 
and that  they would, unless they specifically requested otherwise, be 
anonym ised in the thesis and all other work produced. I  have t r ied as a 
principle to om it  any ident ify ing features of the interviewees through the 
use of false names and ident it ies as is suggested by Wind et  al.  (2004) . 
However, I  recognise that  the field from which my interviewees were 
chosen is small.  Therefore it  will be relat ively easy for those within that  
community to at t r ibute part icular viewpoints to specific individuals. 
However, the major ity of my interviewees hold prom inent  posit ions within 
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their field and so many of their opinions are likely to already be in the 
public domain.  
 
During my research I  was given informat ion that  was part icularly 
sensit ive, for example, informat ion regarding advisory discussions that  
have not  been made public or regarding personal relat ionships between 
interviewees. On occasions I  was asked to turn off my recorder and to 
t reat  the informat ion as “off record” .  The informat ion gathered while the 
recorder was turned off has not  been used within this thesis. Other 
interviewees asked not  to have part icular views at t r ibuted to them, in 
such cases I  have t r ied to further anonym ise their comments through 
simply labelling them as a commit tee member.  
 
As a rule I  did not  disclose interviewee ident it ies to other interviewees. 
However, on some occasions it  was necessary to reveal that  I  had spoken 
to certain people, and in cases where I  was int roduced to new 
interviewees through past  contacts this disclosure was unavoidable. 
Several of my interviewees also discussed the work and opinions of other 
academ ics and fellow advisory board members, many of whom I  had, or 
intended to interview. This is perhaps unsurprising given that  this area is 
dom inated by a relat ively small group of people who appear to know each 
other on both a personal and professional basis. Such cross referencing of 
other elites and the highlight ing of elites as being part  of a wider social 
and polit ical network is also noted as a feature of this type of research by 
Desmond (2004)  and Cormode and Hughes (1999) . 
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Where, during interviews it  was necessary to discuss other people’s work 
or opinions, I  was careful to only discuss informat ion that  was publicly 
available, and did not  at t r ibute informat ion obtained through previous 
interviews to individuals. Murphy and Dingwall (2001)  cite Borland (1991)  
and Stacy (1991)  to highlight  that  part icipants, when reviewing 
informat ion that  they have provided, may be unhappy at  how they have 
been depicted or may not  recognise their story as their own. Several of 
my interviewees requested that  if I  were to publish my research that  they 
are shown any material that  I  would be at t r ibut ing to them, even when 
anonym ised. I  believe this to be a reasonable request  as the issue of 
pest icide residues remains content ious within the media with many of my 
interviewees unhappy at  how the issue and their work is port rayed. 
Murphy and Dingwall (2001)  use Cassell’s  (1978)  work to illust rate that  
once informat ion is made public it  is difficult  to cont rol how it  may be 
used or viewed in the future. I  therefore believe it  is the researcher’s 
responsibilit y to record and present  field data in an accurate and factual 
manner so as to t ry and avoid any m isinterpretat ion that  may be 
damaging to those who part icipated in your research. This work has not  
yet  been formally published but  I  plan to adhere to the requests that  
were agreed between me and my part icipants during the publicat ion 
process. 
   
3 .5  Data analysis 
The interview recordings were t ranscribed and analysed themat ically, with 
each separate theme coded and broken down into sub- themes. Coding 
was done manually and without  the use of data management  software 
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such as NVivo. I  decided against  the use of such software as I  felt  it  
would distance me from the raw data and present  a fragmented picture, 
where themes would appear art ificially discrete. Through using manual 
methods I  was able to gain a more holist ic understanding of the data and 
observe often complex links between different  themes.  
 
Key themes that  were found across the data were ideas of boundaries, 
whether between science and non-science or expert ise and non-expert ise, 
and the importance of fram ing in both conceptualising and solving 
problems. To analyse the data I  therefore drew on exist ing literature from  
Sociology and Science and Technology Studies (STS)  that  have explored 
these concepts in other set t ings. A descript ion of these concepts and 
just ificat ion of their use can be found below.  
 
3 .5 1  Boundary w ork 
The issue of demarcat ing science from non-science has been widely 
discussed within the STS literature and is relevant  to this work, which 
seeks to understand why certain evidence and expert ise is considered as 
more acceptable than others in the r isk assessment  of pest icides. The 
specific term  “boundary work”  was first  used by Gieryn (1983)  to 
highlight  how scient ists dist inguish their work from non-science through:  
 
Their at t r ibut ion of selected characterist ics to the inst itut ion of 
science ( i.e. to its pract it ioners, methods, stock of knowledge, 
values and work organisat ion)  for the purpose of const ruct ing 
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a social boundary that  dist inguishes some intellectual act ivity 
as non-science. (Gieryn, 1983 p.782)   
 
Gieryn (1983)  argues that  boundary work rout inely occurs at  all levels of 
scient ific discussion ranging from the teaching of science in the school to 
the direct ion of research of nat ional funding councils. I n making this claim  
he st resses that  demarcat ion is not  simply an abst ract  issue for the 
debate of social scient ists. I nstead, its use can tangibly affect  not  only the 
material resources made available to actor groups but  also lead to the 
reinforcing of professional authority and privileges among those perceived 
as ‘scient ific’. 
 
I n drawing on the work of the philosopher Thoreau, Gieryn (1999)  later 
likens boundary work to the process of map drawing, proposing the term  
“cultural cartography”  to illust rate how epistem ic authority and credible 
methods are drawn out  to create borders and landmarks on a cultural 
map to signify what  is and is not  science. I t  is important  to note that  such 
landmarks and boundaries are not  stat ic or drawn object ively;  rather they 
are contextual and differ depending on the cartographer and purpose of 
the map. Boundary work can therefore be viewed as a st rategic behaviour 
employed by scient ists to protect  the boundaries of their discipline and 
social com munity from threats against  it s cognit ive authority (Guston, 
2001) .  
 
Halffman and Hoppe (2002)  using the work of historian Steve Shapin 
(1992)  build on Gieryn’s research to suggest  a wider definit ion of 
boundary work:  
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Boundary work defines a pract ice in cont rast  to other 
pract ices, protects it  from  unwanted part icipants and 
interference, while at tempt ing to  prescribe proper ways of 
behaviour for part icipants and non-part icipants (demarcat ion) ;  
at  the same t ime, boundary work defines proper ways for 
interact ion between these pract ices and makes such 
interact ion possible and conceivable (coordinat ion) . (Halffman 
and Hoppe, 2002 p.13)  
 
Boundary work can therefore be seen as dual purpose, where 
demarcat ion is used to dist inguish between groups and coordinat ion is 
used to exam ine how apparent ly r ival groups relate to one another.  
 
So far, boundary work has been discussed as a deliberat ive st rategic 
act ion. However, other researchers, while agreeing that  boundary work 
rout inely occurs, make the suggest ion that  such pract ices are often 
applied unreflect ively within everyday pract ice often act ing to reinforce 
exist ing organisat ional at t itudes (Knorr-Cet ina, 1981;  Kinchy and 
Kleinman, 2003) .  I n extending these assumpt ions in their own empir ical 
research, Eden et  al. (2006)  show how boundaries are cont ingent ly 
drawn, result ing in a fuzzy grey area of negot iat ion and rhetoric. They 
highlight  Jasanoff’s (1987)  research on the blurr ing of boundaries 
between science and polit ics to illust rate how ‘science’ can be a pliable 
resource used to further a rhetorical case or suit  the needs of the 
cartographer. Guston (2001)  too highlights Jasanoff’s (1990)  work, but  
uses it  as an example of how boundary work can be policy- relevant  with 
the blurr ing of boundaries result ing in more product ive policy-making.  
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Both Gieryn (1999)  and Halffman and Hoppe (2002)  argue against  
essent ialism ;  if there is no fixed definit ion of science or polit ics then there 
can be no one r ight  way to demarcate between the two. This issue is 
further complicated by the heterogeneous nature of science and the 
differ ing frameworks found within different  scient ific disciplines. Halffman 
and Hoppe (2002, p.11)  therefore use Gieryn’s definit ion of boundary 
work to provide a framework for social researchers to study this st rategic 
act ion. I t  is this framework (shown below)  that  I  have used in this 
research:  
 
x Analyse how the actors involved define science. 
x Discover what  they consider to be scient ific and non-
scient ific pract ices, problems, tools, theories, concept ions, 
behaviour or people. 
x Analyse how such concept ions are presented discursively 
as st rategic moves to claim  or deny legit imacy in areas of 
social life.   
 
I ndeed, it  has previously been suggested by Barnes (1974)  that  that  
before we as academ ics at tempt  to define and demarcate science we 
should exam ine it  as it  is defined by the actors under study. Hence, I  
have used the concept  of boundary work not  to make claims over the 
scient ific basis of the data used to formulate r isk advice, but  as a tool to 
explore and understand how the actors involved map out  the boundaries 
of what  they believe to be scient ific and who they consider expert , and to 
explore the consequences of such cartographic creat ivity.   
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The concept  of boundary work has been usefully extended to consider 
“boundary objects”  (Star and Griesemer, 1989)  and “boundary-ordering 
devices”  (Shackley and Wynne, 1996) . I n recognising the heterogeneity 
of science and the different  view points, and thus tensions that  this 
brings, Star and Griesemer (1989, p.393)  suggest  a new analyt ical 
concept  – boundary objects, which they define as follow:   
 
Boundary objects are objects which are both plast ic enough to 
adapt  to local needs and const raints of the several part ies 
employing them, yet  robust  enough to maintain a common 
ident ity across sites. They are weakly st ructured in com mon 
use, and become st rongly st ructured in individual-site use. 
They may be abst ract  or concrete. They have different  
meanings in different  social worlds but  their st ructure is 
common enough to more than one world to make them 
recognizable means of t ranslat ion. The creat ion and 
management  of boundary objects is key in developing and 
maintaining coherence across intersect ing social worlds. 
 
Shackley and Wynne (1996)  have built  on this concept  to suggest  that  
within scient ific debates scient ific uncertainty can challenge both the 
science and the authority of scient ists. Scient ists therefore often have to 
occupy a dual posit ion in order to retain a technical rat ionality when 
involved in policy making processes;  on one hand they are obliged to 
acknowledge and discuss uncertainty, while on the other they have to 
m inim ise the follow-on assumpt ion that  uncertainty challenges the 
authority of science, m aking it  unsuitable for use in policy making. This 
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may create an addit ional tension in the field of r isk assessment  where 
there is often a cultural desire (as discussed in Chapter Two)  to reduce 
the incidence of Type 1 errors ( false-posit ives)  so as to avoid over-
regulat ion. I n this sense scient ific uncertainty is used as a boundary-
ordering device that  “allows scient ists ( i)  to t ranslate uncertainty for 
policymakers so as to make its reduct ion appear more t ractable and ( ii)  to 
maintain a r icher, or more heterogeneous, version of uncertainty for 
scient ific communit ies than for policymakers so that  scient ific integrity 
can be preserved around an agenda of t ractable scient ific problems”  
(Shackley and Wynne, 1996, p.293;  Barke, 2009) . These concepts will be 
used to help consider how the actors involved in the r isk assessment  of 
pest icides manage scient ific uncertainty. 
 
3 .5 2  Fram ing 
I n situat ions where quest ions and problems associated with r isk are 
difficult  to single out  from a melange of inter-connected issues it  often 
becomes necessary to invoke a select ive vision, where issues are fram ed  
to make them manageable or cont rollable. According to Goffman (1974, 
p.21)  fram ing allows actors to “ to locate, perceive, ident ify, and label”  
problems. Fram ing therefore provides meaning and a method by which 
actors can organise and guide future act ion (Koenig, 2007) . The 
development  and invocat ion of regulat ion can therefore be viewed as one 
method of fram ing. 
 
Accordingly, frames are used by actors as “principles of select ion, 
emphasis and presentat ion composed of lit t le tacit  knowledge about  what  
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exists, what  happens, and what  mat ters”  (Git lin, 1980, p.6) . While in 
many instances fram ing may be latent , others have argued that  fram ing 
can be a deliberat ive and manufactured process allowing actors to focus 
at tent ion on and promote one problem definit ion or recommendat ion over 
another (Entman, 1993) .  
 
Once problems have been framed it  follows that  they should become 
easier to solve. Thus, complex problems may be tamed for the purpose of 
const ruct ive discussion or regulatory ease. However, it  must  equally be 
recognised that  any solut ion to a tamed problem is unlikely to account  for 
those wild issues that  have been excluded from the problem and 
subsequent  discussion (Jasanoff, 2000;  Millstone, 2007) .  
 
Millstone (2007) , drawing on Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne, has 
argued that  the inst itut ional and polit ical contexts in which advisors work 
can st rongly shape their “ fram ing assumpt ions” . Millstone ( ibid, p.499)  
suggests these assumpt ions are important  for four reasons:  
 
First ly, they are very influent ial, secondly, they have exercised 
their influence in an almost  ent irely invisible or 
unacknowledged way, thirdly, they are readily contestable, 
and fourthly, because the unacknowledged ways in which 
science and polit ics have been hybridized, and then 
m isrepresented as if purely scient ific, have been fundamental 
failures, of which BSE and GM crops are two of the most  
conspicuous examples.  (Millstone, 2007, p.499)  
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Thus, fram ing can be used to determ ine what  evidence is and is not  
allowable in r isk discussions and how such evidence is interpreted. A key 
consequence may be that  those who are not  able to present  acceptable 
evidence are effect ively excluded from act ively part icipat ing in any r isk 
dialogue, a situat ion at  odds with the current  UK Government  goal of 
wider engagement . I n the same vein, where there are alternat ive 
fram ings of the same issue there is the potent ial for m iscommunicat ion 
and a greater likelihood of disagreement  in proposed solut ions or advice. 
 
The concept  of fram ing will be used in this thesis to explore how different  
groups conceptualise the issues surrounding the r isk assessment  
pest icides and the product ion of r isk advice and which actors are allowed 
to part icipate in these debates.  
 
3 .6  Sum m ary 
I n this chapter I  have provided a detailed overview of the methods used 
within this research -  documentary analysis and interviews – detailing the 
reasons behind these choices.  
 
Specifically,  I  have discussed issues surrounding sampling and access, 
ethics and the difficult ies in interviewing elites and obtaining grey 
literature. Here, I  detailed that  25 interviews were conducted as part  of 
this research and that  interviewees were largely those working within the 
pest icide advisory system, although, a number (6)  were members of 
NGOs or indust ry groups. I  discussed that  the major ity of the 
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documentary evidence was relat ively easy to access and where there 
were problems, alternat ive evidence sources were considered.   
 
Last ly, I  have discussed how the collected data have been analysed using 
a themat ic approach that  has drawn on the concept  of fram ing and 
boundary work.  
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Chapter 4 : History of Pest icide 
Regulat ion in England and W ales 
4 .1  I nt roduct ion 
There are current ly few detailed historical narrat ives that  explore, using 
archival data, how pest icide assessment  and use have t radit ionally been 
managed in England and Wales15
 
. I n this chapter I  therefore aim  to 
address the first  of my research quest ions -  How have the potent ial r isks 
of pest icides been historically assessed and regulated in England and 
Wales since their first  com m ercial use in the m id- twent ieth century? -  to 
understand how historical decisions may have shaped pest icide 
assessment  and regulat ion as we understand it  today. 
To achieve this I  will detail how statutory regulat ion has evolved through 
a succession of voluntary agreements. I n part icular, I  focus on the 
beginnings of English pest icide assessment  and regulat ion in the 1950s 
and 1960s, illust rat ing how decisions made during this early per iod have 
direct ly shaped the role and rem it  of current  English pest icide advisory 
bodies. I  show that  from the 1950s onwards there were serious concerns 
raised relat ing to chronic exposure to low- levels and exposure to m ixtures 
of pest icides. However, I  argue that  the archival evidence suggests that  
such concerns have been persistent ly bracketed within the assessment  
                                                 
15
 Notable except ions are van Zwanenberg’s (1996)  PhD thesis on 
“Science, Pest icide Policy and Public Health:  Ethylene Bisdithiocarbamate 
Regulat ion in the UK and USA” , and Gilbert ’s (1987)  PhD thesis on 
“Pest icide Safety Policy and Cont rol Arrangements in Britain” .  
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and regulatory process, and thus effect ively removed from the rem it  of 
pest icide advisory bodies.  
 
I  conclude the chapter with an overview of the process current ly used to 
determ ine Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs)  for pest icides and discuss the 
UK’s regulatory integrat ion within Europe.  
 
The assessment  of pest icides falls over several regulatory areas 
depending on their type, use and potent ial hazard. This thesis is largely 
concerned with the r isk presented to the public through the consumpt ion 
of food containing residues. I n the following account  of English regulatory 
history I  therefore concent rate on the regulat ion relevant  to consumer 
protect ion. However, some issues relat ing to other regulatory areas, such 
as operator and bystander safety or effects to wildlife, provide the wider 
context  to this discussion and convey the complexity of pathways of 
pest icide exposure that  inevitably overstep the socially const ructed 
boundaries of regulat ion.   
 
Much of the informat ion used within this chapter has been obtained 
through the exam inat ion of archival data which is supplemented by case 
studies;  this was previously discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
4 .2  1 9 0 0 - 1 9 5 0 : Assessm ent  to ensure efficacy  
The applicat ion of pest icidal substances to plants can be t raced back 
through writ ten records to Homer in 1000 BC (Carlile, 2006) . However, 
although there are sporadic records of chem ical preparat ions being used 
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for pest  cont rol purposes throughout  history it  is not  unt il the m id 20 th 
Century that  pest icides were adopted for use on an indust r ial scale (Ware 
and Whitacre, 2004) . Unt il the 1940s pest icides were largely inorganic 
chem ical preparat ions that  were primed for use prior to applicat ion;  this 
‘homemade’ status meant  there were few official rules and regulat ions 
surrounding their safe use (Russell,  2005) . 
 
The beginnings of English pest icide regulat ion can be t raced back to 1931 
when the Minist ry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) , apparent ly under 
pressure from the Nat ional Farmers Union, suggested to the Associat ion 
of Brit ish I nsect icide Manufacturers (ABI M16
 
)  that  t raders of pest icides 
should label their preparat ions and subm it  these to government . 
Pest icidal substances could then be put  on an approved list  with the aim  
of helping farmers reduce their out lay on inefficient  products (van 
Zwanenberg, 1996) . I t  was also during this period that  MAF began to 
conduct  annual surveys of crop diseases throughout  England and Wales 
(Russell,  2005) .  
I n 1942, the Advisory Commit tee on the Scheme for Approval of 
Proprietary Products for the Cont rol of Plant  Pests and Diseases was 
established. The purpose of this commit tee was to consider applicat ions 
made voluntarily by pest icide manufacturers;  applicat ions were assessed 
on factors such as safety, product  labelling and proposed use. Following 
amendments to the scheme, the t it le of the scheme was altered in 1949 
to the Crop Protect ion Products Approval Scheme (CPPAS), which was 
superseded in 1960 by the Agricultural Chem icals Approval Scheme (MAF 
                                                 
16
 ABI M is now the Crop Protect ion Agency. 
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371) . The CPPAS was designed to enable professionals to provide advice 
on crop protect ion products, with accepted products allowed to label 
themselves as Minist ry approved (MAF 98/ 484) . The statement  below 
suggests that  at  this t ime applicat ions were assessed on the basis of 
efficacy as opposed to safety, with members encouraged to approve 
substances “wherever possible” :  
 
Although the at t itude of the Advisory Commit tee to its work is 
to recommend the approval of products wherever possible 
rather than their reject ion, the scheme will have the effect  of 
discouraging the use of unsat isfactory preparat ions. (MAF 
98/ 484, PS37:  2)  
 
The Commit tee argued that  in order for the scheme to operate, the 
Advisory Commit tee required a Joint  Panel which could provide it  with the 
necessary guidance. I n addit ion to members of the Advisory Commit tee 
and representat ives of other government  departments, the Joint  Panel 
included five representat ives of the ABI M (MAF 98/ 484, PS 37:  3) . The 
inclusion of the ABI M on the Panel suggests that  there has historically 
been a close working relat ionship between government  and indust ry in 
the area of pest icide regulat ion. Such a relat ionship is likely to have been 
beneficial to pest icide manufacturers as not  only would they have had 
representat ion within the approval process but  they would also have 
gained a valuable insight  into how products came to be recommended or 
rejected.   
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An important  breakthrough in the development  of commercial pest icides 
came in 1938 and 1939 when the first  organophosphate, TEPP and the 
organochlorine, DDT were discovered (Hajek, 2004) . The chem ical 
propert ies of DDT were subsequent ly passed to the Brit ish Minist ry of 
Product ion, whose wart ime work led to significant  advances in the 
development  of crop protect ion products (Green, 1995) . By the end of the 
Second World War, the group working on DDT at  the Minist ry of 
Product ion had been disbanded, instead, an inter-departmental 
commit tee was established within the Agricultural Research Council 
(Green, 1995) .   
 
To summarise, there appears to be lit t le evidence of any form  of pest icide 
regulat ion or government  involvement  in the product ion and use of 
pest icides prior to the 1930s. During this period, Ministers and 
government  departments favoured the use of voluntary approval schemes 
over statutory product  regist rat ion and encouraged the part icipat ion of 
indust ry groups within the advisory process. Assessment  of pest icides was 
focussed towards determ ining efficacy as opposed to safety, which 
appears a secondary concern during this t ime. 
 
However, the rapid advances in the chem ical indust ry and its applicat ion 
to crop protect ion products during the Second World War resulted in the 
UK Government  paying increased at tent ion to ensuring both the efficient  
and safe use of pest icides, changes that  will be discussed in the next  
sect ion. 
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4 .3  1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 0 : The W orking Party on 
Precaut ionary Measures against  Toxic 
Chem icals used in Agriculture 
Linked to both the increasing availabilit y and use of pest icides was a 
growing concern for the safety of agricultural operators. During the 
1940s, several deaths and poisonings of agricultural workers were 
at t r ibuted to the use of the pest icide DNOC and other organophosphate 
insect icides (Gilbert  and Macrory, 1989) . These incidents, coupled with 
the public cont roversy surrounding the presence of nit rogen t r ichlor ide in 
bread flour and its link to seizures in dogs (Silver and Pollock, 1948) , 
culm inated in the establishment  of the Working Party on Precaut ionary 
Measures against  Toxic Chemicals used in Agriculture, chaired by the now 
em inent  Lord ( then Professor)  Solly Zuckerman. The Working Party 
conducted three key inquir ies under Zuckerman which broadly fell within 
the following areas:  operator safety, consumer goods safety and the 
effects of pest icides on wildlife.  
 
4 .3 1  1 st W orking Party Report : Operator Safety  
The 1951 report  ent it led “Operator Safety”  highlighted that  operators 
often took insufficient  precaut ion when handling and using pest icidal 
products. I n response to these findings, the Working Party made the 
recommendat ion that  legal requirements be int roduced in respect  to the 
wearing of protect ive clothing and the safe handling and use of pest icides 
(Gilbert  and Macrory, 1989) . These concerns were formally addressed in 
the 1952 Agriculture (Poisonous Substances)  Act , which required the 
provision of protect ive clothing for workers to reduce the likelihood of 
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agricultural poisoning (HMSO, 1952) . This Act  was enforced by Area and 
County MAF officials and was largely considered at  the t ime to be 
successful, if a lit t le over protect ive (Edson, 1958) .  
 
I n part icular, the Report  made explicit  reference to the r isks involved in 
the handling and use of organophosphate (OP)  chem icals in agriculture. 
The Working Party, having invest igated the health effects of dinit ro and 
organo-phosphorus sprays on workers, concluded that  not  only should 
products be bet ter labelled (as a deadly poison)  but  that  there was, at  
that  t ime, no protect ive equipment  available that  would allow both the 
necessary bodily vent ilat ion and complete protect ion from chem ical 
exposure. However, the key finding of the report , which is now much 
cited due to its stark warnings (Lean and Emmet t , 1996) , was that  the 
chief danger of OP pest icides lay in repeated low- level exposure, which 
the Working Party felt  could result  in adverse chronic effects to human 
health (Hansard, 1996) .  
 
During 1951, the Advisory Council on Science Policy also expressed 
concern regarding consumer safety following exposure to pest icides in 
food. Gilbert  and Macrory (1989)  note that  although the Advisory Council 
believed the r isk to be small it  was concerned that  the rapid adopt ion of 
new substances posed dangers “ for which assessment  procedures were 
inadequate” , especially in respect  to the assessment  of chronic effects. I n 
response to these fears, the Advisory Council established the Commit tee 
on Toxic Substances in Consumer Goods. The Commit tee subsequent ly 
recommended that  pest icide m anufacturers should subm it  evidence to the 
relevant  government  department  to demonst rate that  a product  did not  
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pose r isks of acute toxicity (Tizard, 1951) . I nterest ingly, despite previous 
concerns, these recommendat ions did not  cover chronic toxic effects. 
 
4 .3 2  2 nd W orking Party Report : Effects on the 
Consum er 
Following the above recommendat ions, the second Zuckerman inquiry 
focussed on the possible r isks of pest icide exposure to food consumers. 
The 1953 report  suggests that  the public had become fearful of pest icides 
as a result  of their increased use and a perceived lack of knowledge 
regarding their toxic effects (MAF 98/ 484)  – st r ik ingly, these same 
concerns are st ill present  today (Friends of the Earth, 2004a;  Pest icide 
Act ion Network, 2004) . I t  is noteworthy that  at  the inaugural meet ing of 
the Pest icide Group in 1954 the discussion cent red on the safety of 
pest icides to the public and environment  (Green, 1995) , suggest ing that  
this issue was considered pert inent  among the UK’s leading pest icide 
scient ists at  this t ime.   
 
The first  meet ing of the Working Party on Precaut ionary Measures against  
Toxic Chemicals used in Agriculture (Part  I I :  Effects on the Consumer)  
was held on 24 th May 1951. During this meet ing the terms of reference 
were set  out  and the list  of chem icals that  would need to be considered in 
relat ion to consumer food r isk discussed. Most  notably, the m inutes of the 
meet ing reveal that  “ chem icals would have to be judged in the light  of 
present  knowledge as there was no t ime for detailed scient ific 
invest igat ion” , an issue that  is repeatedly m ade reference to throughout  
future meet ings (MAF130/ 61, [ WPC (2)  3] ) . During the second meet ing in 
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July 1951, the Group decided that  a Sub-Commit tee should be enacted to 
consider the substances in three categories of knowledge that  ranged 
from “unknown toxicity”  to “ fair ly safe” . By the fifth meet ing in June 
1952, the Working Party had drawn the following conclusions, as are 
shown in the m inutes (MAF130/ 61) . I  have highlighted the statements 
salient  to this thesis:  
 
x The cont inued use of toxic chem icals appeared to be 
necessary  to achieve maximum  agricultural product ion 
and prevent  undue losses of stored food. 
 
x That  there was lit t le r isk to the consumers of food which 
had been t reated with toxic chem icals either in growth or 
in storage, provided that  these substances were properly 
used. 
 
x However, there appeared to be a considerable r isk 
associated with the improper use of those toxic 
substances and it  had been established that  m isuse did 
frequent ly occur.  
 
x Only 40%  of our food supply was home grown and, 
therefore, able to be bought  under direct  cont rol. Of the 
other  6 0 %  im ported from  overseas, lit t le  w as know n 
of m ethods of t reatm ent  or  of the chem icals used .  
Moreover, it  should be emphasised that  there was no 
cont rol from  the retail stage onwards. 
 
x I t  w as im possible to assess toxicological hazards 
w ith any degree of accuracy ;  therefore, any decision 
about  cont rol of toxic chem icals must  be based on a 
reasonable assessment  of the risk by those who were 
competent  to advise on the informat ion available. 
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x The exist ing law (Food and Drugs Act , 1938)  already 
imposed an obligat ion upon food manufacturers to ensure 
that  the food produced for human consumpt ion was non-
toxic. 
 
x The insect icide m anufacturers already took every 
precaut ion to assure themselves that  no dangerous r isk 
from residues at tended the use of substances which they 
marketed. They had expressed a w illingness to 
t ransform  w hat  w as now  a voluntary undertaking 
into a  statutory responsibility .  By doing so they not  
only fulfilled their formal obligat ion under the law, but  also 
st rengthened their t rading posit ion. 
 
x I t  appeared advisable to increase and dissem inate the 
knowledge available about  toxic chem icals by: -  
o devising further methods of analysis;  
o dist r ibut ing the available informat ion on those 
methods and on the known acute and chronic 
toxicological r isk;  
o carrying out  further research towards improving 
exist ing m ethods and devising new methods for 
the ident ificat ion of residues, especially where 
break-down products m ight  be involved. 
 
x More research into the developm ent  of safer 
a lternat ives for some of the toxic substances at  present  
in use seemed to be desirable.  
o That  in consider ing whether the cont inued use of 
any toxic substance was just ified, a balance must  
be st ruck between its r isk and efficacy and those of 
possible alternat ives. 17
                                                 
17
 I n a later document  the Scient ific Sub-Commit tee on Poisonous 
Substances used in Agriculture and Food Storage state that  the basis for 
discrim inat ion is the assumpt ion that  both do vir tually the same job. 
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The above conclusions appear somewhat  inconsistent  suggest ing that  the 
Working Party faced several obstacles in fulfilling its rem it . For example, 
it  concluded that  there “was lit t le r isk to the consumers of food which had 
been t reated with toxic chem icals…provided that  these substances were 
properly used” , yet  it  later acknowledged that  it  was “ impossible to assess 
toxicological hazards with any degree of accuracy” . I mportant ly, it  
concluded that  decisions should only be made by those with the 
necessary expert ise who can be considered competent  to advise. 
However, a common theme running through discussions in the 1950s and 
into the 1960s was that  both actual methods and the resources ( including 
t rained staff and laboratories)  to perform  both toxicological tests and 
residue analysis were either in too short  a supply or simply unavailable18
                                                                                                                                                 
However, it  suggests that  in pract ice such discrim inat ion is impract ical, if 
not  impossible, as it  can take years of use to assess a pest icide’s value 
and there are too many variables to consider. I t  iterates that  the Sub-
Commit tee’s funct ion is not  to recommend one product  over another but  
to judge whether each product  presents a toxic hazard to either the user 
or consumer and if so how this hazard can be reduced (MAF 98/ 484, PS 
53) ;  a pract ice that  remains today. 
. 
18
 I n response to the second Working Party Report  on consumer r isks the 
ABI M clear ly states (MAF 130/ 62,  21 September 1953) :  “Few 
manufacturers have facilit ies for providing informat ion on toxicity and 
there are only lim ited opportunit ies for seeking the help of consultants.”  
 
The m inutes from the 3 rd meet ing of the Scient ific Sub-Commit tee on 
Poisonous Substances used in Agriculture and Food Storage (06.01.1955)  
also discuss the level of work required in residue analysis. A Dr Ashworth 
quotes the example of the insect icide Schradan, revealing that  the Joint  
MAF/ ABI M Commit tee had spent  two years at tempt ing (unsuccessfully)  to 
find a method of analysis to detect  residues of  Schradan and its 
metabolites in food. I t  was further suggested that  the development  of 
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These lim ited resources therefore raises the quest ion of how certain the 
Working Party could have been of the scale of r isk facing UK consumers 
at  this t ime. This difficulty was amplif ied as 60%  of food consumed at  
that  t ime was imported, with lit t le informat ion on how it  was produced or 
stored;  where food was grown within the UK it  could not  be guaranteed 
that  pest icides were properly used.  
 
Perhaps the most  interest ing conclusion is that  indicat ing insect icide 
manufactures “had expressed a willingness to t ransform  what  was now a 
voluntary undertaking into a statutory responsibilit y”  (MAF130/ 61) . 
I ndeed the first  recom mendat ion made within the draft  report  produced in 
December 1952 stated:  
 
That  Departments should take statutory powers to call for the 
regist rat ion and licensing of all chem icals that  are int roduced 
and offered for sale as substances which protect  agricultural 
products from diseases and pests.  (MAF130/ 61, W.P.C. (2)  33, 
p. 19)  
 
However, the apparent  willingness of indust ry to convert  to statutory 
measures is not  seen in other documents and memos from that  period, 
which suggests that  both government  departments and indust ry had 
object ions. For example, both the Agricultural Department  and the Labour 
Division stated in its consultat ion response that  in its opinion there was 
no just ificat ion for changing the voluntary regime to a statutory one. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
new analyt ic methods for just  one chem ical could take two full t ime 
workers one or more years (MAF 98/ 484, (PS24) / SC36) . 
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apparent  lack of data to firm ly conclude whether there was a danger is 
used to defend maintaining the status quo:  
 
I t  is hard to find any real just ificat ion for the change of view in 
this new report , in which the main theme is that  there has as 
yet  been no known instance of illness result ing from eat ing 
food previously sprayed with weed killers or insect icides and 
that  the main danger is that  there is insufficient  informat ion to 
decide whether there is even a potent ial danger.   (MAF130/ 61, 
W.P.C. (2)  38)  
 
Archived documents from this period suggest  that  indust ry interests were 
st ill heavily promoted within this area. For example, it  was felt  by some 
government  departments that  not  only would the scheme be difficult  to 
enforce but  that  the cr iter ia detailing whether new products should be 
accepted or rejected were insufficient  and that  government  test ing 
facilit ies were at  that  t ime inadequate and may lead to a “ tedious delay to 
the manufacturer”  (MAF130/ 61, Labour Division, 19 January 1953) ;  many 
of the consultat ion responses suggest  that  both the ABI M and 
government  departments did not  want  to move away from voluntary 
measures due to the belief that  the int roduct ion of statutory requirements 
would be unnecessarily obst ruct ive to the working pract ice of indust ry. I t  
should be noted that  during this period manufacturers were only 
encouraged to not ify if they felt  that  a chemical was likely to present  a 
toxic r isk to health. Thus, voluntary arrangements cont inued to rely on a 
mutual t rust  between indust ry and government .  
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Sim ilar ly, the m inutes of the Working Party’s meet ing on the 20th May 
1953 (MAF 130/ 62)  show that  the Board of Trade was concerned that  the 
requirements would delay insect icide development  and suggested that  
any “proposed scheme of not ificat ion should have the m inimum of 
rest r ict ive effect  on the indust ry” . Likewise, the Minist ry of Food st ressed 
the importance of promot ing consumer confidence “without  hampering 
the indust ry” . Several other documents also indicate that  departments did 
not  see the benefits of statutory not ificat ion when:  “Generally speaking 
manufacturers of crop protect ing chem icals have a proper sense of 
responsibilit y and can be relied upon to take precaut ions and issue 
inst ruct ions [ for use] ”  (MAF 130/ 61, Hort iculture Branch I , 19 January 
1953) . Addit ionally, while other count r ies, such as the U.S., Germany and 
Denmark had already implemented a form  of statutory cont rol, it  was  
thought  unnecessary in the UK by many Minist r ies because ” t rade 
organisat ions have a highly developed sense of social cont rol by voluntary 
means”  (MAF 130/ 61, I nfestat ion Cont rol Division) . 
 
This reluctance led to the Working Party’s recommendat ion being moved 
in the published report  from  ( i)  to ( iii)  with the wording altered, at  the 
request  of other government  departments, to include the phrase “as soon 
as opportunity offers” :  
 
That  general enabling powers should be sought , as soon as 
opportunity offers, for uses if further experience shows that  
the making of statutory regulat ions is necessary to ensure that  
arrangements on the lines proposed in ( ii)  above work 
effect ively. (MAF 98/ 484)  
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This alterat ion and the relegat ion of the recommendat ion suggest  that  the 
Working Party was under pressure to accommodate the demands of 
Ministers and government  departments who did not  want  to jeopardise 
their relat ionship with indust ry. Notably, as early as 1955 this closeness 
was publicly quest ioned in the Brit ish Medical Journal by B. S. Plat t ,  a 
leading Medical Research Council scient ist . Plat t  raised concerns that  such 
a relat ionship could lead to indust ry interests being unduly accounted for 
in the advisory process:  
 
We have, to recognise in this, the possibilit y of a conflict  of 
interests in which, the Brit ish Medical Journal (1954)  remarks, 
“ I t  is doubt ful if the influence of any such reformer [ posing as 
a champion of the individual safety and protector of the public 
welfare]  would ever equal that  of a powerful comm ercial 
interest  anxious to int roduce a new material or technique into 
food product ion”  (MAF 130/ 62;  Plat t ,  1955, p. 179) .  
 
The 2nd Report  covers a wide range of aspects relat ing to consumer r isk 
and sought  to establish what  effect  contam inat ion by agricultural 
chem icals may have upon the consumer. While the Working Party was not  
able to discover any specific instances of illnesses occurr ing as a result  of 
eat ing t reated food, it  is st ressed that  this should not  lead to 
‘complacency’.  I t  further stated that  new chem icals intended for 
agricultural purposes should not  be commercially applied unt il there is 
adequate informat ion regarding their toxicity. I mportant ly, the report  
highlights several areas of uncertainty and potent ial r isks to both humans 
and wildlife in increasing the use of chem icals in agriculture. Specifically,  
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it  acknowledged the lim its of animal models in toxicity test ing and 
highlight  that  there is insufficient  toxicity and residue data for many 
compounds that  were in use;  lim itat ions that  are st ill pert inent  today as I  
show in Chapter Five. 
 
A key message in the report , and one that  is st ill widely debated, is the 
potent ial r isk facing the public from the regular consumpt ion of small 
amounts of pest icide residues over long periods of t ime. The Working 
Party believed that  the public was unlikely to be reassured about  the 
possibilit y of chronic effects just  because none were shown in long- term  
rat  studies. This issue was discussed further within the sect ion relat ing to 
regulatory adm inist rat ion. Here, the report  stated that  adverse health 
effects, as a result  of consum ing residues, cannot  be guaranteed to 
manifest  themselves immediately after consumpt ion and as such it  may 
not  be possible to link an illness to the consumpt ion of a part icular food 
item 19
 
.  I mportant ly, this led the Working Party to conclude that  the 
exist ing legislat ion was inadequate to ensure the full protect ion of public 
health, a posit ion that  is st ill argued by NGOs today (Pest icide Act ion 
Network, 2004) . 
To summarise, the 2nd Report  appears to recommend a precaut ionary 
approach towards pest icide use and clearly states that  a lack of reported 
illness should not  lead to complacency;  chronic exposure to low- levels 
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 A point  further expanded upon by Plat t  (1955, p. 180)  in the BMJ was 
that  there is a lack of informat ion surrounding the presence of chem icals 
in food and that  their effect  on the human body “may be subt le, insidious 
and long delayed” . 
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through the consumpt ion of food residues was a regular ly noted concern. 
Despite concluding that  there appeared to be lit t le r isk to consumers from  
t reated food, both the Report  and the Working Party m inutes 
acknowledged that  there was often a lack of data available on which to 
assess the r isks posed by a pest icide. I t  was recommended, and indeed 
desired by indust ry, that  where such data existed it  should only be 
assessed by those deemed to have the relevant  expert ise, which in this 
case were seen to be toxicologists.  
 
While the Working Party was act ively in favour of a statutory system, the 
pressure exerted largely by government  departments, and to a lesser 
extent  indust ry bodies, meant  that  this recom mendat ion was not  enacted. 
The key reasons cited for cont inuing the voluntary scheme can be 
summarised as:  concern over the effect  of a statutory scheme on the 
pest icide indust ry;  concern over an inadequate scient ific knowledge base 
upon which to regulate pest icides;  concern over a lack of governmental 
resources required to run a mandatory scheme.  
 
I n the final report  a cont inuat ion of the voluntary scheme was 
recommended, unt il it  could be demonst rated as inadequate. As in the 
1940s the ABI M and other t rade organisat ions remained in close working 
contact  with those making regulatory decisions. The implicat ions were 
publicly quest ioned at  the t ime but  did not  result  in any notable changes 
in working pract ices.  
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4 .3 3  Maxim um  Residue Levels ( MRLs) : Early 
discussions 
I n response to the food safety concerns that  had now begun to st rongly 
emerge, as described above, the Working Party Report  recommended that  
a separate commit tee be established to advise government  departments 
on the following four areas:  r isks to consumers;  the technical inform at ion 
required for product  not ificat ion;  the level of liaison required between 
official and unofficial agencies;  and the set t ing of maximum residue lim its 
(MAF 98/ 484) . As a result ,  the Advisory Commit tee on Poisonous 
Substances used in Agriculture and Food Storage (now the Advisory 
Commit tee on Pest icides or ACP)  and a Scient ific Sub-Commit tee were 
established in 1954 to implement  the int roduct ion of what  would be 
known as the Not ificat ion of Pest icides Schem e (MAF 130/ 62;  Gilbert  and 
Macrory, 1989) . The Commit tee included both adm inist rat ive and 
technical representat ives from various government  departments. I t  
should also be noted that  there was a desire among members to include 
indust ry in Commit tee discussions. I t  was believed that  a range of 
representat ives would be necessary due to the diversity of technical 
problems that  were thought  likely to arise in evidence assessment . For 
example, the I ndust r ial Pest  Cont rol Associat ion expressed concerns that  
the Commit tee should have the relevant  knowledge and expert ise, which 
it  saw as being held by toxicologists – a theme that  has persisted today 
and is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven:  
 
Trade must  be fully assured that  quest ions of toxicology would 
be set t led by toxicologists and not  by the general com mit tee 
who may not  have the requisite knowledge…the funct ion of the 
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toxicologists was to make certain that  every loophole was 
covered and that  nothing was left  to chance to go wrong, as 
that  would be ext remely unfortunate for both the Minist ry and 
t rade. This aspect  would be the sole concern of the 
toxicologists.  (MAF 130/ 62, A: 10408 W: 3)  
 
Minutes from the Sub-Commit tee meet ing of November 17 th 1954 show 
that  the issue of residue lim its was discussed in relat ion to the product  
Schradan (MAF 98/ 484, PS 18) . While m em bers agreed that  in general 
the set t ing of “perm it ted or tolerance lim its”  was desirable, many 
opposed this in pract ice. I n the example of Schradan several reasons 
were cited as to why a lim it  should not  be set :  lack of field data;  
insufficient  toxicological data;  and a concern that  the set t ing of a lim it  
would lead to increases in use simply because it  was government  
approved. Notably, Dr Barnes, a toxicologist  from  the Medical Research 
Council argued that :  “ I t  would seem that  even when we had adequate 
data on any one insect icide we would have to take a calculated r isk in 
recommending a perm it ted level” .  A Dr Mart in also worr ied that :  “We may 
be forced to adopt  a possible lim it  purely for adm inist rat ive reasons and 
that  a figure would be set  before we had sufficient  basic informat ion on 
which to base such a figure” . 
 
The issue pertaining to the lack of informat ion was again raised by the 
Advisory Commit tee during its December m eet ing where it  was stated 
that  at  that  t ime (1954)  “no methods were known at  present  for 
est imat ing small concent rat ions of chemicals” . Addit ionally, analyt ic 
facilit ies were thought  to be inadequate, with neither the Medical or 
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Agricultural Research Councils, nor the Government  Chemists having 
enough staff to do the necessary work (MAF 98/ 484, PS 22) .  However, 
the m inutes also reveal the beginnings of the current  pract ice of linking 
residue lim its to Good Agricultural Pract ice (GAP) ;  Dr Wright  from the 
Minist ry of Food urged that :  
 
…inst ruct ions regarding the applicat ion of pest icides should 
always be accompanied by statements of the perm issible lim its 
in the crops as sold to the consumer…no crop should be 
t reated with a pest icide for which a perm issible lim it  could not  
be laid down (MAF 98/ 484, PS 22) .  
 
Despite these issues the m inutes from the fifth meet ing in 1955 suggest  
that  decisions surrounding pest icide assessment  and safety were often 
weighted in favour of indust ry as opposed to the consumer. For example, 
several m embers of the Advisory Commit tee felt  there were 
circumstances where the usual not ificat ion process could be over ruled as 
“somet imes a manufacturer could not  reasonably be expected to wait  
while an item  reached the agenda of the Subcommit tee” . Members were 
rem inded that  I ndust ry were subm it t ing data on a voluntary basis and as 
such the Commit tee should be as cooperat ive as possible;  to both ensure 
that  manufactures cont inued to have confidence in the process and to 
avoid resort ing to the implementat ion of a statutory regime (MAF 98/ 484, 
PS 48) . 
 
A key issue facing both the Advisory Commit tee and Sub-Commit tee in 
designing the Not ificat ion and Clearance Scheme was the desire by 
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manufacturers for secrecy in regist rat ion. A principle of “ secret  
not ificat ion”  was therefore recom mended;  here informat ion subm it ted by 
indust ry would init ially be viewed by preferably one appointed expert  and 
definitely by no more than three officials, who would personally assess 
and approve the data within three weeks of its subm ission (MAF 98/ 484, 
PS 84) .  
 
I n later discussions surrounding the set t ing of residue lim its the Advisory 
Commit tee recommended that  farm ing pract ices be modified to allow for 
an adequate ‘safety’ t ime interval to occur between the spraying and 
harvest ing of crops. I t  was recommended that  such intervals should not  
be arbit rary but  based both on chem ical analyses of t reated crops and on 
the results of dietary toxicity tests on animals;  data which it  stated should 
accompany the not ificat ion documents sent  to the Advisory Commit tee to 
help establish residue lim its. However, unlike other European count r ies, 
residue lim its remained legally unenforceable (Edson, 1958) .  This point  
appears to have caused frust rat ion within some parts of MAFF20
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 MAF’s rem it  widened to include the Fishery indust ry (MAFF)  in 1956. 
, 
suggest ing that  the close relat ionship between MAF(F)  and indust ry in 
relat ion to pest icide assessment  was not  universally welcomed. For 
example, M.D.M Franklin (Joint  Secretary of the Food Standards 
Commit tee) , stated that  he did not  feel that  the current  set  up of the 
various Advisory Bodies was “best  adapted or sufficient ly wide in its 
coverage to secure maximum protect ion for the consumer” .  I ndeed, in 
discussing whether statutory lim its were pract ical, he is forthr ight  in 
expressing his frust rat ion with the Sub-Commit tee’s reluctance to impose 
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lim its, again suggest ing that  assessments were designed in favour of 
indust ry rather than consumer protect ion:  
 
…my impression is that  the difficult ies are by no means 
insuperable and that , on the analyt ical side, the Scient ific Sub-
Commit tee may be set t ing a standard of perfect ion which is 
out  of line with those we have accepted in other spheres. I n 
any event , it  is difficult  to see why we cannot  make a start  
when the Americans, who are supposed to insist  on a method 
of detect ion being available, have recent ly laid down lim its for 
50 or more pest icides. (MAF 260/ 90, 13 February 1958)  
 
To conclude, it  was during the 1950s that  MRLs were first  seriously 
discussed as a regulatory tool. While the Scient ific Sub-Commit tee 
generally appeared to favour their implem entat ion this was often not  
borne out  in pract ice;  several reasons were cited as to why the calculat ion 
and imposit ion of lim its would be both impract ical and unnecessary. An 
issue that  was repeatedly raised was the lack of data available and the 
inadequacy of test ing facilit ies. There was therefore a concern among 
Commit tee members that  lim its would be devised on an adm inist rat ive 
rather than scient ific basis. Therefore, while other European count r ies and 
the U.S. calculated and set  legally enforceable lim its, England and the 
rest  of the UK remained reliant  on its voluntary scheme;  a point  that  
appears to have frust rated several MAFF officials and indicates that  the 
posit ion of MAFF towards indust ry was a source of tension within the 
organisat ion. 
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The influence of indust ry can be keenly seen as the Commit tees was 
acutely aware that  the Not ificat ion Scheme was voluntary and as such 
there appeared to be a feeling among members that  they should be as 
accommodat ing as possible with indust ry to ensure cont inued 
cooperat ion. I ndeed, as a result  of listening to indust ry requests and 
concerns surrounding t rade secrecy, a scheme of secret  not ificat ion was 
enacted, with the result  that  decisions could be made on the opinion of 
one elected reviewer.       
 
4 .3 4  3 rd W orking Party Report : Risks to W ildlife 
The third Zuckerman Working Group Report  “Risks to Wildlife”  was 
released in 1955. As a result  of this Report  the rem it  of the Advisory 
Commit tee was widened to include the possible r isks to wildlife from  
pest icide use.  
 
Gilbert  and Macrory (1989)  detail how the interest  regarding the effects 
of pest icides on wildlife grew during the late 1950s, largely as a result  of 
the int roduct ion of new pest icides such as seed dressings, Dieldr in and 
Aldrin. The authors ( ibid)  state that  while farm ers and wildlife 
organisat ions began to report  damage to wildlife that  they believed to be 
the result  of pest icides, the extent  and cause of damage was quest ioned 
by both MAFF and indust ry. The House of Commons Select  Com mit tee 
was charged with invest igat ing the phenomena, however, the evidence 
presented in support  of farmers and act ivists’ claims was considered by 
MAFF and indust ry to be unreliable, being based on anecdotal 
observat ions rather than hard science. A situat ion m irrored in the more 
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recent  2005 Royal Commission of Environmental Pollut ion invest igat ion 
into the effects of bystander exposure, which I  discuss in Chapter Six.  
 
4 .4  1 9 6 0 s– 1 9 8 5 : Recognising r isk and 
em erging calls for  statutory control  
Following the Zuckerman Working Group Reports of the 1950s the issue 
of whether to int roduce pest icide legislat ion was repeatedly discussed 
from the early 1960s up to the int roduct ion of the Food and 
Environmental Protect ion Act  (FEPA)  in 1985. This sect ion considers those 
discussions, out lining the reasons as to why a voluntary scheme was 
maintained. 
 
I n 1960 MAFF was asked to consider the problems that  were likely to 
arise through cont inued use of the voluntary not ificat ion scheme. MAFF’s 
report , as others before, st ressed that  “wherever possible voluntary 
act ion should be used rather than legislat ion” . I ndeed, it  suggests that  
the int roduct ion of a statutory scheme may lead to host ilit y and a desire 
to “get  round”  requirements by indust ry (MAF 260/ 90) . However, on the 
issue of whether all products should be not ified, rather than just  those 
deemed suitably toxic, it  praised indust ry, stat ing that  in its opinion 
manufacturers tended to err on the side of caut ion, adding that  widening 
the scheme would “create a lot  of unnecessary work which would 
seriously curtail the t ime and energy – which can be devoted to really 
important  mat ters”  (MAF 260/ 90) .  Addit ionally, there were serious 
concerns expressed that  official approval, including recommendat ions on 
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labelling, could expose the government  to lit igat ion if accidents occurred 
through the use of ‘approved’ substances.  
 
The issue of set t ing residue lim its was once again raised, though doubts 
were expressed as to how well it  could be enforced. Of part icular note is a 
discussion on the need to take into considerat ion the use of mult iple 
products on the same crop and the possibilit y of a cumulat ive effect  for 
the consumer, suggest ing that  there were concerns over the effects of 
exposure to mult iple pest icides as far back as the early 1960s. I n 
part icular, Professor Sir Charles Dodds, an em inent  biochem ist  and 
Chairman of the Food Addit ives and Contam inants Sub-Commit tee, is 
described in an internal MAFF memo as worrying about  the large number 
of residues that  were being carr ied over into foods and the fact  that  “ they 
knew lit t le or nothing about  the interact ion of one on another”  (MAF 
260/ 216, 1961) .  
 
4 .4 1  The classificat ion of pest icide residues 
As the use of pest icides in agriculture leads to the presence of residues in 
food, discussion on the set t ing of residue lim its was undertaken by both 
the Advisory Commit tee on Poisonous Substances and the Food Addit ive 
and Contam inants Sub-Commit tee (FACS) . However, the FACS was keen 
to highlight  that  operat ional differences in the two commit tees raised 
certain difficult ies;  most  notably that  the FACS’ funct ion was to make 
proposals for regulat ion, whereas the Advisory Commit tee’s was to 
manage a voluntary scheme. I t  was therefore felt  by the FACS that  
enforcing regulat ions governing the incorporat ion of intent ionally added 
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addit ives in food was easier than cont rolling the residues of chem icals 
applied to growing crops.  
 
The FACS, in keeping with its pr inciple that  chem ical addit ives in food 
should be kept  to a m inimum, advocated a general pr inciple of perm it t ing 
only one of several effect ive substances to be used for a part icular 
purpose in food. I t  stated that  this decision should be based on factors 
such as relat ive toxicit y, amount  required and potent ial for interact ion. 
However, while this is a key principle for addit ives it  argues in support  of 
the Scient ific Sub-Commit tee’s views on subst itut ion;  that  these 
dist inct ions cannot  be adequately applied to pest icides due to a wide 
variat ion in applicat ion condit ions. I n part icular, it  was felt  that  there 
were unpredictable factors, such as differences in growing environments 
and changing weather, which could alter the level of pest icide residues 
found in crops. I t  was believed that  this variat ion would increase the 
difficulty of set t ing and enforcing MRLs. A key concern in this respect  was 
apport ioning blame if excessive residues were detected, i.e., was it  the 
responsibilit y of the grower, the dist r ibutor or the manufacturer? I t  was 
therefore felt  that  the set t ing of enforceable lim its and applying the same 
regulatory principles as used for addit ives to pest icides would remain 
difficult  under a voluntary scheme (MAF 260/ 216, 1961. PS 351) .  
 
Despite these concerns there was no discussion within the document  
recommending a move to a statutory regime. I nstead, the Scient ific Sub-
Commit tee made the suggest ion that  the only pract ical way of checking 
that  the voluntary scheme was working was to regularly sample food 
crops to measure the level of residues present  (MAF 260/ 216, 1961, 
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FSC/ FAC/ MIN/ 4) . An internal MAFF memo indicates crops would be 
sampled at  harvest  to reduce the doubt  of responsibilit y if excessive 
residue levels were discovered (MAF 260/ 216, 1961) .  
These discussions are significant  in the history of pest icide regulat ion as 
this appears to be one of the ear liest  discussions surrounding the 
classificat ion of pest icides for regulatory purposes. The discussions 
between FACS and the Advisory Commit tee suggest  that  it  was here in 
the early 1960s that  the decision was made to not  classify pest icides as 
either an addit ive or a contam inant , but  to t reat  them as a separate 
ent ity for which separate regulat ions would apply 21
 
.   
Addit ionally, it  is noteworthy that  the just ificat ion to t reat  pest icides as 
separate is grounded in ideas of intent  and an acknowledgement  of the 
complexity and variat ion found in farm ing condit ions. Cont ingencies that  
in other pest icide r isk discussions have been used by MAFF to just ify 
inact ion, as is shown in 4.42 where discrepancies between MAFF 
assumpt ions and the reality of farm ing pract ice is discussed (Health and 
Safety Execut ive, 1978;  I rwin, 1995) . 
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 This classificat ion rem ains today. I n the UK pest icides are not  viewed 
as addit ives as they have no funct ional value in food at  the t ime of 
consumpt ion and many residues will have degraded to non-detectable 
levels by the t im e the food is consumed. They are also not  t reated as a 
contam inant  as they are deliberately applied to protect  crops. The 
except ion is for water where they are t reated as a contam inant .  
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4 .4 2  The Pest icide Safety Precaut ion Schem e 
( PSPS)  
I n the early 1960s, the requirements of the not ificat ion scheme were 
revised under the Pest icides Safety Precaut ion Scheme (PSPS) . The rem it  
of the PSPS was to enable the government  to provide advice on 
precaut ionary measures related to the use of new agricultural pest icides. 
The PSPS was a cont inuat ion of the previous voluntary agreement  and 
required m anufacturers of new chem icals to provide a data package 
out lining the safety of the product . This package was to include 
informat ion regarding toxicity and persistence, however, data confirm ing 
efficacy 22
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 The gap in data regarding the efficacy of the crop protect ion products 
was met  by the int roduct ion of the voluntary Agricultural Chem icals 
Approval Scheme (ACAS) , which required that  any chem ical subm it ted 
had already been accepted by the PSPS. Approval by ACAS was based on 
data subm it ted by the manufacturers in conjunct ion with tests carr ied out  
by the Advisory Services. Although voluntary, once a product  had been 
approved by ACAS it  was allowed to use a ‘recom m ended’ emblem on the 
product  indicat ing that  the material had been tested and shown to work 
(Russell,  2006) .  
 was not  required (Russell,  2005) . I n several respects, the PSPS 
appears to have been a progressive move as it  required data on the 
possible effects of pest icide use on product  users, consumers of t reated 
produce and the potent ial damage to wildlife and the wider environment . 
I ndeed, following the int roduct ion of the PSPS the key safety 
recommendat ions for each substance were now published on the product  
label. Labels included informat ion on protect ive clothing and advice on the 
necessary levels of applicat ion to t reat  produce, which were designed to 
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moderate the amount  of residues found on crops. However, these were 
not  legally enforceable and MAFF remained reliant  on user compliance.  
 
I n 1964, the Advisory Commit tee on Poisonous Substances began a three 
year review of safety cont rol arrangements concluding that  the exist ing 
scheme worked well.  I n part icular, it  praised the co-operat ion between 
government  and indust ry, stat ing that  the voluntary arrangements 
allowed flexibilit y and low operat ing costs (Department  of Educat ion and 
Science, 1967, I I  (10) ) . Despite these benefits the Advisory Commit tee 
was concerned that  the voluntary scheme did not  offer enough protect ion 
on products that  had not  gone through the PSPS process. As a result ,  in 
1967 the Advisory Commit tee recommended that  a mandatory scheme be 
int roduced, which would impose st r icter condit ions of use (Department  of 
Educat ion and Science, 1967, 168.(1) ) . 
 
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion (RCEP, 1979)  
suggested that  at  first  the Associat ion of Brit ish Manufacturers of 
Agricultural Chem icals supported this recommendat ion. However, 
although legislat ion was drafted in 1968 it  was never enacted, largely due 
to greater support  for voluntary arrangements by Ministers in 1972. The 
issue of legislat ive cont rol of pest icides was again raised in 1979 by the 
RCEP whose seventh report  suggests that  while indust ry were init ially 
responsive to statutory cont rol they were wary that  legislat ion would be 
based on polit ical rather than scient ific considerat ions;  which they argued 
would increase costs and regist rat ion t imes with lit t le improvement  in 
safety or efficiency (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 1979) . 
The Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP)  was also not  in favour. van 
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Zwanenberg (1996)  proposes that  it s reasons were largely based on the 
fear that  such legislat ion would place a st rain on the already lim ited 
number of toxicological experts and would be t imely and expensive, 
requir ing the hir ing of addit ional staff. The eventual impetus for change 
was not  a desire to increase pest icide safety but  a ruling in the 1980s by 
the European Commission stat ing that  the UK was in breach of 
Community t rading rules. 
 
A key discussion during the 1964 review was on the set t ing of residue 
lim its, with the Commit tee recomm ending that  more food residue data be 
collected. However, it  was clearly stated that  “ tentat ive residue lim its”  for 
act ive ingredients should only be established once sufficient  data had 
been collected, and only once these lim its have been in place for a 
‘reasonable’ length of t ime should they be replaced with statutory lim its 
(Department  of Educat ion and Science, 1967, 168.(30-32) ) . 
 
To check that  users were applying the correct  amount  of pest icides, 
produce surveys were undertaken by the Working Party on Pest icide 
Residues to monitor the levels of residues in food, the results of which fed 
into total diet  studies (RCEP, 1979) . However, the first  report  of the 
Working Party in 1978 concluded that  total diet  studies were no longer 
necessary, a decision which was supported by the Scient ific Sub-
Commit tee on Pest icides (MAF 256/ 316, PS 3134) . Despite these 
conclusions in 1979 the Steering Group on Food Surveillance stated that  
while total diet  studies “could not  be just ified on a scient ific basis... [ they 
have]  proved cost  effect ive and beneficial from  the polit ical point  of view”  
(MAF 256/ 316, 15 October 1979) . I n part icular, it  was felt  that  this 
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survey method was an excellent  presentat ion tool which could be used to 
defend Britain’s residue monitor ing policy to European counterparts, and 
hence defend the voluntary nature of the PSPS and the use of non-
statutory MRLs. The Steering Group highlighted that  during 1967-1977 
the surveys did not  demonst rate any residues at  levels that  were of 
concern. However, the Group later acknowledged that  the favoured 
method of analysis may have resulted in the dilut ion of residues, reducing 
them to a level below the lim it  of detect ion (MAF 256/ 316, 15 October 
1979) . This suggests that  at  this t ime the method of analysis was 
inadequate at  determ ining whether levels had been breached and 
therefore whether the public were at  r isk. 
 
The monitor ing of residue levels in the UK was again discussed in the 7 th 
RCEP Report  (1979)  where it  was reiterated that  the pract ices undertaken 
within the UK were out  of line with other members of the European 
Community. I n part icular, it  was noted that  in cont rast  to the UK, other 
European count r ies both rout inely sampled and tested individual food 
stuffs and removed from sale food items which were found to contain 
residues above agreed levels, singling out  farmers who pract ised poor 
pest icide m anagement . The RCEP argued that  such schemes served to 
improve customer protect ion and encouraged a more conservat ive use of 
pest icides. However, m inutes from the Steering Group meet ing indicate 
that  members felt  the method to be less cost  effect ive than total diet  
surveys, as it  placed greater dem ands on laboratory facilit ies which, as 
previously discussed, were in short  supply. 
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Wat terson (1990) , suggests that  although many involved believed the 
PSPS scheme worked well,  there were equally those that  felt  the PSPS 
was lim ited in its effect iveness and was unduly secret ive. The PSPS, as in 
previous arrangements, ensured that  all subm it ted data were handled 
confident ially, to ensure t rade secrecy. However, the RCEP noted that  
confident ialit y was often extended beyond the data subm it ted by indust ry 
to include any related informat ion -  such as that  on the side effects linked 
to pest icide exposure -  with the result  that  the public were effect ively 
denied the abilit y to input  or access informat ion (RCEP, 1979) . I t  is also 
noteworthy, that  while indust ry actors were not  present  on the two main 
commit tees they were allowed on several expert  panels. These panels 
advised the Scient ific Sub-Commit tee on aspects such as labelling, 
indust ry was also encouraged to negot iate with the secretariat  in respect  
to test ing cr iter ia and the type of data required for product  not ificat ion 
(Gillespie et  al. ,  1979) . This close working relat ionship was reflected upon 
by the RCEP (1979)  who, like others such as Plat t  (1955) , highlighted the 
resultant  mutual advantages for both government  and indust ry.  
 
A key quest ion of the RCEP’s 7 th report  (1979)  asked:  What  is the 
underlying policy towards pest icide use? I t  is clear from  the report  that  
the RCEP had serious m isgiv ings surrounding the cont inued reliance on 
voluntary agreements. I ndeed, the RCEP suggested that  the best  way to 
both reduce pest icide usage and ensure that  all chem icals were 
adequately tested before use would be to enact  a formal policy as per the 
pract ice in count r ies such as the Netherlands, Japan and parts of the USA. 
However, despite both an increase in use and reliance upon pest icides, it  
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stated that  the need for such a policy appears not  to have been 
considered in the UK:   
 
The MAFF view, and that  of the agricultural and agrichem ical 
indust r ies, is that  provided the chem icals are applied properly 
in accordance with the manufacturer’s inst ruct ions their safety 
is ensured through the test ing undertaken as a requirement  of 
the PSPS;  that  the cost  of pest icides discourages excessive 
use;  and that  the knowledge and experience of farmers, 
backed up by advice from manufacturers and from ADAS, 
ensures the necessary care in use and the select ion of the 
most  effect ive products. (Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollut ion, 1979, 3.74)  
 
The above statement  offers an insight  into how MAFF just ified its 
cont inued advocacy of voluntary agreements over the establishment  of 
statutory powers. I t  suggests MAFF made a number of assumpt ions in its 
cont inued support  of the PSPS;  most  notably that  all products would be 
subm it ted for review and that  it s test ing cr iter ion, which had been 
negot iated with indust ry, was adequate to ensure safety for both users 
and consumers. Addit ionally, it  assumed that  once cleared, all products 
will be correct ly labelled and inst ruct ions adhered to. As in previous 
voluntary schemes, these assumpt ions placed the onus of responsibilit y 
for safe use on the user rather than the regulator. 
 
Exam inat ion of official literature from the Health and Safety Execut ive 
(HSE)  suggests that  in many instances these expectat ions of good 
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pract ice did not  occur. For example, the HSE stated in its publicat ion 
Agriculture 1976 (1978)  that  some manufacturers “were slow to br ing 
their container labels up to date” . Such labelling failures are believed 
likely to have cont r ibuted to the 46 reported pest icide related incidents in 
1976 that  included burns, dermat it is and neurological poisoning (Health 
and Safety Execut ive, 1978) . This publicat ion also details that  despite 
inspectors providing demonst rat ions of ‘safe’ pest icide use at  agricultural 
shows and during farm  visits, they were often unsuccessful in changing 
farm ing pract ice. Likewise, in the publicat ion Agriculture 1977 (Health and 
Safety Execut ive, 1979)  the HSE stated:  “a lot  of work st ill needs to be 
done to im prove their  [ older farmers]  knowledge and to change their  
at t itudes” . While these examples relate to occupat ional safety they 
illust rate how assumpt ions made at  a Ministerial level did not  always 
match the day- to-day reality. This suggest ion has been made by others 
including I rwin (1995)  who in researching the herbicide 2,4,5-T argued 
that  the ACP’s focus on the “ recomm ended way”  and “ recommended 
purposes”  was often at  odds with reality. Such examples highlight  that  
there was often a gap between advice and its implementat ion and 
suggest  that  voluntary agreements may have been part ly responsible for 
inadequate product  labelling and associated operat ional r isks. 
 
I n summary, it  can be argued that  unt il the Food and Environment  
Protect ion Act  (FEPA)  1985 there was lit t le change in the way pest icides 
were regulated within England, though calls for statutory cont rols were 
emerging. The PSPS maintained the close working relat ionship between 
UK Government  and the crop protect ion indust ry, encouraging mutual 
t rust  between the two. I n this sense, indust ry was able to work closely 
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with government  commit tees to ensure that  products were accepted 
quickly and with m inimal experimentat ion and adm inist rat ive costs. 
However, actors such as the RCEP argued that  the process was unduly 
secret ive and was in effect  closed to anyone outside of the inner circles of 
the advisory community. Thus, during this period pest icide policy was 
largely developed between government  and its client  groups, effect ively 
leaving the public and non-experts outside of assessment  and regulatory 
discussions.   
 
Despite other count r ies adopt ing legally enforceable MRLs, the UK did not  
move towards the posit ion of statutory lim its. I nstead, a series of residue 
surveys were undertaken as a mechanism to check good agricultural 
pract ice. There are several suggest ions made in mem os and literature 
taken from that  period that  indicate that  there was a cont inued shortage 
of laboratory and methodological resources with which to analyse 
pest icide residues and that  sampling methods may have resulted in lower 
residues being recorded than were actually present . 
  
4 .5  1 9 8 5 – 1 9 9 1 : Food and Environm ental 
Protect ion Act  ( FEPA)  and the int roduct ion of 
statutory lim its 
The effect iveness of exist ing residue cont rols were again exam ined in 
1980 by the House of Lords Select  Commit tee on the European 
Communit ies. The report  indicates that  there was unanimous support  for 
the cont inuat ion of exist ing cont rols ( including voluntary not ificat ion and 
non-enforceable MRLs)  by those organisat ions who subm it ted evidence to 
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the Commit tee (MAFF, 1986) . Despite cont inued advocacy for non-
statutory lim its, in 1985 the Food and Environment  Protect ion Act  (FEPA)  
was passed, which replaced both the PSPS and ACAS. Part  I I I  of the Act  
gave MAFF Ministers broad powers to:  
 
protect  the health of human beings, creatures and plants;  
safeguard the environment ;  secure safe, efficient  and humane 
methods of cont rolling pests;  and make informat ion about  
pest icides available to the public. (HMSO, 1985, Part  I I I  S.16)  
 
I n part icular, S.16 (12)  of FEPA states that  any cont ravent ion of 
regulat ions, condit ions of approvals, requirements or knowingly supplying 
false informat ion and failing to disclose key data was now considered an 
offence (HMSO, 1985) . Specifically, S.16 (2. k & l)  states that  Ministers 
may now through regulat ions:  
 
specify how much pest icide or pest icide residue may be left  in 
any crop, food or feeding stuff;  and direct  that , if there is 
more pest icide or pest icide residue in any crop, food or feeding 
stuff than the port ion specified by vir tue of (k)  above, either of 
the Ministers shall have power-  
( i)  to seize or dispose of the crop, food, feeding stuff in 
quest ion or to require that  some other person shall dispose of 
it ;  
( ii)  to direct  some other person to take such remedial act ion 
as appears to the Minister to be necessary as a result  of the 
cont ravent ion. 
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The above illust rates that  the enact ing of FEPA signified a significant  
change in the way that  pest icide residues in food were regulated within 
England with a move away from voluntary agreements. The decision to 
develop legally enforceable residue lim its can also be seen as the start  of 
the UK’s integrat ion within the European Community with respect  to 
harmonising pest icide policy. 
 
FEPA was updated the following year under the 1986 Cont rol of Pest icides 
Regulat ions (COPR)  (HMSO, 1986) . COPR further enhanced pest icide 
safety by requir ing commercial users to be sufficient ly t rained to handle 
pest icides so to safeguard the health of humans, wildlife and the 
environment . I mportant ly, COPR defined the pest icides that  were subject  
to cont rol and set  out  an approval scheme that  was to be sat isfied before 
any pest icide could be stored, supplied, used or advert ised (HMSO, 
1986) .  
 
The implem entat ion of FEPA and COPR enabled a greater legal cont rol by 
the UK Government  over the manufacture, dist r ibut ion and use of 
pest icides. However, it  has been argued by some social researchers that  
because the requirem ents were set  out  in regulat ions and codes of 
pract ice, as opposed to primary legislat ion, there was a high degree of 
flexibilit y in the regulatory fram ework that  allowed for changes and 
adaptat ions (Gilbert  and Macrory, 1989) . 
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4 .5 1  Maxim um  Residue Levels: Legal enforcem ent  
The Pest icide Residues Commit tee defines Maximum Residue Levels 
(MRLs)  as:  
 
The maximum concentrat ion of pest icide residue (expressed as 
m illigrams of residue per kilogram of food/ animal feeding 
stuff)  likely to occur in or on food and feeding stuffs after the 
use of pest icides according to Good Agricultural Pract ice 
(GAP) 23
 
,  i.e., when the pest icide has been applied in line with 
the product  label recommendat ions and in keeping with local 
environmental and other condit ions) . (Pest icide Residues 
Commit tee, 2008)  
I t  is important  to note that  MRLs are used only as a check in the 
monitor ing of pest icide use (Defra, 2007a)  and are not  a health-based 
exposure lim it . They are therefore not  linked to pest icide safety lim its 
such as the Acceptable Daily I ntake (ADI )  or the Acute Reference Dose 
(ARfD) 24
 
.  However, the Pest icide Safety Directorate state that  pest icide 
use would not  be allowed if the MRL led to exposure greater than either 
health-based lim it  (Pest icide Safety Directorate, 2008) .   
                                                 
23
 Good Agricultural Pract ice (GAP)  is the nat ionally authorised safe use of 
pest icides under actual condit ions necessary for effect ive and reliable pest  
cont rol. Good pract ice should ensure that  crops are left  with the smallest  
residue achievable (MAFF and HSE, 1990) .  
24
 See Chapter Five for definit ions. 
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I  have highlighted that  pr ior to 1985, the UK, unlike its European 
counterparts, resisted the int roduct ion of legally enforceable MRLs25
                                   
 in 
favour of voluntary agreements. I  discussed that  this reluctance towards 
statutory cont rol was originally at t r ibuted to the argument  made by the 
Advisory Commit tee on Poisonous Substances used in Agriculture and 
Food Storage and its Scient ific Sub-Commit tee that  there was insufficient  
scient ific data to establish MRLs. However, by 1986 MAFF documents 
suggest  that  the UK’s reluctance to impose statutory lim its was beginning 
to underm ine its posit ion with Europe;  other member states quest ioned 
whether the UK’s reliance on voluntary cont rols gave farmers “ the 
advantage of less st r ingent  standards”  (MAFF, 1986, p.5) . The desire for 
credibilit y within Europe and the belief that  adopt ion of statutory lim its 
would increase t rade can therefore be seen as an impetus for change 
within England and the UK.               
The new law was also believed to be more protect ive of human health. 
Gilbert  (1987)  notes that  although the Food and Drugs Act  (1955)  
(changing to the Food Act  1984)  provided statutory protect ion against  the 
sale of food that  was dangerous to health, it  was not  rout inely applied in 
respect  to pest icide residues. I ndeed, a FEPA consultat ion document  from  
MAFF states that  residue levels would have to be “ext raordinarily high in 
order to render the food direct ly injur ious to health and thereby secure a 
                                                 
25
  Although the changes were int roduced in the 1985 FEPA, it  was the 
1988 Pest icides (Maximum Residue Levels in Food)  Regulat ions that  
bought  these changes into effect . These regulat ions stated that  MRLs 
would be determ ined as far as possible in accordance to guidance 
provided by the Codex Commission.  
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convict ion under sect ion 1 of the Food Act ”  (MAFF, 1986) . I n defending 
England’s previous reliance on the Food and Drugs Act  the same 
document  ( ibid, p.5)  states that  this Act  was “ int roduced originally to 
cont rol the gross alterat ion of food before it  was realized that  very low 
quant it ies of contam inants m ight  also present  a r isk to the populat ion if 
ingested over long periods” . Such a statement  suggests MAFF has a poor 
long- term  inst itut ional memory;  in addit ion to highlight ing the dangers 
faced by operators through repeated low- level exposure to OP pest icides 
(1951) , the second Zuckerman Report  (1953)  on consumer r isk 
repeatedly highlighted that  chronic exposure to low- levels, through the 
consumpt ion of residues in food, posed a potent ial health r isk. Both of 
these reports were published before the int roduct ion of the 1955 Food 
and Drugs Act , thus suggest ing that  the issue of chronic low- level 
exposure has been repeatedly sidelined within the assessment  and 
regulatory community. 
  
From the 1980s onwards several European direct ives have related to 
MRLs for pest icides in foodstuffs, including Art icle 100a of the 1986 Single 
European Act  and the 1990 Direct ive on Residues in Fruit  and Vegetables. 
The aim  of European MRL guidelines was to enable t rade across the 
European Community. Although the European guidelines referred to the 
work of the World Health Organisat ion’s Codex Alimentarius 
Commission 26
                                                 
26
 The Commission was established in 1963 to provide food standards and 
guidelines with the aim  of unifying and integrat ing individual count ry 
levels to promote internat ional t rading (FAO and WHO, 2006) . Although 
there was no enforceable legal framework for the im plementat ion of 
,  the European MRLs were often more conservat ive than the 
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comparat ive Codex values (Hough, 1998) ;  either reflect ing Good 
Agricultural Pract ice (GAP)  that  applied to Europe only, or represent ing a 
polit ically negot iated comprom ise between different  nat ional lim its (MAFF, 
1986) . European MRL values were typically decided upon by an expert  
panel that  assessed relevant  scient ific literature and food survey data, 
with experts drawn from across member states. The discursive process 
thus suggests that  MRL lim its are not  based wholly on scient ific data but  
are negot iated and shaped by social and polit ical values.  
 
The European Commission (EC)  is current ly in the process of set t ing MRLs 
for over 600 foodstuffs and has set  levels for approximately 200 
(Pest icide Safety Directorate, 2006b) . I t  was in 1990, following the 
Direct ive on Fruit  and Vegetables, that  the UK began to rout inely adopt  
EC MRLs. Today, where they are available, EC MRLs are the default  values 
if there are no UK temporary MRLs or imported tolerances, these take 
precedence over other UK nat ional or Codex values (Pest icide Safety 
Directorate, 2006b) . However, it  should be noted that  the EC Direct ives 
containing the MRLs are only enforceable in the UK if they have been 
t ransposed into nat ional legislat ion (Defra, 2007a) .  
 
To summarise, the passing of FEPA and COPR and the adopt ion and 
enforcement  of MRLs can be seen as a move away from the voluntary 
schemes that  characterised pest icide regulat ion for much of the 20 th 
Century and have helped align the UK with other European Community 
                                                                                                                                                 
Codex MRLs unt il 1995 (FAO, 1995) , their use was encouraged by the 
United Nat ions Resolut ion 39/ 248 (United Nat ions, 1985) . 
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members. However, there were st ill concerns present  regarding the 
scient ific basis of these lim its.   
 
4 .6  1 9 9 1 : European harm onisat ion &  the Plant  
Protect ion Products Direct ive  
The European Union is in the process of harmonising pest icide regulat ions 
under the Plant  Protect ion Products Direct ive 1991. The approval of 
pest icides in the UK is therefore in t ransit ion from a nat ional system 
based on FEPA and the 1986 regulat ions (as amended)  to a European 
system set  out  in Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC (EEC, 1991) . Present ly, there are 
two parallel approval systems in EU member states where the scient ific 
evaluat ion of pest icides is carr ied out  at  either a nat ional or European 
level. Under both systems there are four approval levels;  Experimental 
Approval, Provisional Approval, Full Approval and Emergency Approval. 
 
I t  is hoped that  harmonisat ion will enable a greater degree of t rade and 
ensure that  all mem ber count r ies are compliant  with cent rally set  
standards such as MRLs;  thereby providing a safety baseline across 
Europe. An addit ional benefit  of harmonisat ion will be the creat ion of a 
cent ral database (Annexes) , which should in theory help to decrease 
duplicat ion of research ( in turn reducing the number of animals used in 
research)  and shorten regist rat ion t imes.  
 
To register a new product  under the Direct ive, companies must  choose a 
member state to who they will subm it  their scient ific data dossier. The 
member state will evaluate the data to ensure that  they comply with the 
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Direct ive requirements concerning safety to humans and the 
environment . I f acceptable, the member state will then subm it  a report  to 
the Commission where it  will be passed to the Standing Commit tee on the 
Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFA)  to be considered by other mem ber 
states. I f deemed acceptable, it  will be listed in Annex 1 (Defra and 
Health and Safety Execut ive, 2005) . 
 
I n the UK, the Direct ive was implemented in 1993 changing to the Plant  
Protect ion Products Regulat ion (PPPR)  in 1995, now the PPPR 2003. I n 
the UK, it  is the Pest icide Safety Directorate27
                                                 
27
 Unt il April 1st 2008 the PSD was an Execut ive Agency of Defra. I t  was 
t ransferred to the Health and Safety Execut ive (as an internal agency)  
following Defra’s review of it s regulatory agencies and the 
recommendat ions made in the 2005 Hampton Review of Regulators. I t  
should be noted however that  the st rategic policy responsibilit y for 
pest icides will remain with Defra Ministers (Health and Safety Execut ive, 
2008) . 
 (PSD) , an agency of the 
Health and Safety Execut ive, who is responsible for pest icide regist rat ion 
(Health and Safety Execut ive, 2007) . I n addit ion to regist rat ion, the PSD 
has the responsibilit y of providing advice to Ministers regarding the 
development  and enforcement  of pest icide policy and legislat ion (Defra 
and Health and Safety Execut ive, 2005) . Although the PSD is responsible 
for the regist rat ion of pest icides, it  is the Advisory Commit tee on 
Pest icides (ACP)  which assesses and evaluates the data packages 
subm it ted by manufacturers. I ndeed, it  is required by law that  the ACP be 
involved in every decision regarding the grant ing, amending or revoking 
of approval. However, although the ACP provides advice, the final 
approval decision is taken by Ministers ( ibid) .  
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I n 2008 there were 18 members of the ACP including the Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman;  with the except ion of the two lay members (a 
relat ively recent  phenomenon)  all members can be viewed as having 
scient ific expert ise, most  notably in human or environmental toxicology – 
this is further discussed in Chapter Seven. While it  is increasingly difficult  
to find advisory mem bers who have no link to indust ry, the Code of 
Pract ice for the ACP is clear in stat ing that  all interests should be publicly 
recorded and those employed in the pest icide indust ry or holding a 
directorship are not  eligible to join (Defra, 2001, 6.1) , members therefore 
tend to be leading academ ics who sit  on mult iple comm it tees relat ing to 
pest icides. Members meet  several t imes a year and although there have 
been calls by campaign groups to int roduce open meet ings they remain 
closed to the public on the grounds of commercial confident ialit y. 
 
At  a European level there are several different  working groups and 
commit tees who regulate and provide advice regarding pest icides. I n 
addit ion to the Council and European Parliament , pest icides fall under the 
rem it  of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) , several regulatory 
and scient ific commit tees and various working groups including the 
Working Group on Pest icide Legislat ion (Defra and Health and Safety 
Execut ive, 2005) . This division of responsibilit y is m irrored in the UK 
where there are now several bodies involved in the regulat ion of 
pest icides, leading some in the field of pest icide r isk assessment  to 
suggest  that  European harmonisat ion has increased bureaucracy (Marrs 
and Ballantyne, 2004) . For example, in addit ion to the ACP the following 
bodies are also involved in UK pest icide regulat ion:  the Pest icide Safety 
Directorate (PSD) ;  the Pest icide Residues Commit tee (PRC) ;  the Biocides 
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and Pest icides Unit ;  The Environmental Panel;  The Medical and 
Toxicological Panel;  The I nter-Departmental Secretariat  ( I DS) ;  The 
Biocides Consultat ive Commit tee and the Pest icides Forum (Defra and 
Health and Safety Execut ive, 2005) . These individual bodies are not  
cent rally governed but  fall under the rem it  of a variety of UK agencies 
including:  Defra;  the Environment  Agency, the Health and Safety 
Execut ive;  the Food Standards Agency;  the Department  of Health and 
various regional departments. This diffusion of regulatory power has been 
crit icised by several NGO groups and pest icide act ivists, including the 
Pest icide Act ion Network 28
 
,  on the grounds that  issues relat ing to 
pest icide approval, use and effect  are art if icially separated and therefore 
harder to manage in a holist ic manner.  
I n addit ion to those listed above, advice to consumers regarding the 
consumpt ion of pest icide residues in food is now also provided by the 
Food Standards Agency (FSA) . While the FSA is not  involved in the 
assessment  and regist rat ion of pest icides it  has commissioned reviews 
through the Commit tee on Toxicity of Chem icals in Food, Consumer 
Products and the Environment  (COT) 29
                                                 
28
 Taken from interview data. 
 and undertaken research on the 
29
 The COT is a scient ific commit tee that  was established by government  
in 1978 to provide advice to MAFF and various other government  
departments on issues relat ing to the toxicity of chem icals. I n discussing 
chem ical r isks in food COT states that  it :  “aims to form  an object ive view 
on the available evidence in a way that  recognises both uncertaint ies and 
assumpt ions and considers the possible variat ion in interpretat ion of 
scient ists working from different  standpoints”  (Commit tee on Toxicity, 
2008) . 
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r isks faced by consumers from the consumpt ion of pest icide residues in 
food. I n response to a growing concern surrounding the effects and 
potent ial r isks surrounding human exposure to pest icide m ixtures it  
produced the following report :  Risk Assessment  of Mixtures of Pest icides 
and Sim ilar Substances (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b) . The publicat ion 
of this report  has led to a further review by COT on the Variabilit y and 
Uncertainty in Toxicology of Chem icals in Food, Consumer Products and 
the Environment  (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2007)  and a research 
programme ent it led:  Mixtures:  Toxicology and Exposure (T10) , which is 
invest igat ing the tools required to study the interact ions of pest icide 
m ixtures during the r isk assessment  process (Food Standards Agency, 
2008) .  
 
To summarise, the int roduct ion of the Plant  Protect ion Products Direct ive 
1991 has seen a move towards European harmonisat ion. While 
harmonisat ion has recognised benefits, most  notably in the creat ion of a 
safety baseline across member states, there are also drawbacks with the 
process of assessment  and regist rat ion perceived to be more bureaucrat ic 
than in previous decades;  there are now several agencies within England 
and the UK that  work in the area of pest icide regulat ion and r isk 
communicat ion, each of whom have a different  rem it  and agenda. These 
differences have resulted in tensions between advisory bodies, a theme 
that  is discussed in detail within Chapter Six. As in previous decades the 
r isk assessment  of pest icides for regulatory purposes is st ill undertaken in 
closed meet ings by those perceived to have toxicological and scient ific 
expert ise. Whilst , in previous decades members of com mit tees, such as 
the ACP, were predom inant ly government  employees, members are now 
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likely to be leading academ ics, m any of whom are serial professional 
commit tee members. However, there has been a recent  move among 
advisory commit tees, in an at tempt  to both increase procedural 
t ransparency and reduce the public percept ion of indust ry bias, to include 
lay members within the commit tee.  
 
4 .7  Sum m ary 
I n this chapter I  have illust rated how decisions made during the 1950s 
and 1960s have direct ly shaped the role and rem it  of current  English 
pest icide advisory bodies. Specifically, I  illust rated that  decisions taken in 
the 1960s mean that  pest icide residues are not  classified as either a food 
contam inant  or addit ive;  the result  of which is that  they are subject  to 
different  assessment  and regulatory processes.  
 
I  detailed how statutory regulat ion has evolved through a succession of 
voluntary agreements that  were underpinned by mutual t rust  between 
government  and indust ry. I  highlighted that  despite other count r ies’ 
willingness to implem ent  statutory cont rols and the legally enforceable 
Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs)  this move, while debated internally 
within MAFF, was ult imately resisted by the UK Government  which 
favoured placing the burden of responsibilit y on indust ry and pest icide 
users.  
 
I  suggested that  indust ry welcomed this resistance, as cont inuat ion of 
voluntary pract ices allowed them to work closely with government  
departments, providing them opportunity to help shape assessment  
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requirements and ensure a quick and efficient  approval process. A key 
argument  made by government  in favour of maintaining the voluntary 
process was that  there was a shortage of both resources and skills with 
which to undertake statutory assessment  and the set t ing and checking of 
MRLs. I ndeed, I  illust rated using the example of Schradan that  there was 
a percept ion among government  departments and advisory groups that  it  
could take years to analyse an individual pest icide substance. I n 
discussing this, I  showed how there were concerns that  the set t ing of 
statutory residue lim its would mean proposing lim its that  were not  
scient ifically established but  adopted purely for adm inist rat ive purposes;  
a posit ion that  was largely seen by those involved as unsat isfactory. 
  
I mportant ly, using archival evidence I  suggested that  in several instances 
the expectat ions of good pract ice by indust ry and pest icide users did not  
occur in reality. Notably, memos from the 1970s indicate that  where 
residues were being monitored the methods used to analyse residue 
levels were quest ionable and may have led to art if icially low- levels being 
recorded. As such the t rue extent  of r isk facing the public is likely to have 
been unknown. Addit ionally, I  highlighted that  advisory bodies were 
reluctant  to consider alternate types of evidence that  fell outside that  
provided by indust ry or that  collected by government  departments. 
Where evidence was assessed it  was felt  by indust ry that  it  should only be 
assessed by those with expert ise, preferably toxicological, and that  the 
process should remain as confident ial as possible. These requirements 
can be seen as having shaped the make up of pest icide commit tees 
working today, such as the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP)  that  
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st ill holds its meet ings in private and has only relat ively recent ly 
int roduced two lay-members.  
 
I n part icular, I  have demonst rated that  from the 1950s onwards there 
were serious concerns raised relat ing to chronic exposure to low- levels 
and exposure to m ixtures of pest icides. I  have illust rated using archival 
evidence that  despite these concerns being referenced throughout  this 
period they have been persistent ly bracketed within the assessment  and 
regulatory process, with the effect  that  discussion of these concerns has 
effect ively been removed from the rem it  of pest icide advisory bodies such 
as the ACP. I ndeed, although more recent ly there has been a move to 
invest igate these concerns by the Food Standards Agency. The very fact  
that  these concerns are st ill present  sixty years from when they were first  
raised suggests that  despite significant  technical and scient ific 
developments in the area of r isk assessment , the fundamental quest ions 
we are asking about  the r isks of exposure to pest icides have not  
significant ly altered since the first  consumer review by Zuckerman in 
1953.  
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Chapter 5 : Managem ent  of Uncertainty in 
the Risk Assessm ent  of Pest icide 
Residues 
5 .1  I nt roduct ion 
I n the previous chapter I  showed that  the fundamental quest ions that  are 
being asked today about  the r isks of exposure to pest icide m ixtures 
through food were already being raised throughout  the early history of 
pest icide regulat ion. I n this chapter I  step behind the regulat ions to 
explore the toxicological science30 on which pest icide reference doses31
 
,  
and hence r isk advice, is derived. I n doing so I  seek to answer the 
following research quest ion:  How are the potent ial r isks of pest icide 
residues in food assessed in the current  advisory system  for regulat ion 
and why has this system  been challenged? 
I n this chapter I  will illust rate that  the historical regulatory separat ion of 
pest icides from other environmental and food contam inants, as discussed 
in Chapter Four, has today resulted in pest icides being t reated as an 
anomaly, which does not  conform  to the standard environmental r isk 
assessment  framework used within Defra. I nstead, the regulatory 
requirements and assessment  guidelines are now largely determ ined at  a 
                                                 
30
  The thesis is pr imarily concerned with human exposure I  will therefore 
discuss those assessments relevant  to human toxicity. 
31
 This thesis is only concerned with pest icides that  are classed as 
chem ical substances as found in Part  A of Annex I I  of the Direct ive 
91/ 414/ EEC (Office for Official Publicat ions of the European Communit ies, 
1991) .  
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European level and managed within the UK by the Pest icide Safety 
Directorate (PSD)  and the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , which 
assesses indust ry produced data dossiers for the purpose of regist rat ion.  
 
I  will highlight  that  r isk assessment  can be broken down into four 
interlinking stages that  combine science and expert  judgement . I n this 
chapter I  focus on the second stage of r isk assessment , hazard 
characterisat ion. I  discuss -  using a combinat ion of scient ific literature 
and policy documents, and interview data taken from scient ists and 
members of government  advisory commit tees -  that  in the assessment  of 
pest icides there has historically been a reliance on in vivo methodology. 
The benefits and drawbacks of this pract ice, as conceptualised by those 
working in the field, are discussed and it  is suggested through the 
evidence presented that  although decisions surrounding test ing 
requirements are purportedly object ive through increased levels of 
standardisat ion, the decisions as to how tests are designed and selected 
for use in determ ining human reference doses are shaped by historical, 
social and pragmat ic considerat ions.  
 
Last ly, I  explore a key area of challenge and uncertainty in pest icide r isk 
assessment  which concerns the quest ion of how to study and assess 
chem ical m ixtures. I  suggest  that  the study of chem ical m ixtures has 
historically received lim ited at tent ion within the regulatory and r isk 
advisory community for two reasons:  1)  a perceived difficult y by 
regulators and scient ists in conduct ing the science, and 2)  a belief that  it  
is a non-problem when individual components are present  at  an 
acceptable level. Where m ixtures have been addressed researchers have 
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typically favoured undertaking simple studies using binary m ixtures at  
high doses. I n doing so the complexity found in real life exposure is likely 
to be reduced, suggest ing that  the t rue scale of uncertainty will remain 
indeterm inable.  
 
5 .2  Risk assessm ent  guidance &  legislat ion 
An important  feature of the informat ion pertaining to pest icides is that  the 
evidence considered as acceptable for use in assessment  is largely 
determ ined and standardised by regulatory requirements and framed by 
the cr iter ia imposed by the UK Government  and European Union. Such 
regulatory frameworks are frequent ly viewed as beneficial by those within 
the r isk assessment  community as they st ipulate m inimum data 
requirements, which aim  to provide r isk assessors with the necessary 
informat ion (as believed by the regulatory authorit ies) , to undertake 
informed evidenced-based decisions. Mandat ing evidence requirem ents 
also means that  in theory each substance is assessed on equal grounds 
and that  r isk can be easily compared. Although this has obvious merits, it  
creates problems for the acceptabilit y of new methods that  purport  to 
assess the effects of m ixtures but  that  current  regulatory guidelines do 
not  recognise. 
 
5 .2 1  European harm onisat ion 
I n Chapter Four I  out lined that  while the Pest icide Safety Directorate 
(PSD)  and Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP)  are responsible for 
assessing pest icide r isk assessment  data in the UK, since 1991 the 
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informat ion required is now largely determ ined at  a European level 
through Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC (Office for Official Publicat ions of the 
European Communit ies, 1991) 32
 
.   
For a pest icide to be approved, manufacturers must  subm it  a technical 
dossier to the nat ional assessment  body of the count ry where they wish 
to market  their product . The informat ion required is detailed in the 
Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC under Annex I I  and must  contain “ informat ion 
necessary for evaluat ing the foreseeable r isks, whether immediate or 
delayed, which the substance may entail for humans, animals and the 
environment ”  (Office for Official Publicat ions of the European 
Communit ies, 1991, 1.1)  
 
For act ive substances in Annex I I  Part  A, the subm it ted dossier comprises 
eleven categories of informat ion, which includes toxicological and 
metabolism  studies, and informat ion pertaining to residues in or on 
t reated products, food and feed ( ibid) . Notably, unlike other areas of 
environmental r isk in the UK, the PSD and the ACP do not  follow the 
formal r isk assessment  document  Greenleaves 2 33
                                                 
32
 The test  requirements for act ive pest icide substances are set  out  in 
Annex I I  with the equivalent  for formulated products set  out  in Annex I I I .  
 when assessing the 
33
 Greenleaves 2 refers to the “Guidelines for Environmental Risk 
Assessment  and Management ”  that  was joint ly developed by the 
Department  of the Environment , Transport  and Regions, The Environment  
Agency and the I nst itute for Environment  and Health. Defra states that  
the guidelines “emphasises the establishment  of r isk assessment , r isk 
management  and r isk communicat ion as essent ial elements of st ructured 
decision-making processes across Government , and provides an over-
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r isk from pest icides (Defra et  al. ,  2000) . I nstead, they follow the “Uniform  
Principles”  as detailed in Annex VI  of Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC (Office for 
Official Publicat ions of the European Communit ies, 1991) , which is 
supplemented with guidance documents and procedures out lined in the 
World Health Organisat ion’s (WHO)  I nternat ional Program me on Chemical 
Safety ( IPCS)  Environmental Health Criter ia 104 and 210 ( I PCS, 1990, 
1999) . 
 
The current  UK legislat ive framework regarding pest icides has been 
designed with the following four aims, which must  be met  if a pest icide is 
to be approved for sale and use (Defra and Health and Safety Execut ive, 
2005, p.8) :   
 
x Pest icides should only be approved for use if they are 
effect ive;  
x No-one should develop any serious illness through the use 
of pest icides;  
x No-one should be harmed or made ill by the presence of 
pest icide residues in food or dr ink;  and 
x When pest icides are use in accordance to the condit ions of 
their approval, any adverse effect  on wildlife or the 
environment  are sufficient ly small to be deemed 
acceptable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
arching framework for the development  of funct ional r isk assessment  
guidance”  (Defra et  al. , 2000) . 
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I n the following part  of this chapter, I  will largely focus on category five of 
the required informat ion in Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC, which relates to 
toxicological and metabolism  studies. These studies are highly important  
as they are used to determ ine both the No Observed Adverse Effect  Level 
(NOAEL)  and the Lowest  Observed Adverse Effect  Level (LOAEL) , which 
are ut ilised in the set t ing of human reference doses. There are current ly 
three reference doses in respect  to pest icides that  are used within the UK 
and Europe;  the Acceptable Daily I ntake (ADI ) , the Acute Reference Dose 
(ARfD)  and the Acceptable operator exposure level (AOEL) 34
 
.  The ACP 
defines the ADI  and the ARfD as follows (Defra and Health and Safety 
Execut ive, 2005, p.10) :  
Acceptable Daily I ntake ( ADI )    
This is the amount  of a chem ical which can be consumed every 
day for a lifet ime in the pract ical certainty, on the basis of all 
known facts, that  no harm  will result .  I t  is expressed in 
m illigrams of the chem ical per kilogram bodyweight  of the 
consumer. The start ing point  for the derivat ion of the ADI  is 
usually the lowest  “no adverse effect  level”  (NOAEL)  that  has 
been observed in animal studies of toxicity. This is then 
divided by an uncertainty factor (most  often 100 35
                                                 
34
 The AOEL is not  relevant  to this thesis and so will not  be discussed. 
)  to allow 
for the possibilit y of that  animals may be less sensit ive than 
humans and also to account  for possible var iat ion in sensit iv ity 
35
 The applied uncertainty factor is usually a combinat ion of a factor of 10 
to account  for the inter-species differences and a factor of 10 to account  
for int ra-species differences, though this may vary by substance.  
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between individuals. The studies from which NOAELs and 
hence ADI s are derived take into account  any impurit ies in the 
pest icide act ive substance as manufactured, and also any toxic 
breakdown products of the pest icide.  
 
Acute Reference Dose ( ARfD)  
The definit ion of the ARfD is sim ilar to that  of the ADI , but  it  
relates to the amount  of a chem ical that  can be taken in at  
one meal or on one day. I t  is normally derived by applying an 
appropriate uncertainty factor to the lowest  NOAEL in studies 
that  assess acute toxicity or developmental toxicity. 
 
I n this sect ion I  have discussed the regulatory framework that  
surrounds the assessment  of pest icides and how this is increasingly 
determ ined at  a European level. I n the following sect ion I  move on to 
discuss the process of r isk assessment . 
 
5 .2 2  Risk assessm ent : A four stage process 
Risk 36
                                                 
36
 Defra (2002)  defines a hazard as:  “any situat ion that  in part icular 
circumstances could lead to harm” , and r isk as:  “a combinat ion of the 
probabilit y of the occurrence of a defined hazard and magnitude of the 
consequences of the occurrence” .  
 from  exposure to chem icals is typically characterised through an 
assessment  process that  ut ilises both technical evidence and expert  
judgement  (Benford, 2008) . The convent ional r isk assessment  paradigm,  
as used by Defra, consists of four parts:  hazard ident ificat ion, hazard 
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characterisat ion, exposure assessment  and r isk characterisat ion (Defra, 
2008) . While the first  three stages are purportedly grounded in scient ific 
pract ice, the fourth stage, r isk characterisat ion, can be bet ter thought  of 
as a hybrid of science, expert  judgement  and policy.  
 
At  the stage of hazard ident ificat ion, the r isk that  a substance may pose 
is unknown;  this stage is used to ident ify the inherent  capacity of a 
chem ical to cause adverse effects, although it  is important  to note that  
hazard does not  always equate to a r isk. Once these have been ident ified 
hazard characterisat ion will occur. During this second stage there will be a 
sem i-quant itat ive evaluat ion of the chem ical under study, which includes 
invest igat ing factors such as dose response and toxic potency. The 
toxicity of a chem ical is typically determ ined using a combinat ion of three 
methods37:  epidem iology, in vivo and in vit ro methods. The result ing 
effect  (or lack of effect )  associated with exposure to a part icular dose can 
be measured and used to plot  a dose response curve. These curves are 
then used in the determ inat ion of the Lowest  Observed Adverse Effect  
Level (LOAEL) , the No Observed Adverse Effect  Level (NOAEL) 38
                                                 
37
 Recent  methodological developments have seen a r ise in computat ional 
methods based on toxico-kinet ics to determ ine toxicity. However, these 
computat ional methods are yet  to be widely accepted or officially 
validated for the purpose of regulatory decision-making and are not  
current ly available for toxicity endpoints.  
 and the 
No Effect  Level (NEL) .  
38
 This process refers to the test ing of chem icals that  are not  carcinogenic 
and specifically non-genotoxic. Chem icals are typically assessed 
different ly depending on their capacity to induce cancer, with non-
carcinogenic chem icals typically working within a scient ific model that  is 
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The third stage of the r isk assessment  process involves assessing 
exposure. This is used to qualify the level of chem icals to which humans 
and the environment  are exposed with regards to the magnitude, 
durat ion and frequency (Risk Assessment  and Toxicology Steering 
Commit tee, 1999) . Assessment  of exposure is an important  part  of the 
r isk assessment  process;  it  is only through exposure that  a chem ical is 
upgraded from being defined as a hazard into a r isk. There are three 
standard approaches used within exposure assessment :  direct  m ethods 
that  measure exposure at  the point  of contact  as it  occurs;  indirect  
m ethods that  ext rapolate est imates from exist ing data;  biological 
m onitor ing (Fryer  et  al.,  2004) .   
 
The final stage is r isk characterisat ion. Defra’s (2002)  definit ion of r isk is 
the standard definit ion used in quant itat ive r isk assessment , i.e., a 
combinat ion of the probabilit y of a defined hazard and the magnitude of 
occurrence. I t  is therefore an est imate of both the probabilit y that  an 
adverse effect  will occur and of it s severity, and durat ion in a given 
populat ion under defined exposure condit ions. To compensate for human 
genet ic variabilit y and for the differences between the animals used in 
toxicological studies and humans, an uncertainty/ safety factor is used 
along side the NOAEL and LOAEL to calculate human reference doses. 
These doses are then used for regulatory purposes to protect  human 
health and the environment . I n the case of pest icides these are the 
Acceptable Daily I ntake (ADI )  and the Acute Reference Dose (ARfD) . Risk 
characterisat ion is therefore based on both the informat ion obtained in 
                                                                                                                                                 
grounded in the concept  of threshold doses, where exposure to levels of 
chem icals below the threshold is seen as acceptable. 
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the first  three stages of r isk assessment  and the context  in which the 
assessment  is conducted. I t  is therefore important  when characterising 
r isk to consider all available informat ion from the first  three stages and to 
check that  all possible hazards and routes of exposure have been 
considered. 
 
5 .3  Regulatory pest icide toxicology 
5 .3 1  The dom inance of in vivo m ethods 
The toxicological assessment  of pest icides relies heavily on the use of in 
vivo methods that  use animals as a model for humans. I ndeed, unlike 
pharmaceut icals, in vivo tests of pest icides are typically only carr ied out  
in animals39
                                                 
39
 I ntent ional human dosing is not  a recognised method of pest icide 
test ing by the European Chemical Bureau and is therefore not  required as 
part  of the dossier provided by pest icide manufacturers (European 
Chemicals Bureau, 2006) . However, when available it  m ay be considered, 
provided that  tests meet  st r ict  ethical guidelines. 
. A key benefit  of using animals, as conceptualised by those 
working in toxicology and r isk assessment , is that  it  not  only allows 
scient ists to accurately cont rol the chem ical dose adm inistered but  also 
the environment  in which it  is given. This pract ice therefore increases the 
likelihood of demonstrat ing a causal link between dose and effect ;  
something which is recognised in scient ific and regulatory literature as 
often impossible to do with human epidem iological informat ion where 
there may be other confounding factors (Office for Official Publicat ions of 
the European Communit ies, 1991;  Defra and Health and Safety 
Execut ive, 2005) . The difficult ies of using epidem iological data were 
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recent ly discussed by the Head of the Food Standards Agency’s (FSA) 
Chemical Risk Assessment  Unit , who wrote that :  “even when causality 
can be assumed, informat ion on the degree and durat ion of exposure 
result ing in the reported effect  is generally lacking or highly uncertain”  
(Benford, 2008) .   
 
I n fact , epidem iological evidence is not  always required in the assessment  
of new pest icides for the purpose of regist rat ion at  either the UK or 
European level;  it  is unlikely that  there will be enough associated 
populat ion exposure data available at  the t ime of assessment 40
 
 (Office for 
Official Publicat ions of the European Communit ies, 1991;  Defra and 
Health and Safety Execut ive, 2005) . I ndeed, the use of epidem iological 
material in the r isk assessment  of pest icides was seen as problemat ic by 
the majority of the Advisory Commit tee of Pest icides (ACP)  members that  
I  interviewed:  
“ the t rouble with epidem iology studies in general is that  they 
are very insensit ive, you know you need enormous 
populat ions, the disease or the toxicity you are studying needs 
to be a rare occurrence and not  a background in the 
populat ion, you rarely have any idea about  what  dose levels 
people were exposed to, so there are so many variables that  it  
is quite difficult  to really say whether what  you are measuring 
is t rue or not ”  (L)  ACP Member  
 
                                                 
40
  Epidem iological data is part  of the reassessment  of older pest icides 
that  have been in use over a number of years. 
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Epidem iology and exposure assessment  are complex due to both the 
variety of chem icals that  may be present , the possibilit y of mult iple 
exposure routes and other confounding factors. This complexity is widely 
recognised amongst  r isk assessors such as the UK Risk Assessment  and 
Toxicology Steering Commit tee (1999 b, p.9) , who write that  the process 
of assessing r isk associated with human exposure relies on a “number of 
assumpt ions,  est imates and rat ionalisat ions” . For example, exposure 
modelling can rarely replicate the complexity of real exposure scenarios;  
as such they will only ever provide approximat ions of realit y (van Veen et  
al. ,  2001) ;  suggest ing that  the very methods used within r isk 
assessment , as a means of quant ifying r isk, can themselves becom e a 
source of uncertainty.  
 
Likewise, although there are areas such as genotoxicity which are 
considered to be well established, there are many recognised difficult ies 
that  can affect  the success and perceived reliabilit y of in vit ro methods, 
such as differences in t issue react ion and underest imat ion of toxicity 
when compared with in vivo studies (Timbrell,  2002) . I n regulatory 
pest icide assessment , in vit ro tests are generally used as part  of a t iered 
assessment  process, where the results are used to determ ine what  test  
procedure should follow – the proceeding tests will usually involve an in 
vivo methodology (Office for Official Publicat ions of the European 
Communit ies, 1991;  Whit ford, 2002) . This methodological hierarchy was 
discussed by interviewees such as (P) , an academ ic toxicologist , who 
spoke of a novel in vit ro study they had been researching, which they 
considered as robust  but  that  would not  be accepted by regulatory 
authorit ies due to a lack of confirmatory in vivo evidence. 
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I n addit ion to the perceived advantages in terms of allowing experimental 
cont rol, the use of smaller animals with short  life spans and high 
fecundity allows for the monitor ing of effects over both the lifespan of the 
animal and the lifespan of it s offspring. Animals are therefore often seen  
within toxicology as a pract ical alternat ive to human test ing as they can 
easily be housed and regularly exam ined and be commercially bred for 
different  purposes;  inbred st rains are often perceived within toxicology as 
being able to provide more consistent  results and animals can be 
specifically bred to be suscept ible to certain diseases. Moreover, the fact  
that  they have been used for several decades in regulatory r isk 
assessment  has acted to perpetuate their use;  the informat ion from past  
tests has created a database against  which assessment  authorit ies judge 
the toxicity of new pest icides (Whit ford, 2002, p.25) . Thus suggest ing 
that  regulatory authorit ies deem it  necessary to cont inue to adopt  such 
tests in order to establish and compare the toxicity of pest icides against  
each other and maintain a thorough database. 
 
5 .3 2  Challenges of anim al use 
Despite the preferent ial use of in vivo methodology, concern remains over 
the appropriateness of using animals as a surrogate model for humans. 
This reflects not  only the ethics of animal use but  also the scient ific 
validity of ext rapolat ing effects demonst rated in animals to humans.  
 
Regulatory pest icide tests use a range of animals that  typically include 
rats, m ice, rabbits, guinea pigs and dogs. Depending on the type of 
invest igat ion, tests may be required to be performed on more than one 
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species;  usually rats plus an addit ional species (Commit tee on Toxicity, 
2007) . Although primate test ing is undertaken and is accepted in 
regulatory r isk assessment , it  is not  compulsory and several interviewees, 
including members of the ACP, commented that  they would prefer 
pr imates not  to be used as they saw no added benefit  in their use.  
 
I n order to standardise tests at  an internat ional level, organisat ions such 
as the World Health Organisat ion (WHO) and the Organisat ion for 
Econom ic  Co-operat ion and Development  (OECD, 1982)  have produced 
guidelines such as Good Laboratory Pract ice41
                                                 
41
 GLP and Compliance Monitor ing were revised by the OECD in 1998 and 
adopted by the EU as Direct ives 99/ 11/ EEC and 99/ 12/ EEC. I n 1999 the 
UK updated its regulat ions through SI  1999/ 3106 and later through SI  
2004/ 994. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) define GLP as:  
 (GLP) , which since 1986 
have to be adhered to within UK regulatory requirements for pest icides. 
These guidelines standardise test ing techniques, including species choice, 
experimental design, and interpretat ion of test  results. Like European 
harmonisat ion, adherence to these guidelines should in theory produce 
studies that  are acceptable for use by mult iple internat ional agencies. I t  
was therefore hoped by regulators that  the int roduct ion of internat ional 
guidelines would reduce both the financial costs and the number of 
 
“GLP embodies a set  of pr inciples that  provide a framework within which 
laboratory studies are planned, performed, monitored, recorded, reported 
and archived...GLP helps assure regulatory authorit ies that  the data 
subm it ted are a t rue reflect ion of the results obtained during the study 
and can therefore be relied upon when making r isk/ safety assessments”  
(Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, 2007) . 
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animals used in toxicity test ing e.g. through the set t ing of animal number 
guidelines and a reduced need for replicat ion of experiments to meet  the 
requirements of different  member states42
 
 (World Health Organisat ion et  
al. ,  2003) .  
I n a recent  report  providing guidance on the set t ing of acute reference 
doses (ARfDs)  for pest icides the Joint  FAO/ WHO Meet ing on Pest icide 
Residues (JMPR) stated that :  
 
The NOAEL from the most  sensit ive species should be used 
unless there is evidence to demonst rate it  is not  appropriate 
for a human r isk assessment . (Solecki et  al. , 2005 p.1574)  
 
However, as was highlighted by (P) , an academ ic m ixtures toxicologist ,  
this approach can only be thought  of as flawed;  to definit ively know this 
informat ion one would have to test  every anim al species, which (P)  stated 
is clearly impossible. Addit ionally, the test ing of the most  sensit ive 
species may not  be realist ic. For example, the cost  of obtaining and 
housing the animal may be prohibit ive, the animal may not  cope in 
laboratory condit ions or it  may be banned or discouraged from use on 
ethical grounds.  
 
I t  is therefore common that  animals are selected for test  purposes on 
pract ical grounds such as their availabilit y and abilit y to survive 
                                                 
42
  I n relat ion to pest icides this goal was formally recognised in the 4 th 
stage review of the EU Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC on Plant  Protect ion Products 
in Art icle 5: 2 and in Art icle 8 (2) :  11 (European Commission, 2004b) . 
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laboratory condit ions (Sant illo et  al. ,  2000) .  This was recognised in the 
2007 report  by the Food Standard Agency’s (FSA)  Working Group on 
Variabilit y and Uncertainty in Toxicology of Chem icals in Food, Consumer 
Products and the Environment  (VUT) :    
 
I deally toxicity studies would be conducted in the animal 
species exhibit ing toxicokinet ics for the substance of interest  
that  most  closely resemble those in humans;  however, in 
pract ice this is not  always feasible, and rodents and a 
rest r icted range of other species are commonly used. This is 
based on availabilit y and pract icabilit y and the existence of an 
extensive historical database. (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2007. 
5.10 p.37)  
 
This report , which feeds into the product ion of consumer food safety 
advice issued by the FSA, can clearly be seen to acknowledge that  the 
choice of animals used as models in the r isk assessment  process is often 
determ ined on a pragmat ic rather than scient ific basis. This suggests that  
in such situat ions assumpt ions made by toxicologists are either:  (1)  that  
the choice of animal will not  exhibit  markedly different  effects to the 
ideal, or (2)  that  r isk management  decisions taken at  a later stage will 
adequately deal with species var iat ion in the test ing process, or (3)  both 
are assumed. 
 
The choice of species or even st rain of species in which to undertake 
experimental toxicological research is cr it ical as responses to chem ical 
exposure may differ m arkedly between species and even st rains of the 
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same species (Steinmetz et  al. , 1998;  Klot ing et  al. , 2003;  Scholze and 
Kortenkamp, 2007) . Such differences were frequent ly ment ioned as 
problemat ic by interviewees. For example (K) , a senior toxicologist  from  
the Pest icide Safety Directorate (PSD)  noted that  known variat ion m ade it  
possible to choose a st rain so that  a part icular effect  was masked, or to 
choose a st rain where there is a naturally large variat ion, so that  any 
effect  would be difficult  to dist inguish from the cont rol group. (K)  noted 
that  this situat ion had the potent ial to be exploited to have a pest icide 
pass assessment :   
  
“ if you think your compound is going to produce certain types 
of test icular tumours you could choose a rat  st rain that  has a 
very high background…but  there is also the potent ial that  that  
part icular st rain has a very low background of other types of 
tumours so by t rying to mask one you could end up allowing 
someone to pick something up that  wouldn’t  have been quite 
so obvious in a different  st rain, I  would hope that  companies 
aren’t  quite that  cynical but  I  wouldn’t  actually bet  much of my 
pension on it ,”  (K)  Senior PSD Toxicologist  
 
The above suggests that  the choice of animal can affect  the outcome of 
the test  and int roduce error into the r isk assessment  process. Addit ionally 
(X) , a member of the ACP, suggested that  the intensive inbreeding of rats 
for the purpose of toxicological test ing has resulted in st rains that  in their 
opinion cannot  be considered normal:  
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“well everybody uses rats, and actually they are not  
necessarily very good, because these inbred st rains can have 
funny lit t le quirks of their own, I  mean there is one inbred 
st rain that  rout inely shows up quite large numbers of baby 
rats that  only have one eye, and I  think lets not  use them at  
all,  lets not  even go down that  route because obviously this is 
not  a normal animal and not  something you want ,”  (X)  ACP 
Member 
 
Such a statement  quest ions the reliabilit y of the data derived from the 
use of animals which are being rout inely used as human models, yet  
cannot  be seen as representat ive of a normal version of the species 
tested.  
 
I mportant ly, in some areas there may be no animal equivalent  for 
part icular human illnesses or condit ions, which either makes animal 
models redundant  or requires the use of proxy indicators, which 
int roduces a further layer of uncertainty into the assessment . An example 
of this in pest icide assessment  can be seen in the study of developmental 
neurotoxicity (DNT) , where although the majority of regulatory data are 
obtained from rodent  studies, it  is recognised within some scient if ic and 
advisory literature that  there are lim itat ions as “ there is no age at  which 
the whole rodent  brain can be considered to be at  a stage of development  
equivalent  to the human”  (Vidair, 2004;  Commit tee on Toxicity, 2007 
p.80 [ 9.28] ) . Addit ionally, the VUT report  highlights that  there is a debate 
surrounding the interpretat ion of results and whether tests are 
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sophist icated enough to observe a disturbance of part icular modes of 
cognit ive funct ion:   
 
…observat ions could be interpreted as either a demonst rat ion 
of the lack of neurotoxicity at  low doses or the insensit iv ity of 
the regulatory tests to disturbance of higher cognit ive 
funct ion.   (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2007, 9.29)   
 
The Joint  FAO/ WHO Meet ing on Pest icide Residues (JMPR)  has also 
discussed the interpretat ion of data in neurotoxicity studies with reference 
to the set t ing of ARfD for pest icides. Here it  cites the example of the 
pest icide MPTP to highlight  that  negat ive results in an animal study do not  
always equate to negat ive effects in humans (Solecki et  al. ,  2005 
p.1583) . I n such situat ions it  suggests that  the solut ion is to use the most  
sensit ive species when deriving ARfDs. However, it  is not  clear how the 
most  sensit ive species should be ident ified or how prior knowledge should 
exist  as to the fact  that  an effect  will not  exhibit  in a part icular animal.   
 
5 .3 3  Stat ist ical robustness  
A key considerat ion in experimental study design is the number of 
animals required. Typically, tests with animals are designed to be 
amenable to stat ist ical analysis (Fest ing, 2000)  and the tests required for 
regulatory purposes, such as those from the OECD (1993) , offer 
guidelines on the m inimum number of animals which should be used to 
ensure reliabilit y. This is in part  because the number of animals used can 
influence the LOAEL and the NOAEL, which can be defined as the lowest  
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observed adverse effect  level that  is significant ly different  from the 
unt reated cont rol group (LOAEL)  and the no observed adverse effect  level 
(NOAEL) , which is typically the next  lower tested group. This influence 
was discussed by (S) , a member of the Commit tee on Toxicity (COT) , 
who highlights how the number of animals used can be important  in 
determ ining whether a response to a chem ical can be t reated as an 
effect :  
 
“ the No Effect  Dose sounds as if it  is good because it  says, 
‘well at  this dose there is no effect , therefore it  is safe’,  but  all 
that  actually means is, that  with the size of the group we 
measured and the endpoint  we measured, we could not  
dist inguish between these animals and the cont rols, it  does 
not  actually mean that  there was no effect ”    (S)  COT Working 
Group Member 
 
As detailed by (S) , producing the LOAEL and NOAEL requires the use of 
stat ist ical hypothesis test ing, a process that  can result  in two types of 
errors:  Type 1 where a false posit ive occurs, or the error of reject ing a 
correct  null hypothesis and Type 2 where a false negat ive occurs, or the 
error of not  reject ing a false null hypothesis. I n addit ion, a third type is 
now thought  of as being present . Type 3 errors relate to the fram ing of 
r isk problems, the presence of ignorance and the inabilit y of r isk 
assessors to account  for unknown variables and processes in their  
decision-making (De Marchi, 2003) . 
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Errors are important  considerat ions in regulatory science as the 
occurrence of Type 1 errors may to lead to over- regulat ion, which is likely 
to be expensive and over protect ive, while an excess of Type 2 errors is 
likely to lead to under- regulat ion, increasing the possibilit y of r isk through 
exposure. Scient ists are able to cont rol the probabilit y of a Type 1 error 
occurr ing through choosing aQDSSURSULDWHVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOĮZKLFKLV
usually at  least  0.5, which relates to a 95%  confidence interval. Scholze 
and Kortenkamp (2007 p.85)  highlight  how the rates for Type 1 and 2 
errors are inversely related, whereby the smaller the probabilit y of one 
the larger the probabilit y of the other, indicat ing that  the use of a small 
ĮPD\OHDGWRDQLQFUHDVHLQ7\SHHUURUV 
 
The set t ing of appropriate significance values has important  
FRQVHTXHQFHVDVLQFUHDVLQJDQĮYDOXHIURPWRZRXOGUHTXLUH
a greater difference between the cont rol and dosed groups for the result  
to be considered as significant  (Douglas, 2000) . This would act  to 
decrease the likelihood of Type 1 errors but  lead to an increase in Type 2 
errors. This may be important  in rarer diseases or toxicological effects 
that  have a low incidence rate in both the cont rol and dosed group. I n 
such a situat ion the detect ion of a potent ial r isk is st rongly linked to the 
confidence level chosen (Cranor, 1993) .  
 
Douglas (2000 p.566) , in discussing “ induct ive r isk” 43
                                                 
43
 Here Douglas (2000 p.561)  uses Hempel’s (1965)  definit ion of 
“ induct ive r isk” , to state that  “because no evidence can establish a 
hypothesis with certainty, acceptance (of a hypothesis)  carr ies with it  
,  suggests that  in 
many circumstances the choice of stat ist ical significance in r isk 
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assessment  studies is not  made on an understanding of mathemat ical 
theory, rather, it  is guided through research t radit ion and/ or more 
pragmat ic factors such as the choice of stat ist ical software that  is to be 
used. Cranor (1993 p.33)  too suggests that  a low significance level value 
may be linked to a cultural philosophy regarding scient ific progress and a 
demand for certainty:  
 
When the chances of false posit ives are kept  low, a posit ive 
result  can be added to scient ific knowledge with considerable 
knowledge that  it  is not  a random chance. Were one to 
tolerate higher r isks of false posit ives, take greater chances of 
new informat ion being false by chance alone, the edifice would 
be much less secure. (Cranor, 1993, p.33)  
 
The above suggests that  the requirements and const raints of toxicological 
test ing for regulatory purposes can impact  on the determ inat ion of the 
NOAEL and LOAEL, which in turn will affect  the value of the reference 
dose. This point  was acknowledged by the Joint  FAO/ WHO Meet ing on 
Pest icide Residues (JMPR) , who after an extensive review of pest icide r isk 
assessment  data found up to 2500- fold differences in the ARfD values set  
for individual pest icides as a result  of different  NOAEL and LOAEL values 
being used in calculat ions (Solecki et  al. , 2005, p. 1572) . 
 
I n addit ion to highlight ing the importance of choosing the correct  study to 
set  regulatory guideline values, the differences re- illust rate how the 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘induct ive r isk’ that  the hypothesis may turn out  to be incorrect . I nduct ive 
r isk is the r isk of error in accept ing or reject ing hypotheses” .  
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select ion of animals can great ly affect  the outcome of toxicological tests. 
The JMPR’s review also exemplifies how reference doses vary by count ry 
and are determ ined by social and polit ical decisions as well as 
toxicological evidence. This situat ion was discussed by interviewee (P) , an 
academ ic m ixtures toxicologist , who spoke of at tending a regulatory 
commit tee and being asked to vote on the most  appropriate study from 
which to ext ract  an NOAEL value. The example suggests that  regulatory 
decisions remain reliant  upon expert  judgement  and a degree of flexibilit y 
and discret ion in the assessment  process. 
 
Despite the stat ist ical requirements for certain numbers of animals to be 
used in regulatory tests, many interviewees made reference to the fact  
that  they frequent ly see studies where only a small number of animals 
are used, a point  that  many found problem at ic. For example, (X) , a 
member of the ACP, was concerned as to the stat ist ical robustness of 
such studies:   
 
“ I  think one of the worr ies at  the moment  is that  numbers of 
animals that  are required to be used, I  mean everyone is 
t rying to reduce the levels of animal use, so the numbers of 
animals used I  think are very very small,  they are so t iny, you 
know they perhaps use five in each set  or something like that , 
and you know if one of the animals has something funny 
wrong with it ,  it  throws everything out ,”  (X)  ACP Member 
 
(X) ’s concerns raise quest ions about  the ut ilit y of data produced with 
small sample sizes. For example, what  benefit  is to be gained from 
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conduct ing in vivo research if the results are not  amenable to stat ist ical 
analysis or effects cannot  be stat ist ically different iated from the cont rol 
group with the necessary degree of confidence for regulatory purposes? 
 
The reduct ion in the numbers of animals being used is part  of a m ove by 
European authorit ies towards alternat ive methods. This can be seen by 
the adopt ion of Direct ive 86/ 609/ EEC in 1986, where a key aim  was to 
reduce, refine or replace the numbers of animals used within experiments 
through st ipulat ing that  animal experiments should not  be performed 
where alternat ive methods exist 44
 
 (European Commission, 2008) . 
However, many of the toxicologists I  interviewed quest ioned the 
availabilit y of alternat ive methods despite the Direct ive being 
implemented over 20 years ago. 
For example, (D) , a senior toxicologist  at  the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA) , did not  believe there would be an imminent  reduct ion in animal 
use within regulatory tests, as they considered in vit ro and other methods 
unable to replicate the complexity of a whole organism:  
 
“ there is a lot  of interest  in the potent ial of toxicogenomics to 
cut  down on animal test ing, but  that  has quite a long way to 
go yet , not  least  because we need to understand more about  
                                                 
44
  The Direct ive prompted the creat ion of the European Cent re for the 
Validat ion of Alternat ive Methods (ECVAM) in 1992. A sim ilar cent re was 
created in the UK known as the NC3Rs (Nat ional Cent re for the 
Replacement , Refinement  and Reduct ion of Animals in Research)  which 
focuses on the “promot ion, development  and implementat ion of the 3Rs 
in animal research and test ing”  (NC3Rs, 2008) .  
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what  various gene changes mean, but  also you know the 
whole animal, or the whole human is a complex organism with 
systems as well as t issues and organs and it  is very difficult  to 
replicate”  (D)  Senior FSA Toxicologist  
 
Sim ilar ly, toxicologist  (L) , a member of the ACP, commented that  in their 
opinion there simply are not  enough suitable in vit ro tests to replace the 
in vivo studies st ipulated in the regulatory guidelines. 
 
While the above are generalisat ions, such comments do indicate a 
percept ion among the regulatory community that  characterisat ion of 
hazard in the r isk assessment  of pest icides will remain reliant , at  least  in 
the near future, on the use of in vivo methods despite their acknowledged 
flaws.  
 
5 .3 4  Sum m ary of regulatory pest icide toxicology 
I n the above I  have illust rated that  although in vivo test ing is the 
dom inant  method employed in the toxicological assessment  of pest icides 
it  is not  without  it s difficult ies, many of which appear to be recognised to 
varying degrees by the scient ific and regulatory community. Such 
difficult ies include select ing a suitable anim al model to m irror human 
development , replicat ing ‘normal’ growth in laboratory condit ions where 
pract ical considerat ions may affect  results, and select ing enough animals 
for the test  to be stat ist ically meaningful. I  have argued that  differences 
in st rain response and abnormal development  can be problemat ic for 
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regulators and r isk assessors, and raise the quest ion of how appropriate it  
is to ext rapolate animal data to humans.  
 
I  have argued that  despite a call for the most  sensit ive species to be 
used, animals are often selected on a pragmat ic basis or because of 
historic regulatory norms. I  have also discussed that  the requirements 
and const raints of toxicological test ing for regulatory purposes, which 
may be determ ined and shaped by social and polit ical factors, impact  on 
the determ inat ion of the NOAEL and LOAEL, which in turn will affect  the 
value of the reference dose and whether a substance is considered 
acceptable for use. 
 
What  is interest ing is that  despite recognising many of these drawbacks, 
the regulatory community remains reliant  on in vivo methods due to a 
percept ion within this community that  there are few viable assessment  
alternat ives. These observat ions support  previous sociological research on 
the pract ice of r isk assessment , such as that  conducted by Wynne (1992) , 
which suggests that  knowledge of r isk is often determ ined by pragmat ic 
decisions based on pract icalit ies such as what  is measurable or 
observable.  
 
The evidence also suggests that  there is a culture within pest icide r isk 
assessment  that  places emphasis on reducing the possibilit y of Type 1 
errors ( false posit ives)  and hence avoiding over- regulat ion. This was 
shown to be problemat ic for rarer diseases or toxicological effects that  
have a low incidence rate in both the cont rol and dosed group. The 
current  lack of awareness of the third type of error in r isk assessment  
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may also be problemat ic as it  suggests that  there is lim ited scope for 
wider thinking in the r isk assessment  process. This has tangible 
consequences in relat ion to r isk assessment  and r isk management ;  the 
four stage risk assessment  model, as illust rated by Defra, suggests that  if 
an issue is not  considered within the first  three stages (hazard 
ident ificat ion, hazard characterisat ion and exposure assessment )  then it  
will ult imately be excluded in the characterisat ion of r isk and in turn 
methods of r isk management . The lim itat ions discussed in this sect ion 
therefore suggest  that  the characterisat ion of r isk using data collected 
from in vivo methods is a proxy for the actual level of r isk, which is 
indeterm inable within the current  system. 
 
5 .4  How  are the challenges posed by exposure 
to m ixtures and low - levels of pest icides 
addressed in r isk assessm ent? 
I n the previous sect ions I  have shown that  even before one begins to 
consider the challenges posed by the problem of low- level exposure and 
chem ical m ixtures, r isk assessment  of pest icides is already characterised 
by significant  uncertaint ies ar ising from the reliance on in vivo 
methodology that  is m andated by current  regulatory guidelines. I  now 
turn to the area of r isk assessment  that  addresses the issues presented 
by exposure to low- levels and m ixtures of chem icals. As I  have 
highlighted in Chapter One, there is now a growing body of literature 
which suggests current  regulat ions and r isk assessment  pract ices do not  
adequately ensure that  human health and the environment  are protected 
from exposure to m ixtures;  where procedures are in place it  has been 
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suggested in some scient ific literature that  there is likely to be a high 
degree of uncertainty (van Zorge, 1996;  Weinhold, 2003;  Wharfe et  al. , 
2004) .  Such uncertainty may in part  be due to the amount  of t ime and 
research that  has historically been spent  invest igat ing this area;  
compared to the research invest igat ing the adverse effects of single 
substances, exposure to chem ical m ixtures has received only marginal 
at tent ion. This deficiency was highlighted by the I PCS (2001)  in its 
framework for integrated r isk assessment  where it  states that  “many 
internat ional and nat ional organisat ions have expressed a need for an 
integrated, holist ic approach to r isk assessment  that  addresses real life 
situat ions of mult ichem ical, mult im edia and mult ispecies exposures” .  
 
I ndeed, the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , recent ly issued a 
joint  regulatory update on its approach to assessing the mammalian 
toxicity of two or more compounds when found in a single pest icide 
product  (Pest icide Safety Directorate, 2005) . This update highlights that  
while the ACP does now consider potent ial interact ions of mult iple act ive 
substances if present  in one formulated product , there remain areas of 
known uncertaint ies for some act ive substance, such as the mechanism of 
mammalian toxicity ( ibid, p. 2) . However, the subject  of assessing r isk 
from a m ixture of products is less clear, a point  touched upon by ACP 
member (N) , who suggested that  this was an area in which the ACP 
lacked expert ise:  
 
“ I  mean on this one at  a t ime basis it  [ the ACP]  does a 
thorough job in applying the law as it  is now, however, there 
are some areas of uncertainty in the r isk assessments which 
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are done, and those are the ones that  I  am often banging a 
drum about , so one obviously is m ixtures…we are not  experts 
on that  at  all,”  (N)  ACP Member   
 
I n the above, (N)  reflects that  the current  pract ice of assessing chem icals 
on a single substance basis may not  be sufficient ly robust  to protect  the 
public from any r isk posed by exposure to m ixtures of pest icides. The use 
of the phrase “ I  am  often banging a drum about ”  also suggests that  N’s 
concerns are either not  shared across the Commit tee, or that  m ixtures 
are not  rout inely addressed in the ACP’s evaluat ions of r isk assessment  
data. 
 
This issue has been discussed by the sociologist  Casper (2003) , who 
highlights that  the study of the effect  of chem icals on the environment  
and human health has been lim ited to a few highly contested and often 
cont radictory examples of individual chem icals which have been modelled 
or tested using only known pathways, which often cannot  replicate the 
complexity of real life exposure pat terns. Although toxicological test ing of 
individual chem icals is useful in predict ing the fate and behaviour of a 
chem ical in the environment , reality is more complex with chem icals 
occurr ing in combinat ion at  low-doses over long t ime periods. I t  is 
therefore often difficult  and expensive to isolate the effect  of exposure to 
m ixtures from other factors. I t  is in part  this complexity and the 
possibilit y for variance in the composit ion of m ixtures that  makes the 
assessment  of r isk challenging for regulators. Shore (2003) , in her study 
on indoor air pollut ion, proposes that  this has resulted in chem ical 
m ixtures being understudied and poorly understood by those considered 
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as expert . A view that  appears to be supported in (N) ’s comments above 
and shared by (P) , an academ ic toxicologist  specialising in m ixtures, who 
too suggested that  m ixtures research had been marginalised due to a 
percept ion among regulators and scient ists that  both the science and the 
regulat ion of this issue was seen as too complicated. van Zorge (1996, 
p.1033)  proposes that  marginalisat ion has largely occurred for two 
reasons:   
 
x The problem is regarded as too complex so solut ions 
cannot  be expected 
x The problem is regarded as a non-problem at  low levels of 
exposure (e.g. where health-based standards for 
components of the m ixture are not  exceeded. I n this case 
standard set t ing for single substances is expected to be 
sufficient )  
 
The issue of r isk assessment  of pest icide m ixtures was publicly addressed 
by the Food Standards Agency (FSA)  in 2000 when it  set  up the Working 
Group on Risk Assessment  of Mixtures of Pest icides and Sim ilar 
Substances (WiGRAMP) . The report  by WiGRAMP clearly acknowledges 
the complexity involved in the study of m ixtures of pest icides stat ing:  
“ r isk assessment  of any toxic effects of chem ical m ixtures is ext remely 
difficult ”  (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b, p.7) . Addit ionally, it  highlighted 
that  while there have been several other reports invest igat ing the toxicit y 
of m ixtures;  the majority have focussed on addit iv ity studies with few 
exploring the possibilit y of synergism . This finding is echoed by El-Masri 
et  al. (1997)  and Kortenkamp (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2001)  who state 
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that  due to the complexity involved, where studies exist  they will t ypically 
only use binary m ixtures at  relat ively high doses with acute toxicit ies and 
endpoints;  situat ions which do not  reflect  real life exposure. However, the 
at t itude to m ixtures research appears to be changing, with the subject  
r ising in prom inence over the last  decade at  both a nat ional and European 
level45
 
.   
I n the above I  have discussed that  although challenges surrounding 
exposure to low- levels and m ixtures of chem icals are acknowledged as a 
concern, they appear marginalised within the current  assessment  
framework.  The following sect ion explores why this may have occurred 
within pest icide r isk assessment . 
 
5 .4 1  Pest icide assessm ent  as an exem plar 
The most  common theme among toxicologists interviewed was that  
exposure to low- levels of pest icides, either singularly or as a m ixture, was 
not  an issue that  they saw as a concern. This opinion can be seen in 
ext racts such as the one shown below from (F) , a renowned toxicologist , 
who when asked what  they considered to be the main concerns regarding 
pest icide residues in food replied:  
 
“ I  don’t  think there are any…well I  would say that  in terms of 
any other chem ical grouping pest icides are the most  
thoroughly studied and intensively evaluated group of 
                                                 
45
 See the European White Paper on a st rategy for future chem icals policy 
(Commission of the European Communit ies, 2001) . 
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compounds by far, you know it  is almost  im possible to get  a 
waiver for any component  of the dossier”  (F)  COT Working 
Group Member 
 
Here, fram ing the r isk from pest icide residues as a non- issue (F)  
effect ively denies legit imacy to any alternat ive view. This perspect ive may 
be explained through considerat ion of (F) ’s status as an expert  who has 
been deeply embedded in the regulat ion of pest icides and product ion of 
r isk advice within the UK for the past  twenty years. Therefore, if (F)  were 
to acknowledge concern, they would be underm ining the current  r isk 
assessment  system by suggest ing that  it  is somehow inadequate at  
protect ing people’s health and so unfit  for purpose.  
 
The fram ing of pest icide residues as a non- issue is again seen within 
former ACP member ( I ) ’s dialogue:  
 
“as current ly managed the r isks from pest icide residues in 
food are substant ially less than other health r isks associated 
with food, for example r isks from m icrobial food contam inat ion 
and bird flu, r isks relat ing to under and over nut r it ion…I  think 
the evidence that  we have on adverse health effects is that  
they occur principally in relat ion to use or m isuse of pest icides 
rather than in relat ion to pest icide residues in the diet ,”  ( I )  
Former ACP Member 
 
Here, ( I )  frames the r isk from residues in relat ion to other food r isks that  
( I )  deems to be more pressing, thereby suggest ing that  this part icular 
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r isk is small.  The relat ive insignificance is further implied through ( I ) ’s 
fram ing of the r isk in terms of pest icide ‘m isuse’, ergo if rules are adhered 
to then r isk is m inim ised or elim inated. A sim ilar message can be seen in 
the following ext ract  from  ACP member (X) , who, in speaking about  
bystander exposure, suggests that  when problems occur, they do so due 
to human error:  
 
“ I  think the bystander effect  is a very difficult  one, I  do think 
you can get  problems when occasionally farmers m isjudge it ,  
they do overspray by m istake…I  think you can genuinely get  
cases where frankly people have got  the m ix wrong…I  mean 
given that  a lot  of people who are doing the spraying are not  
necessarily terr ibly good at  maths or not  terr ibly well 
educated, probably you could make it  simpler,”  (X)  ACP 
Member  
 
As the above examples indicate, the overall consensus among 
interviewees from government  bodies and in part icular the ACP was that  
when compared to other chem ical groups, pest icides are one of the most  
thoroughly and intensively tested group of all chem ical compounds. 
Several interviewees referred to the fact  that  test ing of pest icides has 
occurred in various guises for the past  40 to 50 years, which has resulted 
in a wealth of evidence surrounding their use and effect  that  simply is not  
there for other chem ical groups;  a factor that  they used to just ify their 
posit ion that  exposure to low- levels of pest icides such as residues in food 
was a non- issue. 
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This mass collect ion of data was at t r ibuted to the st r ict  legal requirem ents 
that  dictate the type of evidence that  is required before a pest icide can be 
assessed for sale and use. I ndeed, the scale of data collect ion led several 
advisory body interviewees to present  pest icides as an exemplar of how 
other chem icals should be assessed.  
 
Yet , whilst  there is lit t le doubt  that  the regulatory guidelines set  out  in 
Direct ive 91/ 414/ EEC have increased the overall volume of data required 
for the assessment  of new products, some interviewees, most ly NGO staff 
but  also a senior Pest icide Safety Directorate (PSD)  toxicologist ,  
quest ioned what  is actually being produced and whether the evidence 
st ipulated by the regulatory r isk assessment  guidelines addresses the 
more complex and understudied areas such as the effects of exposure to 
m ixtures. I ndeed, while the majority of interviewees argued that  the 
informat ion requirem ents are designed to be comprehensive and that  
st r ict  adherence is necessary to standardise data packages, others have 
expressed concerns that  they are overly lim it ing and have led to a “ t ick 
box”  mentality which acts to discourage the use of innovat ive techniques 
and rest r icts lateral thinking.  
 
5 .4 2  I s the m ethod validated and has the box been 
t icked? 
A key issue, as can be seen in the following quote from a senior 
toxicologist  at  the PSD, is that  although regulatory bodies m ay be 
interested in a variety of assessment  evidence they are in fact  lim ited by 
regulatory requirements as to what  they can officially use in pract ice:  
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“ I  think that  we are quite open to looking at  the results but  
whether we can use them in a regulatory context  is, to an 
extent  we are rest r icted by the fact  that  we are supposed to 
be having studies done to these OECD guidelines, so if 
someone has got  a new study which they think is equivalent  to 
an OECD guideline study but  has not  gone through the process 
and been validated, whilst  we can say yes this is very 
interest ing and it  sort  of supports your argument , there can be 
legal or if you like regulatory quest ions over whether we can 
use it  on its own without  anything else to go with it ”  (K)  
Senior PSD Toxicologist  
 
Sim ilar ly, (B) , a science policy advisor for the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA) , spoke of an evidence hierarchy, where evidence is weighted by its 
or igin. So, (B)  claims that  the FSA considers evidence (of which science 
may be just  one part )  from  all reputable sources, but  that  anecdotal 
evidence or evidence that  had not  been produced using validated 
methods was likely to be used as a start ing point  to guide future 
research, rather than evidence in itself.  The reluctance of government  
advisory bodies to include alternat ive forms of evidence in assessments 
led several interviewees to com ment  that  the necessity of adhering to 
guidelines can deter companies from developing and using newer 
methods, or collect ing and submit t ing informat ion outside of what  is 
required, especially if there is no financial incent ive to do so:  
 
“Well you could say that  they should be upgrading and looking 
at  newer methods…they don’t  because it  is not  required, you 
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see they do the standard tests which are required, which 
everyone has set t led on, which have been you know ECVAM 
validated or validated by t ime sort  of thing…I  mean why 
should they you see? I t  is going to cost  money if they do 
research like that , and why should they? They are not  asked to 
do it ,”  (X)  ACP Member 
 
When asked about  this issue, (R) , a regulatory affairs manager for a 
pest icide m anufacturer, suggested that  there is a desire among indust ry 
to develop new tests but  that  this process can be frust rat ing as the 
result ing evidence will often not  be counted in assessment ;  regulators are 
reluctant  to use the result ing evidence due to concerns about  the 
potent ial for lit igat ion if a chem ical was later found to cause harm . 
 
However, the st r ict  pract ices and closed nature of regulatory toxicology 
appear to be at  odds with the depict ions of the science of toxicology 
provided by interviewees, who described the field of toxicology as a 
“developing science”  and st ressed the importance of “ thinking outside of 
the box” . For example, toxicologist  (S)  illust rates the cont radict ion and 
tension that  typifies the collect ion and assessment  of pest icide data for 
regulatory purposes;  that  while standardisat ion is viewed as necessary to 
produce robust  and acceptable evidence, “people have discovered toxic 
effects by applying cut t ing edge science using completely non-standard 
techniques, and it  is important  that  they are allowed to do that  and they 
are not  lim ited by things being too standardised” . This is likely to be 
important  in areas such as the study of the effects of chronic exposure to 
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low- levels and m ixtures, where current  research may be being conducted 
using newer non-validated tests. 
 
Several interviewees highlighted how the current  regulatory evidence 
requirements have been shaped by historical scient ific developments that  
saw a r ise in the number and types of experiments that  were available, 
thus suggest ing that  there are per iods of t ransit ion, or paradigm shifts, in 
regulatory toxicology where the merits of older techniques are reviewed 
and newer methods become standardised, accepted for regulatory use 
and added to the bat tery of required tests. This idea was highlighted by 
(F) , a member of the Commit tee on Toxicity (COT) , who spoke of “going 
along with a paradigm that  has been established by experience and 
pract ice” . 
 
While several interviewees felt  that  working within a paradigm offered 
advantages in relat ion to standardisat ion and robustness in assessment , 
others such as (K)  felt  that  it  has led to the development  of a t ick box 
mentality. (K) , a PSD toxicologist , suggested that  in the past  when there 
were fewer guidelines, those producing evidence had to give greater 
thought  to what  they were doing. (K)  discussed that  the current  
rout inisat ion of studies has resulted in a t ick box approach where 
companies run through the required list  of tests with lit t le thought  as to 
whether they are necessary or useful:  
 
“ I  would say using your brain more, you do a couple of studies 
and you say well we are not  seeing anything in those so it  is 
not  worth doing that  one and we should be looking over here, 
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instead at  the moment  I  think there is a lot  of t ick boxing, that  
you have to do these 30 studies and almost  the companies 
just  run through them and they don’t  really think about  it ,  I  
think there should be more thought  going in”  (K)  Senior PSD 
Toxicologist  
 
The lack of considerat ion of wider consequences and the wasted potent ial 
for a greater use of the evidence was discussed by several interviewees. 
For example, (V) , a Brit ish Crop Product ion Council (BCPC) 
representat ive, commented that  they were aware of several people over 
the past  50 years who had wanted to pull all the evidence together and 
view it  as a collect ive whole, but  had been put  off “by the enorm ity of the 
task” . Likewise, (J) , a toxicologist  and member of a COT working group, 
believed that  “ the taking of a broad scient ific view is less common in the 
pest icide world than in other worlds”  such as medicine.  
 
Unsurprisingly, this perceived lack of a wider perspect ive is heavily 
cr it icised by several NGOs and academ ics outside of the advisory bodies 
to be det r imental for the understanding of the issue as a whole. For 
example, interviewee (Y) , a member of the Pest icide Act ion Network 
(PAN) , highlighted the work of Theo Colborn 46
                                                 
46
 Theo Colborn, a zoologist  and senior scient ist  with the WWF, co-wrote 
the book “Our Stolen Future”  (Colborn et  al. , 1997) , which is widely 
viewed as a sequel to Carson’s “Silent  Spring”  (Carson, 1962) . The book 
out lines Colborn’s work invest igat ing the link between exposure to 
synthet ic chem icals and endocrine disrupt ion in wildlife and humans.  
 to illust rate how it  was only 
when evidence from different  scient ific disciplines was brought  together 
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and considered holist ically did the scient ific community begin to realise 
that  certain synthet ic chem icals, including pest icides, were linked to 
endocrine disrupt ion. 
 
5 .4 3  The problem  of proving a negat ive 
The lim itat ions of collect ing evidence surrounding the effects of pest icides 
in real life situat ions was also a recurr ing theme found in interviews with 
those working in pest icide regulat ion. This was summarised by (V) , a 
representat ive from the Brit ish Crop Product ion Council (BCPC), who 
stated “one of the problems with pest icide residues or with pest icide 
regulatory science is that  you are always t rying to prove a negat ive, it  is 
impossible isn’t  it?”  Here (V)  ident ifies a key issue;  it  is impossible to 
produce evidence to show that  a substance is r isk free in all situat ions. As 
such, decisions must  be taken on the basis of available evidence, which at  
t imes, may not  be comprehensive, part icularly in those areas considered 
as fr inge, such as chronic effects from the exposure to low- levels of 
m ixtures. This was discussed by (S) , a member of the Commit tee on 
Toxicity (COT) , who stated:  “essent ially the issues that  confront  
regulatory toxicologists are issues of how to prior it ise the many different  
problems and where to stop the invest igat ion, because resources are 
never going to be adequate to completely elim inate all potent ial forms of 
toxicity for all potent ial chem icals” . 
   
(S) ’s statement  suggests that  r isk assessors focus on those problems that  
they consider to be most  concerning, suggest ing that  the choice of where 
and how to concent rate assessment  is not  purely scient ific, but  involves 
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judgement  and social values. The use of fram ing in conceptualising r isk 
problems therefore int roduces the possibilit y of Type 3 errors occurring, 
i.e., the presence of ‘ignorance’ and the inabilit y of r isk assessors to 
account  for unknown variables and processes in their decision-
making. Hoffmann-Reim  and Wynne (2002)  discuss Type 3 errors in their 
art icle “ I n r isk assessment , one has to adm it  ignorance” , where they 
make the following bold statement  (p.416) :  “Risk assessment  and policy 
need to emphasize uncovering the lim its to knowledge rather than 
proving exist ing knowledge to be correct .”  
 
A common theme seen in the interviews, especially with those from the 
Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , was that  in cases where links 
between exposure and effect  are inconclusive, there was a tendency to 
flag up potent ial flaws in the research to just ify the posit ion that  
pest icides were a non- issue when used correct ly. This can be seen in the 
excerpt  below where ACP toxicologist  (X) , explains why, in their opinion, 
there is a lack of reliable evidence demonst rat ing a clear link between 
exposure to pest icides and cancer:  
 
“despite people really working very hard, I  don’t  know of any 
evidence, at  least  for pest icides, which clearly links pest icide 
use with cancer, and there have been suggest ions but  in every 
case the research is flawed or you can think of a lot  of other 
possibilit ies, so you know it  m ight  not  be a pest icide at  all,”  
(X)  ACP Member 
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(X) ’s account  is a classic example of what  Gilbert  and Mulkay (1984)  
describe as a cont ingent  repertoire;  a pat tern of discourse frequent ly 
used by scient ists to reduce the credibilit y of research or other scient ists 
with whom they disagree. Here, the suggested lack of a clear link was 
used by (X)  to just ify not  taking a more precaut ionary at t itude towards 
pest icide use and regulat ion. A sim ilar argument  was made by (V)  from 
the Brit ish Crop Product ion Council,  who suggests that  difficult ies 
associated with epidem iology – “ there is no hard and fast  causal link you 
know, a lot  of these seem to be com ing from these epidem iological 
studies, which you know somet imes the numbers are a bit  iffy as well”  -  
are a reason why certain studies cannot  be t rusted or used for regulatory 
purposes.  
 
However, this posit ion of dism issing effects due to the inabilit y to obtain 
water t ight  proof of causat ion was crit icised by others interviewed, who 
suggested that  such a posit ion is m isguided and being used to just ify 
inact ion. For example, (E) , a former chairman of the Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollut ion (RCEP) , was vehement  in stat ing that  they 
believed “ it  highly probable that  90%  of the areas where chem icals in the 
general sense and pest icides in part icular are used, you will never be able 
to get  any convincing stat ist ics, and if you don’t  realise that  to begin with, 
then I  think there is a fundamental m isunderstanding” . 
 
(E)  went  further in stat ing that  although it  can be difficult  for a body 
charged with assessing evidence to publicly adm it  that  there are areas of 
uncertainty, it  is bet ter to disclose ignorance than mask or avoid the 
problem -  a pract ice that  (E)  suggests is common within the ACP:  
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“ if you say you don’t  know it  is quite difficult ,  but  I  think we 
have now gone through a cultural change in most  places apart  
from  the ACP, where if you don’t  know, you say you don’t  
know, because in the long run it  is damaging to people and 
the community and it  is even damaging to people’s careers if 
you keep being dogmat ic,”  (E)  Former RCEP Chairman 
 
(E) ’s comments have obvious consequences in terms of the acceptabilit y 
of evidence to regulatory authorit ies and advisory bodies. I n part icular,  
they suggest  that  the ACP does not  recognise the lim its in ext rapolat ing 
data. The result  of which is that  the ACP is unable to acknowledge the 
potent ial uncertainty surrounding effects of human exposure to pest icides 
due to an unwillingness to acknowledge adverse effects, unless they can 
be conclusively proven. This view was shared by some dissent ing 
members of the ACP, such as (O) , who stated:  “ I  do think that  people, 
any individuals who think that  their health has been damaged by 
pest icides should be listened to, and I  think that  they are too easily 
dism issed on the Commit tee [ ACP] ” .  
 
(E) ’s suggest ion that  real life causal data are highly difficult  to obtain was 
m irrored by others, in part icular those interviewees who were members of 
NGOs, as can be seen in the following statement  made by (Y) , a staff 
member of the Pest icide Act ion Network (PAN) :  
 
“ there is so much uncertainty and there will be for the 
foreseeable future, part icular ly about  chronic effects of 
pest icides that  you therefore have to make a value judgement  
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about  where you think, how far you should take a 
precaut ionary approach,”   (Y)  PAN Staff Member 
 
I nterviewee (C)  from the Soil Associat ion too raised concerns surrounding 
the extent  to which the ACP recognises the lim its of science and 
suggested that  the ACP’s mandate and embedded culture of simply 
assessing the science in isolat ion has meant  that  it  often fails to consider 
the wider implicat ions of pest icide use and agricultural pract ice:  
 
“ you see it  is the people who on the [ ACP]  who are lost  in it , 
they are lost  in this world of looking at  detail and t rying to, 
and not  actually understanding the lim its of science and 
thinking about  whether pest icides are necessary,”  (C)  Soil 
Associat ion Staff Member 
 
The key quest ions that  these quotes raise were surm ised by interviewee 
(E)  who asked:  “ if you think then that  there is no way of proving your 
case, should you act?”  I t  is clear from the above that  a lack of certainty in 
causat ion is often used as a reason by the Advisory Commit tee on 
Pest icides to just ify maintaining the status quo and denying the need to 
invoke a more precaut ionary at t itude in relat ion to pest icide use and 
exposure 
 
5 .5  Sum m ary 
Despite the commercial applicat ion of pest icides over the past  sixty years 
there remain uncertaint ies surrounding their effects on human health and 
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the environment . I n this chapter, I  stepped behind the regulat ions to 
explore the toxicological science upon which pest icide reference doses, 
and hence r isk advice, is derived. I  illust rate that  the regulatory 
assessment  requirem ents, which are specific to pest icides, are now 
largely determ ined at  a European level, although they remain managed 
within the UK by the Pest icide Safety Directorate (PSD)  and the Advisory 
Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) . I  discuss how within the UK it  is the ACP 
who has responsibilit y for reviewing pest icide dossiers subm it ted by 
indust ry and that  typically as a result  of historical pract ice, pest icide 
substances are assessed on an individual basis so that  potent ial effects 
from exposure to mult iple pest icides are not  rout inely addressed within 
the r isk assessment  process. The result  of which is that  potent ial effects 
of exposure to m ixtures are effect ively excluded from ACP discussions and 
therefore remain formally unacknowledged in its assessment  of r isk. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis I  largely focus on the second stage of r isk 
assessment , hazard characterisat ion and illust rate how there has 
historically been a reliance on in vivo methodology. I  exam ine the 
tensions of this reliance and highlight  that  although those working in the 
area perceive there to be significant  benefits in animal use, especially in 
t rying to establish causality between dose, exposure and effect  there are 
also recognised challenges. I n part icular,  there are long standing 
concerns noted in both the scient ific and policy literature regarding the 
appropriateness of using animals as a surrogate model for humans. These 
concerns cent re on the validity of ext rapolat ing effects observed or not  
observed in animals to humans. I  discuss how the results of tests could 
be influenced by factors such as choice of anim al species and 
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experimental design so that  the very models used to expand our 
knowledge and understanding can themselves become a source of 
uncertainty. I mportant ly, I  show that  methodological choice is often m ade 
on the basis of social/ community norms and pragmat ic reasoning. I n this 
sense, the methods and guidelines which have been put  into place to 
standardise tests can be seen as int roducing a false sense of confidence 
in the results as we remain ignorant  of the t rue r isk or scale of 
uncertainty. This finding supports previous research, such as that  
undertaken by Wynne and Mayer (1993) , which has argued that  the 
assessment  of r isk is it self subject  to scient ific uncertainty and that  
knowledge of r isk is often determ ined by pragmat ic decisions based on 
pract icalit ies such as what  is measurable or observable (Wynne, 1992) .  
 
I mportant ly, I  use the interview and documentary evidence to suggest  
that  there is a culture within pest icide r isk assessment  that  encourages 
the reduct ion of Type 1 errors to avoid the possibilit y of over- regulat ion. I  
also suggest  that  there is both a lack of awareness and lack of scope in 
the current  system to consider Type 3 errors. I  argue that  this and the 
reliance on animal test ing in toxicology will have tangible consequences 
as it  suggests that  the current  narrow characterisat ion of r isk using data 
primarily collected from in vivo methods can only be a proxy for the 
actual level of r isk, which is current ly indeterm inable. 
 
When considering the previous ad hoc nature of pest icide assessment , the 
move towards standardised methods and guidelines is viewed by many in 
the field as posit ive;  if applied consistent ly across Europe it  should 
provide a baseline of data which are t ransferable across count r ies and 
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markets. This can be crucially important  for regulatory agencies and 
assessment  bodies who may have lim ited resources and t ime in which to 
make decisions. Mandat ing evidence requirements should in theory 
ensure that  every substance is assessed on equal grounds and using the 
most  useful and appropriate informat ion. However, the evidence 
presented here suggests that  standardisat ion can equally have the effect  
of devaluing evidence which is produced outside of this process and 
lim it ing its scope to im pact  on decision making – assessment  bodies are 
simply not  able to consider it ,  as it  is classed as unacceptable or unfit  for 
regulatory purposes.  
 
I  argued that  this is likely to be problem at ic in those areas, such as 
m ixtures toxicology, which often ut ilise newer alternat ive non-validated 
methods. Addit ionally, it  was noted that  although working within an 
established paradigm was believed by interviewees to offer advantages, 
the very methods adopted to increase our understanding through 
providing a st rong evidence base, were also recognised by some 
interviewees as barr iers to developing new knowledge. I  show that  there 
is a belief among some regulatory toxicologists that  the current  
rout inisat ion of studies has resulted in a t ick box mentality which 
discourages considerat ion of both new approaches and areas outside of 
the regulatory rem it . Thus the evidence presented here indicates that  
there is a tension present  in pest icide regulatory science;  although it  is 
widely acknowledged that  standardisat ion and rout ine are required to 
produce robust  regulatory evidence, it  is often only when toxicologists are 
able to think creat ively and apply non-standard techniques that  
understanding is increased.  
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I t  is also clear from this evidence that  the decisions as to how tests are 
designed and selected for use in determ ining human reference doses are 
not  wholly object ive as is often purported but  are int r insically shaped by 
historical, social and pragmat ic considerat ions regarding what  is actually 
measurable. The very fact  that  methods differ across count r ies suggests 
that  assessment  and interpretat ion of results is in part  a polit ical and 
value based act ivity. I n this sense the findings of this thesis support  
previous STS arguments, such as those made by I rwin et  al.  (1997, p. 
24) , that  suggest  because r isk assessment  guidelines have been shaped 
by social object ives, the underlying science can never be t ruly separated 
from social values. Thus, to quote the authors ( ibid) ;  the science used in 
pest icide regulatory r isk assessment  “ interlinks social, bureaucrat ic and 
scient ific demands”  with the result  that  social assumpt ions are allowed to 
“pervade the developm ent  of a technical regulatory regime” .  
 
A recurr ing theme found in interviews with those working within pest icide 
regulat ion related to the lim itat ions in obtaining evidence pertaining to 
the effects of pest icides in real life situat ions. Therefore, decisions have to 
be taken in the knowledge that  there is a degree of uncertainty. However, 
I  discuss that  there is a percept ion -  pr imarily among those outside of the 
ACP and the government  advisory process, but  it  is also one recognised 
and shared by the RCEP -  that  the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides 
(ACP)  is reluctant  to acknowledge this uncertainty in its decision-making 
process. I  use the evidence collected in this thesis to further suggest  that  
lack of certainty in studies exploring causat ion between real life exposure 
and ill health are used by the ACP as an argument  to maintain the status 
quo and current  regulatory pract ices. Shackley and Wynne’s (1996)  
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exam inat ion of boundary-ordering devices, suggests that  scient ific 
uncertainty can challenge both science and the authority of scient ists. I f 
applied here, it  suggests that  the ACP may deny the possibilit y of 
uncertainty in its assessments so as not  to underm ine the current  
regulatory system, within which it  is embedded.  
 
I n the later part  of the chapter I  show that  a key area of challenge and 
uncertainty in pest icide r isk assessment  is in how to study and assess 
chem ical m ixtures. Drawing on both published literature (van Zorge, 
1996;  I PCS, 2001;  Shore, 2003)  and interview data I  suggest  that  this 
area has historically received lim ited at tent ion within the regulatory and 
r isk advisory community for two reasons:  first , there is a percept ion 
among regulators and scient ists that  the science is difficult  to conduct  and 
that  the area is too complex to regulate;  secondly, there is a belief that  
exposure to m ixtures is a non- issue when individual components are 
present  at  otherwise acceptable levels. Where m ixtures have been 
considered I  show that  researchers have typically favoured undertaking 
simple studies, for example using binary m ixtures at  high doses. I n doing 
so the complexity found in real life exposure is likely to be reduced. This 
would suggest  that  within the current  r isk assessment  paradigm the t rue 
scale of uncertainty regarding the r isks from exposure to m ixtures is 
indeterm inable.  
 
The case of assessing pest icide m ixtures therefore supports Wynne’s 
(1992)  argument  that  the pervasion of pragmat ic choices in toxicological 
studies has the effect  of art if icially reducing uncertainty. A key problem of 
this act ion, as noted by Wynne ( ibid) , is that  once uncertainty has been 
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removed it  becomes difficult  to reint roduce at  a later stage of assessment  
and analysis.  
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Chapter 6 : Fragm entat ion of Governm ent  
Advice on Pest icide Risks 
6 .1  I nt roduct ion 
I n previous chapters I  have suggested that  despite scient ific 
developments, the uncertaint ies present  and the quest ions that  are being 
asked about  the r isks of pest icides have not  significant ly altered since the 
first  consumer review in 1953. I n Chapter Five I  argued that  both the 
means of product ion and presentat ion of scient ific evidence for regulat ion 
can be implicit ly and explicit ly shaped by social, polit ical and pragmat ic 
factors, such as regulatory guidelines and historic scient ific norms. This 
chapter focuses on r isk advice, the stage following r isk assessment , and 
highlights how inst itut ional pract ices can act  not  only as frames and 
boundary objects that  help establish which areas of r isk are seen as most  
important , but  can also determ ine which evidence is acceptable for use in 
providing advice.  
 
I n this chapter, I  exam ine the key emerging tensions found between the 
official advisory system for pest icide regulat ion, as typified by the 
Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , and other government  bodies 
involved in assessing r isk and providing advice, with specific reference to 
how these conflicts have been managed. To achieve this I  draw on three 
case studies. First , I  exam ine the 2002 report  produced by the Working 
Group on the Risk Assessment  of Mixtures of Pest icides which, although 
concluding that  the r isk from exposure to m ixtures is likely to be small,  
posed challenges to the r isk assessment  pract ices of the ACP. Second, I  
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exam ine the advice from the Food Standards Agency (FSA)  surrounding 
the consumpt ion of pest icide residues and how init ial advice was 
subsequent ly altered in line with the ACP’s recommendat ions. Third, I  
consider the 2005 report  produced by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollut ion (RCEP)  ent it led “Crop Spraying and the Health of 
Residents and Bystanders” , whose precaut ionary recommendat ions 
provoked widespread crit icism  across other government  advisory bodies, 
such as the ACP and the Commit tee on Toxicity (COT) . 
 
6 .1 1  Risk advice  
Risk advice is a heterogeneous term  that  varies in meaning depending on 
context  and user. I n this thesis the term  is used to describe the provision 
of recommendat ions that  are meant  to aid decision-making that  m ight  
reduce or prevent  the occurrence of harm. To be effect ive, r isk advice 
needs to be seen as grounded in clear evidence or philosophy, it  has to 
appeal on either the basis of facts and known outcomes, or it  must  
conform  to a set  of shared social values. I n recent  years, following the 
cont roversy over the link between BSE in cat t le and vCJD in humans, the 
UK Government  has emphasised its use of evidence-based decision-
making in the creat ion of official r isk advice (The Cabinet  Office, 1999;  
The St rategy Unit , 2002) , suggest ing that  government  advice is based on 
ident ifiable evidence, as opposed to polit ical or social values.   
 
The product ion and provision of r isk advice is commonly associated with 
guidelines and recommendat ions provided by governmental bodies. 
However, it  is recognised that  there has been a proliferat ion of r isk advice 
196 
in recent  years surrounding use and exposure to pest icides with the effect  
that  government  can no longer be considered the sole provider;  advice is 
now easily obtainable from a range of sources including foreign regulatory 
authorit ies and NGOs (The St rategy Unit , 2002. p.22) . Addit ionally, as 
different  aspects of pest icides have been allocated to different  advisory 
areas – see Chapter Four – there has been a fragmentat ion of advice 
provision within government . While the greater provision of advice should 
not  in itself be problemat ic, it  may become so if advice differs by source 
or is cont radictory in nature. I t  is therefore important  to explore how 
different  groups of informat ion providers produce their r isk advice and 
why advice can vary, even between government  advisory bodies when all 
are claim ing to ground their advice in evidence. 
 
To select  evidence to use in both r isk assessment  and r isk advice it  is first  
necessary to define the problem that  requires solving. Previous chapters 
have illust rated that  the area of r isk relat ing to pest icide exposure is 
complex and ent renched in wider concerns surrounding the environment  
and human health. I n situat ions where quest ions and problems associated 
with r isk are difficult  to single out , it  often becomes necessary to invoke a 
select ive vision, where issues are framed to make them manageable or 
cont rollable (Jasanoff, 2000;  Millstone, 2007) . The development  and 
invocat ion of regulatory and advisory rem its can therefore be viewed as 
one method of fram ing. 
 
I n addit ion to helping define the problems posed in r isk assessment , 
fram ing determ ines what  evidence is and is not  acceptable in r isk 
discussions and how such evidence is interpreted, a consequence of which 
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is that  those who are not  able to present  acceptable evidence are 
effect ively excluded from act ively part icipat ing in any r isk dialogue.  
 
I n this chapter I  use three case studies to illust rate how there are now 
not  only tensions between government  and environmental groups, but  
also tension between and within different  government  bodies as advice 
becomes more fragmented. I  suggest  that  such tension is the result  of 
conflict ing polit ical rem its, which has resulted in differ ing 
conceptualisat ions of scient ific uncertainty and a public st ruggle to gain 
authority in an increasingly overcrowded advisory area. I n all examples, I  
discuss how the r isk assessment  pract ices and advice produced by the 
Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP)  has been challenged, and how in 
all cases the ACP has successfully managed to set  aside concerns and 
maintain the status quo through exert ing its inst itut ional authority in this 
domain.  
 
6 .2  Advice on exposure to pest icide m ixtures 
The first  case study explores the Working Group on the Risk Assessment  
of Mixtures of Pest icides (WiGRAMP) 47
                                                 
47
 The WiGRAMP was a working group set  up by the Commit tee on 
Toxicity. The WiGARMP had ten members, which included those with 
expert ise in medicine, toxicology, biostat ist ics, pathology and 
pharmacology. There were also two public interest  members (Commit tee 
on Toxicity, 2002b) . 
 and its 2002 report  ent it led “Risk 
Assessment  of Mixtures of Pest icides and Sim ilar Substances” , which was 
published at  the request  of the Food Standards Agency (FSA)  by the 
Commit tee on Toxicity (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b) . Since publicat ion, 
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this report  has become a key document  that  is used by the FSA to issue 
consumer advice regarding exposure to m ixtures of pest icides through 
the consumpt ion of residues in food. The report  is the culm inat ion of a 
review of scient ific and policy documents, and evidence presented to the 
WiGRAMP from those it  considered as experts and stakeholder groups.  
 
The establishment  of the WiGRAMP appears to have been driven by social 
demands, rather than any significant  changes to the scient ific 
understanding of m ixtures. This can be seen in the report ’s int roduct ion, 
where it  is stated that  it  was a combinat ion of consumer concern and a 
statement  by the outgoing Chairman of the Working Party on Pest icide 
Residues (WPPR)  in 1999 48 that  prompted the FSA to ask the COT to 
establish a working group to review the r isk assessment  of pest icide 
m ixtures. At  the beginning of the execut ive summary it  is reported that  
there is a recognised concern 49
                                                 
48
 The report  states that  the outgoing Chairman of the WPPR “drew 
at tent ion to the fact  that  lit t le is know about  the toxicological interact ions 
between pest icides and commented “ that  pest icide residues of the same 
class ( for example organophosphates)  will be at  least  addit ive in their  
effects because they act  by the same toxicological mechanism” ”  
(Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b, p.11) . 
 “ that  the regulatory system for pest icides 
found in foods does not  rout inely address the toxic effects of different  
substances in combinat ion”  (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b, p. 5) . This 
was followed by an acknowledgement  that  to date, no informat ion has 
49
 The report  at  this point  does not  indicate the source of concern. 
However, in 2.7 the report  states that  the Working Group reviewed 
informat ion regarding “concerns which have been expressed by 
consumers and other stakeholders”  (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b, p. 
12) .  
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been specifically reviewed regarding the effects of exposure to m ixtures 
of pest icides in the UK, and that  “unt il this has been done, it  cannot  be 
judged whether the approach current ly taken to r isk assessment  is 
sufficient ly protect ive and based on sound toxicological pr inciples”  ( ibid, 
p.11) . I n part icular, like others discussed in Chapter Five, the WiGRAMP 
drew at tent ion to the fact  that  exist ing research, which has focussed on 
the interact ion effects at  high doses, may be unsuitable for use in the 
assessment  of exposure to the non- toxic levels found in food items. 
 
Towards the beginning of the report  the WiGRAMP acknowledges a 
number of lim itat ions and difficult ies associated with assessing the 
toxicology of m ixtures – see paragraphs 1.14 – 1.19 ( ibid) . Within these 
paragraphs the Working Group details that  the “ r isk assessment  of any 
toxic effects of chem ical m ixtures is ext rem ely difficult ”  and that  “ some 
interact ions may not  be easy to predict ” . However, it  is stated that  not  
only are there “ relat ively few”  studies available that  consider the effects 
of m ixtures, but  that  “ for the most  part ”  the studies are not  appropriate 
for use. The report  further states that  those studies that  the Working 
Group did consider to be well designed are probably unrepresentat ive of 
exposure dose. This can be seen as a bold statement  considering 
paragraph 1.11 of the same report :  
 
The commit tee considered that  because of the nature of the 
pest icide and veterinary surveillance programmes, it  was 
ext remely difficult  to assess the frequency with which 
residues, below or above legally enforceable maximum residue 
lim its (MRLs)  occur…Further, data on exposure from sources 
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other than food and water seem to be ext remely scanty or 
non-existent . (Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b)  
 
These statements suggest  that  within an already relat ively narrow sphere 
of research and literature, the WiGRAMP further lim ited the evidence it  
considered as acceptable for use in this review. I t  is unclear from  the 
report  what  cr iter ia the WiGRAMP applied when deciding to include or 
reject  data. However, in Chapter Five it  is suggested that  it  is usual for 
government  bodies to apply a st r ict  framework regarding evidence 
select ion as they are often lim ited by externally imposed regulatory 
requirements and guidelines.  
 
Following a two year review the Working Group made several 
recommendat ions regarding future assessment  and approval of pest icides 
– see Box One. These recommendat ions suggest  that  there were areas of 
the current  r isk assessment  process, as used by the ACP, which could be 
improved upon or further developed in respect  of assessing and managing 
m ixtures. Notably, it  proposes that  there should be addit ional “ formal 
analysis and possible experimental invest igat ion”  to assess the r isks 
posed by m ixtures, which it  suggests will require changes to the 
methodology current ly employed. However, despite all of these 
recommendat ions and the clear acknowledgement  of uncertainty, the 
cent ral finding of the report , which has been repeatedly used by the FSA 
in its r isk advice, is that  “ the r isk to people's health from m ixtures of 
residues is likely to be small” .  Given all of the above this finding has been 
widely cr it icised and challenged by scient ists and NGO groups alike. 
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Box 1 : Regulatory Recom m endat ions taken from  the Execut ive 
Sum m ary of the W iGRAMP Report  ( Com m it tee on Toxicity, 2 0 0 2 b)  
 
1.24 We recom m end that  t he approval of pest icides used on 
crops, and authorizat ion of sim ilar com pounds used in 
veterinary m edicine should consider all sources of exposure.
1.25 We recom m end that  a scient ific and system at ic 
fram ework should be established to decide when it  is 
appropriate t o carry out  com bined r isk assessm ents of 
exposures to m ore than one pest icide and/ or veterinary 
m edicine.
1.26 In the event  that  it  is considered appropriate t o carry out
r isk assessm ent  of com bined exposure, the default  
assum pt ions should be that  chem icals with different  t oxic 
act ions will act  independent ly (sim ple dissim ilar act ion) , and 
those with the sam e toxic act ion will act  addit ively (sim ple 
sim ilar act ion) . I n the lat t er circum stances a toxic equivalency
approach m ight  be considered. I n specific instances the 
possibilit y of interact ion, part icularly of potent iat ion, m ay have 
to be considered. I n such circum stances adequate dose-
response data will be essent ial in the interpretat ion of findings 
in relat ion to dietary intakes and other hum an exposures.
1.27 We recom m end that  the approval of pest icides and 
authorizat ion of com pounds used in veterinary m edicine 
should include m ore form al analysis, and possibly 
experim ental invest igat ion, of the potent ial for com bined toxic 
act ion or interact ion due to the addit ion of other substances t o
the form ulat ions em ployed. This considerat ion should also 
include tank m ixes of pest icides.
1.28 Analysis of all sources of exposure to pest icides and of 
concurrent   exposure to m ore than one pest icide will require 
changes in the m ethods used in r isk assessm ent , including, in 
som e cases, t he use of probabilist ic exposure assessm ent .  
This will be cont ingent  on changes in residue surveillance. 
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6 .2 1  Crit icism  of the W iGRAMP report  
The publicat ion of the report  resulted in much crit icism  towards the 
WiGRAMP. I nterest ingly, this cr it icism  varied from suggest ions that  the 
report  failed to fully acknowledge the uncertainty and public concerns, to 
suggest ions that  it  was overly alarm ist  in present ing pest icides as 
universally bad, while at  the same t ime being over cr it ical of the ACP and 
the current  r isk assessment  methods.  
 
Prior to the final publicat ion, a draft  report  was made available for 
consultat ion – Box Two details part  of the draft  Execut ive Summary. To 
understand the type of cr it icisms levelled at  the WiGRAMP I  have drawn 
on interview data from those working in this area at  the t ime of 
consultat ion and publicat ion, and examined examples of the 
correspondence received during this period. I t  should be noted that  the 
original correspondence was unavailable for v iewing and that  the ext racts 
shown here originate from the sender, as opposed to the Food Standards 
Agency where this informat ion is stored. However, having discussed the 
type of responses received with those within the WiGRAMP, the evidence 
presented here appears to be reflect ive of the range of responses it  
received.  
 
The first  piece of correspondence to be exam ined is from Professor 
Andreas Kortenkamp, a prom inent  UK based toxicologist  who specialises 
in studying mult i- component  m ixtures. Kortenkamp wrote to the 
WiGRAMP expressing concerns regarding both the report ’s findings and 
the conceptual understanding of the Working Group, which he viewed as 
lacking in the area of m ixtures toxicology. 
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Box 2 : Execut ive Sum m ary of the Draft  W iGRAMP Report  1 .2 0  –  
1 .2 3  ( Com m it tee on Toxicity, 2 0 0 2 a)  
 
I m plicat ions for  assessing potent ia l health r isks for  hum ans exposed 
to pest icide m ixtures 
 
1.20 Generally, when exposure levels of the chem icals within a m ixture are in 
the range of the NOAELs, no addit iv ity and no potent iat ing interact ions are 
found, indicat ing the applicabilit y of the basic concept  of "simple dissim ilar 
act ion” , which suggests that  adverse react ions would be unlikely. 
 
1.21 On the other hand, in vivo studies with chem icals that  exhibit  the same 
target  organ and the same mode of act ion have shown that  the effects of  
m ixtures of sim ilar ly act ing toxicants show addit iv ity (dose addit ion) , which 
results from simple sim ilar act ion. This is the case, even at  levels slight ly 
below the LOAEL of the individual compounds. The dose addit ion model is 
applicable over the range of exposure levels up to and above NOAELs. 
 
1.22 Some studies (acute and subacute toxicity, genet ic toxicity, 
carcinogenicity)  have addressed the combined effect  of m ixtures of pest icides 
and in a few studies clear cases of potent iat ion were observed in animals 
exposed to levels of toxic substances showing adverse effects of individual 
compounds. However, direct  ext rapolat ion of these findings to much lower 
dose levels is not  valid. Thus the probabilit y of any health hazard due to 
addit iv ity or potent iat ing interact ion of m ixtures at  ( low)  non- toxic doses of 
the individual chem icals is likely to be small,  since the dose of pest icides to 
which humans are exposed is generally much lower than the NOAEL, at  least  
through food. 
 
1.23 Some endpoints that  have been studied in animals or in in vit ro systems 
are relevant  to groups in the populat ion believed to be at  higher r isk than the 
general populat ion. Such endpoints include developmental toxicity studies, 
endocrine and neurotoxic effects and genotoxicity studies. On the basis of 
lim ited informat ion it  seems likely that  the default  assumpt ions in relat ion to 
m ixtures in children and pregnant  and nursing mothers would be the same as 
for the rest  of the populat ion. 
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I n part icular, Kortenkamp appears concerned with the statements made 
by the WiGRAMP in paragraphs 1.20 and 1.21 of the Execut ive Summary 
(Box Two) , which suggests exposure to m ixtures is unlikely to result  in 
adverse react ions when individual components are present  at  levels 
sim ilar to the No Observed Adverse Effect  Level (NOAEL) ;  a view that  is 
common among regulators – see Chapter Five.  The ext ract  below is 
taken from Kortenkamp’s let ter (sic) :  
 
This statement  is m isleading…I t  seems to me that , throughout  
the draft  report , the Working Group has erroneously equated 
NOAEL with NEL. To clar ify the result ing ambiguit ies, the 
report  will gain from  taking account  of a current  debate 
concerning the inappropriateness of NOEL as est imates of low 
( toxic)  effects. With many toxicological tests, effects below 
10%  cannot  usually be detected as significant ly different  from 
unt reated cont rols. The level of sensit iv ity is often anywhere 
between 10 and 30% ....I n other words, the poorer the data 
quality, the larger the NOEL. Thus, NOEL (and NOAEL)  are 
quite unreliable est im ates of zero effect  levels. Rather, they 
define a range of doses where the occurrence of effects can 
neither be ruled out , nor confirmed. This is something 
altogether different  from NEL!  Thus, the above statement  
[ 1.20]  is only correct  when NOAEL is replaced with NEL. 
Sim ilar considerat ions apply to this paragraph [ 1.21] . I t  
contains the sentence:  “This ( i.e. dose addit ion, AK)  is the 
case, even at  levels slight ly below  the LOAEL of the 
individual com pounds”. This t ime, the Working Group 
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appears to confuse NEL with LOAEL. Dose addit ion will occur, 
even at  levels below zero effect  levels, provided the number of 
m ixture components is sufficient ly large. (Kortenkam p, 
2002)  
 
I n this excerpt  Kortenkamp highlights that  the phrasing of the draft  
statement  erroneously equates the No Observed Effect  Level (NOEL) , the 
NOAEL and at  t imes the Lowest  Observed Adverse Effect  Level (LOAEL)  
with the No Effect  Level (NEL) . This makes the statement  m isleading as 
the NEL, the most  st r ingent  standard, suggests the lowest  r isk. 
Kortenkamp’s cr it icisms appear to have been noted by WiGRAMP as the 
wording of 1.20 and 1.21 was altered in the final document  – see Box 
Three.  
 
Specifically,  paragraph 1.20 has been significant ly altered with the final 
version making no reference to NOAELs, the possibilit y of potent iat ion or 
the possibilit y of an adverse effect  occurr ing. Although paragraph 1.20 in 
the draft  report  begins with ‘generally ’,  the proceeding statement , with 
the clear use of the word ‘no’, suggested the WiGRAMP was confident  that  
“ simple dissim ilar act ion” 50
                                                 
50
 Simple dissim ilar act ion is when “ the nature, mechanism and/ or site of 
act ion of the chem icals in the m ixture are different . Thus each chem ical 
exerts its own individual toxic effect , and does not  alter the effects of 
other chem icals in the m ixture”  (Vermeire et  al. ,  2007, p.271) . 
 is the most  suitable concept  for use and as a 
result  exposure to m ixtures is ‘unlikely’ to result  in adverse effects. The 
statement  shown in the final report  is by cont rast  much more lim ited in 
its scope;  in making a more factual and generalised statement  the 
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uncertainty present  in the draft  has been reduced, largely through the 
om ission of any discussion of alternat ive types of chem ical interact ion. 
The following paragraph (1.21)  had also been altered significant ly in a 
manner that  addressed Kortenkamp’s comments. The final version is thus 
more nuanced, placing a greater emphasis on invest igat ing the 
interact ions at  “non- toxic effect  levels” . 
 
Box 3 : Execut ive Sum m ary of the Final W iGRAMP Report  1 .2 0  &  
1 .2 1  –  paragraphs 1 .2 2  &  1 .2 3  rem ain as they w ere in the draft  
show n in Box 2  ( Com m it tee on Toxicity, 2 0 0 2 b)  
 
 
I m plicat ions for  assessing potent ia l health r isks for  hum ans 
exposed to pest icide m ixtures 
 
1.20 Studies in vivo with chem icals that  exhibit  the same target  organ 
and the same mode of act ion have shown that  the effects of m ixtures of 
sim ilar ly act ing toxicants show addit iv ity (dose addit ion) , which results 
from simple sim ilar act ion. This is the case, over the whole dose range. 
 
1.21 I t  is essent ial to know what  happens at  non- toxic effect  levels, 
including exposure levels just  below the LOAEL, in order to assess the 
health r isk for humans exposed to m ixtures of pest icides, veterinary drugs 
and sim ilar substances. Generally, when exposure levels of the chem icals 
within a range of the NOAELs, and the components of the m ixture have 
different  modes of toxic act ion, no addit iv ity and no potent iat ing 
interact ions are found, indicat ing the applicabilit y of the basic concept  of 
“ simple dissim ilar act ion” , which suggests that  adverse react ions would be 
unlikely. 
 
 
I n responding to 1.22 of the draft  execut ive summary Kortenkamp (2002)  
made a further point  that  it  is unclear why the WiGRAMP concluded that  
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direct  ext rapolat ion to lower doses is invalid. I nterest ingly, there is no 
explanat ion for this conclusion in the final report .  
 
Arguably, the most  important  paragraphs of this sect ion of the report  are 
1.22 and 1.23, which have been used by the FSA to issue the following 
advice to consumers;  advice that  has been publicly quest ioned and 
disputed by scient ists and NGOs alike:  
 
The r isk to people's health from m ixtures of residues is likely 
to be small…children and pregnant  or breast feeding women 
are unlikely to be more affected by the 'cocktail effect ' than 
most  other people (Food Standards Agency, 2002b)  
 
Some of the most  vocal cr it icism  of this advice was made by 
environmental and health NGOs such as BRAME51
 
 (Harr ison and Harr ison, 
2003)  and Friends of the Earth. For example, Sandra Bell,  in a statement  
made by Friends of the Earth (2002b)  not  only quest ioned the certainty of 
the WiGRAMP’s conclusions but  suggested that  they were based on 
“assumpt ions, not  actual evidence” . I ndeed, she goes as far to say that  
the WiGRAMP “uses bad science to play down r isks to human health in 
order to just ify inact ion” . 
Kortenkamp (2002)  in his writ ten evidence also suggests that  there 
simply is not  the evidence to provide firm  conclusions as to the r isks 
posed. Notably, he again implies that  the WiGRAMP’s understanding of 
                                                 
51
 BRAME stands for the Blue Ribbon for the Awareness of ME. 
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the issue is flawed and overly confident  in its dism issal of public concerns 
regarding potent ially vulnerable sub-groups:  
 
The Working Party may deem the probabilit y of health hazards 
to be low, but  frankly, in the absence of evidence, we simply 
do not  know…I t  is surprising to see that  the Working Group 
dism isses possible concerns about  part icularly vulnerable 
subgroups of the populat ion. Given the lim ited informat ion 
available, it  would seem imprudent  to make such far- reaching 
statements. (Kortenkam p, 2002)  
 
The crit icism  of the WiGRAMP was not  lim ited to those outside of the 
government  advisory process. Several interviewed members of the ACP 
were also cr it ical, but  for differ ing reasons. When ACP member (X)  was 
asked about  the WiGRAMP report  they suggested that  the WiGRAMP had 
been dism issive of the ACP and had overstated the potent ial adverse 
health effects of pest icides.  
 
“ I  felt  that  they had definitely com e out  saying that  pest icides 
are really bad, and I  mean my own view is that  we actually 
don’t  have any evidence for that  at  all,  one way or the other 
really, I  felt  that  WiGRAMP in part icular was rather dism issive 
of the ACP,”  (X)  ACP Member  
 
Thus, whereas those outside of the advisory process felt  that  the 
WiGRAMP had been too confident  in using the evidence to suggest  that  
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there were no problems, (X)  felt  they had been too quick to use the 
evidence to suggest  that  problems were possible.  
 
I n cont rast , ACP member (N)  held sim ilar views to Kortenkamp and 
Friends of the Earth. I n interview, (N)  detailed how they gave evidence to 
WiGRAMP, but , like those shown above was disappointed with its findings. 
I n part icular, (N)  highlights the discrepancies between the WiGRAMP’s 
conclusions regarding the r isks to children and pregnant  women and 
those found in other regulatory guidelines, such as the European Weaning 
Direct ive and the American Food Qualit y Protect ion Act  (FQPA) ;  
suggest ing, sim ilar to the argument  presented in Chapter Five, that  the 
process of pest icide r isk assessment  is not  wholly object ive but  combines 
science, polit ics and expert  judgement , so that  decisions made by one 
authority may not  be replicated elsewhere.  
 
Sim ilar to Kortenkamp, (N)  suggests that  the WiGRAMP report  projects a 
certainty of knowledge about  the r isks posed by m ixtures that  (N)  
believes is simply not  warranted given the current  lim itat ions in 
methodological tools:  
 
“Basically we know nothing, you know?…I  mean the ACP does 
look at  metabolites, but  we don’t  have the tools to analyse a 
m ixture of such and such, and so you say what  are the 
opt ions? The opt ions are the sort  of thing that  they give in the 
Weaning Food Direct ive…and the FQPA in the States…so there 
are disparit ies between regulatory authorit ies across the 
world,”  (N)  ACP Member  
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Despite individual m embers’ concerns regarding the validity of the 
WiGRAMP’s findings, the publicat ion of the report  led to a change in the 
assessment  procedure adopted by the ACP. The Pest icide Safety 
Directorate (2003b, p.1)  noted that  as a result  of the WiGRAMP report  
“ the ACP now rout inely considers the possibilit y of toxic interact ions 
where two or more pest icides are co- formulated in the same product ” . 
However, while a progressive step away from the norm  of assessing 
single substances in isolat ion, this addit ional considerat ion does not  
address the issue of m ixtures where humans are exposed to more than 
one substance.  
 
A key problem in changing assessment  pract ice in line with the 
WiGRAMP’s recommendat ions is highlighted by the Food Standards 
Agency (2005)  in its “Act ion Plan on the Risk Assessment  of Mixtures of 
Pest icides and Sim ilar Substances” . Here the FSA noted that  new 
recommendat ions may be difficult  to int roduce in respect  of pest icide 
assessment  due to regulatory authority ly ing within EC legislat ion;  it  
would be illegal for the UK to unilaterally add requirements to the 
authorisat ion process. The st r ict  adherence by the ACP to these 
regulatory requirements when assessing pest icides may in part  explain 
ACP member (X) ’s frust rat ion with the WiGRAMP report  and belief that  it  
had been dism issive of the ACP, i.e., although the WiGRAMP may disagree 
with the current  assessment  policy and in that  sense crit icise the ACP’s 
approach to m ixtures, the ACP is unable to formally change its approach 
without  it  being agreed within Europe, although it  should be noted that  it  
would be acceptable for the UK to raise this as an area of concern that  
needs to be addressed.  
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I n summary, despite the WiGRAMP report  making some progress towards 
acknowledging m ixture specific r isks within the regulatory community, it s 
cent ral findings were widely cr it icised, from one side, for failing to give 
due weight  to the uncertainty involved, part icularly in terms of potent ial 
impacts on more vulnerable populat ions and, from the other side, to the 
regulatory requirements that  dictate the rem it  of pest icide assessments 
undertaken by the ACP. As such, the credibilit y of the resultant  advice has 
been publicly challenged by both those within and outside government . 
 
6 .3  Pest icide residues: To peel or  not  to peel 
This second case study discusses the advice surrounding exposure to 
pest icides in food. Previous chapters have discussed how pest icide 
residues are commonly found on and within fruit  and vegetable produce. 
Despite im plementat ion of regulatory guidelines in the UK relat ing to 
residue lim its (Chapter Four)  there remains a significant  level of public 
concern regarding their  presence in food 52
 
.  I n response to these concerns 
the government  and others have issued advice based on a variety of 
evidence sources. I n what  follows, I  will show how advice can differ 
depending on the evidence used and the conceptual frame in which 
advice is produced.  
Two key players in providing ‘official’ pest icide r isk advice in the UK are 
the ACP and the FSA. However, despite both being governmental bodies 
                                                 
52
 The 2005 Eurobarometer on r isk found that  65%  of the Br it ish public 
surveyed were worr ied about  pest icide residues in fruit ,  vegetables or 
cereal (European Commission, 2006) . 
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they can be viewed as having often incompat ible agendas. The ACP’s 
rem it  is to advise Ministers on “any mat ters relat ing to the cont rol of 
pests in furthering the general purposes of Part  I I I ”  of FEPA (Advisory 
Commit tee on Pest icides, 2008) , whereas the FSA was established “ to 
protect  the public's health and consumer interests in relat ion to food”  
(Food Standards Agency, 2002a) . These different  funct ions have resulted 
in these bodies fram ing the role of pest icides in dist inct  ways. The ACP 
frames pest icides as a pest  management  tool and therefore assesses 
them against  cr iter ia such as ut ilit y and fitness for purpose. I n cont rast ,  
the FSA frames its discussion of pest icides in the same way it  does other 
food contam inants53
 
;  they are undesirable components and their presence 
should be m inim ised as far as possible.  
The different  fram ings by official bodies such as the ACP and FSA are 
influent ial in the discourses of other government  inst itut ions. For 
instance, in 1997, three years prior to the establishment  of the FSA, the 
UK’s Chief Medical Officer issued the following piece of advice regarding 
pest icide residues found in food:   
 
…washing fruit  and vegetables before consumpt ion is always a 
sensible precaut ion to ensure it  is clean. Peeling is a mat ter of 
consumer choice, but  is a sensible addit ional precaut ion when 
preparing fruit  and vegetables for small children (Minist ry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and Food, 1997;  Hansard, 2000) .   
 
                                                 
53
 As discussed by interviewee B, a senior FSA science policy advisor.  
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The FSA init ially based its r isk advice upon the MAFF guidance. However 
in 2001, in light  of it s specific rem it  to provide advice to consumers, 
independent  to that  of other government  departments, it  requested that  
the ACP review the Chief Medical Officer’s advice. Following discussion the 
ACP issued this statement :   
 
Washing or peeling fruit  and vegetables before consumpt ion is 
good hygiene. However, it  is not  required as a protect ion 
against  pest icides residues. When deciding whether pest icides 
should be approved for use in the UK, the ACP makes no 
assumpt ion that  fruit  or vegetables will be washed or peeled. 
(Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides, 2002a)  
 
Here the ACP is clearly stat ing that  it s assessment  process is thorough 
and that  any piece of fruit  or vegetable sold within the UK should be safe 
to eat , irrespect ive of whether it  has been cleaned or prepared for 
consumpt ion. As a result  of the ACP guidance the FSA rescinded its 
previous advice and issued new guidance that  was aligned to that  
provided by the ACP:  
 
You don't  need to wash or peel fruit  and vegetables because of 
pest icide residues. However, it 's a good idea to wash fruit  and 
vegetables before you eat  them to ensure that  they are clean, 
and to help remove germs that  m ight  be on the outside. 
 
I f a vegetable or piece of fruit  is especially dir ty, washing 
m ight  not  be enough to get  it  clean, so then you could peel it . 
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For example, carrots somet imes need scraping or peeling to 
remove soil. (Food Standards Agency, 2004a)  
 
Whereas between the period of 1997 and 2002 the official advice was that  
washing and peeling would be advantageous in the protect ion of child 
health, the advice shown above side-steps the issue of whether it  is 
beneficial to act ively t ry and reduce the amount  of pest icide residues 
consumed. I nstead, it  implies that  where residues are present  then they 
are at  a level that  is safe to eat  and that  the only gain in washing and 
peeling is one of hygiene. The fact  that  the FSA so quickly adopted the 
ACP’s guidance is interest ing. I t  suggests the FSA felt  uncomfortable or 
unable to publicly maintain its view that  as a contam inant , residues 
should always be reduced to the lowest  possible levels regardless of 
whether they are deemed safe. 
 
The interview I  conducted with (G) , a former member of the Pest icide 
Act ion Network (PAN) , cast  light  on these issues. I n part icular, it  was 
suggested by (G)  that  the FSA had no opt ion but  to back down on its 
previous advice, as at  the t ime (2002)  its own organisat ional credibilit y 
was too low to effect ively challenge the ACP, an advisory body that  has 
been established as the leading UK authority on pest icide r isk assessment  
for several decades. This opinion is supported by Pennycook et  al. ’s 
(2004. p.305)  assessment  of the situat ion, which suggests that  the advice 
of washing and peeling was withdrawn “due to internal concern that  such 
a posit ion would underm ine the credibilit y of the current  regulatory 
system for pest icides” . Following this argument  one can surm ise that  if 
the FSA did not  alter it s advice then not  only would the FSA be overt ly 
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challenging the authority and expert ise of the ACP, but  it  would run the 
r isk of alienat ing and confusing the public with m ixed messages regarding 
the safety of pest icide t reated food.  
 
When asked about  this issue, (B) , a senior FSA science policy advisor, 
explicit ly denied that  the FSA was const rained by the Pest icide Safety 
Directorate (PSD) , which was at  the t ime part  of Defra54
 
.  However, 
interviewee (B)  acknowledged that  the FSA’s mandate and ethos of 
“put t ing the consumer first ”  can cause fr ict ion with Defra, which (B)  
stated, views its own processes and advice as robust  and therefore 
considers the work of the FSA as an unnecessary duplicat ion. These 
comments therefore suggest  that  despite the FSA outwardly appearing to 
align itself with the views and advice of the ACP, there is an underlying 
tension and conflict  between the two bodies in relat ion to their rem it  and 
concept ion of the role of pest icides.  
This is interest ing on several levels. First , as shown in Chapter Four, 
pest icides have historically been regulated different ly to substances 
classed as food contam inants and addit ives. Yet  despite this regulatory 
different iat ion the FSA appears to view them as such, at  least  on an 
internal basis. Secondly, it  suggests that  by classifying them as 
contam inants the FSA is covert ly implying that  wherever possible residues 
should be reduced as they serve no nut r it ional purpose, suggest ing that  
                                                 
54
 The Pest icide Safety Directorate is responsible for the ACP. At  the t ime 
of interview (2008)  the PSD remained under the regulatory jur isdict ion of 
Defra, they have since become an agency of the Health and Safety 
Execut ive (HSE) . 
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residue reduct ion is preferable to non- reduct ion even when residues are 
present  at  levels the ACP and the EU have deemed safe. The internal 
organisat ional classificat ion of pest icides as contam inants therefore puts 
the FSA in a precarious posit ion of having to support  the ACP while at  the 
same t ime provide public advice as to how to m inim ise pest icide residues. 
An example of such advice is shown below. I t  is noteworthy that  this 
advice direct ly followed the previous FSA ext ract , which dictated that  
washing and peeling was unnecessary:  
 
Washing, peeling fruit  and removing the outer leaves of 
vegetables may remove residues of certain pest icides. But  
some pest icides are system ic, which means they are found 
within the fruit  or vegetable. For some fruits, such as oranges, 
peeling will usually rem ove most  of the residues that  m ight  be 
present , but  small amounts of some residues may st ill remain 
in the fruit . (Food Standards Agency, 2004b)  
 
These guidelines suggest  that  the FSA is ambivalent  about  the status of 
pest icide residues. According to it s own inst itut ional logic, pest icides are 
viewed as undesirable. However, in aligning with the ACP, the FSA is not  
only coerced into fram ing pest icides as benign but  it  r isks underm ining its 
public status as an ‘independent ’ advisory body. Thus the effect  of the 
FSA’s dichotomous posit ion is confusing advice that  simultaneously denies 
the need to wash and peel fruit  and vegetables on the basis of residues 
while maintaining that  such act ion m ight  be advisable.  
 
217 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the change in FSA advice was taken as a cause 
for concern by a number of consumer and environmental groups such as 
Friends of the Earth and the Consumers’ Associat ion (Connor, 2002) . I n 
part icular, Friends of the Earth (2002c)  quoted the government ’s Pest icide 
Residue Commit tee’s (PRC) 55
 
 own report  from  that  year to highlight  that  
the pest icide chlorpropham had been found in unpeeled potatoes at  four 
t imes the Acute Reference Dose (ARfD)  for adults and 21 t imes the ARfD 
for toddlers;  the same PRC report  acknowledged that  levels were found to 
be within ARfD lim its when potatoes were peeled (Pest icide Residues 
Commit tee, 2002) . As a result ,  both Friends of the Earth and the 
Consumers’ Associat ion argued that  unt il it  can be guaranteed that  this 
type of produce is free from all pest icides then it  would be prudent  to 
maintain advice on methods of pest icide removal or reduct ion:  
Earlier  this year the Government  withdrew the only pract ical 
advice it  gave to parents about  reducing pest icide residues in 
food -  to peel fruit  and vegetables before giving it  to young 
children. Today's results show just  how ill informed that  
decision was. I t  is alarm ing that  pest icide safety levels are st ill 
being exceeded in unpeeled potatoes and in pears -  popular 
with young children…the Government  and retailers should be 
act ing to ensure that  our food is safe to eat  without  having to 
                                                 
55
 The Pest icide Residues Commit tee (PRC)  is responsible for nat ional 
surveillance programmes and crop sampling procedures (Pest icide 
Residues Commit tee, 2009) . I t  is not  involved in the init ial r isk 
assessment  of pest icides, it s funct ion is to monitor that  levels found in UK 
produce are within the statutory guidelines. 
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peel it  f irst . But  unt il that  t ime the peeling advice should be 
brought  back. (Friends of the Earth, 2002c)  
 
Fr iends of the Earth cont inued to campaign on this issue and in 2004 
published new research highlight ing that  the government ’s own data 
suggested there was the possibilit y that  a number of children were 
potent ially consum ing pest icide residues at  levels greater than were 
deemed officially safe. The following excerpt  is taken from a press release 
following the publicat ion:  
 
New research by Friends of the Earth, published in a peer-
reviewed journal this weekend, shows that  up to 220 young 
children a day could have been exposed to potent ially 
dangerous levels of pest icides just  from  eat ing a single apple 
or pear…The research, conducted with two leading experts on 
pest icide exposure, Professor Andrew Wat terson of St ir ling 
University and Dr Vyvyan Howard of Liverpool University used 
mathemat ical modelling to measure exposure to pest icides for 
children aged between 18 months and four years old. Using 
the Government 's own data on pest icide residues found on 
apples and pears, and informat ion on the quant it ies of apples 
and pears eaten by young children from the Nat ional Dietary 
Survey, the study found that  between 10 and 220 young 
children could be exposed pest icide residues at  levels which 
could pose immediate and long term  threats to health. 
(Friends of the Earth, 2004c)  
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I n order to challenge and underm ine the official advice on pest icide 
residues Friends of the Earth mobilised scient ific credibilit y in three key 
ways. First , it  noted that  it s research was published in a peer reviewed 
journal, suggest ing that  the quality of it s research is equal to that  of 
professional academ ics. Secondly, it  stated that  research has been 
conducted using recognised methods by academ ics that  are described as 
“ leading experts,”  again highlight ing the degree to which its research sits 
within a larger scient ific discourse. Last ly, the significance of the research 
is suggested through the fact  that  it  has used government  data, thereby 
m inim ising the possibilit y that  it  could be accused of sampling bias. Thus, 
Friends of the Earth aim  to not  only pluralise the advice available to 
consumers regarding pest icide residues, but  suggest  that  its own 
guidance is superior to that  from the government  arguing that  the lat ter 
fails to acknowledge the uncertaint ies and discrepancies in its data. 
 
To summarise, the differences in how the Advisory Commit tee on 
Pest icides and the Food Standards Agency frame pest icides has resulted 
in a tension between the two bodies. The rescinding of advice to wash 
and peel fruit  and vegetables by the FSA and its subsequent  alignment  
with the ACP suggests that  the ACP has a greater inst itut ional authority 
than the FSA. The authority of the ACP throughout  the history of UK 
pest icide regulat ion has been previously discussed in Chapter Four and it  
is interest ing to observe that  the FSA appears to be unwilling to challenge 
the ACP’s advice, despite the FSA’s explicit  m andate to put  the customer 
first . The dom inance of the ACP can be further witnessed by the fact  that  
the FSA did not  alter it s advice, despite the Pest icide Residue Commit tee 
collect ing and publishing informat ion suggest ing that  there are occasions 
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where it  m ight  be necessary to peel to ensure that  residues levels remain 
under the ARfD. Silence on the part  of the FSA on this mat ter therefore 
raises doubts as to the Agency’s abilit y or willingness to fulfil it s cent ral 
consumer orientated mandate. 
 
I n this case study, I  have discussed how the fragmentat ion of advice 
surrounding residues was publicly reduced across government  bodies 
through the FSA changing its posit ion to match the ACP’s. However, in 
doing so it  encouraged a proliferat ion of advice from those external to the 
official advisory process who have been crit ical of the ACP’s, and in turn 
the FSA’s, guidance. Such advice was shown to substant ially differ from  
that  of the government  and can be characterised by the fact  that  it  is 
more precaut ionary, placing greater emphasis on areas of uncertainty and 
discrepancies within the government ’s own r isk assessment  pract ices. I t  
is therefore likely that  such alternat ive advice will act  to underm ine the 
FSA’s advice and weaken its credibilit y as an organisat ion that  puts the 
consumer first .  
 
6 .4  The RCEP and bystander exposure 
The final case study explores the 2005 Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollut ion (RCEP)  report  ent it led “Crop Spraying and the 
Health of Residents and Bystanders” . The recommendat ions made within 
the report  were perceived by many within the area of pest icide r isk 
assessment  as cont roversial56
                                                 
56
 I n the consultat ion exercise of Defra’s 2007 review of the RCEP, “Crop 
Spraying and the Health of Residents and Bystanders”  was named as the 
 and the publicat ion resulted in a ser ies of 
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public exchanges between the RCEP and other interested governmental 
bodies, most  notably the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , over 
what  advice should be provided to farmers and the public. I n the 
following I  out line the findings and explore why the report  was so 
cr it ically received by the ACP.  
 
I n 2004 when the RCEP was asked to invest igate crop spraying and 
bystander exposure the issue was not  new. The RCEP itself highlights that  
the subject  had been discussed in 1987 by the House of Commons 
Agricultural Select  Commit tee and again in 1990 by the Br it ish Medical 
Associat ion, which suggested that  the data surrounding the effects of 
pest icides on human health were incomplete (Brit ish Medical Associat ion, 
1992) . I n 2002 the issue was again revisited at  the ACP’s annual open 
meet ing and the resultant  advice, produced by the ACP for Ministers, was 
used to frame the 2003 Defra “Consultat ion on the I nt roduct ion of No-
Spray Buffer Zones Around Resident ial Propert ies”  (Pest icide Safety 
Directorate, 2003a) . Part  of this advice is shown below:   
 
Members concluded that  on the basis of the informat ion 
current ly available the r isk assessment  for bystanders used at  
present  provides adequate protect ion, even if spray is applied 
to the edge of a field. The Commit tee has asked PSD to collect  
some further experim ental data to provide further support  to 
this view. Nonetheless, the Commit tee recognises that  many 
may consider it  socially unacceptable to spray r ight  to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
RCEP’s most  cont roversial report ,  both in terms of it s f indings and the 
commissioning st rategy (Defra, 2007b) .   
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boundary of a neighbour’s property. I f Ministers agree, they 
may wish to consider opt ions to rest r ict  this pract ice. 
(Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides, 2002b)  
 
The above clear ly establishes that  in 2002 the ACP held an opinion, 
sim ilar to that  held regarding residues, that  current  r isk assessment  
pract ices were adequate in protect ing human health. I ndeed, it  suggests 
that  a change in pract ice would only be valid on social and not  scient ific 
grounds. Despite cont inued assurances from the ACP and the Pest icide 
Safety Directorate (PSD)  that  there was no scient ific case for 
implement ing addit ional measures to safeguard human health, public 
concern remained (Pest icide Act ion Network, 2005b) . I t  was in response 
to this concern that  in June 2004 the Rt . Hon. Alun Michael 57
 
 asked the 
RCEP to produce a report  on the science used to assess r isk from crop 
spraying.  
The circumstances surrounding this report  were unusual and breached 
convent ion;  the RCEP was asked direct ly by the Minister to undertake the 
research. A key reason cited by Mr Michael for request ing that  the RCEP 
undertook this piece of work was a desire for an “ independent  appraisal”  
of the evidence58
                                                 
57
 Alun Michael was at  that  t ime the Minister for Rural Affairs and Local 
Environmental Quality.  
;  implying that  bodies such as the ACP and the PSD, 
58
 The following is taken from Mr Michael’s writ ten statement :  “ I  have 
listened to the concerns of campaigners who hold st rong views about  how 
crop spraying has affected their  health. Their v iews are undoubtedly 
sincerely held and although no new scient ific evidence was produced to 
support  their case, I  believe the t ime is now r ight  for a fresh and 
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were comparat ively perceived by the public as lacking independence. The 
unusual commissioning process had unfortunate repercussions for the 
validity of the report ;  the m inister ial request  led to a percept ion that  the 
RCEP was unduly influenced in its assessment  and this has since been 
used as just ificat ion for why the report  should be dism issed. This situat ion 
has perhaps been exaggerated due to the cont roversial nature of the 
report ’s findings, which were at  odds with the advice produced by the ACP 
and have since been heavily contested by other government  bodies 
(Defra, 2007b) .  
 
I n part icular, the RCEP suggested within the report  that  there may be 
links between bystander exposure and chronic ill health, including mult i-
system and mult i- symptomat ic disorders such as Mult iple Chemical 
Sensit iv ity (MCS)  and Chronic Fat igue Syndrome (CFS) . I t  is important  to 
note the tentat ive judgement  on behalf of the RCEP, as it  is clear in 
stat ing in the report  that  on the evidence it  received it  would be 
impossible to conclusively confirm  or deny such links exist . However, the 
RCEP propose that  the r isk assessment  process, in part icular the 
toxicological component  and exposure modelling, is inadequate in 
considering the more complex health problem s that  have been at t r ibuted 
to pest icide exposure and so it  is feasible that  with more study links 
m ight  be found to exist .  
 
When taken as a whole, the RCEP report  quest ioned both the current  
pract ice of agricultural spraying and the r isk assessment  process that  
                                                                                                                                                 
independent  appraisal of the science.”  (Defra, 2004 -  shown in Appendix 
A of the 2005 RCEP report )  
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underlies the condit ions of use. The report  made a number of 
recommendat ions, the most  publicly content ious of which was the 
proposal for the implementat ion of 5m buffer zones surrounding 
agricultural areas where pest icide spraying would not  be allowed. The 
negat ive react ion to this recomm endat ion by other government  bodies, 
who subsequent ly challenged the evidence base for this proposal, was 
such that  this issue appears to have overshadowed other aspects of the 
report  and has been used by these bodies to discredit  the report  as a 
whole.  
 
On a wider note, the RCEP recommended that  the regulat ion of pest icides 
needs to be rest ructured so that  regulat ion is separated from the 
approval system. I t  argued that  this would place greater weight  than is 
current ly available on addressing health issues associated with pest icide 
exposure and allow for a more act ive considerat ion of wider 
environmental object ives (Defra, 2007b, p.31) . Such comments suggest  
that , like the environmental groups previously discussed, the RCEP 
favours a broader and more holist ic approach to the assessment  of 
pest icides than is current ly in use. 
 
I n making such recommendat ions, the RCEP can be viewed as being 
implicit ly cr it ical of the ACP, its pract ices and its relat ive power within the 
field of UK pest icide regulat ion. Within the report  it  is explicit ly suggested 
that  the ACP regularly plays down the uncertainty present  when assessing 
bystander exposure to pest icides through failing to adequately 
acknowledge alternat ive views and the polit ical and ethical judgements, 
which the RCEP state are implicit  in it s advice:  
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I n the light  of the lack of r igour in the underlying science, we 
have been surprised at  the level of confidence expressed in 
advice to Ministers and the level of assurance given to the 
public about  the safety of residents and bystanders potent ially 
exposed to agricultural pest icides. We have concluded that  the 
level of these assurances is not  robust ly founded in scient ific 
evidence. Lim itat ions in the data and alternat ive views of the 
science, as well as polit ical and ethical judgements implicit  in 
this advice, all need to be clearly acknowledged. (Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 2005, paragraph 
6.14)  
 
Given the st rength of this statement  it  is perhaps unsurprising that  the 
ACP and other governmental bodies have been ext remely cr it ical of this 
report .  
 
6 .4 1  Differences in conceptualising scient ific 
uncertainty 
The ACP’s official response to the RCEP report  was published in December 
2005 and can be seen as the ACP t rying to reaffirm  its posit ion as the 
UK’s foremost  expert  advisory group on pest icide assessment . The ACP 
achieves this through two st rategies:  first , through suggest ing that  the 
RCEP exaggerated the r isk and secondly, through suggest ing that  the 
RCEP was overly precaut ionary in its at t itude towards pest icide use and 
management . This can be seen in the opening page of the ACP’s response 
document :   
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We consider that  the RCEP’s recommendat ion for compulsory 
5 met re buffer zones alongside resident ial property, schools 
and hospitals to provide added protect ion against  possible 
health r isks from spray drift  is a disproport ionate response to 
scient ific uncertainty…We agree that  there are scient ific 
uncertaint ies in these areas that  warrant  further research, but  
we think that  they are m inor, and no greater than the 
uncertaint ies that  exist  in other aspects of human health r isk 
assessment  for pest icides, or for many other environmental 
health hazards.  (Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides, 2005, p. 
3)  
 
Although the ACP acknowledges that  there are uncertaint ies, it s response 
t r ies to dism iss them and reduce the perceived scale of uncertainty 
through a comparison with other uncertaint ies found within the field of 
environmental health. This is interest ing for two reasons. First , as argued 
by the RCEP, unt il more informat ion is gathered, the scale of the 
uncertainty cannot  be ident ified due to the very fact  that  the data are 
either unknown or uncertain;  secondly, it  is interest ing that  the ACP 
would choose to compare bystander r isk and uncertainty to other 
environmental r isks and uncertaint ies outside that  of pest icides, when the 
ACP itself is not  specifically expert  in those areas. This is remarkable 
because it  dism isses the RCEP report  largely because it  does not  consider 
the RCEP to have the necessary expert ise with which to adequately 
assess the r isks in this area. Throughout  its response, the ACP implies 
that  the RCEP did not  fully understand the problem, was sloppy in its 
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assessment  and report ing, and was unqualified to comment  in this area. 
This can be seen in statements such as:  
 
…we draw at tent ion to various errors of fact  and logic in their 
report . We note that  several of it s most  important  conclusions 
appear to have been reached after what  we consider to be an 
incomplete considerat ion of the relevant  evidence. (Advisory 
Commit tee on Pest icides, 2005, p.4)  
 
And:  
 
Annex 1 lists var ious technical errors and m isleading 
statements in the RCEP report . Although these do not  impact  
cr it ically on the conclusions of the report , they are potent ially 
confusing for the public, and suggest  that  the RCEP did not  
fully grasp the area of r isk assessment  on which they were 
invited to advise. (Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides, 2005, 
paragraph 1.4, p.5)  
 
The ACP also raised concerns about  adopt ing an over-precaut ionary 
at t itude in relat ion to pest icide use and exposure. I n part icular, it  worr ies 
that  “over-precaut ion can send a m isleading message to the public, 
causing them to lim it  their act ivit ies unnecessarily, and perhaps even 
generat ing illness that  would not  otherwise occur” 59
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 Here the ACP quote three art icles that  suggest  pr ior belief and 
assumpt ions regarding the danger of pest icides and other environmental 
hazards can be used to predict  not  only when and what  symptoms will 
 (Advisory Commit tee 
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on Pest icides, 2005, paragraph 3.40, p.15) . The ACP repeatedly endorse 
the posit ion that  precaut ionary act ions must  be consistent  and 
proport ionate to the degree of scient ific uncertainty present  and it  
st rengthens its argument  through suggest ing that  the uncertaint ies in this 
area of r isk assessment  are no greater than those found in “other aspects 
of human r isk assessment  for pest icides, or for many other environmental 
health hazards”  ( ibid, p3) . Finally, it  claims that  it s views are shared “by 
most  other scient ists who are involved in r isk assessment  of pest icides”  
( ibid) , suggest ing that  the RCEP does not  have the necessary expert ise to 
make any judgements in this area and that  the RCEP’s advice is 
inconsistent  with the dom inant  scient ific discourse.  
 
The RCEP issued a formal reply that  sought  to address some the ACP’s 
cr it icisms. Specifically,  the RCEP noted what  it  considered to be the crux 
of the disagreements, a difference in opinion over “what  act ion it  is 
appropriate to take in the absence of scient ific certainty, where human 
health may be at  stake” , which it  suggests may reflect  differences in the 
two bodies’ approach to the assessment  of uncertainty (Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 2006, paragraph 6) . I n light  of 
the ACP’s comments it  writes that  it  has as a Commission re-exam ined 
the evidence and that  it  stands by its recomm endat ions, which it  v iews as 
both ‘appropriate’ and ‘proport ionate’.  To further st rengthen its credibilit y 
and weaken that  of the ACP, it  notes that  “a number of members of the 
ACP, dissent ing from the majority ACP view, agree with us”  (Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 2006, paragraph 7) .  
                                                                                                                                                 
occur following exposure, but  also a pat ient ’s response to t reatment  
(Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides, 2005, paragraph 3.40, p.15) . 
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A key reason given by the RCEP for why it  adopts a more precaut ionary 
stance concerns the current  pract ice within the ACP of placing emphasis 
on assessing the act ive ingredient (s)  rather than assessing the m ixture as 
a whole. I n cr it icising the management  of this area, the RCEP raise 
doubts -  sim ilar to those expressed in relat ion to the WiGRAMP report  -  as 
to the validity of the ACP’s long standing posit ion that  the current  
assessment  system adequately protects against  the potent ial r isks that  
may be associated with exposure to chem ical m ixtures. Here, it  expresses 
concern over the possibilit y of synergy and that  “ the potent ial impact  of 
exposures on the full range of the human populat ion, has not  been fully 
addressed, and that  there remain significant  areas of r isk and 
uncertainty”  (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 2006, 
paragraphs 14 and 15) ;  an argument  that  echoes that  made by 
environmental groups in relat ion to residues. 
 
This view that  the RCEP acted appropriately given the presence of 
scient ific uncertainty and incomplete or conflict ing data was reiterated by 
(E) , the former chairman, who suggested that  the ACP is at  t imes 
dism issive or reluctant  to consider different  types of evidence:  
 
“Well we don’t  say that  any part icular study should be 
believed, what  we say is that  the evidence is just  not  st rong 
from any of them and we make a very clear statement  at  the 
beginning…what  we said is that  there is a lot  of stuff out  there 
which people tend to ignore, so the ACP puts aside the 
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Ontario60
 
 study and they put  aside the other things”  (E)  
Former RCEP Chairman  
(E) ’s opinion of the ACP m irrors a statement  made by the RCEP in relat ion 
to the ACP’s assessment  of r isk. Here the ACP is depicted as stubborn, a 
body closed to alternat ive opinion and unwilling to carry out  or endorse 
further research that  may reduce the uncertaint ies described within the 
RCEP report , uncertaint ies which in several cases the ACP acknowledged:  
 
We accept  the ACP’s view that  the evidence from further study 
m ight  support  the hypothesis that  there is not  a problem  from 
pest icide exposure. That  would be important . What  we cannot  
accept  is a reject ion of research that  seeks to reduce 
uncertaint ies in this area, part icular ly when this is coupled 
with cont inuing assert ions that  there is not  a problem, and 
that  act ion to reduce exposure is disproport ionate. (RCEP, 
2006, paragraph 20)  
 
While the ACP had in 2002 suggested that  there may be social grounds to 
int roduce buffer zones, the RCEP endorsed the view that  where there is 
scient ific uncertainty, decisions should not  be taken on the basis of 
science alone, but  should be considered within a wider framework that  
includes social, ethical and econom ic components. The RCEP suggested 
that  the ACP is locked into a mode of un- reflexive working which fails to 
                                                 
60
 The Ontario study was a systemat ic review by the Ontario College of 
Fam ily Physicians of epidem iological literature produced between 1990 
and 2003 on the health effects of pest icides (Ontario College of Fam ily 
Physicians, 2004) .  
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recognise or account  for differences in perspect ives regarding r isk 
assessment  and the management  of uncertainty. To st rengthen its 
argument  it  again makes reference to the ACP members who issued 
m inority statements:  
 
But  we remain concerned that  the ACP seems unable or 
unwilling to accept  that  most  of it s advice to Ministers is based 
on an implicit  judgement , in a context  of scient ific uncertainty, 
about  the relat ive importance of public concerns about  human 
health and well being. I mplicit  judgements are being taken on 
the benefits of pest icide usage and consequent  conclusions 
drawn about  what  is in the public interest . The four members 
who disassociated themselves from parts of the ACP response 
were evident ly also uncomfortable with this judgement . (Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 2006, paragraphs 24 
and 25)  
 
I n addit ion to Defra asking the ACP to provide a response, the 
Department  of Health asked the Commit tees on Toxicity (COT)  and 
Carcinogenicity (COC)  to comment  on the recommendat ions pertaining to 
health (Defra, 2006a) . I t  is interest ing to note that  the COT and COC 
appear to agree with the RCEP’s conclusions in sect ion 2.1-2.15, which 
suggested that  no firm  conclusions could be drawn regarding a causal link 
between resident  or bystander exposure and ill health (Commit tee on 
Carcinogenicity and Commit tee on Toxicity, 2006, paragraph 13) . 
However, in concluding, the COT and COC disagreed with the RCEP’s 
recommendat ions [ 2.65]  for both further urgent  scient ific research to 
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invest igate a possible link between pest icide spraying and ill health and 
for a more precaut ionary approach to be taken regarding passive 
exposure;  this was conceptualised by the COT and COC as essent ially a 
polit ical and not  a scient ific problem and hence responsibilit y for 
managing r isks lies downst ream with policy-makers and not  scient ists or 
advisory bodies. However, there was lit t le recognit ion by these 
commit tees that  the process of r isk assessment  and the tests performed 
are themselves part ially subject ive, being shaped by historical, social and 
regulatory systems.  
 
The reviews from the COT, COC and ACP were used to formulate an 
official government  response to the RCEP report , which was released in 
July 2006 (Defra, 2006b) . The statement  below can be viewed as an 
amalgamat ion of the responses made by the individual bodies and sets 
out  the reasons why part icular RCEP recommendat ions would not  be 
enacted:  
 
The scient ific advice received is clear that  there is insufficient  
evidence to support  the Royal Commission’s recommendat ions 
for addit ional regulatory measures on safety grounds. 
I nt roducing regulat ions for other reasons such as perceived 
nuisance from spraying would be incompat ible with the 
Government ’s Bet ter Regulat ion policy. Government  has 
therefore decided against  int roducing any new regulat ions at  
this t ime. (Defra, 2006a)  
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I n the report  the government  also agrees with the RCEP’s conclusions 
that  “ the evidence does not  allow a firm  conclusion to be drawn on 
causality in relat ion to chronic ill health”  (Defra, 2006b, p.7) . However, 
the government ’s response regarding how to manage these unknowns 
can be seen as being aligned with that  of the ACP, i.e.,  that  uncertainty is 
not  a reason to adopt  a more precaut ionary approach and that  no 
addit ional measures can be just ified on the basis of current  scient ific 
knowledge.  
 
The Government  believes that  being unable to rule out  the 
possibilit y of a link can not  be considered a basis to support  
the recommendat ion of an urgent  need for research into any 
potent ial chronic ill health effects from pest icide exposure of 
resident  and bystanders. Sim ilar ly there is no scient ific basis 
for addit ional precaut ion beyond the already precaut ionary 
approach current ly adopted. (Defra, 2006b, paragraph 18, 
p.7)  
 
Within the press statement , Defra’s Chief Scient ific Adviser, Howard 
Dalton, did however suggest  that  other recommendat ions such as those 
pertaining to the development  of bet ter, more realist ic exposure models 
would be addressed:  
 
We are completely reviewing the model used to assess 
resident  and bystander exposure as part  of the pest icide 
approvals process. The current  approvals process is adequate 
with clear safety margins built  in, however, I  recognise that  it  
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needs to be more clearly demonst rated to the public that  
approvals are based on high quality underpinning science. 
(Defra, 2006a)  
 
The above statement  is interest ing due to its cont radictory message. 
Dalton first  states that  the model used in exposure assessment  is to be 
completely reviewed thereby acknowledging the possibilit y that  it  may be 
flawed. However, he later denies that  the current  system is in anyway 
scient ifically inadequate, despite at  t imes appearing so to the public. This 
issue was touched upon in the Brit ish Crop Product ion Council’s (BCPC) 
response, who sim ilar ly framed the issue as one of polit ics as opposed to 
science. I n its writ ten response, the BCPC drew parallels between 
bystander exposure and government  advice on the MMR vaccine and the 
GM crops debate arguing that  in all of these examples:  “a balance has to 
be st ruck between the conclusions of a scient ifically based assessment  of 
r isks and benefits and the percept ions by individuals and the general 
public of the nature of r isks or sources of harm  based on beliefs”  (Brit ish 
Crop Product ion Council,  2006, p.2) . 
 
The BCPC, like the COT, COC and ACP focused on the challenges in 
obtaining evidence of causality between bystander exposure and illness, 
especially when illnesses such as MCS or CFS are poorly defined and 
without  a common aet iology. I t  argued the net  result  is that  such illnesses 
fall outside of the current  hazard test ing system, with the effect  that  it  
becomes impossible within the current  system to determ ine whether 
part icular chem icals m ay induce such effects ( ibid) . However, despite 
such an acknowledgement  it  was wary of the RCEP’s call for further 
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research, which it  suggested was likely to be “ long term , expensive and 
not  necessarily guaranteed to provide clear solut ions”  ( ibid) . 
 
I n this case study I  have illust rated how the report  and recommendat ions 
produced by the RCEP were dism issed by other government  advisory 
bodies largely because they were seen to be at  odds with the current  
assessment  process and understanding of bystander r isk from crop 
spraying. As such the advice and recommendat ions produced by the RCEP 
were not  taken forward at  a government  level. 
 
6 .5  Sum m ary  
I n this chapter I  have illust rated that  there are now several government  
advisory bodies that  are involved in the assessment  of pest icides, with 
each applying its own conceptual framework with which to assess and 
advise on r isks. This has resulted in increasing tensions between advisory 
bodies and a proliferat ion of advice both inside and outside of government  
that  is not  always compat ible. I n part icular, I  explored how fragmentat ion 
of advice and challenges to the dom inant  advisory system, as embodied 
by the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , has been managed and 
what  these challenges mean in respect  of authority and legit imacy of 
advice provision.  
 
I n the first  case study I  explored advice surrounding exposure to m ixtures 
of pest icides. I  highlighted that  despite the WiGRAMP report  being a 
progressive step in the acknowledgement  of m ixtures specific r isks within 
the regulatory community, it s cent ral findings were widely cr it icised for 
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failing to give due weight  to the uncertainty involved and the regulatory 
requirements that  dictate the rem it  of pest icide assessments performed 
by the ACP. As such the credibilit y of the resultant  advice has been 
publicly challenged by both those within and outside government . 
 
I n the second case study that  considered the advice surrounding 
consumpt ion of residues, I  illust rated that  the differences in how the 
Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides and the Food Standards Agency frame 
pest icides has resulted in a tension between the two bodies. However, I  
discussed how the fragmentat ion of advice surrounding residues was 
publicly reduced across government  through the FSA changing its posit ion 
to match that  of the ACP. One consequence of this was that  this 
encouraged a proliferat ion of advice from those external to the official 
advisory process, which has been overt ly cr it ical of the ACP’s and 
subsequent ly the FSA’s guidance. This alternat ive advice (produced by 
NGOs)  was shown to substant ially differ to that  of the government ’s and 
can be characterised by the fact  that  it  is more precaut ionary, placing 
greater em phasis on areas of uncertainty and discrepancies within the 
government ’s own r isk assessment  pract ices. I  suggested that  it  is likely 
that  alternat ive advice will act  to underm ine the FSA and weaken its 
credibilit y as an organisat ion that  purports to put  the consumer first . A 
situat ion that  is likely to be exacerbated by the fact  that  even in the face 
of government  sourced evidence from the Pest icide Residues Commit tee 
detailing that  peeling may be necessary in order to reduce residues to an 
acceptable level the FSA has not  altered its advice. 
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I n the third case study I  discussed how the report  and recommendat ions 
produced by the RCEP were largely dism issed by other government  
advisory bodies. I  suggested that  this was because they were seen to be 
too precaut ionary and at  odds with the current  assessment  process and 
wider understanding of bystander r isk from crop spraying. As such the 
advice and recommendat ions produced by the RCEP were sidelined by the 
government  who favoured the views expressed by the ACP, a commit tee 
that  has been shown in these case studies to consistent ly endorse the 
current  assessment  regime despite being repeatedly presented with 
evidence suggest ing that  there are areas, such as exposure to m ixtures, 
that  are not  fully accounted for within the current  assessment  process.  
 
When viewed as a whole the evidence from the three case studies 
suggests that  while the ACP has now begun to accept  the possibilit y of 
effects from exposure to m ixtures through independent  act ion or simple 
addit iv ity (note only in the cases where mult iple substances are combined 
in one product ) , it  appears to systemat ically neglect  the possibilit y of 
synergism , a posit ion that  has been crit icised by the RCEP. Thus although 
the ACP has publicly rejected the cr it icism  levied on it  by the RCEP, the 
evidence presented here across all three case studies suggests that  the 
RCEP was just ified in making such remarks. I ndeed, the evidence 
presented in this chapter suggests that  the more reflexive approach to 
r isk assessment  as adopted by the RCEP is epistemologically superior to 
that  of the ACP’s, which appears to consistent ly fail to account  for 
differences in perspect ives regarding approaches to r isk assessment  and 
the management  of uncertainty. 
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I n general, the case studies suggest  that  there is a fundamental 
difference in how the ACP and other government  bodies frame the r isk 
from pest icides when compared to those actors outside of the policy 
process. Notably, government  r isk advice tends to reflect  areas of greater 
scient ific certainty, whereas advice from  NGOs is typically more 
precaut ionary and tends to draw upon and reflect  areas of scient ific 
uncertainty. This would suggest  that , while these fram ings are 
diamet r ically opposed, the two groups are unlikely to agree on how to 
manage any r isks from pest icides.  
 
All three case studies illust rate that  it  is widely recognised among 
advisory bodies that  there are lim itat ions in the abilit y to determ ine 
causal effects using the current  evidence base, specifically when 
considering real life exposure scenarios. However, there are key quest ions 
surrounding the extent  to which these lim itat ions are acknowledged 
within the process of r isk assessment  and product ion of r isk advice by 
bodies such as the ACP. I ndeed, the ACP has been repeatedly cr it icised 
for using the inabilit y to prove causat ion between exposure and effect  to 
just ify inact ion and maintain the status quo.  
 
I n all of the case studies and in part icular that  pertaining to crop 
spraying, it  is suggested that  uncertainty and ignorance can be reduced 
through further research. However, these calls appear to have been 
resisted by the ACP and other government  advisory bodies on the 
grounds that  they would be resource intensive and not  necessarily 
guaranteed to provide any further informat ion.  
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Advice on pest icide residue r isks therefore has to be formulated on the 
basis of incomplete evidence and in the knowledge that  there are areas of 
uncertainty and ignorance. Research by Shackley and Wynne (1996)  on 
boundary-ordering devices suggests that  scient ific uncertainty can 
challenge both science and the authority of scient ists. Drawing on this it  
is likely that  the ACP may deny the possibilit y of uncertainty in its 
assessments so as not  to underm ine the current  regulatory system in 
which it  is embedded.  
 
I nst itut ional pract ices are therefore shown in this chapter to not  only act  
as frames but  also as boundary objects61
 
 that  help establish which r isk 
quest ions are acceptable to ask and determ ine which evidence is 
acceptable for use in providing answers. The official regulatory framework 
is therefore a type of anchoring device that  acts to create consensus 
across advisory bodies and const rain alternat ive interpretat ions (van der 
Sluij s et  al. , 1998) . 
I t  was recognised within the case studies that  where there are 
uncertaint ies then the select ion of evidence will blend both scient ific and 
policy considerat ions, therefore, any subsequent  r isk advice will be 
heavily influenced by the init ial fram ing of the issue. Many of these points 
have been recognised and discussed within the STS literature. For 
example, Jasanoff (1991, p.29)  has argued that  where there is 
uncertainty or ambiguity in scient ific knowledge used for policy then 
“ facts alone are inadequate to compel a choice” . I n such situat ions 
                                                 
61
 (Star and Griesemer, 1989)  
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evidence select ion will blend both scient ific and policy considerat ions, with 
the result  that  policy-makers are required to seek something other than 
science to legit im ise the choice of evidence used in r isk decisions and 
subsequent  advice. However, it  should be noted that  the apparent  use of 
“ sound science”  in just ify ing decision-making does not  exclude the 
potent ial for socio-polit ical influence. I ndeed, much of the literature 
reviewed in Chapter Two suggests that  r isk decisions are frequent ly 
tacit ly shaped by such factors, they may just  be less imm ediately obvious 
to an observer (Jasanoff, 1986;  Wynne, 1992;  I rwin et  al. ,  1997;  
Jasanoff, 1997a;  Sarewitz, 2004;  van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2005) ;  
a point  recognised by the RCEP in its report  on r isks from crop spraying 
which argued that  tacit  assumpt ions should be more openly discussed.  
 
One method that  has been used to gain authority and legit imacy in the 
area of pest icide r isk assessment  and advice is the leverage of ‘experts’ in 
the assessment  process. However, this leverage can also lead to tensions 
between different  expert  groups as they compete to gain authority in an 
increasingly overcrowded arena. For example, the furore surrounding the 
publicat ion of the RCEP’s report  on crop spraying was not  simply due to 
differences in problem fram ing;  in quest ioning the current  r isk 
assessment  and management  process, the RCEP was in fact  quest ioning 
the authority and credibilit y of the ACP. This public challenge was seen by 
ACP member (O)  as part ially explaining the ACP’s negat ive react ion to the 
report :  
 
“ I  think it  is vested interest  in one, I  mean it  is a defence of 
their expert ise [ ACP’s] , you know “ this is my area and you 
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know it  is not  for cr it icism” , not  of them specifically or of their 
specific discipline but  of the process of r isk assessment , the 
body of knowledge and process”  (O)  ACP Member  
 
The themes of authority, expert ise and legit imacy and the dist inct ion 
between the r ight  and wrong kind of expert  were seen extensively in the 
interviews with advisory body members and will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter 7 : Re- construct ing the 
Legit im acy of Scient ific Experts in the 
Post - BSE Era 
7 .1  I nt roduct ion 
I n Chapter Six I  illust rated that  the product ion of r isk advice can lead to 
tensions not  only between government  bodies and NGOs, but  also 
between different  bodies within government . I  suggested such tensions 
are not  solely the result  of differences in scient ific understanding and 
conceptualisat ion of r isk and uncertainty. They are in part  a result  of 
compet ing claims for authority and recognit ion of expert ise. The 
inst itut ional authority afforded to the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides 
(ACP)  within the UK has made it  difficult  for others, including other 
government  departments, to credibly challenge the ACP. I n this chapter I  
will explore the factors that  underlie such difficult ies;  percept ions of 
expert ise, t rust  and epistem ic authority.  
 
I  have also shown within this thesis that  the advisory system surrounding 
pest icides can be characterised as being in a state of flux, a system that  
is st ill responding to changes inst igated by the BSE crisis of the m id-
1990s and subsequent  calls for the use of evidence based policy, greater 
t ransparency in the policy-making process and a widening of part icipat ion 
to include not  only alternat ive sources of scient ific and technical expert ise 
but  also lay representat ives (Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollut ion, 1998;  House of Lords Select  Commit tee on Science and 
Technology, 2000;  The St rategy Unit , 2002) . However, there are 
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significant  tensions surrounding not  only the role of lay people on 
commit tees but  whether such people can actually be considered as lay at  
all (Collins and Evans, 2002) . This chapter therefore seeks to answer my 
fourth research quest ion:  How are com pet ing claim s for scient ific 
expert ise and for lay involvem ent  in r isk assessm ent  being handled in the 
case of pest icide residues? 
 
The chapter is divided into four sect ions. I n the first  sect ion I  consider 
what  it  means to be the ‘r ight ’ k ind of expert  and show that  there are 
tensions between those experts appointed for their specialist  knowledge 
and those appointed to ensure a breadth of expert ise. I  propose that  it  is 
not  enough to simply be appointed as an expert  in order to be perceived 
as legit imate. I n the second sect ion I  discuss barr iers to ‘groupthink’, 
highlight ing that  the pest icide advisory system in the UK is comprised of a 
t ight  knit  community of those perceived by government  as embodying 
specific types of expert ise, who are often appointed on to commit tees not  
just  because of their technical abilit y but  also because of their shared 
values. However, I  argue that  at tempts to change the membership of 
such commit tees st ill need to achieve legit im acy, which requires a careful 
navigat ion of the science/ policy boundary to retain credibilit y and prevent  
both accusat ions of polit ical interference and discord within commit tees.  
 
I n the third sect ion I  explore what  happens when experts disagree and 
show that  in respect  of the ACP there is a desire to present  assessment  
findings and advice as being consensually agreed and derived using the 
most  relevant  specialist  expert ise – thus perpetuat ing the myth that  
science speaks with one voice (Collingr idge and Reeve, 1986) . I n the final 
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sect ion I  consider the effects of widening part icipat ion in advisory 
commit tees to include lay members. Drawing on the work of Collins and 
Evans (2002)  I  argue that  there is a paradox;  although appointed as non-
experts, many lay members can be considered as possessing interact ional 
and somet imes even cont r ibutory  expert ise. Paradoxically, although their  
expert ise is frequent ly not  recognised by those appointed as ‘experts’ it  is 
their knowledge and professional competency that  allows them to interact  
within r isk discussions. 
 
7 .2  Being the ‘r ight ’ k ind of expert  
I n this sect ion I  discuss that  there are com pet ing claims for expert ise 
from different  actors. Such claims are shown to be rooted in different  
understandings of what  counts as the r ight  kind of expert ise and who 
embodies this. I n previous literature it  has been discussed how in Brit ish 
advisory bodies expert ise and t rustworthiness is often embodied in the 
person. Advisory commit tees for example, have in the past  been 
described as comprising the “great  and the good” , so that  when defending 
recommendat ions it  was often enough “ to show that  the best  people were 
selected to evaluate the situat ion and to draw the appropriate 
conclusions”  (Jasanoff, 1997a p.227) . However, in the following I  argue 
that  in the area of pest icides, the situat ion is becom ing m ore complicated 
as there are increasing tensions between the not ions of experts having 
specialist  knowledge versus experts having scient ific breadth;  in 
quest ions of r isk it  is no longer enough to simply be appointed as an 
expert  in order to be perceived as legit imate. This tension is epitom ised in 
how the ACP and the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion 
245 
(RCEP)  describe themselves:  the ACP as an “expert  commit tee”  which 
values specialist  knowledge62
 
 and the RCEP as a “commit tee of experts”  
which values scient ific breadth. Both commit tees can be considered as 
being comprised of experts in the t radit ional sense. 
Throughout  the interviews, many ACP members, in part icular those 
appointed for their toxicological knowledge, were very cr it ical of the RCEP 
report  on crop spraying;  they frequent ly st ressed that  they did not  feel 
that  the RCEP had the r ight  sort  of expert ise with which to make 
judgements in the area of pest icide r isk. I n part icular, they repeatedly 
noted that  with the except ion of the lay members, all ACP members are 
experts on pest icides, with many also possessing toxicological expert ise.  
 
The issue of whether you need to be a toxicologist  to be able to make an 
informed judgement  in the area of pest icide r isk was seen across the 
interviews and is at  the heart  of all the disagreements. (S) , a toxicologist  
and member of the Commit tee on Toxicity (COT) , suggested that  
toxicologists are now under pressure to protect  their historically pr iv ileged 
posit ion in this area:  “ I ’m  afraid toxicologists are in a rather difficult  
posit ion of maintaining their own discipline” . Here (S)  was referr ing to the 
difficulty toxicologists face in finding a balance between communicat ing 
r isk while not  overselling it  to enhance or maintain their own advantaged 
disciplinary posit ion in r isk assessment . Sim ilar ly, COT working group 
member (T)  suggested that  the pace of change in toxicological science 
                                                 
62
 See I rwin’s (1995)  Cit izen Science, where ext racts taken from the ACP’s 
1980 report  on the pest icide 2,4,5-T illust rate how the ACP has been 
formally recognised as an “expert  commit tee”  for several decades. 
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meant  that  many of those toxicologists t radit ionally considered as expert  
and included in advisory groups can no longer be described in such 
terms:  
 
“Somet imes the science is really hard, I  mean I  don’t  
understand all this genom ic stuff,  I  will soon be out  of my 
depth and I  suspect  a lot  of the t radit ional toxicologists are, 
they are not  experts anymore, and I  just  think they have got  
to have an understanding of the problem to be of any help,”  
(T)  COT Working Group Member 
 
Such comments suggest  that  there is recognit ion among toxicologists that  
new developments and areas of interests in r isk assessment  are likely to 
reduce the need for the more t radit ional style toxicological expert ise, and 
instead favour a move towards more diverse advisory membership that  
includes alternat ive specialisms.  
 
The differences in the composit ion of expert ise in the ACP and RCEP was 
reflected upon by (E) , the former chairman of the RCEP. (E)  saw the use 
of a wide range of experts in the RCEP as a st rength as it  encouraged a 
mult i-disciplinary approach to understanding scient ific problems, which 
(E)  felt  helped to facilitate a broader and more holist ic considerat ion of 
environmental r isk:   
 
 “ [ the RCEP]  is a body where everybody cont r ibuted to the 
discussion, there was no sense that  because you are an 
econom ist  that  I  can’t  cr it icise you, it  was a debat ing 
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environment…everybody knew something about  what  each 
other is doing and each person had a long t rack record in their 
area but  was willing to think and argue and talk around the 
subject , so my view is that  we bought  experience and a lot  of 
expert ise, but  also an abilit y to debate the subject  in a way 
that  you have to…you also have to make sure that  the 
scient ist  is thinking about  it  in the context  of the social 
environment , and that  is what  I  think the Royal Commission 
does very well”  (E)  Former RCEP Chairman  
 
As can be seen from the above, (E)  appears not  to privilege one discipline 
over another believing that  it  is important  to consider the wider context  of 
an issue through discussions between different  fields. I n this sense, the 
RCEP can be seen as valuing the type of expert ise Collins and Evans  
(2002)  describe as ‘interact ional’.  However, it  is the very fact  that  the 
RCEP study was conducted by experts from a range of disciplines that  
appeared to generate the most  cr it icism  from ACP members. This 
cr it icism  is likely to be related to the almost  diamet r ic approach that  the 
ACP takes in conceptualising and assessing r isk and uncertainty, which 
may in part  reflect  the historical dom inance of toxicologists within the 
Commit tee. Unlike the RCEP, where variety in expert ise is valued, the 
ACP place weight  on the fact  that  members have shared expert ise and a 
depth of knowledge in one area, most  notably pest icide toxicology.  
 
For example, while ( I ) ,  a former ACP member, suggests that  in general,  
advisory commit tees benefit  from  having members with different  
expert ise, they are caut ious to st ress that  this should st ill be the ‘r ight ’ 
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type of expert ise;  they are referr ing here to the fact  that  none of the 
RCEP members were toxicologists. The inference is that  unless you are a 
toxicologist  you are unable to fully understand toxicological studies or be 
qualified to comment :  
 
“Well,  you want  to have people with different  expert ise that  is 
for sure, and you want  to have people with the appropriate 
expert ise to deal with the problems that  are under 
invest igat ion, and one of the problems with the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollut ion is that  they didn’t  
have anybody with the appropriate expert ise and they didn’t  
really recognise the lim its of their  own expert ise and they 
ended up making silly scient ific m istakes in the report  that  
they produced, so you do need to have people with the r ight  
expert ise”   ( I )  Former ACP Member 
 
Without  knowing who was a member of the RCEP at  the t ime of the report  
one m ight  surm ise from ( I ) ’s statement  that  the RCEP was bereft  of all 
relevant  expert ise. However, of the thir teen members one was a 
Professor of I mmunopharmacology, the chair himself was Chair of 
Biological Sciences and Head of Cambridge University’s Department  of 
Biochem ist ry, another was a Professor of Plant  Biology and a further three 
are listed as Professors in different  fields of Environmental Science and 
Policy. The others occupied senior roles in fields ranging from chem ist ry 
to econom ics. This suggests that  not  only was there a significant  degree 
of scient ific expert ise within the Commit tee but  that  several worked in 
disciplines direct ly related to toxicology.  
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However, the excerpt  below from toxicologist  and ACP member (L)  
suggests that  (L)  clearly felt  that  the lack of actual toxicologists within the 
RCEP led to it  failing to understand the evidence and is therefore a reason 
to dism iss the report :  
 
“ it  was full of factual errors, if you look at  the people involved 
in writ ing it ,  there is not  a single card carrying 
toxicologist…the only toxicologist  I  know who happens to think 
it  is a great  report , happens to be X63
 
,  you talk to the 
president  of the Brit ish Toxicological Society I ’m  sure you 
would get  a sim ilar but  more diplomat ic answer than m ine, it  
doesn’t  represent  the situat ion and a lot  of it  is completely 
factually incorrect  as well,”  (L)  ACP Member 
I n the above (L)  highlights the importance of being the r ight  kind of 
expert  if assessment  findings are to be considered credible. By aligning 
their views with that  of the Brit ish Toxicological Society, (L)  seeks to 
reinforce the standing of their argument  by suggest ing their view is 
widespread among other recognised experts in this field, who (L)  believes 
to be other toxicologists. This is further achieved through linking the 
views of the RCEP with those of toxicologist  X, who (L)  had previously 
dism issed in the interview as not  having the credent ials to be considered 
a ‘real’ toxicologist .  
 
                                                 
63
 X is not  a reference to interviewee (X) . 
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Sim ilar ly, ACP member (X)  also suggested that  the RCEP was unable to 
cr it ically assess the evidence it  was provided with from those claim ing to 
have been affected by pest icides. I n Collins and Evans’ (2002)  terms (X)  
is suggest ing that  only ‘cont r ibutory’ expert ise is legit imate for evaluat ing 
pest icide r isks and that  only the specialist  members of the ACP possess it .  
The RCEP’s ‘expert ise’ is presented as inadequate in handling such 
complex issues:    
 
“ I  think it  is a very complex and emot ional topic and I  thought  
that , you know, they really hadn’t  looked at  all the factors…I  
think you can get  people who make these crusades part  of the 
lives, it  makes them so much more dramat ic and 
interest ing…with some of these people you can’t  be certain 
that  they are as scrupulous as they should be, I  mean are they 
for instance going to rush into the field that  has just  been 
sprayed and going to roll around in the stuff and say levels in 
my blood are terr ibly high, you know once they have made the 
point  that  pest icides are terr ible they are going to st ick with it , 
you would be bet ter off with somebody like me just  standing 
there, you know I  wouldn’t  do anything like that , and people 
can take blood samples and then we would know, what  the 
levels m ight  be in human beings…you know I  don’t  care what  
the result  is I  just  want  to know what  the t ruth is,”  (X)  ACP 
Member 
 
I nterest ingly, (X) ’s comments suggest  that  not  only are there differences 
in expert ise but  also in t rustworthiness. (X) ’s statement  suggests that  
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they believe that  campaigners or those who have claim ed to be affected 
by pest icide spraying are somet imes ‘unscrupulous’ and uninterested in 
the t ruth. They are depicted by (X)  as dism issive of evidence that  does 
not  support  their or iginal posit ion that  “pest icides are terr ible” . I ndeed, 
(X)  suggests that  many people who claim  to be affected, far from  being 
debilitated by exposure relish the at tent ion that  it  can bring. I n cont rast , 
(X)  and the other members of the ACP are port rayed by ACP member (X)  
as impart ial and scient ific, only interested in the t ruth. Yet , the ACP itself 
has been charged with exact ly the same at t r ibutes that  (X)  finds so 
worrying in others, namely, an unwillingness to consider alternat ive 
evidence that  does not  support  its or iginal posit ion on the low r isk of 
pest icides and as defending the status quo – see Chapter Six. 
 
I n cont rast , cr it ics of the ACP quest ioned the ACP’s depict ion of the RCEP 
as lacking in expert ise. For example, (Q) , a member of the Pest icide 
Act ion Network (PAN) , not  only dism issed the ACP’s cr it icism  but  raised 
the quest ion as to whether toxicologists are in fact  the best  people to 
assess r isk, especially when it  is not  confined to one narrow area:   
 
“ this after all is the Royal Commission, to say that  they 
haven’t  got  the correct  expert ise is just  absolute nonsense, 
well you m ight  as well say well the Advisory Commit tee on 
Pest icides doesn’t  have the correct  expert ise or the Pest icide 
Residues Commit tee don’t  have the correct  expert ise, because 
who are they? They are toxicologists and they don’t  
necessarily know about  it ,”  (Q)  PAN Staff Member  
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This sent iment  was echoed by (O) , a non- toxicologist  ACP member, who 
disagreed with their fellow commit tee members regarding their port rayal 
of the RCEP. (O) ’s response perhaps raises the most  im portant  quest ion 
in debates surrounding r isk and uncertainty, namely that  does too narrow 
a focus lead to a neglect  of the wider picture:  
 
“ I  think that  as a body they are, you know they are the top 
commission on the environment  and they are appointed to be 
that , there is the whole issue that  to make sense of what  you 
are doing, do you really need to be an expert  or actually when 
you are a real expert  do you just  see the t rees and not  the 
wood?”  (O)  ACP Member  
 
I n the above I  have argued that  there are tensions in the field of pest icide 
r isk assessment  between the not ions of experts having specialist  
knowledge versus experts having scient ific breadth, and that  in quest ions 
of r isk it  is no longer enough to simply be appointed as an expert  in order 
to be perceived as ‘expert ’.  I  show that  there appears to be a growing 
recognit ion among toxicologists in this field that  new developments and 
areas of interest  in r isk assessment  are likely to reduce the need for the 
more t radit ional toxicological expert ise. I nstead, it  was argued that  there 
needs to be a move towards more diverse advisory membership that  
includes alternat ive specialisms to facilitate a broader and more holist ic 
considerat ion of r isk. However, such a move will be difficult  while bodies 
such as the ACP view the dom inance of specialist  members as a st rength 
and more diverse memberships as problem at ic in solving complex r isk 
quest ions. At  the heart  of the mat ter was the quest ion over whether the 
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capacity to engage across disciplines ( interact ional expert ise)  was 
deemed to be essent ial or legit imate by comparison with specialist  
disciplinary knowledge (cont r ibutory expert ise) . 
 
7 .3  Barr iers to solving ‘groupthink’ 
So far I  have discussed the cont rast  between expert ise in toxicology and 
expert ise in other areas of science as a key tension in discussions about  
who has the authority to comment  on the subject  of pest icide r isk. 
However, toxicology is it self under pressure to change with the r ise of 
new methods and areas of study, such as m ixtures, emerging as 
specialisms in their own r ight . There are also polit ical pressures on the 
ACP to move beyond its close-knit  circle of m embers -  who share sim ilar 
professional backgrounds -  and address the problem  of ‘groupthink’. 
However, at tempts to t ransform  this advisory system have floundered for 
reasons that  I  discuss below.  
 
A recurr ing theme found in interviews was that  the ACP was frequent ly 
depicted (by those external and internal to the ACP)  as a commit tee 
comprised of individuals with specialised scient ific t raining whose expert  
judgement  was difficult  to challenge either inside or outside the 
Commit tee by those possessing alternat ive forms of expert ise and 
t raining. For example, in ACP m ember (H) ’s account  of the stepwise 
assessment  style adopted within the Commit tee (H)  suggests that  ACP 
members themselves can find it  difficult  to challenge those outside of 
their own discipline. This raises the quest ion as to whether it  is not  just  a 
wider variety of expert ise that  may be required within the ACP and other 
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sim ilar com mit tees, but  whether it  is necessary to have mult iple experts 
from the same discipline ( thus acknowledging that  science doesn’t  speak 
with one voice – see Collingr idge and Reeve, 1986) , as this may lead to a 
more adversarial and discursive culture where it  would be harder for one 
member or a small number of members to dom inate discussions:   
 
“ you have a series of experts going round like that , which has 
its merit  and its value but  I  have argued that  why do we have 
to stand off like that  and leave it  to an individual’s expert ise? 
The t rouble is if there is a toxicologist  at  the other end of the 
table and I  am  there to represent  the environment , I  am very 
reluctant  to challenge the expert  in toxicity, now I  do because 
I  have nothing to lose, but  you can see that  they don’t  want  to 
be quest ioned by someone from some other discipline, they 
don’t  like it ”  (H)  ACP Member  
 
This percept ion was shared by (E) , a former chairman of the RCEP who 
felt  that  the ACP does not  encourage mult i-disciplinary discussion and 
takes too much not ice of one or two individuals. As a result ,  (E)  claims 
that  the ACP is unable to move on in its thinking. A view supported by 
comments made off the record by one ACP member who did not  wish to 
be named. This member suggested that  decisions can be heavily 
influenced by a m inority of persuasive individuals who are frequent ly able 
to alter the thinking of the group by effect ively communicat ing their own 
opinions;  a situat ion that  implies certain mem bers are seen as embodying 
a greater degree of epistemological authority than others. 
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However, this percept ion was not  lim ited to the ACP as members of other 
pest icide commit tees also suggested that  this is a comm on occurrence. 
For example, when speaking about  who has the final decision on whether 
an effect  should be t reated as adverse or not , (K) , a senior toxicologist  at  
the Pest icide Safety Directorate (PSD) , stated:  
 
“At  the moment  it  is EFSA, previously it  was I  suppose down 
to a majority decision, or if you like the fact  that  somebody 
could present  a more persuasive case during the discussions,”  
(K)  Senior PSD Toxicologist  
 
Despite the acknowledged lim itat ions as shown above a common theme 
in interviews with advisory body members was that  appointment  onto 
government  advisory commit tees has changed for the bet ter by 
comparison with the previous approach that  I  described in Chapter Four. 
Many interviewees st ressed that  there are now formal procedures for 
appoint ing experts and lay persons, and that  all members of government  
commit tees are required to divulge potent ial conflicts of interest , such as 
indust ry sponsorship or professional/ financial relat ionships with 
commercial companies. This t ransparency in the appointment  process was 
widely viewed among interviewees as grant ing commit tee members 
legit imacy in their roles as appointed experts. I ndeed, many interviewees 
such as (B) , a science policy advisor at  the Food Standards Agency (FSA) , 
highlighted the importance of expert  commit tees being seen to be  
comprised of individuals working outside of government  so that  it  can 
legit imately challenge policy and inst itut ional thinking. I mportant ly, the 
appoint ing of those considered to be independent  of both government  and 
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indust ry was viewed as a significant  means of safe guarding against  the 
possibilit y of ‘groupthink’ within commit tees. 
 
However, there was recognit ion among some interviewees (both internal 
and external to the advisory process)  that  due to the commercialisat ion of 
much academ ic research it  is increasingly difficult  to find suitable 
‘independent ’ experts, especially when, with the except ion of expenses, 
they are not  paid for their t im e and involvement :  
 
“ it  is becom ing more and more of a problem  in that  there is 
the conflicts of interest , which they have to declare even if it  is 
just  someone in their own department  who has got  a grant  
from Bayer…also the fact  that  in the UK you don’t  really pay 
them for their t im e, so yes that  can be a hindrance in get t ing 
the best  people on to these commit tees,”  (K)  Senior PSD 
Toxicologist   
 
These lim itat ions appear to have shaped the membership of commit tees 
such as the ACP. I n effect  the lack of monetary reward and t ime dem ands 
means that  the job is likely to appeal to established 
academ ic/ professional experts who have the capacity in their employment  
to take t ime out  for advisory roles. I n this sense, the majority of 
members of UK government  advisory groups can be characterised by the 
fact  that  they hold senior posit ions and are towards the top of their  
professional careers. This phenomenon has been discussed by the former 
Commissioner for Public Appointments, Baroness Rennie Fritchie, who has 
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damningly described advisory commit tees as being full of “pale, stale 
males”  (Press Associat ion, 2003) . 
 
Although one m ight  argue that  there are advantages in appoint ing senior 
professionals in terms of the experience they bring, there may equally be 
disadvantages. For example, appointment  of one type of expert ,  
regardless of discipline is likely to impact  on the nature and type of 
discussions held within a commit tee and may lead to the development  of 
Type 3 errors, as an issue is only conceptualised within a narrow 
theoret ical sphere. This was discussed by COT working group member 
(U) , who was explicit  in stat ing that  the important  thing in science is to 
ask the r ight  quest ions, which in (U) ’s opinion necessitates thinking about  
issues from a mult i-disciplinary perspect ive:  
 
“unt il you ask the r ight  quest ions you will not  get  the r ight  
answers and so you have got  to be always asking those 
quest ions, and again I  think you don’t  want  the same person 
with the same m indset , with the same wir ing asking the 
quest ions all the t ime…I  think that  is the wrong direct ion to go 
in where you narrow things down, you should be going out , 
now I  know you can’t  assim ilate all the knowledge that  is out  
there but…the more you understand it  the m ore that  you will 
make the r ight  choices”  (U)  COT Working Group Member  
 
The inclusion of different  types of experts was recognised by a small 
number of interviewees as important  in areas such as the r isk assessment  
of m ixtures, where much academ ic work has been undertaken at  the 
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fr inges of more convent ional toxicology programmes ( these interviewees 
were typically those current ly outside of the ACP and advisory process 
who were already calling for a more holist ic understanding of the issue) . 
However, recruit ing those with the relevant  alternat ive expert ise was 
recognised by many interviewees as frequent ly being difficult  to do in 
pract ice. This can be seen in the excerpt  below taken from (K) , a senior 
PSD toxicologist , who in discussing the membership of the WiGRAMP 
noted that  the only toxicologist  in the group who was specifically an 
expert  in m ixtures was based in the Netherlands, suggest ing there are 
recruitment  difficult ies for advisory commit tees:   
 
“ I  suppose if you are talking about  m ixtures then there is a 
great  shortage of toxicologists who really do know much about  
m ixtures, but  there was Dr Groten who has done quite a lot  of 
work on m ixtures, again I  suppose it  m ight  have shown that  
either there weren’t  any m ixtures experts in the UK or they 
didn’t  want  to join the group,”  (K)  Senior PSD Toxicologist   
 
I ndeed, a key feature of UK government  advisory groups involved in 
pest icide r isk assessment  is that  they are dom inated by a small group of 
experts who typically share the same values and professional opinions. 
These academ ics can be bet ter labelled as serial or professional 
commit tee members who can be characterised by the fact  they have sat , 
somet imes concurrent ly, on a range of government  advisory groups over 
the past  15 to 20 years, moving from one commit tee to another as soon 
as their appointment  ends. This feature of UK advisory commit tees 
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appeared to be well recognised by interviewees, with one (J) , a COT 
working group member, labelling these experts as ‘quangocrats’:  
 
“ it  is also t rue as with any quango, part icularly in this count ry, 
you are stuffing them with quangocrats, or regular at tendees 
of commit tees, who have got  the t ime, are bright  and talk a 
lot , and then you have problem of who are they 
represent ing?...There are many difficult ies there relat ing to a 
quite small pool of people who are knowledgeable and 
competent  at  such things”  (J)  COT Working Group Member  
 
I n addit ion to UK commitments, many of those interviewed also sit  on 
advisory groups within Europe and are professionally linked to each other 
through specialist  societ ies. I n this sense it  can be considered as a t ight  
knit  community, where despite a public move towards t ransparency in 
appointments, many commit tee members appear to be recruited as a 
result  of their  contact  with other members and an expression of shared 
values with the host  organisat ion. This can be seen in the following 
interview ext ract  with ACP member (L) :  
 
(L) :  How did I  get  on the ACP? I t  was suggested to me that  I  
apply to the advert , 
 
RD:  Who suggested that  to you? 
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(L) :  I  am  not  sure I  should say that  ( laughing) , several people 
I  guess, people in the Food Standards Agency who are 
involved and people on the ACP as well,  
 
Following the subm ission of an applicat ion form , potent ial members are 
interviewed by a panel ( typically comprised of specialist  non-government  
experts and members from government  departments and agencies such 
as Defra or the Food Standards Agency)  ostensibly to assess their 
technical competence in the area in which they have applied to represent . 
However, (L)  discussed this process not ing that  in their opinion the panel 
did not  have the necessary competence to assess a person’s technical 
capabilit y and that  “ it  was more to assess how you would work in a 
commit tee type environment  and the sort  of judgements you would 
make” . Such a statement  suggests that  there has been a degree of 
polit ical shaping to the Commit tee, with interviews used to sound out  
potent ial members’ decision-making thought  processes and value 
judgements. I n this sense, appoint ing those who publicly share an 
organisat ion’s and exist ing com mit tee members’ values is unlikely to 
disrupt  exist ing pract ices and may actually cement  the development  of 
groupthink;  exist ing m ethods of problem fram ing and conceptualisat ions 
of r isk are likely to remain unchallenged by new commit tee members.   
 
I t  was this percept ion of new appointees maintaining the status quo and a 
move by Ministers to widen the expert ise found within the ACP that  led to 
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arguably one of the most  content ious appointments64
 
 to the Commit tee in 
recent  history. This incident , which is discussed below can be seen as a 
clear case of failed boundary work where polit icians, in t rying to move 
into the scient ific terrain, actually reduced their own polit ical and scient ific 
credibilit y. Here in an at tempt  to increase the legit imacy of the ACP by 
deliberately int roducing new members with alternat ive scient ific expert ise 
and values, Ministerial intervent ion had the opposite effect , reducing the 
legit imacy of the Commit tee through underm ining the supposedly 
t ransparent  appointments process. The following provides an account  of 
the appointment . 
I n the early 2000s the ACP’s recruitment  st rategy appears to have been 
altered;  several mem bers appointed after this point  discussed that  in 
addit ion to their ‘technical’ interview they were asked to undertake a 
second interview with Michael Meacher, the then Minister of State for the 
Environment . This addit ional interview was viewed among exist ing 
members as cont roversial, as it  was perceived that  the Minister was 
overstepping the boundary of their polit ical role and illegit imately entering 
the scient ific domain. I nterview data from ACP members suggests that  
one appointment  in part icular proved incredibly divisive within the 
Commit tee;  one member had been granted membership at  the request  of 
the Minister, despite them ‘failing’ the technical interview:  
 
                                                 
64
  To maintain anonym ity appointees will not  be named – the appointee 
in quest ion is shown as X in the following quote, this is not  interviewee 
(X) . 
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“X was not  accepted technically, but  the Minister said “ I  don’t  
give a damn, you are st ill on that  comm it tee”  and Y65
 
 said 
“ you can’t  do that , it  is biased, it  is unfair, you can’t  put  your 
polit ical will on us”  and he said “well look, I  am  the Minister, I  
can do what  I  like” ”  (H)  ACP Member 
As can be seen in (H) ’s ext ract , other Commit tee members were 
uncomfortable with this appointment . I ndeed, several interviewees 
implied that  this appointment  was so content ious that  a number of 
members had threatened to resign over it .  I n general, members felt  that  
Ministerial interference underm ined the Commit tee’s credibilit y and 
threatened the legit imacy of the appointments process.   
 
This cr it icism  was not  lim ited to within the Commit tee and the 
appointment  was publicly condemned in a press statement  by Baroness 
Rennie Fritchie, the then Commissioner for Public Appointments. Baroness 
Fritchie described the appointment  as ‘unprecedented’, suggest ing that  it  
would “bring the appointment  system into disrepute”  as it  underm ined the 
work undertaken by government  departments, such as Defra, to increase 
t ransparency and openness in the appointment  system  (Hencke, 2003;  
Press Associat ion, 2003) .  However, Lord Whit ty, the junior environment  
m inister, who assisted Michael Meacher in the decision, stated that  the 
appointment  was “ totally just ified”  as a means of expanding the 
membership to include more environmentalists within the Commit tee 
(Press Associat ion, 2003) . This suggests that  the Minister at  the t ime felt  
                                                 
65
  Y was an exist ing member of the ACP at  the t ime of the appointment ;  
it  is not  a reference to interviewee (Y) .  
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that  the ACP had too narrow a base of expert  members and placed too 
lit t le considerat ion on the wider environmental and health issues 
associated with pest icide use.  
 
I ndeed, (N) , a dissent ing member of the ACP, argued that  it  was precisely 
because of concerns surrounding the ACP’s credibilit y that  the Minister 
had intervened and placed this member on the Commit tee. I n short , (N)  
suggests that  at  that  t ime (ear ly 2000s)  the Minister had doubts over the 
will and abilit y within the current  membership to reconsider current  
advice over the potent ial r isks of pest icides. I n part icular, (N) ’s response 
shown below indicates that  they believed that  the Minister felt  that  there 
was an unhelpful “ yes men”  culture within the ACP, whose shared 
understanding and conceptualisat ion of the r isk posed by pest icides acted 
to maintain the status quo rather than act ively challenge and quest ion the 
evidence presented:   
 
“Michael Meacher made a decision that  advisory commit tees 
should become more opposit ional rather than left  to the usual 
pairs of hands – so basically the yes men, so I  think one of the 
reasons that  happened was that  after BSE where they 
suddenly realised that  actually you know if you have got  an 
expert  commit tee of yes men, who are just  chosen because 
they agree along the same lines and you keep the status quo 
and then when things go wrong it  lands on the Minister’s desk, 
and the best  way of Ministers knowing earlier  is if they have a 
talking shop where people argue…so I  suspect  as part  of that  
process they would want  to have more people from shall we 
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say what  I  would call the m ore precaut ionary wing of 
environmental science on commit tees”  (N)  ACP Member 
 
(N) ’s account  shown above suggests that  Ministerial intervent ion was 
undertaken to create a more adversarial environment  within the 
Commit tee, where exist ing members’ views would be challenged and 
alternat ive, more precaut ionary based opinions would be considered. This 
opinion was shared by former ACP member ( I ) ,  who suggested that  a 
number of appointments had been made by Mr Meacher to encourage a 
more opposit ional approach. As we have seen, this move was not  
successful. 
 
I n the above I  have shown how the ACP has been variously described as 
a closed commit tee served by a small group of professional experts with 
shared values. The t ight  knit  community found within UK pest icide r isk 
advisory bodies has raised concerns surrounding the possibilit y of 
groupthink and shown how there is a percept ion that  members with 
alternat ive expert ise have found it  difficult  to challenge the dom inant  
discourse and inject  a more adversarial approach. 
 
However, the evidence presented here indicates that  at tempts to change 
the membership to achieve more precaut ionary object ives st ill need to 
achieve legit imacy, which requires a careful navigat ion of the 
science/ policy boundary, rather than a heavy-handed overstepping which 
can be easily represented as polit ical interference. Addit ionally, as 
Jasanoff (1990;  1997a)  has demonst rated in the US context , the 
adversarial approach is not  guaranteed to work as members often find it  
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increasingly difficult  to understand each other and interact  product ively. 
These ideas are explored further in the next  sect ion where I  consider how 
the ACP has handled internal dissensions from newer m embers who have 
been successfully int roduced to the Commit tee but  who have found it  
difficult  to be recognised as an expert .  
 
7 .4  W hat  happens w hen experts disagree? 
I n many instances in r isk assessment  commit tees unanimous decisions 
are not  possible as members may st rongly disagree over the 
interpretat ion of evidence. I n such cases, it  is often necessary for those 
disagreeing to issue m inority statements or reports out lining how their  
judgement  differs from the rest  of the group. However, some members of 
the ACP who have wanted to issue such statements expressed a difficulty 
in doing so, as in request ing this they are seen as overt ly challenging 
other members’ expert  judgement .  
 
This was discussed by (O) , a member of the ACP, in relat ion to their  
views on the RCEP Crop Spraying report :  
 
“ I  have been a m inorit y voice on that  report , and it  is difficult  
being a m inority voice when you are not  an expert ,”  (O)  ACP 
Member  
 
(O) ’s comment  that  it  is difficult  to be a m inority voice when you are not  
considered an expert  is important  as it  suggests the ACP has an expert ise 
hierarchy that  determ ines how credible a person’s judgement  is on a 
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part icular subject . I ndeed, the ACP has established formal rules about  the 
rem it  of members in relat ion to their expert ise stat ing that  it  considers it  
inappropriate for any member to authoritat ively speak on behalf of the 
Commit tee on issues outside of their own discipline. This view is 
epitom ised in the statement  below taken from the m inutes of the 307 th 
ACP meet ing, which suggests that  it  believes that  the credibilit y of the 
Commit tee may be at  r isk if members are seen to overstep their posit ion:  
 
The Chairman spoke to Members about  dealing with the 
media. He rem inded them that  while there was no problem in 
their speaking to the Press, they should make it  clear that  
they spoke personally and not  on behalf of the Commit tee…he 
then pointed out  that  as the membership of the Commit tee 
was in the public dom ain, it  was important  that  when making 
public statements about  pest icides, members did not  comment  
on scient ific issues which lay outside their individual area of 
expert ise. I f they did this, there was a danger to the scient ific 
credibilit y of the Commit tee. (Advisory Commit tee on 
Pest icides, 2004b, paragraph 10.1)  
 
This statement  reflects the widespread assumpt ion that  to be considered 
as both effect ive and high quality, advice issued by a collect ive body to 
government  must  necessarily be consensual – an assumpt ion that  
perpetuates the myth that  “science is one”  (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, 
p.11)  and serves to increase the difficulty for individual members to 
express views that  dissent  from the majority. To this end on the 
infrequent  occasions that  m inority statements are released by ACP 
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members it  is interest ing to note that  the individual mem ber’s role on the 
Commit tee is often highlighted. Given the previous statement , such 
ident ificat ion suggests that  the ACP use this pract ice to suggest  that  
dissent ing members should be ident ified as inexpert  in the mat ter in 
which they are comment ing on. An example of this can be seen in how 
the ACP managed one member’s m inority statement  in relat ion to the 
ACP’s assessment  of a pest icide literature review known as the Ontario 
Study.  
 
The Ontario study was a systemat ic review of epidem iological literature 
produced between 1990 and 2003 on the health effects of pest icides by 
the Ontario College of Fam ily Physicians (2004) . The report  indicated that  
there was evidence to suggest  that  there were in some cases links 
between pest icide exposure and adverse health effects, which included 
certain types of tumours and effects to the reproduct ive system. The 
report  was formally reviewed in 2004 by the ACP, which dism issed it  as:  
“ scient ifically weak, it s main flaw being to draw inappropriate conclusions 
and make impract ical recommendat ions for r isk management  on the basis 
of superficial considerat ion of an incomplete and biased select ion of the 
relevant  scient ific evidence”  (Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides, 2004a) .  
 
However, one member, Christopher Stopes -  appointed as an expert  in 
organic farm ing -  dissented from the ACP’s conclusions and issued his 
own response, which was published on the ACP’s website. Within this 
m inority statement  Mr Stopes acknowledges that  the Ontario report  
contained some flaws but  suggests that  these are not  sufficient  enough 
for the report  to be ent irely dism issed, as it  was by other ACP members. 
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I n his statement  Mr Stopes argues that  the ACP failed to adequately 
consider alternat ive views, which may hinder the formulat ion of future 
r isk management  st rategies. Again his statement  shown below suggests 
that  the ACP is reluctant  to consider evidence where there is difficulty 
establishing causal links between exposure and ill health:  
 
There may be valid cr it icisms to be made of the pest icides 
literature review of the Ontario College of Fam ily Physicians. 
Some of the relevant  points are out lined in the responses from 
the ACP. However, in my view, these are not  sufficient  to 
significant ly dim inish the relevance or importance of the 
Report , as is implied by the ACP statement ;  indeed I  believe 
there is much to commend in the Report . 
 
There is a range of views on the conclusions of the Report , and 
I  do not  agree with the statement  issued by the ACP. 
Alternat ive views are relevant  and in my view have not  been 
given adequate considerat ion. They may be very important  in 
formulat ing appropriate r isk management  st rategies to protect  
human health. 
 
I  concur with the conclusions of the response from the Ontario 
College of Fam ily Physicians to the ACP statement . “Overall we 
were saddened by the overwhelm ing negat ive tone of your 
cr it icisms. We can always demand bet ter reviews and bet ter 
evidence, but  we should ask ourselves whether this is the best  
way to move policy and pract ice towards more sustainable 
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approaches to human act ivity in the long- term” . (Mr Stopes -  
Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides, 2004c)  
 
To accompany Mr Stopes’ statement  the following writ ten comment  was 
posted on the ACP website by the then Chairman:  
 
[ Mr Stopes’]  differences of opinion relate to technical aspects 
of epidem iology and the interpretat ion of epidem iological data. 
I t  is important  to note, therefore, that  the original ACP 
statement  was agreed by all of the members appointed to the 
Commit tee for their expert ise in epidem iology, medicine and 
toxicology. Furthermore, it  was only agreed after independent  
advice had been obtained from five other epidem iologists. 
(Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides, 2004c)  
 
I n the above statement  the Chairman effect ively reduces Mr Stopes’ 
credibilit y in two ways. First , it  is highlighted that  the original ACP 
posit ion was taken following advice from both internal and external 
experts, suggest ing that  it s own judgement  is one considered appropriate 
by other recognised experts. Secondly, Mr Stopes’ credibilit y is further 
reduced through the suggest ion that  this disagreement  is effect ively in an 
area that  Mr Stopes, as an organic farm ing expert , is unqualified to draw 
any expert  conclusions on. Hence his m inorit y statement  should not  be 
allowed to underm ine the official posit ion of the ACP as it  is based on an 
incomplete understanding of the evidence.  
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This incident  was commented on during an interview with former ACP 
member ( I ) ,  who reiterated that  Mr Stopes was unqualified to com ment  
on this area. I n the excerpt  below ( I )  is referr ing to those members who 
had been appointed due to Ministerial intervent ion:   
 
“well some of them were appointed as experts but  experts in, 
not  in the areas that  they were comment ing on, that  is for 
certain, so we had an expert  in organic farm ing who was 
comment ing on and disagreeing with the external 
epidem iologist  about  the interpretat ion of epidem iological 
evidence, well he is ent it led to do that  but  when you report  
the disagreement , you have to make clear that  the person 
who is disagreeing is not  appointed as an expert  in toxicology 
or epidem iology”  ( I )  Former ACP Member   
 
The pract ice within the ACP of encouraging members to only comment  on 
areas related to their specialised expert ise was picked up by the RCEP in 
its recent  report  on crop spraying. Here the RCEP crit icised this approach 
suggest ing that  in privileging certain forms of expert ise in r isk 
discussions, other equally legit im ate views, such as those held by lay 
members, would be excluded:  
 
Such an approach also calls into quest ion the value of 
deliberat ion in scient ific commit tees and the role of lay 
members, if expert ise is always to be privileged in this way. 
(Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion, 2005, p.83)   
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I n sum, the capacity for wider engagement  with different  sources and 
forms of expert ise is dim inished in this case by the adherence to the ACP 
norm  of present ing assessment  findings and advice as being consensually 
agreed and derived using the most  relevant  expert ise. This perpetuates 
the mythical not ion of science as speaking with one voice (Collingridge 
and Reeve, 1986) . Some mem bers within the ACP, who represent  
m inority specialisms within the group, have therefore found it  difficult  to 
challenge the dom inant  discourse and publicly express their own views. 
Where members have issued m inority statements, the ACP typically 
handles dissent  through distancing opposing members’ views from the 
major ity by st ressing the differences in expert ise and claim ing epistem ic 
authority in the mat ter by aligning the majority view with other external 
experts who share the expert ise of the majority.  
 
Such privileging of expert ise has been previously cr it icised by the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollut ion which has suggested that  such an 
approach acts to reduce the value of lay input  into r isk discussions, an 
issue that  I  turn to in the next  sect ion. 
 
7 .5  W idening part icipat ion and lay m em bership 
So far, I  have exam ined the difficult ies faced by at tempts to widen the 
range of expert ise in advisory commit tees in the case of pest icide r isk 
assessment . I n this sect ion, I  explore a second aspect  of post -BSE 
changes in the organisat ion of advice, namely, the inclusion of ‘lay’ 
representat ives on commit tees in a further at tempt  to widen part icipat ion.   
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The democrat isat ion of advisory expert ise is an area that  has not  only 
been crit ically exam ined within STS but  in turn has been influenced by 
this growing body of academ ic research. For example, those such as I rwin 
(2006, p.300)  have highlighted that  even the most  “ science-cent red 
government  report  is incomplete without  a sect ion on ‘public 
engagement ’” . However, in a discussion paper exploring the move 
towards wider part icipat ion in r isk regulat ion and policy, Rothstein (2003)  
concludes that  although widening part icipat ion may increase public 
confidence in a regulatory regime, “broadening part icipat ion per se does 
not  necessarily produce more dem ocrat ic or robust  policy outcomes than 
closed processes” . I rwin (2006)  has also suggested that  there is a lack of 
clar ity surrounding widening part icipat ion, which has resulted in a 
discursive st ruggle emerging around what  counts as “ legit imate talk”  and 
how talk should be const ructed within public engagement . I n part icular, 
I rwin ( ibid)  highlights how the twin goals of consensus building and the 
call for the greater involvement  of ‘innocent ’ cit izens, as opposed to 
act ivists have created tensions and an often simplist ic homogenised view 
of the public. 
 
I n the following I  explore the role of lay members within pest icide 
advisory groups and how they are conceptualised by both themselves and 
other ‘expert ’ commit tee members.  
 
7 .5 1  The role of lay m em bers w ithin com m it tees 
As I  have previously shown in this chapter, many members of the ACP 
argue that  the issues they consider are so technical that  highly specialised 
273 
expert ise is essent ial for making judgements that  m ight  be considered 
legit imate. I ndeed, several stated that  some issues were so technical 
even other experts/ scient ists outside the discipline in quest ion were not  
qualified to comments with any authority:  
 
“a lot  of the issues that  we were considering were really quite 
technical and there tends to be only one or two members of 
the Commit tee who really have the expert ise to pronounce 
with any authority on those issues, somet imes when it  is down 
to very few people with expert ise we will get  external advice 
as well,  because it  is bad pract ice to have decisions driven 
ent irely by one person,”  ( I )  Former ACP Member  
 
The above statement  is t roubling for two reasons. First , if taken at  face 
value then it  raises clear quest ions over the ut ilit y of including those 
without  expert  knowledge in advisory commit tees, as they will be unable 
to fully comprehend the evidence which they are being asked to assess. 
Secondly, if taken as a reflect ion of how commit tee members 
conceptualise r isk assessment , then it  suggests that  those without  formal 
t raining or specific expert ise are likely to be left  out  of discussions, with 
their views deemed illegit imate by other expert  members.  
 
By cont rast , a number of stakeholders outside of the ACP advisory 
system, in part icular those belonging to NGOs or specialisms not  typically 
represented within the Commit tee, advocated the inclusion of lay 
members in r isk discussions, as it  was viewed that  decisions are not  
wholly scient ific but  also incorporate values and polit ics. For example, 
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while (P) , an academ ic m ixtures toxicologist , recognised the need for the 
inclusion of those with technical expert ise they also advocated wider 
part icipat ion and suggested that  when decisions affect  m illions of people 
it  is very arrogant  of scient ists to think that  they alone should make the 
decisions. Sim ilar ly, (Y) , a staff member from the Pest icide Act ion 
Network (PAN)  spoke of how they were often cr it ical of the lack of wider 
part icipat ion and the dom inance of technocrats, when many r isk decisions 
are in fact  polit ical in nature and so should be open to wider discussion:  
 
 “we are very cr it ical that  a lot  of those decisions are made 
purely by technocrats and it  is often expressed in way that  
these issues are far too complicated for the lay person to 
understand, but  not  if it  is a polit ical decision and so we would 
like to have much more t ransparency and more appropriate 
part icipat ion of public interest  groups”  (Y)  PAN Staff Member 
 
(Y)  went  on to suggest  that  appointment  of lay members can be very 
tokenist ic as they are often excluded from the discussions because the 
issues are frequent ly presented in a way that  is unintelligible to the lay-
person, a tact ic that  (Y)  joked was used to discourage part icipat ion:  
 
“ I t  can be very token because if you are going to do that  and 
you are also going to have discussions about  quite technical 
things you really need a facilitator there who can t ranslate 
some of that  language so that  a lay person can understand 
what  these issues are, so if you don’t  have that  you can either 
invite them  and they can’t  follow it  so they don’t  come again, 
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well may be that  is actually the purpose”  (Y)  PAN Staff 
Member  
 
The perceived necessity for high level scient ific detail in advisory 
commit tees was widely discussed by advisory members who largely took 
the view, as is demonst rated by COT member (F)  below, that  it  is often 
impossible to take a highly technical subject  and present  it  at  a level that  
can be understood by the general public:  
 
“ you can’t  take a highly technical subject  [ Toxicology]  and 
make it  all completely understandable by I  think they say a 
level suitable for a twelve year old, that  would be 
inappropriate because you couldn’t  communicate some of the 
technicalit ies”   (F)  COT Working Group Member  
 
However others outside of the advisory process, such as academ ic 
toxicologist  (P) , suggested that  if the public or the lay commit tee 
members do not  understand then the scient ists or experts are not  doing 
their job properly.  
 
Those sit t ing within advisory com mit tees typically regarded the presence 
of lay mem bers in three non-exclusive ways:  first , that  their presence 
was an irr itant  as it  dumbed down discussion and suggested that  they as 
experts could not  be t rusted;  secondly, that  they were helpful in assist ing 
the experts consider issues from a consumer perspect ive;  thirdly, that  
they were welcome as it  highlighted to a wider audience the hard work 
and effort  that  is input ted by expert  members. I n all categories lay 
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members, although appointed members of the commit tees, were 
presented as being outside the actual decision making process, which was 
viewed as the preserve of experts. Examples of these types of 
categorisat ions are shown below. 
 
Several interviewees made reference to the fact  that  the presence of lay 
members acted to reduce the number of experts present  and that  lay 
members often did not  understand what  was being discussed within a 
commit tee. As such discussions often had to be held at  a simpler level 
than they otherwise would be to ensure that  all members understood the 
debate. However, although this proved to be an irr itant  for some, others 
could see that  it  somet imes prom pted the experts to be more art iculate 
and exact  in what  they were saying. For example, the excerpt  from COT 
working group member (J)  below is indicat ive of what  other advisory body 
members discussed in relat ion to the role of lay members:   
 
“ I t  has undoubtedly had drawbacks as it  has reduced the 
number of technical experts on the Commit tee in order to 
maintain the numbers, it  can lower the level of discussion to 
an extent  because you have to explain things far more clearly, 
that  can be an advantage as people have to be far more 
certain in making their statements or claim s at  a technical 
level, it  should increase public confidence, I  don’t  think it  has 
but  I  think that  is a failure in how advice is presented…it  is 
also a problem of the self-select ion, the people who have 
applied to go on to these commit tees by and large are those 
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not  just  with a genuine interest  but  those who have an axe to 
grind,”  (J)  COT Working Group Member 
 
The lat ter part  of the (J) ’s comments reflected a com mon percept ion 
among advisory group members, that  the lay people who were appointed 
often applied to join because they had some sort  of m ission that  they 
wanted to accomplish whilst  on the commit tee. I n this sense, many 
members, such as ACP member (X) , described how although they saw no 
need for lay members, their presence was tolerated as long as these 
members were ‘sensible’ and apolit ical. Here, as in (J) ’s comment  shown 
previously, the presence of lay members was seen by (X)  as a method 
used by government  to raise public confidence in advisory body decision-
making. I nterest ingly, (X) ’s comments also reflect  the previous discussion 
shown in 7.3 where it  was highlighted that  members often have large 
demands made on their t ime with lit t le financial reward. I ndeed, many 
interviewees, such as (X)  presented their commit tee roles in an alt ruist ic 
light , feeling that  it  was their duty as experts to give something back and 
make full use of their professional knowledge:  
 
“ I  think it  is fine provided that  you have sensible lay members 
who don’t  have an axe to grind, I  mean provided that  they can 
see that  we are doing the best  we can with the informat ion , 
but  it  is a modern t rend and I  am  sure we would funct ion just  
the same if we didn’t  have lay m embers, I  think you have to 
respect  professional integrity, I  mean we aren’t  doing it  for the 
money because the money is pathet ic, you know it  is a huge 
amount  of t ime so people are only there because the
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they ought  to be there, so I  actually think it  makes no 
difference but  I  think it  does from the external percept ion”  (X)  
ACP Member 
 
Sim ilar to (X) , COT member (T)  spoke of how they had experienced lay 
members get t ing in the way of discussions, sidet racking members 
through raising issues that  were in their opinion simply not  relevant . Like 
ACP member (X) , (T)  draws characterisat ions of the lay mem bers, 
labelling the ‘good’ ones as those who keep quiet  during the scient ific 
discussions in which they are perceived by other members to have no 
expert ise in:  
 
“ somet imes the lay person doesn’t  understand the issue and if 
that  happens then those people don’t  tend to stay on the 
commit tee very long, and they don’t  even represent  the 
general public very well because it  is alm ost  as if they haven’t  
really understood what  the commit tee is t rying to do, where as 
the good ones or the helpful ones keep quiet  during the 
scient ific discussions but  when it  comes to the decisions, when 
it  comes to expressing it ,  making sure it  is forceful enough or 
simple enough then they are very helpful, and picking up on 
social aspects which perhaps the scient ists have not  really 
thought  of,”  (T)  COT Working Group Member  
 
However, (T) ’s final point  indicates the areas in which lay members were 
widely considered to be useful by their expert  counterparts, namely, 
raising social or consumer aspects and helping the experts communicate 
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more effect ively. This lat ter point  was very prevalent  throughout  
interviews with advisory body members. Lay members were typically 
viewed by other members as being there to flag up those areas that  
required addit ional explanat ion, as (F) , a member of COT stated:  
 
“ [ having lay members]  has been very useful in understanding 
how to communicate and how much detail and t ransparency is 
required, so we think we are being t ransparent  but  in actual 
fact  we are being very technical and so it  is not  t ransparent  to 
anybody, well except  another expert , but  some of them will 
say in no uncertain terms “ this is just  gobbledy gook to us, 
you have to re-write it  so people can understand it ” , and that  
has been very helpful”  (F)  COT Working Group Member  
 
However, (F)  went  further and stated that  the usefulness of lay mem bers 
was also in the fact  that  they could feedback their experience to the 
public and highlight  how seriously the expert  members took their role and 
how hard commit tee members work to ensure the r ight  decisions are 
made. Again the lay members are presented as being external to the 
actual decision-making process:  
 
“ I  think lay members have generally come to appreciate the 
extent  to which the commit tees deliberate the issues and how 
seriously they t reat  it  and how thoroughly they go through the 
data, which maybe, well I  don’t  know what  they thought  but  
some of them have said to me afterwards we are really 
surprised at  what  lengths you guys are going to, to reach a 
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conclusion on this, so I  think that  has been beneficial,”  (F)  
COT Working Group Member 
 
However, how far lay members can really report  back to wider publics is,  
when considering the evidence I  collected, debatable. For example, many 
commit tee discussions, such as those held during ACP meet ings, although 
m inuted, are closed to the public due to commercial sensit iv ity. Other 
meet ings such as those held by the WiGRAMP were organised according 
to Chatham House rules, indicat ing that  no member should direct ly 
divulge what  was discussed during a meet ing. I t  is therefore unclear in 
what  capacity lay members can act ively talk about  their role. This is 
especially t rue for lay members present  in commit tees such as the ACP, 
where as previously discussed all members are act ively discouraged from 
publicly speaking on behalf of the Commit tee in areas outside of their 
expert ise. One ACP member (O)  discussed this, detailing that  they saw 
their role as a lay member as being to comment  on the process of 
decision-making rather than the decisions themselves, i.e., as a 
procedural expert :  
 
“Well it  is being a sort  of go between if you like, between the 
experts and the public, and you are supposed to represent  the 
lay view and or communicate to the public, but  there is a 
m iddle way, which is in other words being like an observer, 
because I  m ight  not  know all the expert ise that  goes on, but  I  
can comment  on the process”  (O)  ACP Member  
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7 .5 2  The paradox of the expert  lay m em ber  
As I  have noted throughout  the thesis many lay members are not  simply 
just  members of the public but  are staff of NGOs or other interested 
consumer groups. I n this sense the boundaries of their roles are often 
blurred as they are expected to act  as lay m embers when in fact  they 
may possess considerable expert ise or authority in a part icular area. I n 
this sense, if we were to apply Collins and Evans’ (2002)  classificat ion, 
many lay members can be considered as possessing interact ional 
expert ise and those have been t rained and previously pract iced as 
scient ists could even be described as possessing cont r ibutory  expert ise;  
both characterisat ions call into quest ion the legit imacy of appoint ing them 
as ‘lay’.  I ndeed, their expert ise and authority is often the reason why 
they have been asked to join a commit tee in the first  place.  
 
This recognit ion that  lay members are often not  lay in the st r ictest  sense 
has been widely discussed by others such as Eden (2005)  and Yearley 
(1992 -b)  – see Chapter Two -  whose research on NGOs indicates that  far 
from  being just  consumers of science many NGO staff produce, consume 
and publish scient ific research. These conclusions are supported by this 
research. For example, many of those that  I  spoke with working within 
NGOs discussed how they and their colleagues had science t raining and 
pract ical work experience. However, although staffs were often t rained as 
scient ists they typically did not  carry out  pr imary or field research. 
I nstead, they saw their role as synthesisers of other’s research with the 
intent ion of drawing conclusions and providing “ independent  informat ion 
on pest icides for governments and decision m akers, researchers, media, 
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concerned cit izens and other interested groups”  (Pest icide Act ion 
Network, 2005a) .  
 
The fact  that  many lay members interviewed had scient ific t raining was 
seen as an advantage by them, with several suggest ing that  it  gave them 
or their organisat ion credibilit y within the pest icide community. For 
example, (Y)  from the Pest icide Act ion Network, spoke of how they 
believed PAN’s credibilit y was based on both the quality of their 
informat ion and the expert ise of their staff:  
 
“ I  think in more general terms our credibilit y is really based on 
the informat ion that  we have and the fact  that  we are not  
scream ing lunat ics, we are not  radicals saying you have to 
stop using pest icides tomorrow and that  we realise that  there 
is a long way to go, and that  the quality of us is in our 
informat ion and the people that  work here and their expert ise 
and background, this all adds to our credibilit y”  (Y)  PAN Staff 
Member 
 
However, despite many NGO staff members, and in part icular those that  
are chosen to become members of advisory groups, possessing such skills 
they are often not  recognised as having expert ise by other commit tee 
members or those assembling the commit tees. This suggests that  there is 
some confusion as to their role;  they are not  considered to be experts yet  
at  the same t ime cannot  be st r ict ly categorised as lay as they possess 
somet imes considerable subject  knowledge, certainly far more than an 
average or disinterested member of the public. PAN staff member (Y)  
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spoke of this paradox, detailing how although members of PAN were often 
asked to join pest icide advisory commit tees because of their subject  
knowledge, they were asked not  as experts but  as public representat ives. 
This suggests that  not  only are NGOs and interested consumer groups 
conceptualised by government  as represent ing the views of the general 
public, but  that  real ‘layness’ -  a complete lack of t raining or knowledge of 
the area -  is not  valued within government  advisory commit tees in this 
field.  
 
This suggest ion can be seen in an ext ract  from  (K) , a senior toxicologist  
at  the Pest icide Safety Directorate (PSD) , who spoke of how Peter 
Beaumont , a previous PAN staff member, had joined the WiGRAMP group 
as a lay member as opposed to an expert  from  a pressure group:  
 
“ I  think WiGRAMP had a good range of backgrounds and  yes 
you had classical toxicologists but  you had stat ist icians, Peter 
Beaumont  was there not  necessarily as a pressure group but  
as a lay member,”  (K)  Senior PSD Toxicologist   
 
The use of expert  lay members was also discussed by lay ACP member 
(O) , who noted that  the ambiguity in their role could lead to confusion 
during commit tee discussions as it  was unclear in which areas of 
discussion they should be involving themselves in:  
 
“ I  do have a specific problem in that  having been appointed as 
a lay person I  am  actually a bit  of an expert , r ight? So I  am  
lit t le bit  uncertain of my ground, cause I  am  not  lay but  I  am 
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called a lay member, but  when as I  was actually recruited as a 
lay member, they wanted somebody who was going to 
understand what  was going on”  (O)  ACP Member  
 
I nterest ingly, not  only do (O) ’s comments suggest  that  like those 
appointed for their expert ise, lay appointments are also polit ically shaped 
and involve the matching of individuals’ social values to those of the 
Commit tee, they also provide an explanat ion as to why certain types of 
lay members are more likely to recruited. This explanat ion appears to be 
linked to comments previously discussed regarding other commit tee 
members’ percept ions of lay mem bers;  that  they are frequent ly seen as 
having an axe to grind or that  their presence is an irr itant  as they do not  
understand the issues being discussed. (O) ’s comments therefore suggest  
that  part icular types of lay people are recruited precisely because they 
are not  lay and so can therefore, at  least  in principle, act ively part icipate 
in the ‘expert ’ discussions. I ndeed, this research suggests that  within the 
pest icide r isk advisory area, lay members, like the experts, are often 
drawn from a small pool of people who can be more accurately described 
as “professional lay people” , who as several interviewees noted move 
from one commit tee to another. For example, PAN staff member (Q)  
discussed how they are invited to sit  on a variety of commit tees because 
of their knowledge of the area:  
 
“we sit  on quite a lot  of them, so we go to the pest icide forum, 
the voluntary init iat ive steering group and various other 
groups such as the PRC…we are invited on because we are 
recognised as the knowledgeable expert  in the area of 
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pest icides, so we are invited to sit  on these things and be 
encouraged, often to be the sort  of cont rary voice if you like”  
(Q)  PAN Staff Member  
 
I t  was this type of lay member that  was typically seen among interviewed 
‘expert ’ members as being the most  useful type of lay person as they 
were considered as being able to understanding the science:  
 
“ that  is why I  say that  there are these professional ones who 
get  used to the other scient ists and they may have a scient ific 
background themselves or they know about  the science a bit ,  
so some lay people are more use than others,”  (T)  COT 
Working Group Member 
 
Another reason given by ‘expert ’ members as to why these types of 
expert  lay members were most  useful was that  the process of being on a 
commit tee was widely viewed as a learnt  skill.  For example, (J) , a 
member of the Commit tee on Toxicity (COT) , wished that  “we had some 
means of teaching people how to be a member of a technical advisory 
commit tee” . Likewise, (T) , a member of the COT described how the lay 
members who they felt  made the most  impact  within the Commit tee were 
those who understood the process, which (T)  argued could take several 
years:  
 
“ I  mean there is this fam iliar isat ion process, you really need a 
term  or three years or something before you get  used to a 
commit tee, and maybe they are so fam iliar with it  that  they 
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know what  to say that  will make an impact , and so they are 
influencing change,”  (T)  COT Working Group Member  
 
To summarise, I  have shown that  there are tensions in the appointment  
and use of lay members within pest icide advisory commit tees. While they 
are often publicly appointed to act  as the innocent  public ( I rwin, 2006)  
they can frequent ly be characterised as possessing interact ional and 
somet imes even cont r ibutory  expert ise (Collins and Evans, 2002) . 
I ndeed, they often appear to be selected specifically because of these 
at t r ibutes.  
 
7 .6  Sum m ary 
I n describing the symbiot ic relat ionship between science and polit ics 
Mukerj i (1989)  has highlighted how government  officials are able to 
legit im ise their decision-making through present ing them as being based 
on expert ise. I n the UK, since the 1960s expert  advisory commit tees have 
been used to supply the specialist  expert ise that  was seen as lacking 
within the civil service, who due to resourcing issues could only be viewed 
as embodying more generalist  skills – see Chapter Four for further detail.     
 
However, as I  have shown throughout  this thesis the area of pest icide r isk 
assessment  and management  is complex and tensions remain between 
those experts who value specialist  knowledge and those who place value 
on the capacity to engage across different  sources of knowledge in r isk 
assessment . I n the words of Jasanoff (1997a) , it  is therefore not  enough 
for the government  to simply appoint  “ the great  and the good”  in order to 
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create legit imacy in r isk decision-making. Coupled with the t radit ional 
reliance on specialist  scient ific expert ise I  have discussed that  there has 
been a move towards wider inclusion and the use of lay members, which 
was shown to create tension within commit tees due to differences in how 
their role is understood and how their knowledge is conceptualised by 
other members.  
 
At  the beginning of this chapter I  argued that  despite a move towards 
wider engagement  and recognit ion among some advisors that  new 
developments in pest icide r isk assessment  are likely to reduce the need 
for the more t radit ional toxicological expert ise, the r ight  type of expert ise 
has remained narrowly defined within the Advisory Commit tee on 
Pest icides (ACP) .  I n part icular, I  illust rated using interview data that  the 
major ity of those working within the ACP believed that  certain types of 
formal expert ise were necessary to understand and effect ively assess the 
often complex informat ion found within the pest icide r isk literature. The 
expert ise that  appeared to be most  highly valued among this group was 
shown to be toxicological;  a finding that  suggests the historic pr ivileging 
of toxicologists in the pest icide regulatory community persists with the 
effect  that  other forms of expert ise are either excluded from or play only 
a m inor role in the ACP’s discussions. 
 
The emphasis the ACP place on a focussed cont r ibutory style expert ise, as 
embodied in toxicologists, can be seen as a direct  cont rast  to the nature 
of expert ise in the Royal Comm ission on Environmental Pollut ion (RCEP)  – 
a body I  have previously shown the ACP to be cr it ical of. The RCEP argues 
that  to t ruly understand and manage r isk there needs to be a move 
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towards more diverse advisory membership that  includes alternat ive 
specialisms to facilitate a broader and more holist ic considerat ion of a 
topic. I n this sense the st ructure and framework of the RCEP encourages 
a more conscious discursive expert , one who is aware of the wider picture 
and willing to talk around a subject . However, the evidence presented 
within this chapter suggests that  such a move will be difficult  while bodies 
such as the ACP view the use of very specialist  members as a st rength 
and more diverse membership as problemat ic in solving complex r isk 
quest ions. At  the heart  of the mat ter is the quest ion of whether to be 
effect ive you require cont r ibutory or interact ional expert ise or a hybrid of 
both? This quest ion has been previously discussed within the STS 
literature with Jasanoff arguing that :  “The most  valued expert  is one who 
not  only t ranscends disciplinary boundaries and synthesises knowledge 
from several fields but  also understands the lim its of regulatory science 
and the policy issues confront ing the agency”  (Jasanoff, 1990, p.243) . 
 
Such a statement  would on the face of it  appear to favour the model 
proposed by the RCEP. However, while the ACP have been externally 
cr it icised by the RCEP, NGOs and some Ministers for their narrow focus 
and unwillingness to consider the new, the RCEP have been crit icised by 
the ACP and other government  departments for failing to fully recognise 
the policy issues surrounding pest icide r isk and for present ing impract ical 
advice that  was widely considered to be not  only undesirable but  also 
unachievable within the current  regulatory framework. There are 
therefore difficult ies in extending Jasanoff’s model of the ideal form  of 
advisory expert ise in pract ice. 
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To understand the at tempts to t ransform  the ACP, the appointment  
system was exam ined and it  was found that  advisory bodies such as the 
ACP are populated by a small number of professional experts or 
‘quangocrats’. I n part icular, despite a supposedly t ransparent  
appointment  framework there remains a percept ion by some government  
staffs, NGOs and even a m inority of ACP members that  groups such as 
the ACP are dom inated by a small group of scient ists, who share a sim ilar 
value system and whose judgements can be difficult  to challenge by those 
who are not  considered to have the appropriate expert ise. I  suggested 
that  this situat ion may be linked to a desire within the ACP to present  
assessment  findings and advice as being consensually agreed and derived 
using the most  relevant  specialist  expert ise. I n an at tempt  to diversify the 
ACP membership and address the perceived issue of groupthink, 
Ministerial intervent ion had been used;  however, this was shown to be 
problemat ic as it  raised quest ions surrounding the legit imacy of the 
appointment  process 
 
Post -BSE there has been a public move within government  to ensure that  
decisions surrounding r isk and advice are not  only t ransparent  but  include 
the input  of non-experts or lay people. However, using the evidence 
presented I  argued that  there are tensions surrounding not  only the role 
of lay people on commit tees but  whether such people can actually be 
considered as lay at  all.  Those sit t ing within pest icide advisory 
commit tees were shown to typically regard the presence of lay members 
in three non-exclusive ways:  first , that  their presence was an irr itant  as it  
dumbed down discussion and suggested that  they as experts could not  be 
t rusted;  secondly, that  they were helpful in assist ing the experts consider 
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issues from a consumer perspect ive;  thirdly, that  they were welcome as it  
highlighted to a wider audience the hard work of the expert  members. I n 
all categories lay mem bers, although appointed members were presented 
as being outside of the decision-making process, which was viewed as the 
preserve as experts.  
 
A key concern that  was raised by ‘expert ’ commit tee m embers regarding 
the presence of lay members was that  they are not  equipped to 
understand the often highly technical debates;  as such their appointment  
was frequent ly perceived by both expert  and lay members to be tokenist ic 
and often resented by those appointed for their technical expert ise. 
I ndeed, there was a suggest ion made by some ACP commit tee members 
that  some issues discussed in meet ings were so technical that  even 
scient ists with expert ise in alternat ive academ ic disciplines were not  
qualified to comment  with any authority. This raises the quest ion of 
whether advisory commit tees not  only need to consider diversity between 
subject  areas but  also within, e.g., through the recruitment  of mult iple 
members from the same discipline to encourage a more adversarial and 
democrat ic discussion of the issues and r isk assessment  literature.   
 
Hoffman (2003) , has argued that  experts will often use technical jargon, 
which acts not  only to exclude the lay com munity in discussions of r isk 
but  also as a form  of epistem ic hegemony that  devalues certain forms of 
knowledge (Adorno et  al. ,  1976) . However, research undertaken by 
Wynne (1982;  1996)  indicates that  lay knowledge is often of cr it ical 
importance in situat ions of scient ific uncertainty;  filling exist ing 
knowledge gaps and raising quest ions overlooked by experts. The 
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research that  I  have presented indicates that  lay members in this area 
were most  valued by other commit tee members not  for their abilit y to fill 
knowledge gaps but  for their abilit y to provide a consumer perspect ive 
that  may be lost  in very technical debates.   
 
However, the findings I  present  suggest  that  there is often a paradox in 
the appointment  of lay members, as although appointed as lay they often 
possess considerable expert ise. I ndeed, they often appear to be selected 
specifically because of these at t r ibutes, as there is recognit ion that  
membership of advisory commit tees requires certain skills that  would be 
absent  in the ‘innocent ’ cit izen ( I rwin, 2006) . Certainly, the lay mem bers 
of the pest icide comm it tees that  were interviewed as part  of this research 
were not  lay in the sense of Wynne’s (1996)  sheep farmers. They often 
possessed relevant  formal qualif icat ions and t raining and in other 
situat ions they would be described as expert  – although they often were 
not  recognised as such within the commit tee st ructure. The labelling of 
lay thus seemed to be applied to either dist inguish their expert ise as 
separate to the rest  of the group, i.e., to highlight  they were not  for 
example a pract ising toxicologist , or to reduce their abilit y to impact  on 
discussions.  
 
Many of those that  were included as lay members were often employees 
of NGOs working in pest icide related fields. Previously, it  has been argued 
that  while NGOs can be ident ified as organisat ionally different  from  
‘unorganised’ cit izens (Breckenridge, 1999) , they are included in policy-
making exercises not  because they possess expert ise, but  because they 
represent  a part icular value system that  is shared by their members. I n 
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this sense, they are not  viewed as experts but  as representat ives of 
public groups or movements. This view was seen in this research where it  
was found that  many NGO members, despite having scient ific 
qualificat ions and subject  expert ise, were asked to join commit tees to 
represent  the view of the wider non-expert  public. Addit ionally, there was 
a percept ion among members interviewed that  they should feedback their  
role to the public. However, I  quest ioned to what  extent  this is possible 
given the st r ict  codes of conduct  that  members must  adhere to in respect  
of confident ialit y. I t  would therefore be easy as I rwin (2006, p.316)  has 
previously suggested to conclude that  “ there is lit t le evidence that  public 
talk has brought  about  a wider cultural and inst itut ional t ransformat ion” . 
However, the evidence presented here suggests that  such a conclusion 
does not  reflect  the nuance of the situat ion;  although wider part icipat ion 
in the field of pest icide r isk assessment  appears from this analysis to be 
lim ited in scope, it  can st ill be described as a progression from previous 
models. However, unt il alternat ive forms of expert ise are recognised as 
legit imate this research suggests that  it  will remain difficult  for those 
outside of the dom inant  expert  group to make any real impact  in 
commit tees such as the ACP. 
 
 
293 
Chapter 8 : Conclusion 
8 .1  I nt roduct ion 
I n this thesis I  have exam ined how the scient ific advisory system in 
England and Wales has responded to concerns about  the r isks of pest icide 
residues in food and demands for wider engagement  in the formulat ion of 
advice. Specifically, I  have explored how the Advisory Commit tee on 
Pest icides (ACP)  frames and manages scient ific uncertaint ies in r isk 
assessment , and why some bodies outside and within government  are 
cr it ical of the ACP’s approach that  is cent red in the convent ional single-
chem ical, high-dose- response paradigm of toxicology. Although some of 
these challenges date back to the early history of pest icide regulat ion in 
England and Wales, the emergence of scient ific research employing newer 
methods to assess the effects of chem ical m ixtures and chronic low- level 
exposure has st imulated new concerns about  the r isks posed by pest icide 
residues for human health.   
 
I n at tempt ing to explain how the ACP is able to bracket  the majority of 
these challenges, I  have drawn on literature from the field of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS)  to make three key arguments. First , it  is 
perceived by the ACP and some other government  advisory bodies that  
change is unnecessary since established methods of pest icide r isk 
assessment  represent  an exemplar for other domains. Secondly, the 
select ion of evidence by the ACP and other related com mit tees such as 
the Commit tee on Toxicity (COT) , is profoundly shaped by prior 
regulatory guidelines that  in providing standardisat ion and quality 
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assurance act  to frame advisory judgements and const rain the select ion 
of r isk assessment  studies that  are considered as adm issible. Thirdly, 
fundamentally different  not ions are at  play in terms of what  const itutes 
legit imate expert ise and who should embody it .  
 
All three arguments have implicat ions for the two major t rends which 
provided the background to my research, i.e., post -BSE at tempts to make 
the role of scient ific advice in Brit ish policy-making more t ransparent , 
part icipatory and ‘evidence-based’ and, the at tempt  to int roduce new 
paradigms of chem ical r isk assessment  in the advisory process. I  shall 
explore these themes further in this concluding chapter. 
 
I n sect ion 8.2, I  summarise the analysis and main findings presented in 
each of the previous chapters and highlight  some of the difficult ies 
encountered in conduct ing this research. I n sect ions 8.3 and 8.4, I  
explore the policy implicat ions of this research and possible areas for 
further inquiry. 
 
8 .2  Sum m ary of findings 
I n this sect ion I  will review and summarise the key arguments made in 
each chapter and consider how this research has addressed the overall 
aim  of understanding:  How are the twin challenges posed by changes in 
the organisat ion of the Brit ish advisory system and by emerging scient ific 
uncertaint ies in the chem ical r isk assessm ent  m anaged in the case of r isk 
assessm ent  of pest icide residues, and to what  effect?  
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I n the int roductory chapter I  set  out  why I  had chosen pest icide residues 
as a case study, highlight ing the complexity found in pest icide r isk 
assessment  and regulat ion. Specifically, I  discussed how although the 
process of assessing r isk from single chem ical substances is considered 
by those working in the field to be well established and robust , other 
chem ical related r isks such as those created from exposure to chem ical 
m ixtures are increasingly recognised within the scient ific and policy 
literature as being less well understood;  often being characterised by a 
high degree of uncertainty (van Zorge, 1996;  Weinhold, 2003;  Wharfe et  
al. ,  2004) . I ndeed, I  illust rated that  previous assumpt ions, made by both 
scient ists and regulators, suggest ing that  exposure to low- levels of 
chem ical m ixtures are unproblemat ic to human health are being 
challenged by NGOs and some scient ists, with newer research that  often 
ut ilises novel or non-validated toxicological methods now beginning to 
suggest  that  interact ions at  low- levels may cause toxicological effects 
(Colborn et  al. ,  1993;  Henschler  et  al. ,  1996;  Rajapakse et  al. ,  2002;  
Royal Com mission on Environmental Pollut ion, 2003;  Sheehan, 2006;  
Christ iansen et  al. ,  2009) . A key area of concern among NGOs and some 
scient ists regarding low- level exposure to chem ical m ixtures was shown 
to be the consumpt ion of food containing pest icide residues.  
 
Despite a growing body of literature suggest ing that  exposure to m ixtures 
of low- levels may be problemat ic the consumpt ion of mult iple residues 
and the potent ial for interact ion remain largely unaddressed by the 
standard single substance assessment  approach favoured by the UK’s 
pest icide assessment  commit tee, the Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides 
(ACP) . This has led many groups including scient ists, campaigners, policy-
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makers and advisory bodies to call for greater use of integrated 
approaches that  consider realist ic mult i- chem ical, mult i- route exposure 
scenarios ( I PCS, 2001;  Pest icide Act ion Network, 2002;  Friends of the 
Earth, 2004b) .  
 
As in other scient ific advisory areas, I  illust rated that  the advisory system 
surrounding pest icides can be characterised as being in a state of flux;  a 
system that  is st ill responding to changes inst igated in the m id-ninet ies 
by the most  prom inent  of all UK food safety cr ises -  bovine spongiform  
encephalopathy (BSE)  and the r isk of it s t ransm ission to humans. The 
cont roversy surrounding the t ransm ission of BSE to humans was 
described as a catalyst  for change in the organisat ion of scient ific advice 
in general and in the case of food-borne r isk in part icular. Notably, I  
detailed that  Whitehall int roduced guidelines for greater t ransparency in 
the scient ific advisory process and a widening of part icipat ion to include 
not  only alternat ive sources of scient ific and technical expert ise but  also 
lay representat ives. Government  departments were also given guidelines 
to follow the tenets of ‘evidence-based policy’. 
 
I n Chapter Two, I  set  out  my reasoning for grounding this research in the 
field of STS and literature from this discipline was explored to consider 
the relat ionships between science, expert ise and decision-making. A key 
feature of the pest icide residue debate – as shown throughout  this thesis 
-  is that  policy decisions surrounding the level of acceptable r isk are 
frequent ly made under condit ions of scient ific uncertainty with the result  
that  the scient ific basis of decisions are regularly challenged by dissent ing 
actor groups outside of the immediate policy-making process. Uncertainty 
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in the r isk assessment  process also suggests that  policy decisions can 
never be wholly scient ific;  instead, they are likely to interlink science, 
expert  judgement  and polit ical values, factors that  may not  always be 
explicit  when safety standards are set , an issue that  I  highlight  has been 
previously widely discussed within the STS literature -  see I rwin et  al. , 
1997;  Levidow, 2003;  Guston, 2004;  Sarewitz et  al. ,  2004. On this basis, 
I  described the assessment  of r isk from exposure to pest icide residues as 
an area of “ regulatory science”  (Weinberg, 1972;  Ashford et  al. , 1983;  
Jasanoff, 1990;  Harr is et  al. ,  2001) ;  where regulatory science is used to 
describe the blurred area between science and policy, where quest ions 
may be asked of science but  cannot  be fully answered through its 
applicat ion. 
 
Science and values were shown in this review of literature to be 
inherent ly linked;  from the init ial fram ing of a problem through to choice 
of methodology to finally finding and agreeing upon a solut ion. The 
reliance on “sound science”  in r isk assessment  and advice, and the 
presence of scient ific uncertainty was shown through the use of previous 
case studies and research literature to be a cause of inact ion and a tool 
that  can be manipulated within policy-making, suggest ing that  
uncertainty itself is complex, and needs to be understood in its social 
context . I  further discussed that  while the principles found within the 
domain of regulatory science can be used to mediate scient ific uncertainty 
and so prevent  inact ion, they raise quest ions that  range from issues of 
validat ion to the involvement  of value judgements in public policy.  
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The themes discussed within this chapter were expanded upon within the 
empir ical study detailed in the proceeding chapters. 
 
8 .2 1  Research m ethods 
The third chapter discussed the methodological approach adopted within 
this research -  a combinat ion of documentary analysis and sem i-
st ructured interviews. I n this sect ion, I  explore some of the difficult ies 
that  lim ited some of the early aspirat ions for data collect ion. 
 
The aim  of documentary analysis was to achieve a contextual 
understanding of the debates surrounding exposure to pest icide residues, 
this in turn helped shape the design of my research and inform  my 
interview based fieldwork. I n part icular, I  was interested in reviewing not  
only STS, sociological and scient ific studies but  also the advisory 
literature produced by the Pest icide Safety Directorate (PSD) , the 
Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides (ACP) , the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollut ion (RCEP)  and the two working groups of the Food 
Standard Agency’s (FSA)  Commit tee on Toxicity (COT) :  WiGRAMP and the 
VUT66
 
.  Literature from NGO groups such as the Pest icide Act ion Network 
(PAN) , Friends of the Earth and the Soil Associat ion (SA)  was also 
reviewed.  
                                                 
66
 Working Group On Risk Assessment  Of Mixtures Of Pest icides 
(WiGRAMP) and the Working Group on Variabilit y and Uncertainty in 
Toxicology (VUT) . 
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I n general, the move towards t ransparency within government  
departments meant  that  much of the documentary evidence, such as 
advisory reports and associated documents, was readily accessible online. 
Addit ionally, recent  changes regarding the access of historical archived 
data also meant  that  the research required to explore my first  research 
quest ion relat ing to historical r isk assessment  and regulatory pract ices – 
discussed in Chapter Four – was easily obtainable from the Nat ional 
Archives. However, there were a number of instances where informat ion 
proved difficult  to access and resulted in changes to my original research 
plan. One example of this -  discussed in Chapter Three -  regarded access 
to the draft  WiGRAMP report . I n this case I  was unable to obtain the 
whole draft  report  and the documents relat ing to the consultat ion as I  had 
hoped at  the start  of my research. I  was therefore compelled to contact  
those who commented on the draft  to build up a picture of how it  may 
have changed between draft  and publicat ion. Other documentary 
evidence that  proved less useful than init ially expected were documents 
detailing internal advisory commit tee events, such as the m inutes for the 
ACP and the RCEP meet ings;  although published online these documents 
generally contained only high level outcomes. As such it  was difficult  to 
determ ine the actual discussions and negot iat ions that  took place within 
these meet ings that  led to the product ion of these outcomes. 
 
I nterviews were conducted during 2007 and 2008. A sem i-st ructured 
approach was chosen to allow part icipants to explore themes and issues 
that  they felt  to be important . Since I  was interested in understanding 
how scient ific literature ( including recent  work on low- level exposure and 
m ixtures)  is assessed in the course of producing r isk advice, I  
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concent rated on interviewing members of three UK advisory bodies that  
have recent ly debated such issues:  the ACP, the COT and the FSA. I n 
total 25 interviews were conducted:  16 interviews with those associated 
with government  advisory commit tees (members of the PSD, ACP, COT, 
RCEP, FSA) , four with members of NGO groups (PAN and the SA) , two 
with representat ives from the agrochem ical indust ry and three with 
m ixtures toxicologists, who worked in academ ic research. Although useful 
in providing context  to this research, much of the data collected from  the 
interviews with the m ixtures toxicologists were not  relevant  to the main 
focus of this thesis regarding how those within the advisory process were 
t reat ing this type of research.  
 
While the major ity of those I  had planned to interview were not  only 
easily contactable but  also willing to part icipate, there were others who 
were more difficult  to access. I n general it  was those working in academ ia 
or government  that  proved the easiest  to contact . There were a small 
number of advisory group members ( less than 5)  that  I  had init ially 
wished to speak with but  could not , however, this was due to logist ical 
issues as opposed to reluctance on their part  to part icipate. On such 
occasions I  subst ituted these interviewees with others working in the 
same area, some of whom had been recommended by the person init ially 
contacted.  
 
The group of people that  proved most  difficult  to contact  and interview 
were those working within NGOs and indust ry. These difficult ies were 
expanded upon in Chapter Three and included reasons such as lack of 
staff resources, changes in research direct ion and t rade secrecy. I  
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therefore had to re-evaluate my methodology and complement  those 
interviews I  could conduct  with writ ten data, such as formal publicat ions 
and data from official websites. I n this sense I  had to t r iangulate smaller 
pieces of data to gain an understanding of the whole.  
 
Const raints both in terms of t ime and resources always affect  how 
research is conducted and this thesis is no different . Due to such 
const raints I  chose to focus on interviewing those working within advisory 
bodies. Although more interviews with those working in the field of 
m ixtures toxicology would have been useful, very few of these 
toxicologists work within the UK and such explorat ion would have 
required internat ional t ravel. Addit ionally, it  was only once I  had begun to 
analyse the data that  I  saw how frequent ly references to the RCEP 
occurred among members of the ACP. These interviews had been spread 
out  over the course of a year and this connect ion was therefore not  
immediately apparent . I  would in hindsight  have liked to have conducted 
further interviews with those involved in writ ing the RCEP’s report  on 
bystander exposure. However, this was not  pract ical. Also, much of the 
informat ion important  to this thesis was actually contained within the 
report  and its associated documents.  
 
8 .2 2  History of pest icide regulat ion in England and 
W ales 
I n Chapter Four, using documentary evidence, I  explored the first  
research quest ion:  How have the potent ial r isks of pest icides been 
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historically assessed and regulated in England and Wales since their first  
comm ercial use in the m id- twent ieth century?  
  
I n order to contextualise current  pest icide assessment  and management  
it  was necessary to consider how they have t radit ionally been managed. 
Historical analysis reveals that  the decisions made during the 1950s and 
1960s st rongly shaped the role and rem it  of government  advisory bodies 
and current  assessment  requirements. Of part icular importance was the 
decision taken in the 1960s by the Food Addit ive and Contam inants Sub-
Commit tee and Advisory Commit tee not  to classify pest icides as either 
food contam inants or addit ives. This decision meant  that  pest icides have 
subsequent ly been subject  to pest icide-specific regulat ion that  was 
mutually const ructed and agreed upon by government  and indust ry. 
 
Current  statutory regulat ion was shown as having evolved through a 
succession of voluntary agreements. A key driver in the government ’s 
decision to maintain voluntary pract ices was internal concern over a lack 
of resources and toxicological expert ise, and a worry that  moving to 
statutory cont rols would mean proposing regulatory lim its that  were 
polit ically rather than scient ifically mot ivated. A key assumpt ion on the 
part  of government  was that  under voluntary cont rols both indust ry and 
pest icide users would act  responsibly and adhere to good pract ice.  
 
However, Health and Safety Execut ive literature indicates that  even in the 
late 1970s manufacturers could not  be relied upon to adequately label 
their products and farmers could not  be relied upon to take not ice of 
warnings. Sim ilar findings to these have been previously discussed by 
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I rwin (1995) , who in researching the herbicide 2,4,5-T argued that  the 
ACP’s focus on the “ recommended way”  and “ recommended purposes”  
was often at  odds with reality. Notably, I rwin’s case study is a clear 
example of the historic reluctance (also evidenced in this thesis)  of the 
ACP to consider evidence alternat ive to that  provided by regulatory 
sources. I ndeed, this thesis is clear in showing that  not  only is the type of 
evidence that  is deemed acceptable for regulat ion and review by 
commit tees such as the ACP rooted in the historical background of English 
pest icide regulat ion but  so to is the type of expert  required to assess such 
evidence, a mat ter that  was discussed in Chapter Seven.  
 
I n this sense, the historical preference for certain types of evidence and 
toxicological expert ise can be seen to have direct ly shaped the 
composit ion and role of pest icide commit tees working today, such as the 
ACP, which with the except ion of it s annual public meet ing st ill holds its 
discussions in pr ivate on the grounds that  meet ings frequent ly contain 
confident ial commercial informat ion. This closed approach has been 
widely cr it icised by those outside of the advisory process and by the 
RCEP. I mportant ly, it  can be direct ly cont rasted to other commit tees in 
the food safety area such as the Spongiform  Encephalopathy Advisory 
Commit tee (SEAC) , whose Code of Pract ice states that  with the except ion 
of the discussion of confident ial literature all advisory meet ings should be 
held in public (SEAC, 2009) . Although the ACP remains in line with the 
most  recent  Code of Pract ice for Scient ific Advisory Commit tees 
(Government  Office for Science, 2007) , where recommendat ion 101 
simply states that  commit tees should aim  to hold open meet ings on a 
regular basis, interview data from ACP members suggests that  the ACP 
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evoke recommendat ion 54 -  “The proceedings of the commit tee should be 
as open as is compat ible with the requirem ents of confident ialit y”  – as 
just ificat ion for why the more regular meet ings should remain closed. I n 
several interviews, ACP members noted that  the recent  review of ACP 
meet ing pract ices concluded that  it  would be too disrupt ive to allow public 
access to the regular meet ings;  the public would have to frequent ly be 
asked to leave to ensure commercial confident ialit y. I t  should be noted 
that  this conclusion was not  endorsed by all interviewed ACP members, 
several of whom felt  that  more could be done to increase the 
t ransparency of the Commit tee, suggest ing that  the recent  ACP review 
was perhaps overly caut ious in its at t itude towards greater t ransparency 
and didn’t  reflect  the wishes of the whole commit tee. 
 
Last ly and most  important ly, in Chapter Four I  demonst rated that  despite 
scient ific progress, the quest ions that  we are asking about  pest icide r isks 
have remained unchanged since the r isks were first  considered 60 years 
ago. I n part icular, I  evidenced that  serious concerns were raised in the 
1950s relat ing to chronic exposure to low- levels and exposure to m ixtures 
of pest icides and that  despite these concerns being repeatedly aired since 
this period they appear to have been persistent ly bracketed within the 
assessment  and regulatory process, and hence effect ively removed from  
the rem it  of pest icide advisory bodies such as the ACP.  I n subsequent  
chapters, I  moved on to consider how and why this happened. 
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8 .2 3  Managem ent  of uncertainty in the r isk 
assessm ent  of pest icide residues  
I n Chapter Five, using a combinat ion of documentary evidence and 
interview data I  sought  to answer the second research quest ion:  How are 
the potent ial r isks of pest icide residues in food assessed in the current  
advisory system  for regulat ion and why has this system been challenged? 
 
The chapter focused on hazard characterisat ion, highlight ing the historical 
reliance on and privileging of in vivo methodology in pest icide assessment  
and the challenges this poses in respect  of the validity of statutory 
reference doses. Methodological choice was shown to be part ially 
subject ive and int r insically shaped by historic, social and pragmat ic 
considerat ions regarding what  is actually measurable or observable. This 
finding therefore supports that  of Wynne (1992)  and I rwin et  al.  (1997, p. 
24)  who have previously writ ten that  the science used in pest icide 
regulatory r isk assessment  is not  wholly object ive and is likely to include 
a m ix of science, expert  judgement  and social and polit ical values;  factors 
that  they argue may not  always be explicit  when safety standards are set . 
 
I n this chapter I  used the evidence to suggest  that  there is a culture 
within pest icide r isk assessment  that  encourages the m inim isat ion of Type 
1 errors to avoid the possibilit y of over- regulat ion. I  also suggested that  
there is both a lack of awareness and lack of scope within the current  
system to consider Type 3 errors. I  argued that  this and the reliance on 
animal test ing in toxicology has tangible consequences as it  suggests that  
the current  narrow characterisat ion of r isk using data primarily collected 
from in vivo methods can only ever be a proxy for the actual level of r isk, 
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which is current ly indeterm inable, a point  that  I  suggest  is not  always 
t ransparent  in decision-making processes.  
 
The move towards evidence standardisat ion was discussed and I  argued 
that  while standardising regulatory requirem ents should in theory lead to 
increasingly t ransparent  and r igorous assessments, in pract ice it  acts to 
devalue evidence which is produced outside of the official process and 
lim it  it s impact  on decision-making – advisory bodies are simply not  able 
to consider it ,  as it  is classed as unacceptable for regulatory purposes. 
This finding suggests that  this move is likely to be problemat ic in more 
fr inge areas, such as m ixtures toxicology, which often ut ilise newer, non-
validated methods. Thus, I  showed that  there is a tension present  in 
pest icide regulatory science:  on the one hand, there is the widely 
acknowledged need for standardisat ion in order to produce robust  
regulatory evidence, and on the other, there is the need for the field to 
evolve in its scient ific understanding which requires the capacity to think 
“outside the box”  and consider new techniques that  are yet  to be 
standardised. 
 
A recurr ing interview theme discussed within this chapter related to the 
lim itat ions of obtaining evidence pertaining to the effects of pest icides in 
real life situat ions and how decisions therefore have to be taken in the 
knowledge that  there is a degree of uncertainty. I  showed that  there is a 
percept ion among NGOs and some previous m embers of government  that  
the ACP is reluctant  to acknowledge this uncertainty in its decision-
making process and that  it  uses this lack of certainty as an argument  to 
maintain the status quo. Applying Shackley and Wynne’s (1996)  
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exam inat ion of boundary-ordering devices, I  suggested that  the ACP may 
deny the possibilit y of uncertainty in its assessments so as not  to 
underm ine the current  regulatory system in which it  is embedded and 
hence its own epistemological authority. This becomes part icularly 
relevant  in the case of uncertainty arising from real life exposure, where it  
is increasingly recognised in both the scient ific and policy literature that  
humans are frequent ly exposed to m ixtures of pest icides, as opposed to 
individual substances. Despite this the ACP are however shown in this 
chapter and throughout  this thesis to persistent ly bracket  these concerns 
and so exclude these potent ial r isks from assessment  discussions.  
 
Due to this persistent  bracket ing pest icide substances remain largely 
assessed on an individual basis so that  potent ial effects from exposure to 
mult iple pest icides are not  rout inely addressed within the r isk assessment  
process. Drawing on both published literature (van Zorge, 1996;  I PCS, 
2001;  Commit tee on Toxicity, 2002b)  and interview data it  was shown 
that  this area has historically received lim ited at tent ion within the 
regulatory and r isk advisory community for two key reasons. First , there 
is a percept ion among regulators and scient ists that  the science is difficult  
to conduct  and that  the area is too complex to regulate;  secondly, there 
is a belief that  exposure to m ixtures is a non- issue when individual 
components are present  at  otherwise acceptable levels. Where m ixtures 
have been considered I  discussed how researchers have typically 
favoured undertaking simple studies that  have focussed on addit iv ity as 
opposed to synergism , typically using binary m ixtures at  relat ively high 
doses with acute toxicit ies and endpoints, situat ions which do not  reflect  
real life exposure (El-Masri et  al. ,  1997;  Commit tee on Toxicity, 2001) . 
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This suggests that  within the current  r isk assessment  paradigm the t rue 
scale of uncertainty regarding the r isks from exposure to m ixtures is 
indeterm inable and therefore potent ially inadequately addressed by 
commit tees such as the ACP. 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter regarding the assessment  of 
pest icide m ixtures therefore supports the findings of other STS 
researchers such as Wynne (1992)  who have argued that  the pervasion of 
pragmat ic choices in toxicological studies has the effect  of art if icially 
reducing uncertainty. A key problem of this act ion, as noted by Wynne 
( ibid) , is that  once uncertainty has been removed it  becomes difficult  to 
reint roduce at  a later stage of assessment  and analysis. I n effect , I  
therefore argued that  the reluctance to address the issue of m ixtures at  a 
scient ific level has resulted from it  being bracketed and om it ted from risk 
assessment  discussions and the product ion of r isk advice by bodies such 
as the ACP, a subject  that  I  turned to in the next  chapter.  
 
8 .2 4  Fragm entat ion of governm ent  advice on 
pest icide r isks 
Chapter Six considered the stage following r isk assessment . There are 
now several government  advisory bodies involved in the assessment  of 
pest icides, with each applying its own conceptual framework with which 
to assess and advise on r isk. I n this chapter, I  showed how this has 
resulted in increasing tensions between advisory bodies and a 
proliferat ion of advice that  is not  always compat ible.  
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Using three case studies surrounding different  types of pest icide exposure 
(pest icide m ixtures, food residues, crop spraying and bystander 
exposure)  the emerging tensions found between the official advisory 
system for pest icide regulat ion, as typified by the ACP, and other 
government  bodies involved in assessing r isk and providing advice were 
exam ined, with specific reference to how these conflicts have been 
managed. I n doing so I  answered the third research quest ion:  How do 
different  advisory bodies use scient ific studies of r isk assessment  to 
produce advice on the r isks of pest icides and pest icide residues? 
 
The case studies suggested that  there is a fundamental difference in how 
the ACP frames the r isk from pest icides when compared to those actors 
outside of the policy process. Government  r isk advice was shown in these 
examples to reflect  areas of greater scient ific certainty where causality 
between exposure and effect  has been established. Conversely, advice 
from NGOs was shown to typically be more precaut ionary reflect ing areas 
of greater uncertainty, where causality is yet  to be officially established;  a 
situat ion that  is not  unique to pest icides and is m irrored in other cases of 
environmental health regulat ion. For example, sim ilar tensions can be 
seen surrounding the advice from government  and NGOs relat ing to 
elect ro-magnet ic radiat ion exposure from mobile phones and phone 
masts (Health Protect ion Agency, 2009;  Powerwatch, 2009) . Here, there 
is cont inued cont roversy surrounding potent ial effects of exposure, with 
NGO groups such as Powerwatch drawing on a range of scient ific studies 
to advocate and advise on methods of reducing exposure. The Health 
Protect ion Agency (2009)  itself highlight ing that  “ it  is not  difficult  to find 
cont radictory results in the literature” . However, the following excerpt  
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from its advice suggests that  it ,  like the ACP and PSD, is const rained in 
the evidence it  is perm it ted to use in set t ing regulatory lim its:  “ included 
in the scient ific review are biological effects that  m ight  have health 
consequences, but  whose existence has not  been confirmed and which 
cannot  be used to develop numerical rest r ict ions on exposure”  (Health 
Protect ion Agency, 2009) . This, like the evidence presented on pest icide 
disputes suggests that  so long as these fram ings are diam et r ically 
opposed the two groups are unlikely to agree on how to manage any risks 
from pest icides.  
 
I n the first  case study, advice surrounding exposure to m ixtures of 
pest icides was considered. Here, it  was highlighted that  the WiGRAMP – 
the working group charged with reviewing evidence – has been widely 
cr it icised for failing to give due weight  to the uncertainty involved in r isk 
assessment  and the regulatory requirements that  dictate the rem it  of 
pest icide assessments performed by the ACP in its report . As such the 
credibilit y of the resultant  advice has been publicly challenged by both 
those within and outside government . I n the second case study that  
explored the advice surrounding consumpt ion of residues, it  was shown 
that  the differences in how the ACP and the FSA frame pest icides has 
resulted in a tension between the two bodies. However, these tensions 
were reduced by the FSA changing its posit ion to match that  of the ACP. 
One consequence was that  this encouraged a proliferat ion of advice from 
those external to the official advisory process, who have been overt ly 
cr it ical of the ACP’s guidance and have subsequent ly sought  to underm ine 
the FSA’s credibilit y through suggest ing that  in aligning with the ACP  the 
FSA has failed in its mandate of put t ing the consumer first . The third case 
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study discussed how the report  and recommendat ions produced by the 
RCEP on bystander exposure were largely dism issed by other government  
advisory bodies. This was because they were seen to be too precaut ionary 
and at  odds with the current  assessment  process and wider 
understanding of bystander r isk from crop spraying. As such the advice 
and recommendat ions produced by the RCEP were sidelined by the 
government  who favoured the views expressed by the ACP.  
 
When viewed as a whole the evidence from the three case studies 
suggested that  while the ACP has now begun to accept  the possibilit y of 
effect  from  exposure to pest icide m ixtures through independent  act ion or 
simple addit iv ity (note only in the cases where mult iple substances are 
combined in one product ) , it  appears to systemat ically neglect  the 
possibilit y of synergism , a posit ion that  has been st rongly cr it icised by the 
RCEP and NGOs. While the ACP was shown to publicly reject  this cr it icism , 
the evidence presented throughout  this thesis suggests that  the RCEP 
was just ified in making such crit ical remarks. I ndeed, it  suggests that  the 
more reflexive approach to r isk assessment  as adopted by the RCEP is 
epistemologically superior to that  of the ACP’s, which appears to 
consistent ly fail to account  for differences in perspect ives regarding 
approaches to r isk assessment  and the management  of uncertainty. 
 
All three case studies illust rated that  advisory bodies working in this area 
recognise that  there are lim itat ions in the abilit y to determ ine causal 
effects using the current  evidence base. Despite this, there are quest ions 
surrounding the extent  to which these lim itat ions are acknowledged 
within r isk assessment  and the product ion of r isk advice by bodies such 
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as the ACP. I n all of the case studies, it  is suggested by the actors 
involved that  uncertainty and ignorance can be reduced through further 
research;  a solut ion that  is not , as others in the field of STS have shown, 
always guaranteed to be effect ive (Wynne, 1992;  Sarewitz, 2004) . 
However, in the case of pest icides I  described how these calls have been 
resisted on the grounds that  they would be resource intensive and not  
necessarily guaranteed to provide further informat ion. I t  is therefore 
somet imes explicit ly but  more commonly im plicit ly accepted by these 
bodies that  advice has to be formulated on the basis of incomplete 
evidence and in the knowledge that  there are areas of uncertainty and 
ignorance.  
 
The case studies empir ically demonst rated the importance of inst itut ional 
pract ices in the fram ing of r isk advice. I ndeed, I  argued that  such 
pract ices not  only act  as frames but  also as boundary objects that  help 
establish which r isk quest ions are acceptable to ask and determ ine which 
evidence is acceptable for use in providing answers. I  suggested that  the 
official regulatory framework is therefore an anchoring device that  acts to 
create consensus across advisory bodies and const rain alternat ive 
interpretat ions (van der Sluij s et  al.,  1998) . 
 
Many of these points have been discussed within the regulatory science 
literature in STS. For example, Jasanoff (1991, p.29)  has argued that  
where there is uncertainty or am biguity in scient ific knowledge used for 
policy then “ facts alone are inadequate to compel a choice” . I n such 
situat ions evidence select ion will blend both scient ific and policy 
considerat ions, with the result  that  policy-makers are required to seek 
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something other than science to legit im ise the choice of evidence used in 
r isk decisions and subsequent  advice. While this was shown to reflect  the 
situat ion in pest icide assessment  I  noted the potent ially m isleading nature 
of Jasanoff’s statement  -  even where the science seems clear, the 
evidence presented in this thesis and in previous STS literature suggests 
that  underlying tacit  assumpt ions remain, suggest ing that  the science 
used in r isk assessment  is rarely wholly independent  of socio-polit ical 
assumpt ions and community norms even when uncertainty and ambiguity 
is considered to be low. 
 
One way in which many working in the field believe legit im acy is achieved 
in r isk assessment  and the product ion of advice is through the ut ilisat ion 
of those considered as ‘experts’ in the domain. However, the evidence 
presented in this thesis suggests that  this leverage can lead to tensions 
between different  expert  groups as they compete to gain authority in an 
increasingly overcrowded arena;  in this respect , the appeal to expert ise 
as a way of dealing with the lim itat ions of science was not  always seen as 
successful. The themes of epistem ic authority, expert ise and legit im acy 
and the dist inct ion between the r ight  and wrong kind of expert  were seen 
extensively in the interviews with advisory body members and were 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 
8 .2 5  Re- construct ing the legit im acy of scient ific 
experts in the post - BSE era  
Having previously illust rated that  the product ion of r isk advice can lead to 
tensions not  only between government  bodies and NGOs but  also 
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between different  bodies within government , I  explored the factors that  
underlie these differences;  percept ions of expert ise, t rust  and epistem ic 
authority. Chapter Seven therefore addressed the final research quest ion:  
How are com pet ing claim s for scient ific expert ise and for lay involvem ent  
in r isk assessm ent  being handled in the case of pest icide residues?  
 
I  have shown throughout  this thesis that  the area of pest icide r isk 
assessment  and management  is complex with tensions remaining 
between those commit tees and experts who value in-depth specialist  
knowledge and those who place value on the use of broader, more 
generalist  expert ise in r isk assessment . Such tensions, as epitom ised by 
the dist inct ion Collins and Evans (2002)  make between cont r ibutory  and 
interact ional expert ise, means that  it  is no longer enough for the 
government  to simply appoint  “ the great  and the good”  in order to create 
legit imacy in r isk decision making (Jasanoff, 1997b) .  
 
I  argued that  the r ight  t ype of expert ise has remained narrowly defined 
within the ACP, illust rat ing that  the majority of ACP members believed 
that  certain types of formal expert ise were necessary to assess the often 
complex informat ion found within the pest icide r isk literature. The 
expert ise that  appeared to be most  highly valued among this group was 
shown to be toxicological;  a finding that  suggests the historic pr ivileging 
of toxicologists in the pest icide regulatory community persists, the effect  
of which is that  other forms of expert ise are either excluded from or play 
only a m inor role in the ACP’s discussions. The emphasis the ACP place on 
a focussed cont r ibutory style expert ise, as embodied in toxicologists, can 
be seen as a direct  cont rast  to the RCEP, which has argued that  to t ruly 
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understand and manage r isk there needs to be a move towards diverse 
advisory membership, that  contains a greater degree of interact ional 
expert ise, to facilitate a broader and more holist ic considerat ion of a 
topic.  
 
I  argued that  despite a purportedly t ransparent  advisory appointment  
framework there remains a percept ion among NGOs, some advisory 
members and members of government  that  groups such as the ACP are 
dom inated by a small group of scient ists, who share a sim ilar value 
system and whose judgements can be difficult  to challenge by those who 
are not  considered to have the appropriate expert ise. I  proposed that  this 
can lead to groupthink and the reluctance to challenge or quest ion the 
status quo. I  suggested that  this may be linked to a desire within the ACP 
to present  assessment  findings and advice as being consensual, thus 
perpetuat ing the myth that  science speaks with one voice (Collingridge 
and Reeve, 1986)  and that  consensus is required to ensure credibilit y.  
 
To address the problem of groupthink, theories such as Beck’s reflexive 
scient isat ion (Beck, 1992)  advocate a de-monopolising and 
democrat isat ion of science that  would allow wider part icipat ion in r isk 
decisions. Post -BSE it  has been common within UK advisory commit tees 
to ensure that  decisions surrounding r isk and advice, are not  only 
t ransparent  but  include the input  of non-experts or lay people. However, I  
found that  there are tensions surrounding not  only the role of lay people 
on commit tees but  whether such people can actually be considered as lay 
at  all.   
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Those sit t ing within the advisory commit tees under study were found to 
typically regard the presence of lay members in three non-exclusive 
ways:  first , that  their presence was an irr itant  as it  dumbed down 
discussion and suggested that  they as experts could not  be t rusted;  
secondly, that  they were helpful in assist ing the experts consider issues 
from a consumer perspect ive;  thirdly, that  they were welcome as it  
highlighted to a wider audience the hard work of the expert  members. I n 
all categories my research indicated that  lay members, although fully 
appointed members of the commit tee, were presented and considered by 
‘expert ’ members as being outside of the decision-making process, which 
was viewed as the preserve of experts.  
 
The evidence also suggested that  there is often a paradox in the 
appointment  of lay members, as although appointed as ‘lay’ they often 
possess considerable expert ise. I n part icular, I  suggested that  while they 
are often publicly appointed to act  as the ‘innocent ’ public ( I rwin, 2006)  
they can frequent ly be characterised as possessing interact ional and 
somet imes even cont r ibutory expert ise (Collins and Evans, 2002) . 
I ndeed, they often appear to be selected specifically because of these 
at t r ibutes, as there is recognit ion that  membership of advisory 
commit tees requires certain skills that  would be absent  in the ‘innocent ’ 
cit izen. However, once appointed they were often not  recognised as 
expert  within the commit tee st ructure.  
 
Many of those that  were included as lay m embers were employees of 
NGOs working in pest icide related fields. Previously, it  has been argued 
that  while NGOs can be ident ified as organisat ionally different  from  
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‘unorganised’ cit izens (Breckenridge, 1999) , they are included in policy-
making exercises not  because they possess expert ise, but  because they 
represent  a part icular value system that  is shared by their members or 
indeed they are included due to both reasons. I n this sense, I  showed 
that  they are often not  viewed as experts but  as representat ives of public 
groups or movements. This view was seen in this research as it  was found 
that  many NGO members, despite having scient ific qualificat ions and 
subject  expert ise, were asked to join commit tees to represent  the view of 
the wider non-expert  public. Addit ionally, there was a percept ion among 
many ‘expert ’ members that  lay members should feed back their role to 
the public. However, I  quest ioned to what  extent  this is possible given the 
st r ict  codes of conduct  that  members must  adhere to in respect  of 
confident ialit y. This research also suggested that  NGO members have 
relat ively lit t le capacity to challenge the fram ing of the debate in terms of 
scient ific evidence given the significant  embedding of scient ific expert ise 
within such organisat ions. 
 
I t  would be easy as I rwin (2006, p.316)  has previously suggested to 
conclude that  “ there is lit t le evidence that  public talk has brought  about  a 
wider cultural and inst itut ional t ransformat ion” . However, the research 
shown in this thesis suggests that  such a conclusion does not  reflect  the 
nuance of the situat ion;  although wider part icipat ion in the field of 
pest icide r isk assessment  appears from this analysis to be lim ited in 
scope, it  can st ill be described as a progression from previous models. 
However, unt il alternat ive forms of expert ise are recognised as legit imate 
it  will remain difficult  for those outside of the dom inant  expert  group to 
make any real impact  in commit tees such as the ACP. 
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8 .3  Policy im plicat ions 
Within this thesis I  have sought  to discuss the challenges present  in the 
assessment  and advisory process around pest icide residue r isks as 
conceptualised by those working within and outside it .  However, in 
bringing this evidence together it  is possible to now become less 
epistemological neut ral and make suggest ions as to the wider implicat ions 
of my findings. Although derived from this specific piece of research these 
implicat ions and more specifically the areas for further reflect ion as 
discussed in 8.31, have been influenced by the STS framework that  I  
have been working within. 
 
The evidence I  have collected and analysed suggests that  are real 
concerns surrounding the current  lim itat ions of the r isk assessment  
process, most  notably surrounding the abilit y of the dom inant  
toxicological paradigm to account  for those types of exposure that  are not  
rout inely covered by regulatory requirements, such as chronic low- level 
exposure and exposure to m ixtures. These findings suggest  that  there are 
both known and indeterm inable areas of uncertainty and hence potent ial 
areas of r isk that  are simply unaddressed by the current  system. 
I nterest ingly however, the evidence suggests that  the problem is not  that  
such issues are wholly unrecognised but  that  they are and yet  remain 
persistent ly bracketed by advisory bodies such as the ACP, which 
repeatedly denies the need to change current  pract ices despite being 
frequent ly presented with evidence to the cont rary.  
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I  noted that  a key difficulty faced by advisory bodies in inst igat ing change 
is the external const raint  imposed upon them through working within a 
statutory framework prescribing what  counts as acceptable evidence. The 
result  is that  regulatory fram ing has at  t imes acted to art ificially reduce 
uncertainty in the r isk assessment  process through om it t ing discussion of 
the more complex scenarios that  are outside of the current  regulatory 
rem it . This in turn encourages a false level of confidence regarding r isk to 
be projected by advisory bodies as they have not  had to consider all 
potent ial exposure scenarios. Such a situat ion increases the difficulty of 
present ing alternat ive and conflict ing views as credible, a part icular 
problem for those suffer ing from illnesses believed to be caused by 
exposure to low- levels of pest icide m ixtures where it  is often difficult  to 
demonst rate a clear causal pathway between exposure and effect . This 
type of situat ion is also compounded by the fact  that  these issues are not  
rout inely addressed within pest icide r isk assessment  and so there is lit t le 
regulatory literature available to support  their claims. My evidence 
suggests however, that  despite at  t imes acknowledging the lim itat ions of 
working within a statutory framework, there appears lit t le desire from 
many members of the ACP to challenge and quest ion exist ing pract ices, 
suggest ing that  there is unlikely to be any major changes in the 
assessment  process in the near future in relat ion to the assessment  of 
m ixtures, unless dictated down by the European Union. 
 
I t  m ight  be presumed from the discussion so far that  the problem of 
uncertainty in the r isk assessment  of pest icide residues can be ‘solved’ 
simply through the int roduct ion of newer methods, such as 
toxicogenomics (Boobis, 2007)  and physiologically based 
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pharmacokinet ic/  pharmacodynamic modelling (El-Masri et  al. ,  1995) , 
that  purport  to make easier the assessment  of exposure to low- levels and 
more com plex m ixtures and their effects, such as synergism  and 
antagonism as opposed to simple addit iv ity. However, I  would call upon 
previous STS studies to suggest  that  all scient ific assessm ents, especially 
those in the regulatory arena, will inevitably be framed by prior 
assumpt ions ( that  m ight  be externally challenged)  and socio-polit ical 
values that  may be m ore or less t ransparent  to the external observer 
(Shackley  et  al. ,  1998;  Sarewitz, 2004;  Sarewitz et  al., 2004) . I n this 
sense, there is no escape from uncertainty or differences between 
scient ific styles. I ndeed, it  has been argued within STS that  r isk 
assessment  is int r insically characterised by uncertainty (Wynne and 
Mayer, 1993;  Levidow, 2003)  -  a finding that  is supported by this 
research -  therefore uncertainty often does not  ar ise from inadequate 
knowledge but  is a reflect ion of the underlying quest ions asked by the 
scient ists and regulators and their select ion of relevant  facts, which have 
been shown in this thesis and previous STS literature to frequent ly be 
based on value choices (van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2000;  Jensen and 
Sandøe, 2002;  Ravetz, 2002;  Levidow, 2003) .   
 
As such, the evidence presented in this thesis supports the arguments 
made in previous STS research in the fields of regulatory science and 
science-based policy-making to suggest  that  the real challenge for r isk 
assessment  and advice is actually about  being open and aware of these 
different  frameworks and successfully handling their implicat ions. To do 
this however, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that  it  is 
imperat ive that  known uncertaint ies are acknowledged and the 
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boundaries of knowledge and understanding are fully considered and 
publicly reported. The evidence indicates that  this would require a 
complete culture change within bodies such as the ACP, which appears to 
be locked into an un- reflexive mode of working that  assumes the current  
system is adequate in assessing r isk and protect ing human health in 
order to protect  it s own epistemological authority in this advisory domain. 
 
This thesis does not  at tempt  to validate the scient ific m erit  of evidence 
that  is current ly not  accepted as legit imate in r isk discussions. Nor does it  
seek to place value on different  types of expert ise. However, the evidence 
that  I  have gathered suggests that  the very narrow focus on pest icide r isk 
and its management , as epitom ised by the ACP, severely lim its the 
potent ial for a wider, more holist ic considerat ion of what  r isks pest icides 
may pose and how these could be managed in the future. I t  is here that  
the evidence and expert ise that  is current ly considered as unsuitable for 
regulatory purposes could be used to help frame these discussions. 
I ndeed, a key argument  made within the thesis is that  uncertainty and 
r isk is often not  due to an inadequate amount  of research but  a result  of 
how a problem has been init ially framed;  the wrong quest ions being 
asked or the wrong methodology being adopted to answer such 
quest ions. Such arguments have been previously recognised by those 
such as Wynne (1992, p.113)  who suggests that  r isk assessment  
pract ices can art ificially reduce uncertaint ies through imposing “man-
made intellectual closure around ent it ies which are more open-ended than 
the result ing [ scient ific]  models suggest ” . As such, he argues that  
rout inisat ion of pract ice can render these uncertaint ies invisible to r isk 
assessors and that  it  is only through “ intense and open exam inat ion of 
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the scient ific evidence and compet ing scient ific interpretat ions”  that  these 
uncertaint ies and their  consequences can be understood. The evidence 
presented in this thesis therefore suggests that  by broadening both the 
evidence base and the expert ise to include alternat ive forms of knowledge 
and understanding, the possibilit y of Type 3 errors in r isk assessment  and 
management  may be reduced. 
 
At  the heart  of the mat ter is the quest ion of whether to be effect ive and 
legit imate advisory commit tees require cont r ibutory or interact ional 
expert ise, or a combinat ion of both? This quest ion has been previously 
discussed within the STS literature with Jasanoff arguing that :  “The most  
valued expert  is one who not  only t ranscends disciplinary boundaries and 
synthesises knowledge from several fields but  also understands the lim its 
of regulatory science and the policy issues confront ing the agency”  
(Jasanoff, 1990, p.243) . I n her U.S. study, The Fifth Branch, Jasanoff 
( ibid)  suggests that  the blurr ing of boundaries between scient ists and 
regulators can actually result  in increasingly product ive policy-m aking.  
The evidence presented here suggested that  within UK pest icide advisory 
commit tees no such balance has been successfully achieved. This was 
seen to be part icular ly t rue in the case of the ACP which st rongly 
advocates the involvement  of a very narrow range of expert ise in r isk 
assessment . However, I  would argue that  it s approach is 
epistemologically inferior to that  of the RCEP’s, as unlike the RCEP the 
ACP appears to consistent ly fail to account  for differences in perspect ives 
regarding approaches to r isk assessment  and the management  of 
uncertainty 
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The findings here support  I rwin’s (2006, p.315)  observat ions that  there is 
a “ considerable lack of clar ity”  surrounding the relat ionship between 
expert  and lay involvement  and hence unresolved quest ions remain 
surrounding the epistemological status of different  voices. Given the wide 
scale move within the UK for greater democrat isat ion of scient ific advisory 
commit tees, the findings presented within this thesis suggest  that  these 
quest ions need to be bet ter addressed before any posit ive effect  of 
widening part icipat ion will be observed. Without  this there is a danger 
that  the appointment  of lay part icipants will be viewed as tokenist ic,  
which would underm ine the init ial goal of increasing legit imacy. Sim ilar ly,  
the goal of greater t ransparency has only part ially been met  within those 
commit tees exam ined here. I f greater t ransparency is a desired feature of 
Brit ish policy-making then greater at tent ion needs to be paid to how this 
can be pract ically achieved. I t  is not  enough to rely on rhetoric that  the 
role of lay members is to feedback their experiences to the public. I f no 
formal process is established then such public communicat ion will not  
occur and the advisory process will remain closed. 
 
8 .3 1  Areas for  further reflect ion  
Following a review of the evidence presented in this thesis and 
considerat ion of how this research relates to other sim ilar research in the 
field of STS I  have ident ified a number of areas in the current  r isk 
assessment  process that  could be bet ter managed if the issue of pest icide 
m ixtures and other related r isks are to be more adequately addressed. 
The five key points as ident ified by this thesis are discussed below:  
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1)  I n relat ion to the specific issue of exposure to m ixtures, the ACP 
should bet ter acknowledge the current  lim itat ions in its r isk 
assessment  process and take steps to address them. I n part icular, 
considerat ion should be given to how it  could reasonably move 
towards the use of integrated approaches that  consider realist ic mult i-
chem ical, mult i- route exposure scenarios as advocated by those such 
as the IPCS (2001) . 
 
2)  There is a need within pest icide r isk assessment  and potent ially 
chem ical r isk assessment  more generally, to make clear to r isk 
managers and the wider public where there are areas of uncertainty 
and indeterm inacy. This point  has been previously recognised by the 
RCEP in its report  “Set t ing Environmental Standards”  where it  is noted 
that :   
 
Scient ific assessments should indicate clearly where the 
boundaries of knowledge lie. To be helpful to policy-makers 
they should indicate clearly what  is known or considered to be 
indisputable and what  is considered to be speculat ive. (RCEP, 
1998, paragraph 2.75)  
 
3)  There is also a need for clearer boundaries to be defined between r isk 
assessment  and r isk management  pract ices as the evidence presented 
in this thesis suggests that  in pract ice they are frequent ly blurred and 
often opaque to external observers. Addit ionally, the reasoning behind 
r isk management  decisions should be explicit ;  it  should be made clear 
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if and when r isk decisions incorporate socio-polit ical considerat ions 
and what  the resultant  effects may be. 
 
4)  The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that  uncertainty can 
not  simply be reduced through conduct ing more detailed research as 
its presence is int r insically linked to the original fram ing of the issue 
and the quest ions that  are posed at  the beginning of the process. To 
reduce uncertainty and also Type 3 style errors there should be 
greater communicat ion between advisory bodies and other 
stakeholders ( including the wider public)  in the early stages of r isk 
assessment . This should not  only help to increase the t ransparency of 
the process but  provide opportunity for the development  of a shared 
understanding of the issue and allow alternat ive view points and 
evidence to be openly discussed.  
 
5)  The role and rem it  of scient ific advisory commit tees should be clar ified 
to bet ter understand what  expert ise is required in different  
circumstances and why. This would help ident ify and make more 
explicit  the role individuals are expected to play. Considerat ion should 
be given to increasing the range of expert ise on r isk assessment  
commit tees so that  a variety of theoret ical and disciplinary posit ions 
are included;  this may help to reduce the possibilit y of groupthink. 
Addit ionally, there should be greater discussion over the inclusion of 
‘lay’ members and whether in actuality some form  of expert ise 
( interact ional, cont r ibutory or procedural)  is necessary in order to fully 
part icipate. Training could be provided to all commit tee members to 
ensure that  they are all able to fully interact  and part icipate when 
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working within a commit tee environment . Where there is an 
expectat ion that  lay m embers should feed their  involvement  back to 
the public, adequate procedures should be put  in place to do so. 
 
8 .4  Further research 
There are a number of ways in which this thesis could be usefully taken 
further.  
 
First , it  would be interest ing to undertake a comparat ive analysis with 
another group of widely used chem icals to explore the extent  to which the 
characterist ics of pest icide assessment  and regulat ion are found 
elsewhere. An example would be to study the recent  cont roversy 
surrounding the use of phthalates in baby bot t les and children’s toys. 
Phthalates are a group of synthet ic chem icals that  are typically used as 
plast icizers. While they have been widely used in a range of consumer 
products for the past  50 years, there has been growing concern among 
environmental and consumer NGOs that  certain phthalates may act  as 
endocrine disrupters affect ing the development  of animal and human 
reproduct ive organs (Friends of the Earth, 2001) . Although organisat ions 
such as American Chemist ry Council have argued that  there is no 
convincing reliable data to suggest  that  phthalates pose a r isk to human 
health (Phthalate I nformat ion Cent re, 2005) , many manufacturers have 
voluntarily removed them from their products am idst  public concern. A 
comparat ive analysis would help draw out  those features of the pest icide 
debate that  are part icular to pest icides, whilst  providing an opportunity to 
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explore how uncertainty and chem ical r isk is managed in a more general 
manner. 
 
Secondly, this research could be extended to explor ing how the issues 
discussed in this thesis have been managed elsewhere using different  
regulatory methods. For example, it  is recognised that  since the 
int roduct ion of the Food Quality Protect ion Act  (FQPA)  in the United 
States in 1996, the US Environmental Protect ion Agency is now required 
to consider the following  in assessing and regulat ing pest icides 
(Environmental Protect ion Agency, 2008) :  
 
x the aggregate r isk from exposure to a pest icide from 
mult iple sources when assessing tolerances  
x the cumulat ive exposure to pest icides that  have common 
mechanisms of toxicity 
 
I t  would therefore be of interest  to look at  the historical background to 
these developments and establish how the assessment  and regulatory 
systems differs in the US from Europe, and what  the implicat ions are in 
terms of set t ing human reference doses for pest icides. This would further 
help to draw out  and characterise those aspects of policy-making that  are 
shaped by social values and expert  judgement .  
 
Sim ilar ly, in the UK a legal Judgement  has been recent ly made in relat ion 
to a possible link between exposure to low- levels of atmospheric toxic 
waste from land reclamat ion in Corby and birth defects. I n this case the 
Judge ruled that  reclamat ion works were capable of leading to some, or 
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all,  of the birth defects presented to the court , despite being carr ied out  
within health and safety rules at  the t ime (Royal Courts of Just ice, 2009) . 
While this ruling does not  state that  the contam inants were definit ively 
and causally responsible, it  is unusual as it  accepts the possibilit y that  this 
m ight  be the case and therefore allows further legal act ion to be taken 
against  Corby Council for negligence. I n many aspects the arguments 
made within this Judgement  can be seen as parallel to those arguments 
presented in relat ion to the r isks result ing from exposure to pest icides. I n 
part icular, paragraph 755 of the Judgement  acknowledges that  low- level 
exposure m ight  be problemat ic:  
 
 …embryos and foetuses are m uch more sensit ive to toxic 
chem icals than adults. The dosage of a teratogen required to 
induce birth defects can be much lower than that  which would 
be required to cause toxic effects in adults and, although its 
teratogenic effects may be the result  of induct ion by high 
doses, they may also be induced by low level exposures. 
(Royal Courts of Just ice, 2009)  
 
Thirdly, during this research it  became apparent  that  European 
harmonisat ion is having an unprecedented impact  not  only on how new 
pest icides are assessed and regulated, but  also in deciding which of the 
older pest icides will remain available for use following re-evaluat ion. 
Several interviewees work within Europe and suggested that  the level of 
toxicological expert ise varies widely between member states. There would 
therefore be merit  in exploring how and why expert ise differs and what  
effect  this may have on the r isk assessment  and the regist rat ion of 
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pest icide substances across Europe. Addit ionally, there was concern 
amongst  interviewees that  the new more st r ingent  requirem ents under 
the European Plant  Protect ion Products Regulat ions (PPPR)  would result  in 
many exist ing pest icide products being withdrawn following a re-
exam inat ion. This was considered problemat ic for a variety of reasons 
including the possibilit y of the developm ent  of pest icide resistance 
through the over use of certain pest icides. I t  would therefore be 
interest ing to explore how the changes in pest icide regulat ion may 
materially affect  pest  management  st rategies across Europe. 
 
Finally, one of the key messages of this research is that  without  a holist ic 
understanding of the problem  it  is difficult  to ask the r ight  quest ions and 
hence m it igate and manage r isk.  I n this sense, the most  interest ing 
piece of further research would be to explore how pest icides could be 
pract ically considered among advisory bodies in a more holist ic fashion. 
Different  assessment  and policy models could be explored to develop a 
workable framework that  would allow the considerat ion of the wider 
issues surrounding human health, the environment , sustainabilit y and 
food security in the assessment  of pest icides.   
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Abbreviat ions  
ABI M Associat ion of Brit ish I nsect icide Manufacturers  
ACAS Agricultural Chem icals Approval Scheme 
ACP The Advisory Commit tee on Pest icides 
ADI  Acceptable Daily I ntake 
AOEL Acceptable Operator Exposure Level 
ARfD Acute Reference Dose 
BCPC Brit ish Crop Protect ion Council 
BMA Brit ish Medical Associat ion 
BSE Bovine Spongiform  Encephalopathy 
CFS Chronic Fat igue Syndrome 
COC Commit tee on Carcinogenicity of Chem icals in 
Food, Consumer Products and the Environment  
COM  Commit tee on Mutagenicity of Chem icals in Food, 
Consumer Products and the Environment  
COPR UK Cont rol of Pest icides Regulat ions 
COT The Commit tee on Toxicity of Chem icals in Food, 
Consumer Products and the Environment  
CPPAS Crop Protect ion Products Approval Scheme 
CSL Cent ral Science Laboratories 
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DEFRA Department  for Environment , Food and Rural 
Affairs 
DNT Developmental Neurotoxicity 
EC European Commission 
ECVAM European Cent re for the Validat ion of Alternat ive 
Methods 
EFSA European Food Safety Authority 
EU European Union 
FACS Food Addit ives and Contam inants Sub-Commit tee 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisat ion  
FEPA UK Food and Environmental Protect ion Act  
FoE Friends of the Earth 
FQPA United States Food Quality Protect ion Act   
FSA Food Standards Agency 
GAP Good Agricultural Pract ice 
GLP Good Laboratory Pract ice 
HMSO Her Majesty’s Stat ionary Office 
HSE Health and Safety Execut ive 
I DS The I nter-Departmental Secretariat  
I PCS I nternat ional Programme on Chemical Safety  
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JMPR Joint  FAO/ WHO Meet ing on Pest icide Residues  
LOAEL Lowest  Observed Adverse Effect  Level 
MAF Minist ry of Agriculture and Food 
MAFF Minist ry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
MCSS Mult iple Chemical Sensit iv ity Syndrome 
MRL  Maximum Residue Lim it  
NC3Rs Nat ional Cent re for the Replacement , Refinement  
and Reduct ion of Animals in Research 
NEL No Effect  Level 
NOAEL No Observed Adverse Effect  Level 
OECD Organisat ion for Econom ic Co-operat ion and 
Development  
PAN Pest icide Act ion Network 
PEX Pest icide Exposure Network 
PI AP  Pest icide I ncident  Appraisal Panel  
PPPD Plant  Protect ion Products Direct ive 
PPPR Plant  Protect ion Product  Regulat ion 
PRC Pest icide Residues Commit tee  
PSD The Pest icide Safety Directorate 
PSPS Pest icide Safety Precaut ion Scheme 
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QSAR Quant itat ive St ructure-Act ivity Relat ionships 
RCEP Royal Commission on Environmental Pollut ion 
SCFA Standing Commit tee on Food Chain and Animal 
Health 
SEAC Spongiform  Encephalopathy Advisory Commit tee 
SCP Scient ific Commit tee on Plants 
STS Science and Technology Studies 
UN United Nat ions 
VMD Veterinary Medicines Directorate 
VUT Working Group on Variabilit y and Uncertainty in 
Toxicology 
WHO World Health Organisat ion  
WiGRAMP Working Group On Risk Assessment  Of Mixtures 
Of Pest icides 
WPPR Working Party on Pest icide Residues 
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I nterview  Schedule  
 
I nterview ee 
Code Let ter  
 
 
I nterview  Date 
 
Organisat ion/ Role 
A 
 
3 rd July 2007 
 
COT Working Group Member 
B 
 
8 th July 2008 
 
FSA Science Policy Advisor 
C 
 
5 th September 
2007 
 
Soil Associat ion Staff Member 
D 
 
3 rd October 2007 
 
Senior FSA Toxicologist  
E 
 
17 th October 2007 
 
Former RCEP Chairman 
F 
 
23 rd May 2007 
 
COT Working Group Member 
G 
 
19 th September 
2007 
 
Former PAN Staff Member 
 
H 
 
 
8 th August  2007 
 
ACP Member  
I  
 
30 th July 2007 
 
Former ACP Member 
J 
 
11 th June 2007 
 
COT Working Group Member 
K 
 
12 th July 2007 
 
Senior PSD Toxicologist  
L 
 
24 th August  2007 
 
ACP Member 
 
M 
 
17 th September 
 2007 
 
 
CSL Scient ist   
N 
 
10 th July 2007 
 
ACP Member 
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I nterview ee 
Code Let ter  
 
 
I nterview  Date 
 
Organisat ion/ Role 
 
O 
 
9 th October 2007 
 
ACP Member 
P 
 
26 th July 2007 
 
Academ ic Mixtures 
Toxicologist  
Q 
 
31st July 2007 
 
PAN Staff Member 
R  21st May 2008 
 
Regulatory Affairs Manager 
for Mult inat ional Chem ical 
Company  
 
S 
 
16 th May 2007 
 
COT Working Group Member 
T 
 
13 th June 2007 
 
COT Working Group Member 
U 
 
4 th June 2007 
 
COT Working Group Member 
V 
 
21st May 2008 
 
BCPC Representat ive 
W 
 
28 th August  2007 
 
Academ ic Computat ional 
Toxicologist  
X 
 
7 th August  2007 
 
ACP Member 
Y 
 
31st July 2007 
 
PAN Staff Member 
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Sam ple I nterview  Quest ions 
I nit ia l Discussion: 
Gather informat ion about  their professional background and professional 
commitments relat ing to the assessment  and management  of pest icides. 
 
x Compared to other areas of chem ical food r isk assessment , do you 
think the issue of pest icide residues in food is important? 
x What  do they consider to be their main concerns regarding pest icide 
residues in food? 
 
Main Quest ions:  
VUT Report  
I  want  to talk a lit t le about  the report  on Variabilit y and Uncertainty of 
Chem icals in food and consumer products. The recent  VUT report  stated 
there was a need for guidelines in the standardised report ing of 
toxicological studies and systemat ic reviews:  
x Do you think that  current  guidelines are acceptable? 
x What  benefits/ drawbacks do you see from standardising guidelines? 
x What  impact  do you think this will have on the use of animals in 
toxicity test ing? 
x How is evidence such as scient ific studies selected for inclusion when 
draft ing reports or giving advice? 
x What  select ion cr iter ia do you use and how do you reject  or otherwise 
weigh evidence? 
x How do ensure that  this process is consistent? 
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x Can you think of occasions when there has been disagreement  over 
the inclusion or reject ion of evidence – what  typically occurs in this 
situat ion? 
x I n general, how much data do you need to make a decision? 
x What  happens when there is insufficient  data to reach a 
conclusion/ decision? 
x What  do you think will be the benefits/ drawbacks of a cent ral 
European regist rat ion system and the int roduct ion of standard 
evidence documents? 
 
Methods 
Many art icles and reports that  I  have read discuss the possibilit y of using 
new methods in the r isk assessment  of chem icals, often highlight ing their 
advantages over older methods.  
x Do you consider new methods to be as reliable as older methods? 
x I n your opinion, how do you think that  difficult ies relat ing to new 
methods can be overcome? 
x Do you think that  methods such as probabilist ic dose- response 
modelling, QSARs, PBPK modelling, meta-analyt ical techniques can be 
bet ter used to address gaps in the data or aid in the interpretat ion of 
data?  
x Why have these techniques not  been used to a greater extent  in 
previous research?  
x How can we bet ter use exist ing/ older data? 
x How should we deal with studies that  give conflict ing/ cont radictory 
results? 
x What  value do you place on the use of human data? 
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x How can we bet ter use epidem iological data? 
x Do you think advisory bodies/ regulators should be more open towards 
accept ing new methodology? 
 
Uncertainty 
The ACP acknowledges that  there is inherent  uncertainty in the r isk 
assessment  of pest icides which must  be accounted for when deciding how 
to manage r isks;  a point  that  is also made in the recent  VUT report  which 
states that  uncertainty and variabilit y should be ident ified and 
characterised.  
x What  do you see as the main sources of uncertainty in the r isk 
assessment  process? 
x What  methods do you think could or should be used to ident ify and 
characterise such uncertainty? 
x What  do think would be added to the process of r isk assessment  by 
ident ify ing uncertainty? 
x Do you think it  is important  to resolve uncertainty? 
x How could this be achieved? 
 
Uncertainty Factors 
Much literature, including the recent  VUT report , raises concerns 
regarding the adequacy of uncertainty factors in protect ing suscept ible 
subgroups and for ext rapolat ing from adults to children:  
x I n a recent  ATLA art icle, FRAME state that  they believe uncertainty 
factors to be arbit rary:  Do you agree with this opinion that  they 
should be chem ical specific? 
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x Some literature has suggested that  an addit ional safety factor be used 
in relat ion to infants and children. Do you think current  arrangements 
are adequate to ensure an acceptable level of safety for the whole 
populat ion? 
x I f you could, would you alter the current  use of uncertainty factors? I f 
yes, how and why? 
 
Expert ise and W ider I nclusion 
x What  role do you see experts/ scient ists as having in the r isk 
assessment  or r isk management  process? 
x Where expert  judgement  is used how can we ensure that  it  is reliable, 
valid and t ransparent? 
x Are these relevant  qualit ies? 
x I n what  way does the use of expert  judgement  affect  the RA and RM 
process? 
x Who counts as an expert  in this sense? 
 
The FSA was set  up with the goal of wider inclusion and the aim  of 
making decision-making more t ransparent :  
x Why do you think they placed emphasis on inclusion and 
t ransparency? 
x Do you think this goal has been achieved? 
x What , if any, effect  on advisory discussions does the inclusion of the 
public or campaign groups have on the discussions and final 
decisions/ reports?  
x What  benefits/ drawbacks occur as a result  of wider inclusion? 
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x Are there any groups or representat ives that  are not  current ly included 
in the discussion surrounding the r isk assessment  and management  of 
pest icides that  you think should be there? 
x What  else in your opinion needs/ could be done to meet  the FSA’s 
goals? 
 
Residue Lim its 
As you are aware, it  was not  unt il 1985 the Food and Environmental 
Protect ion Act  that  many aspects relat ing to pest icide use and exposure, 
including m aximum residue lim its in food, became legally enforceable 
within England:  
x I n your opinion, do you think it  is necessary to have legally 
enforceable lim its?  
x What  do you think are/ were the benefits of changing to lim its that  are 
legally enforced? 
x How well do you think the older system of voluntary not ificat ion of 
pest icides worked in respect  to consumer safety? 
x What  do you consider to be the benefits and drawbacks of a statutory 
system? 
x What  do you see as the benefits and drawbacks of being harmonised 
with Europe in terms of the r isk assessment  process and in terms of 
set t ing lim its such as the MRL? 
x Some have argued that  the harmonisat ion with Europe, including the 
set t ing up of Nat ional and European advisory bodies has increased the 
bureaucracy in the assessment  and regulat ion of pest icides:  
x What  impact  do you think European integrat ion has had on the 
process? 
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Research from the 90s onwards has suggested that  there is variabilit y in 
the amount  of pest icide residues found in products with the result  that  
there are occasional, random instances of high residue levels in indiv idual 
crop units. However, the UK’s assessment  of the issue was that  even the 
highest  residues were unlikely to lead to adverse health effects:  
x Do you agree with this statement? Why? 
x How do you suggest  that  this variabilit y is dealt  with? 
x Do we need to alter monitor ing and sampling techniques? 
x Where do you think the responsibilit y lies for this? 
x Do you think the public need to be bet ter informed about  pest icides 
and methods to lower their exposure? 
 
Mixtures 
There is a recognised problem regarding this issue in relat ion to the 
effects of exposure to m ixtures of pest icides, especially those with a 
common mechanism of act ion or those that  may cause synergist ic effects. 
Some research also suggests that  interact ions at  low- levels may cause 
toxicological effects. Despite a growing concern, the WiGRAMP reported 
that  the r isks posed by exposure to m ixtures is likely to be small:  
x Do you agree with this statement  and why? ( I f in WiGRAMP)  Were 
there many differences of opinion within the working group regarding 
this statement? 
x What  do you see as the main concerns in relat ion to the exposure to 
chem ical m ixtures? 
x Do you think that  certain sub-groups are more at  r isk than others? 
Which ones? 
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x Do you think current  r isk assessment  methods adequately deal with 
this issue? 
x I f not  why not , how can they be adapted? I s this feasible? 
 
The literature in this area often highlights that  we are exposed to 
pest icides from a variety of sources, leading m any to suggest  that  that  we 
need to adopt  a cumulat ive approach as is advocated in the US:  
x Do you agree with this? Why? 
x What  do you think we ( the UK and Europe)  can learn from the US on 
this issue? 
x Why do you think that  the UK differs to the US on this issue? 
 
Vulnerable Sub- Groups 
Much literature on this issue is concerned with potent ially vulnerable sub-
groups of the populat ion such as infants, children and the elder ly. I  have 
not iced that  this point  is frequent ly raised as a concern by NGOs and 
campaign groups:  
x How would you respond to the cr it icism  m ade by such groups in 
relat ion this issue? 
The EU Scient ific Commit tee for Food stated that  it  was not  in a 
posit ion to know whether all core tests relevant  to r isk assessment  in 
infants and young children have been conducted for every pest icide in 
use with the EU:  
x What  do you consider to be the main obstacles to overcome this 
situat ion? 
x Do you think the current  system of assessment  and monitor ing is 
effect ive for all of the populat ion?  
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x Are there changes that  need to be made, or do we need to include a 
wider range of toxicological data such as teratogenic effects for 
pregnant  women as suggested by Harr is or look more closely at  
neurological effects? 
x I f so, at  what  level of assessment  and management  should changes be 
made? 
 
There is some scient ific literature, which is often used by campaign 
groups, that  suggests that  instances of poisoning or ill health as a result  
of exposure to pest icides may be more comm on than stat ist ics suggest  as 
at  is unlikely to be diagnosed as pest icide related by healthcare 
professionals:  
x I n your opinion, do you think this is likely to be the case? 
x What  weight  would you place on claims made that  suggest  ill health 
may result  as a result  of exposure to levels considered as safe e.g. at  
below the ADI ?  
 
Precaut ionary Principle 
The ACP make the suggest ion that  the precaut ionary principle should be 
rout inely applied in the regulat ion of new pest icides:  
x What  do you consider to be a precaut ionary approach? 
x How safe is safe enough? 
x What  difficult ies are faced in applying a precaut ionary approach to 
older substances that  have been in use for many years? 
x How do you think the int roduct ion of direct ives such as the PPPR and 
REACH will affect  pest icide regist rat ion and use?  
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There is an argument  to be made (WHO & RCEP)  that  the only real 
solut ion to concerns regarding pest icide exposure is to reduce its use and 
find alternat ive means of pest  cont rol:  
x Where do you stand on this issue? 
 
x Finally, if you could change one aspect  in the r isk assessment  and 
management  of pest icide residues what  would it  be and why? 
 
W iGRAMP Specific: 
There were many comments subm it ted regarding the draft  publicat ion of 
the WiGRAMP report :  
x Can you summarise what  the main comments or concerns were? 
x Do you think that  the final draft  adequately addressed the subm it ted 
comments? 
 
NGO Specific: 
x Can you tell me a lit t le about  your organisat ion’s work in the area of 
pest icides:  
x How do you conduct  your research? 
x I s it  done in-house by who, what  qualificat ions/ expert ise do they 
have? 
x I s it  peer reviewed? I s this important? 
x Do they consider themselves to be scient ists? 
x What  cr iter ia do they use to select / reject  material? 
x Do they think that  their select ion process differs to that  selected for 
regulatory/ official purposes? 
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x On what  grounds? 
x As an NGO do they feel more or less const rained than other groups in 
what  evidence they use? 
x Who do they think is their audience and how do they think their work 
is received by those in the ‘scient ific’ and ‘regulatory’ community? 
x How does their organisat ion part icipate in the regulat ion of pest icides? 
x What  do they see themselves cont r ibut ing to the discussion that  is not  
available elsewhere?  
 
 
 
 
